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Body, Mind, and Soul in Britain, 1815-1859
How does bodily matter become alive? Is the mind reducible to the brain? These
questions became crucial in the emergent discipline of life science at the turn of the
nineteenth century, when the term 'biology' was coined. The new scientific theories
that arose at this time directly impinged on contemporary religious beliefs
concerning the soul as the principle of immortality, and the mind as the divinely-
endowed basis for human morality. Through an interdisciplinary study of three
episodes, all of which originated in 1816, this thesis examines the interface between
science and religion with regard to souls, minds, and the living body, in the half-
century before Darwin's Origin ofSpecies.
The first episode focuses on a series of controversies (1816-1822) surrounding
William Lawrence, a professor at the Royal College of Surgeons. He postulated that
life could emerge from matter, and that matter could generate thought and sensation.
The express materialism in these views engendered strong scientific and religious
opposition. This study argues that the scientific opposition to Lawrence's views was
motivated largely by a desire to defend the institutional and professional standing of
the surgeons rather than by a commitment to oppose Lawrence's materialism. In
examining the religious opposition to Lawrence, this thesis concludes that ultimately
it was a concern for a secure institutional basis for morality rather than a wish to
defend the doctrine of the soul per se that was at stake.
The second episode revolves around George Combe, the influential author of The
Constitution ofMan (1828). He was decried as an atheist because his phrenological
science allegedly reduced the mind to the physical brain. This thesis offers a new
interpretation of Combe's science as the means through which he framed a natural
religion with a code ofmorality based on natural law. It was a religion that sought to
recast the role of a more materialistic conception of the mind as the vehicle for
morality, and to displace the reliance on an immortal soul and a future state for the
enforcement of morals.
in
The third episode centres on Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818). Through studying
the novel as the fable of its sub-title, The Modern Prometheus, I conclude that the
power ofMary Shelley's moral vision lies in its inescapable warning that an absolute
denial of the spiritual aspects of life is inimical to our humanity. Without being
explicitly religious, Frankenstein encapsulates a new kind of secular humanist
spirituality that denies outright materialism.
In summary, this thesis argues that the interface between religion and biology,
concerning the nature of the living body and the mind, despite initial appearances,
were not primarily over the issues of materialism. The three episodes studied
illustrate a spectrum of attitudes towards scientific materialism, and it is found that
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Chapter ] Introduction 1
The Achilles Heel in the System ofNature
During the seventeenth century there evolved the scheme of scientific ideas
which has dominated thought ever since. It involves a fundamental duality,
with material on the one hand, and the other hand mind. In between there lie
the concept of life, organism, functions, instantaneous reality, interaction,
order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel of the whole
system.
Alfred North Whitehead, 19251
I
'Life before Darwin', as the title suggests, this thesis is a study of the sciences of life
in the period preceding the publication of Darwin's The Origin ofSpecies, which was
a watershed event not only in intellectual history, but more specifically, in the history
of science and religion. With compelling evidence, The Origin established that the
mechanism of evolution was by a process which Darwin called natural selection. In
the history of the relations between science and religion, the publication of The
Origin in 1859 coincided with a new epoch. It marked, to a large extent, the end of
natural theology and the rise of the 'conflict thesis'. The 'conflict thesis' was the
result of a number of newly professionalizing scientists deliberately seeking to
interpret the history of the relationship between science and religion as a history of
two forces fundamentally at variance with each other, with religion as the
obscurantist protagonist.2 Despite Darwin's attempt to advance his theory purely as
a scientific thesis, its religious import did not escape his contemporaries, and it has
been described as destroying 'at one blow the central tradition of recent English
Protestant apologetics - Natural Theology'.3
This thesis examines the antecedent period to the publication of The Origin in
1859. While fully acknowledging the significance of The Origin in shaping the
history of science and religion, this thesis proceeds with the view that The Origin
1 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge, 1926), 80-1.
2 See Frank Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority, Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life (Cambridge,
1993).
3 J. W. Burrow, Introduction to Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Penguin Classics, 1985), 40.
The title for the first edition was On the Origin ofSpecies.
\
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was an epoch-marking, as distinct from an epoch-making, event in the history of
science and religion. In other words, while the epoch-making significance of The
Origin for the study of life science is indisputable, its impact for the history of
science and religion was more of a culmination of the scientific and religious
attitudes in its antecedent period. The publication of The Origin brought into sharper
relief the pressures and tensions in the relationship between science and religion that
had been growing in the first half of the nineteenth century. This thesis is a study of
some of these pressures and tensions in the interface of science and religion in the
pre-Darwinian period.
'Life before Darwin' pertains to life in three senses of the word. In its most
immediate sense, it refers to the inception period of the science of life before Darwin,
taking into account its political and cultural milieu. Secondly, in its more specific
sense, it refers to the new scientific and philosophic approaches to the two
fundamental questions regarding matter and mind; namely, 'How does matter
become alive?' and 'What is the nature of the mind?' Thirdly, 'Life before Darwin'
pertains to the religious life of this period, which had its basis in beliefs in
immortality and morality rooted in the duality of mind and matter. By studying three
episodes that took place in Britain in the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, this thesis
attempts to illuminate a 'life before Darwin' in these different senses.
Britain forms the geographic focus for this study. It is not because Britain
was the leading nation in the advance of life science in this period; that honour
belonged to France. Rather, Britain was chosen partly because it was the home of
Darwin. More importantly, 'the holy alliance between science and religion' - the
belief that religion and science were in a mutually supportive relationship and
revealed in different ways the same truth, was 'a peculiarly English phenomenon', a
legacy from the great names of Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.4 As
the eighteenth century drew to its close, the Reverend William Paley helped to revive
this tradition through his eloquent defence of natural theology with the 'design
argument' — the argument that the evidence of design in the natural world
presupposed the existence of God the designer. It is therefore in Britain where the
challenges of new scientific ideas on religion were most acutely felt.
4 Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century Background, Studies on the Idea ofNature in the Thought of
the Period (London, 1940), 136-7; the author contrasts England with France in this respect.
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Through Nature to Nature's God — the central tenet of natural theology was
that the evidence of design in the created world demonstrated the sentient will of its
benevolent Creator. Belief in the immutability of the species and their independent
creation, which was widely held by most naturalists contemporary with Darwin, were
the corollary beliefs supporting the design argument. Darwin argued that not only
were species mutable, but that mutations were either preserved or led to extinction by
a process of natural selection in the struggle for life. Although it was not his
intention to dismantle natural theology, the effect of his hypothesis was to displace
the design argument with the mechanism of natural selection, and the benevolent will
of a Creator, with the impersonal law of nature. The 1860s saw Thomas Huxley, the
champion of Darwin, promoting the 'conflict thesis' alongside the evolutionary
theory with such gusto that religion almost became synonymous with anti-
evolutionary thought. 'Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every science
as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules' was one of the typically vituperative
utterances of Huxley.5 Across the Atlantic, John Draper's History of the Conflict
between Religion and Science (1874) and Andrew White's The Warfare of Science
and Theology in Christendom (1896) were two seminal titles that gave further
support to the idea of an inevitable conflict between science and religion. Such an
idea became so entrenched in the public minds that when Whitehead gave his Lowell
Lectures in 1925, he remarked that 'the conflict between religion and science is what
naturally occurs to our minds when we think of this subject'.6
Within the British context, the two major historical works on the pre-
Darwinian period in the history of science and religion are Charles Gillispie's
Genesis and Geology, 1790-1850 (1951) and Pietro Corsi's Baden Powell and the
Anglican Debate, 1800-1860 (1988). Gillispie aims at giving 'an account of the
immediate background of the pattern of scientific disagreement which culminated in
disputes about Darwin's book and to attempt to analyse the causes of that
disagreement'. He argues that the 'holy alliance' between science and religion
actually persisted, though not always smoothly, until the mid-nineteenth century, and
5 Thomas Huxley, Collected Essays, 2 vols. (London, 1894), II: 52.
6 Whitehead, op. cit., 83.
7 Charles Gillispie, Genesis and Geology, A study in the Relations of Scientific Thought, Natural
Theology and Social Opinion in Great Britain, 1790-1850, first published 1951 (Harvard, 1996),
xxvii.
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that geology played a crucial role in fraying this alliance.8 For this reason, Gillispie
was led to the investigation of geology rather than biology. The question of species,
as an issue arising from the development of biology, is addressed in Corsi's work.
Against the background of contemporary debates within the Church of England over
theology, biblical criticism and science, Corsi assesses 'the contribution of Baden
Powell (1796-1860) to debates on the methodology of science, natural theology and
the question of species'.9 The importance of pre-Darwinian developments for the
relationship of science and religion is further highlighted by John Brooke's Science
and Religion, Some Historical Perspectives (1991),10 a work justly acclaimed for its
broad scope and impressive command of detail.
In addressing the relationship between science and religion in the pre-
Darwinian period, both Gillispie and Corsi have focused on the science of geology.
This focus on geology during the pre-Darwinian period is fully justified by the fact
that without the discoveries of geologists, the question of species probably would not
have arisen. However, the question of the origin of species that had dominated the
study of life science before The Origin was rather different. This thesis is an essay in
the historical study of the relationship between science and religion similar to
Gillispie and Corsi. But in the choice of subject-matter, this thesis focuses on the life
sciences rather than geology, in recognition that there was an interface between
science and religion before Darwin revolving the science of life which is worthy of
study in its own right.
II
In terms of methodology and research design, this study has deliberately given
prominence to the primary texts that have given rise to the controversies on the
origin of life and the nature of the mind, which mean William Lawrence's Lectures
of 1816 and 1818 and George Combe's The Constitution ofMan (1828) respectively.
In choosing to study Mary Shelley's Frankenstein as, in effect, a critical commentary
on the ongoing debates on the nature of life and the mind, this study again is trying to
8 Ibid., Note No. 13 to Chapter 1, 263.
9 Pietro Corsi, Science and Religion, Baden Powell and the Anglican Debate, 1800-1860 (Cambridge,
1988), 3.
John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion, Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge, 1991).
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give primacy to a significant text of the period. Insofar as this is a study in the
history of ideas, the decision to give prominence to these primary texts is in
recognition that the generation, the appreciation, and the deployment of ideas are
always located in time and space. To a certain extent, the concepts of the soul, the
mind, and the body are all timeless and universal, in that they have existed from time
immemorial, and transcend cultural boundaries. However, the substance of these
concepts evolves with time, and is the product of a confluence of factors that
embrace the range of disciplines from philosophy, psychology, sociology, religion, to
science. For instance, the Platonic soul may seem a 'timeless' concept but the ways
in which it has been interpreted have been subject to continuous change. Since we
share in common the 'concepts' of the body, the mind and the soul with those in the
period under study, it is especially important to guard against tinting the substance of
these concepts for those living two centuries ago with the hues of our own
perception. By research design, this thesis places great emphasis on close reading of
the primary literature, in an attempt to recover, and render more familiar, the
unfamiliar thoughts of the historical figures.
Secondly, as an historical study of science and religion, it is appropriate to
relate briefly the historiography in this area of scholarship. To a large extent, it was
the propagation of the 'conflict thesis' by Draper and White in the post-Darwinian
period, as explained above, that gave rise to this field of scholarship specialising in
the study of how science and religion interrelated through history. After a period of
oscillation from the conflict thesis to ambitious claims that religion stimulated
scientific advance, a new consensus is emerging. By detailed study of a range of
episodes where science and religion interacted, at different ages and in different
places, the need for a highly nuanced understanding of these two belief systems and
their interactions is now apparent.
Ian Barbour in Religion in an Age of Science (1990) laid down the four
categories for the taxonomy of science-religion relationships: conflict, independence,
dialogue and integration. Barbour is probably the most widely cited author in the
study of science and religion, and his taxonomy has been hugely influential.
However, as Cantor and Kenny point out, Barbour's argument is 'underpinned by the
view that in the science-religion domain there is an inexorable progress from
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Conflict, through Independence, to Dialogue and Integration'.11 Influential as his
taxonomy is, Barbour's underlying argument betrays a whiggish agenda for the
interpretation of the history of science and religion. John Hedley Brooke's
demonstration of the need for a wide spectrum of episodes to portray fairly how
science and religion have interrelated in history is masterfully done in his Science
and Religion, Some Historical Perspectives (1991). Brooke and Cantor, in their
1995 Glasgow Gifford Lectures entitled Reconstructing Nature, further de-bunk all
'master-narratives' which attempt to generalise the historical relationships between
science and religion, and recommend the use of biographical studies as one antidote
to 'master-narrative' approaches. While Brooke and Cantor's efforts represent an
important contribution in the scholarship of science and religion, they are not
directed towards a specific period of history. This thesis is an attempt to put into
practice some of the methodology proposed in Reconstructing Nature in studying the
interface of biology with religion in the pre-Darwinian period. In particular, this
thesis has tried to capture this interface through the life of individuals, and through
their writings. The biographical approach has also been 'recommended' in a
collection of essays on scientific biography, edited by Shortland and Yeo. The claim
is that scientific biographies help to safeguard against a positive account of the
progress of science, sometimes being written by philosophers or historians of
science, whereby the history of science is portrayed 'as steady accumulation of
knowledge', with 'particular truths added to a larger edifice of established truths'.12
While this thesis is not a full-length biography of any of the protagonists, the
discussion of the controversies in this thesis centres on these protagonists, drawing in
factors like social aspirations and religious allegiance, to tease out the nuances
concerning how science and religion interrelated in these individuals.
Finally, this thesis is interdisciplinary in its research method, in appreciation
that the interrelationship of science and religion is a product of scientific ideas and
religious doctrines crossing fire or reinforcing each other, and the fact that the
scientific, religious and cultural attitudes were all set in the wider context of a
nation's social-political life and its intellectual milieu. This thesis attempts to bridge
the internalist and externalist dichotomy that has dominated debates in
11
Geoffrey Cantor and Chris Kenny, 'Barbour's Fourfold Way: Problems with His Taxonomy of
Science-Religion Relationships', Zygon, 36 (2001): 765-781, 766.
12 Michael Shortland and Richard Yeo (ed.), Telling Lives in Science - Essays on Scientific Biography
(Cambridge, 1996), 4.
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historiography in the realm of history of science in the 1960s and 70s. On the whole,
historians who have written on the Lawrence and Combe debates tend to analyse the
differences between the scientific ideas involved as an internalist study, or account
for the controversies in terms of social activities or class struggles. For instance, L.S.
Jacyna adopts the internalist approach in discussing Lawrence's theory of life in his
article 'Immanence and Transcendence', and takes the externalist approach in
discussing the rival theory of life through a study of the 'Images of John Hunter'.13
For phrenology, de Giustino's Conquest of Mind (1975) takes the internalist
approach, while Cooter's The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science (1984) is
primarily an externalist study. The dichotomy between the internalist and externalist
approach is demonstrated in a series of articles on the historiographical discussion
between Cantor and Shapin on the science of phrenology. It is now recognised that
both approaches (internalist and externalist) are inadequate on its own because each
approach presents only half the story. For this reason, in research method, this thesis
combines both approaches to render a fuller picture of the scientific controversies
being studied.
Ill
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the discipline of biology was still at its
inception. It was not until the 1810s that the term biology was coined by Treviranus
of Bremen to denote the 'science of life', and it was in 1819 that the term was
introduced into the English language by William Lawrence, one of the protagonists
in this study.14 During this period the various branches of life science —
comparative anatomy, physiology, histology, pathology, and psychology (including
phrenology) — were making major headway. It was a time when those who studied
13 L.S. Jacyna, 'Immanence or Transcendence - Theories of Life and Organization in Britain, 1790-
1835', Isis, 74 (1983): 311-329; and 'Images of John Hunter in the Nineteenth Century', History of
Science, 21 (1983): 85-108.
14
'A foreign writer has proposed the more accurate term of biology, or science of life,' said Lawrence
in 1819, Lecture on Man ii (London, 1844) 42 (from The Oxford English Dictionary). Treviranus'
treatise on biology was still incomplete at the time of Lawrence's lectures. See also June Goodfield-
Toulmin 'Some Aspects of English Physiology: 1780-1840', Journal ofHistory ofBiology, 2 (1969):
283-320,313.
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the facts of nature also philosophised or theorised about their findings.15 The
questions that pre-occupied their theorising concerned no less the origin of life and
the nature of the mind.
As Whitehead has remarked, the scheme of scientific ideas that evolved
during the seventeenth century involved a fundamental duality, of matter and mind.
In between matter and mind, however, lay the concept of life — organism, functions,
and interaction: these formed the Achilles heel of the whole system. When the study
of nature turned from the physical universe to its life forms in the nineteenth century,
the Achilles heel of the system was revealed. The dualistic framework proved
inadequate for the theorising of life and mind. It was the development in biological
thought, which 'ultimately broke down the old Cartesian dualism of matter and mind
by introducing between them a third term, namely life'.16 The nineteenth century
also saw biology establishing its autonomy as a separate science, independent of
physics on the one hand and of metaphysics on the other.
Much of the advance in life science in the late eighteenth and the early
nineteenth centuries was made by explaining more and more of the phenomena of
life in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry. For instance, the mystery of
bodily heat was unravelled through a new understanding of the chemistry of
combustion, following the discovery of the oxygen gas by Lavoisier. The corollary
of the approach that explained life phenomena in terms of physical or chemical laws
was to promote a more mechanistic and materialistic view of life and the mind. This
view of life directly impinged on the two central religious beliefs. First by removing
the soul as the key to the origin of life, the hope of immortality was brought into
question. Secondly, by identifying the mind with the brain, man was no longer a
class of his own, but could be placed in the chain of being with animals. Another
ramification of equating the mind with the brain was to displace the basis of
morality.
This thesis engages with the term 'morality' in two senses, which can be
broadly described as internal and external. The internal sense of morality pertains to
that innate notion experienced by individual humans that certain modes of behaviour
15 R.G. Collingwood comments on a bad fashion that grew up in the nineteenth century of separating
natural scientists and philosophers into two professional bodies, doing harm to both sides. See Idea of
Nature (Oxford, 1945), 3.
16 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea ofNature (1945, Oxford, 1981), 133.
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are right and others are wrong. This innate sense is often designated as the
individual's 'conscience'. Its existence presupposes the presence of consciousness,
self-awareness, or free will, all of which are considered attributes peculiar to humans
alone. From the anthropological point of view, conscience is a universal
phenomenon, and as such it transcends temporal and spatial confines. While certain
latitude in following the guidance of conscience resides with the individual, in
following conscience, the individual often takes account of morality in its external
sense. In this second, external sense, morality assumes a collective dimension; it
denotes the set of behaviour endorsed by society at large as essential to uphold the
social and political structures deemed to maximise the general good. The remit of
such a code is to prescribe 'right behaviour', and as such the definition of 'right' is
often specific to a particular time and space. The effectiveness of morality in its
external sense is necessarily underpinned by an authority rooted in religion or
ideology. Morality in its external sense is usually harnessed by the ruling classes to
uphold the status quo. Revolutions as movements that overturn the status quo are
often inspired by seminal thinkers whose individual conscience dictates a different
set of moral imperatives at odds with the existing code of morality upholding the
status quo. Thomas Paine was one of the crucial thinkers whose conscience
prescribed a different set of moral imperatives which directly inspired the American
and French Revolutions. Paine's Common Sense became an inspirational pamphlet
for the American Revolution, and his Rights ofMan, for the French Revolution. In
overturning the status quo as represented by colonialism or absolute monarchy, a
new basis of moral authority also came into force. Nature supplanted established
religions and became the moral authority behind the revolutionary slogan of
Freedom, Equality and Fraternity.
With these two senses of morality in mind, this thesis examines how the new
scientific theories that arose during the period of study impinged on two core
contemporary beliefs of the Christian faith. First, that the existence of an immaterial
soul formed the basis of both life and immortality, and secondly, that the 'mind' was
the divinely-endowed basis for human morality. By shifting the terms of the
question regarding the origin of life from the metaphysical to the physiological, early
nineteenth-century thinkers channelled the search for the principle of life from the
immaterial to the material. The existence of an immaterial soul central to the belief
of immortality was therefore called into doubt by what this thesis denotes as
physiological materialism. Furthermore, the psychological explanation of the 'mind'
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as a set of processes conducted within the physical brain challenged the assumption
that the mind was a metaphysical entity with an existence independent of any
material organ. In what this thesis defines as psychological materialism, the mind
became identified with the physical brain, or in a less extreme form of psychological
materialism, as something that resided in the material organ of the brain. To identify
the mind more and more closely with the brain was progressively to erode the
distinction between man and the beast. In traditional Christian discourse, it was the
mind, as distinct from the brain, that was believed to be the divine origin of man's
moral sense, setting him apart from the beast. However, the brain is an organ that
man has in common with higher animals, and animals were not credited with
possessing any moral sense. Physiological and psychological materialism is loosely
termed as scientific materialism in this study. One central argument of this thesis is
that, in respect of the challenges posed by scientific materialism in nineteenth-
century Britain, what was ultimately at stake was not so much the integrity of the
immaterial soul or the metaphysical mind, as the need for a secure basis of morality,
in both the internal and external senses.
Through the detailed study of three historical episodes in the post-Napoleonic
era, this thesis examines the interface between science and religion with regard to the
soul, the mind, and the living body. Following this introductory chapter, the second
chapter is an exercise in intellectual history, exploring the philosophical concept of
materiality, the religious concern for immortality, and the social concern for a secure
basis of morality. This chapter of intellectual history is not meant to exhaust the
views of all seminal thinkers on the subjects of body, mind and soul, but rather to
provide the necessary background on the beliefs held concerning these subjects at the
turn of the nineteenth century in Britain. Along with the views of influential thinkers
on these subjects, the second chapter also explores educated British opinion at the
turn of the nineteenth century through a review of contemporary periodicals, sermons
and pamphlets.
As has been noted, the core chapters consider the interface of science and
religion through three historical episodes. The first episode revolves around William
Lawrence, who, as related earlier, is regarded as having introduced the term
'biology' into English usage. When his materialistic theory of the origin of life and
the nature of the mind entangled him in a series of controversies involving his
scientific colleagues and prominent clerics, Lawrence's career as a budding scientist
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was effectively arrested. Chapter three, on 'Two Theories of Life', examines the
scientific issues at the centre of these controversies, and discusses the religious and
social ramifications of these issues. The decision to accept or reject a scientific
theory was seldom made on scientific grounds alone. The intellectual, social and
religious make-up of the participants, the institutional stance and political milieu all
played their part in shaping the views of the individuals. These factors, while not
directly related to the scientific theories, challenge a purely positivist view of
science; they provide the larger context in which to understand the favourable or
hostile reception of scientific ideas. The religious implications of Lawrence's ideas
are examined in chapter four, entitled 'Materialism and Atheism go hand in hand'.
This chapter traces the course of how the established religion (as represented by the
Church of England) opposed the new scientific materialism by equating it with
metaphysical materialism, and condemning both as promoting atheism and
immorality. In condemning scientific materialism, the ultimate concern for
Lawrence's opponents was not so much the metaphysical integrity of the soul, as the
need to establish a secure basis of morality underpinned by religious authority. For
Lawrence's opponents, morality meant a code of right behaviour, as defined by the
ruling elite, which helped to uphold the social and political structures of Britain.
This moral code was reinforced by the religious authority of the national church and
its theology.
The protagonist of the second historical episode is the Scottish thinker,
George Combe, widely acknowledged as the leading British proponent of
phrenology. The eventual fate of phrenology as a failed science should not blind us
to its position as the most popular form of science in the pre-Darwinian era. The rise
and decline of phrenology, and its social and cultural significance, are thoroughly
explored in Roger Cooter's The Cultural Meaning of Popular Science (1984). The
place of phrenology in Victorian intellectual history, moreover, is assessed in David
de Giustino's Conquest ofMind (1974). This thesis does not attempt to go over the
ground covered in these two fine works; rather, it is primarily concerned with
phrenology as a science of the mind, as an important component in understanding the
nature of the mind in the pre-Darwinian period. Chapter five, on 'Two Sciences of
the Mind', follows the protracted debate between Combe and Sir William Hamilton,
a leading proponent of the Scottish common sense philosophy. It is a debate that
struck at the heart of the nature of the mind. The common sense philosophy
contended that the mind was a metaphysical entity that could only be comprehended
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as a series of mental phenomena within the discipline of mental philosophy.
Phrenology, on the other hand, claimed that the mind was a material object that could
be subject to empirical methods of scientific study.
As the last prominent representative of the common sense philosophy,
Hamilton perceived the dangers posed to the whole basis of morality if metaphysics
were to be supplanted by the kind of psychological necessitarianism, which underlay
the system of phrenology. As a disciple of Thomas Reid, the founder of the Scottish
common sense school, Hamilton upheld that free will was the prerequisite for
morality. For Hamilton, without free will, man could not be a true moral agent. He
opposed the scientific materialism of phrenology because materialism would
ultimately lead to psychological determinism. In this regard, Hamilton also sought to
defend the inner sense of morality by maintaining that conscience presupposes free
will. Combe, to be sure, was equally concerned with morality. However, Combe
differed from Hamilton in that he was not so much concerned with the integrity of
the free will as forming the basis of morality in the internal sense, as he was with
defining a new authority for external morality. For Combe, the existing basis of
morality based on the religious authority of the established church (of Scotland) as he
had experienced from his Calvinistic upbringing was untenable, and he was seeking
an alternative basis for external morality. It is no exaggeration to state that Combe
embraced phrenology because he saw in the new science an alternative authority
based on natural laws that would prove to be infallible. Chapter six analyses how
Combe's The Constitution ofMan was essentially a 'religious' treatise proclaiming a
new external morality, and it discusses how Combe's conversion to phrenology
proved to be the beginning of a new religion for him. It was a form of natural
religion in which nature supplanted the church as the fundamental authority for
external morality. This is not to say that Combe lost his faith in God. In Combe's
mind, natural laws were instituted by God, and nature was an infallible source of
authority from God. His most celebrated work The Constitution of Man was
effectively a treatise of external morality, a detailed code of 'right' conduct as
deduced by him with the science of phrenology.
The third historical episode centres on the genesis of Mary Shelley's
Frankenstein and on the moral vision the novel contains. Chapter seven examines
the extent to which contemporary speculations on the cause of life and the nature of
the mind influenced the conception of the novel. The novel, it is argued, was a
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product of the contemporary scientific speculations of these issues. As is reflected in
the novel's subtitle, Modern Prometheus, Mary Shelley explores the role of the
scientist as the modern Prometheus, stealing the vital spark from heavens to animate
a lifeless frame. In discovering the secret concerning the cause of life, Frankenstein,
who was a created being, became himself a creator of life. Unlike her
contemporaries like Percy Shelley and Lord Byron, who deployed the Promethean
motif to glorify the potentiality of man, Mary Shelley saw in the ambition of
Frankenstein to be the modem Prometheus, a chilling vision of a usurper who had
trespassed some sacred limits of 'right' behaviour. In this respect, Mary Shelley's
moral vision springs from her inner moral sense. Insofar her moral vision is not
reducible to a code of conduct, it transcends the external sense of morality. In
exploring the spiritual essence of humankind, Mary Shelley has taken the nadir of
personhood as her starting point. Pieced together from deceased bodily parts, the
Monster was the utmost embodiment of physiological and psychological
materialism. Yet out of the Monster, forcefully and unmistakably, there emerged a
spiritual being who defied to be treated as a mere object. In asserting the spiritual
essence of the Monster, Mary Shelley's concern went beyond morality, in both the
internal and external sense. Without any recourse to a spiritual Creator held to be
responsible for making man spiritual, Mary Shelley asserted the spirituality of
humankind as a sacred aspect of our personhood. To trample that spiritual aspect of
our personhood is portrayed as the heroic flaw of Frankenstein - both against himself
and against the Monster. The unnatural relationship between Frankenstein and his
created Monster created a web of entanglements that were to destroy all natural
relationships in Frankenstein's life. In exploring this web of relationships, Mary
Shelley conveyed a moral vision, which went far beyond the concern of morals. In
asserting the spiritual essence of man without the direct recourse to a spiritual
creator, Mary Shelley has laid down the basis for a secular, humanist religion which
takes as its fundamental premise the belief that man is a moral being because he is a
spiritual being.
IV
This study ends with the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859.
Thus, the thesis begins with an important landmark in the political history for Britain
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- the end of the French wars with the victory ofWaterloo in June 1815 - and closes
with an important watershed in British intellectual history. The years immediately
after Waterloo proved to be highly significant for the protagonists in the three
historical episodes. Lawrence gave his controversial lectures in 1816 and 1818,
which sparked off the debates on the nature of life. It was in 1816 that Combe first
attended a phrenological demonstration by Spurzheim, which led him along the path
of becoming the champion of phrenology. In the summer of 1816, Mary Shelley
embarked on the writing of a ghost story, which resulted in Frankenstein, published
in 1818. The tempestuous years between the international violence of Waterloo
(1815) to the domestic violence of 'Peterloo' (1819) formed the social and political
background for the three episodes being studied in this thesis.
Britain had been continuously at war with France from 1793 to 1815, apart
from the brief peace of Amiens in 1803. The dominant feeling after the victory of
Waterloo was one of exhaustion rather than triumphalism: 'all the triumphant
sensations of national glory [seemed] almost obliterated by general depression' that
set in after the wars, and many people in Britain were 'simply too worn down and too
weary to feel anything more than a dull relief'.17 An economy that had been
stimulated by war expenditures in excess of £75 million per annum for nearly a
quarter of a century was suddenly deprived of this government spending in the
summer of 1815. This plunged the whole economy into crisis.18 From the autumn
quarter of 1815 through the whole of 1816, the number of bankruptcies soared,
standing at twice the level of the usual average.19 The armament industries bottomed
out, the price of iron and copper plummeted. Many factories and foundries closed
down, which in turn drastically affected iron and copper mines and collieries. The
labourers in other industries, from hardware and machinery, to woollen, cotton and
silk, also suffered reduced hours and wages. Unemployment soared, worsened by
17 Linda Colley, Britons, Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992), 321.
18
Not to mention the American wars from 1778 to 1783, the wars with France alone for over twenty
years cost Britain £1,657,854,518, approximately six times its pre-war national income. See The
Times (12th & 18th September, 1816).
19 The Palmers Index to The Times Newspaper (London, 1903), vols. 1815 - 1819, contain the listing
of cases of bankruptcy published in The Times as an indicator of the state of economy. A summary of
my reading of the index covering 1815-1819 is as follows: For the first 9 months of 1815 averaged
300-350 per quarter; it rose to near 500 cases in the last quarter of 1815. The trend continued
throughout 1816 and into mid-1817, with cases of bankruptcy staying in excess of 500 for every
quarter. The trend reversed back to normal in the later half of 1817 and through 1818, with cases of
bankruptcy dropping to around 250-300 per quarter. Throughout 1819, bankruptcies rose again, (with
the exception of the third quarter), to over 400 cases per quarter.
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the influx of cheap labour from the demobilised army and navy. In every port British
goods piled up or sold below cost.20 For agriculture, the uncertainty of foreign grains
during wartime had meant that heavy capital investment had been made into
marginal land at home to bring it into cultivation to meet demands of a growing
population; without foreign imports, the prices for home-produced grains were
artificially high, and landowners were able to demand high rents. To sustain these
high rents, Parliament, dominated by the landed interest, passed the Corn Law of
1815, excluding foreign corn until the price of native wheat reached the famine-level
of 80s a quarter. The Corn Law fed speculation and grain prices increased, causing
the price of the quarten loaf to soar from lOd to 14d between January and May
1816.21 The situation was worsened by the disastrous harvest that followed the
incessant rain during the summer of 1816. With wages dropping and food prices
rising, riots broke out in the countryside and spread to industrial districts.
These were traditional bread riots precipitated by 'meal mobs' motivated by
sheer economic desperation rather than by any specific political reform agenda. For
instance, riots in Bideford were 'in consequence of a cargo of potatoes being about to
be shipped at the quay'; a mob gathered, armed with bludgeons and other weapons,
22
to prevent the exportation taking place. In Norwich, rioters broke into mills and
threw large quantities of flour into the river, demanding a wage rate of 2s per day and
the fixing of the price of bread and flour. In Norfolk and Suffolk, rioters also called
for a reduction in the price of bread and meat. In Cambridge, a mob of 1500, armed
with sticks and iron pikes, marched under a banner inscribed 'Bread or Blood'.
Similar bread riots broke out in Chippenham, Halsted, Littleport, Bury, Trowbridge,
and Lambeth Marsh, with the mobs damaging property, breaking machinery, and
setting fire to barns or corn-sacks.23
In the manufacturing districts, disturbances started with the pitmen in
Tyneside and Staffordshire. In Newcastle-upon-Tyne, several hundred colliers went
on strike on the ground that their wages were inadequate given the soaring price of
bread and corn. Forty colliers in Bilston Moor, with three wagon-loads of coals as a
20 For instance, the Morning Chronicle, 3rd July 1816, reported an unprecedented occurrence that there
was not a single entry for export and import at the London Custom House for a whole week.
21 The Times, 17th May 1816.
22 The Times, 23rd May 1816.
23 See reporting in The Times, 25th April, 16th, 17th and 18th, 23rd & 30th May and 9th November 1816;
Scots Magazine 78 (1816): 470, and A.J. Peacock, Bread or Blood - The Agrarian Riots in East
Anglia (London, 1965).
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present, proceeded at a rate of twelve miles per day to London in order to petition the
Prince Regent in person. Subsequent disturbances were less peaceful. Desperate
Irish slum-dwellers from the deprived Calton district of Glasgow attacked the soup
kitchen that had been set up by the civic authorities, and the proceeded to wreck
nearby steam-loom machinery; the military force called in by the Sheriff was
attacked with showers of stones and brick-bats from the local rooftops.24 In the
northern Lancashire town of Preston, weavers and Welsh iron moulders attacked
shops and factories; and the employees of Tredegar ironworks in Wales marched to
stop the blast furnaces.25 The destruction to machines caused during these riots was
reminiscent of the organized machine-breaking in the years 1810-11, known as
Luddism; and 'there was a strong suspicion in 1816 that the Luddite gangs were
96
directed by some form of union committee'.
These disturbances of the summer of 1816, uncoordinated and scattered
around the country, with mobs of at most a few hundred strong, were different in
nature and magnitude from the mass gathering planned for 2nd December in Spa
Fields, London. Some extremists came with arms and apparently plotted to seize the
city of London, take the Tower and free the prisoners. Five thousand handbills,
bearing the slogan 'Britons to Arms', were distributed in and around London; they
exhorted people to wait the signal from London to fly to arms:
Haste, break open Gunsmiths and other likely places to find Arms!
Run all constables who touch a man of us; no rise of Bread; no
Regent; no Castlereagh, off with their heads; no Placemen, Tythes, or
Enclosures; no Taxes; no Bishops, only useless lumber! Stand true, or
be Slaves for ever.27
In the event, the number of those expected to join the insurgents was relatively small,
and no attempt was made to force the Tower. Henry Hunt, the oratorical champion
of the radical movement, was arrested bearing with him the insignia of the French
Revolution - a pike, a cap of liberty and a tricolour flag. Despite its failure, the
threatened assault on the Tower reminded the authorities of the storming of the
Bastille in 1789 in Paris. Parliament appointed a Select Committee to enquire into
the unrest. Its report in February 1817 concentrated on the activities of the
24 Scots Magazine, 78 (1816): 549.
25 See The Times, 6th August 1816, and Scots Magazine, 78 (1816): 549 & 633.
26 Norman Gash, Aristocracy and People, (The New History of England, 8, London, 1979), 85.
27
Reports ofSelect Committees, 34 (1817), part iv, 1.
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Spenceans.28 The Committee was one of a number of measures taken by Pitt's
9Q
Government against the threat of Jacobinism." The Government also used agents to
provoke seditious acts within radical groups, and the reports of such agents probably
created an exaggerated sense of a national conspiracy against the established social
on
and political order." The distress of 1816, though economic in nature, led to further
repressive political measures in March 1817 to control the activities of secret clubs
and societies. These were largely confined to the lower classes and to the industrial
districts like Manchester, Glasgow and Paisley.31
The disturbances in 1816 conjured up images of the French Revolution. As
one historian has remarked, 'the French Revolution produced among most propertied
Englishmen a peculiar fear of mob violence'. The intensity of this fear was
unprecedented; 'every minor riot reminded orderly citizens of the excesses of the
French'.32 The non-existence of a civilian police aggravated the political and social
unrest, and was a direct cause of the 'Peterloo' tragedy.33 On 16 August, 1819, some
50,000-60,000 men, women and children converged upon St. Peter's Field in
Manchester for a meeting called 'to consider the propriety of adopting the most legal
28 The Spenceans, according to the report, assumed the title 'in consequence of having revived the
pirnciples, with some variation, of a visionary writer of the name of Spence'. Reports of Select
Committees, 34 (1817), part iv, 1. The Spenceans were followers of the semi-socialist, Thomas
Spence, who advocated land nationalization amongst other things, and whose influence survived his
death in 1814.
29 Ever since the Revolutionary wars with France started in 1793, the British Government under Pitt's
first administration (1783 - 1801) had intensified their control over organisations like the workers'
combinations, trade associations, dissenters' meetings and reform societies. For instance, two
Parliamentary Acts in 1795 made it possible to bring prosecutions of treason on the basis of one's
speech or writings, and to forbid all large public meetings without special permit. In 1796, the
increase in stamp duties on newspapers and the introduction of registration of printing presses
tightened the government's control over the press.
30 The Select Committee of Secrecy was formed to report on seditious practices within the country.
The activities of the Society for Constitutional Information, the Corresponding Society (both based in
London), and those of British Convention and Friends of People in Edinburgh were exclusively
reported on. For instance, the lengthy Second Report from the Committee of Secrecy to the House of
Commons, 6th June, 1794, concerned the procurement of arms (either muskets or pikes) as a frequent
subject for the Corresponding Society. See Parliamentary History, 31 (1794 -1795), 688 -886.
31 The new measures legislated in March 1817 included: licensing of rooms used for public meetings,
a prohibition on federations of societies and meetings over fifty persons without magistrates'
permission, dissolution of the Spencean societies, suspension of habeas corpus for persons arrested on
charges of treason, and the death penalty for inciting members of the armed forces to mutiny. See
Norman Gash, Aristocracy and People, Britain 1815-1865 (London, 1979), 91.
32 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, The Age ofReform, 1815-1870 (Oxford, 1938), 20.
33 In 1829, Peel set up the new police in London, blue-coated, with top hats and trucheons. It saved
the capital during the Reform Bill agitation in 1831 from the radical mobs which troubled Bristol and
other towns. The corps were later extended to other areas of Britain.
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and effectual means of obtaining a reform'.34 Henry Hunt was to be the principal
speaker. He desired the meeting to be the largest assemblage ever seen in the country
and asked for notices to be published in the Manchester Observer and London
papers. Unlike the Spa Fields meeting in December 1816, in which arms were
involved, the leaders of St. Peter's Field meeting stressed that the meeting would
only be morally effective if it were legal and peaceful. However, a select committee
of magistrates from Lancashire and Cheshire, set up in July 1819, was in charge of
the military and civil power at 'Peterloo', and they 'felt a decided conviction that the
whole bore the appearance of insurrection'.35 The Manchester yeomanry and the
Hussars, who had concealed themselves from the procession, moved in soon after
Hunt began his speech. The leaders were arrested under warrants, and the crowd of
60,000 was dispersed in some ten minutes. The speed of the dispersal brought its
casualties: eleven deaths, and 140 wounded, the majority being women and children.
Demands for parliamentary enquiry were rejected. Instead, more repressive
measures were legislated. In November 1820, Parliament passed the notorious Six
Acts, intended to strengthen the laws concerning public meetings and to curb the
radical press.36 The last Act, which imposed a four-penny stamp on all periodical
publications, was intended to kill radical newspapers like Cobbett's Political
Register and Wooler's Black Dwarf.
The shedding of blood at St. Peter's Field aroused indignation and outrage
within all social ranks and orders in Britain. The Manchester Observer coined the
soubriquet 'Peterloo', in bitter mockery of the feat of the British arms at Waterloo.
Among the working-class reformers, factions were forming after Peterloo, with
Hunt's followers inclining to peaceful courses, and supporters of Arthur Thistlewood
advocating a resort to arms. In February 1820, a gang of twenty led by Thistlewood
plotted to murder the whole cabinet. The conspirators were exposed by a
government spy and arrested during a meeting at Cato Street, and they were
executed.
The news of the 'Peterloo' massacre reached the Shelleys, who were residing
34 Orator Hunt, who was to preside the meeting, claimed 150,000, and the Annual Register gave
80,000; the chairman of the committee of magistrates, gave the total of 50,000-60,000, State Trial,
1819:255. See Donald Read, Peterloo - The Massacre and the Background (London, 1958) footnote
3, 131, and for a detailed account of the event.
35
Read, op. cit., 127.
36 The Six Acts concerned: 1. Training Prevention; 2. Seizure of Arms; 3. Misdemeanours; 4.
Seditious Meetings Prevention; 5. Blasphemous and Seditious Libels; 6. Stamp Duites.
Chapter 1 Introduction 19
in Italy. Mary Shelley described how the news 'roused in [Percy] violent emotions
of indignation and compassion', and the sonnet 'England in 1819' was a direct
expression of such emotions:
Rulers who neither see, nor feel, nor know,
But leech-like to their fainting country cling,
Till they drop, blind in blood, without a blow, —
A people starved and stabbed in the untilled field,—
An army, which liberticide and prey
Religion Christless, Godless - a book sealed.37
The government between 1816 and 1820, which put through repressive measures to
control the 'masses' was by no means representative of the whole period under
study. After 1822 the anti-Jacobin tide at last began to ebb. With Peel at the Home
Office, repression was eased, and a climate of liberal Tory reform gradually
emerged. In 1824-5, the House of Commons was induced by the skilled lobbying of
the Radicals, Joseph Hume and Francis Place, to repeal Pitt's Combination Act of
1800, and thus to make trades unions legal under certain conditions. More significant
legislation was to follow. The Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts in 1828,
Catholic Emancipation in 1829, and the Reform Act of 1832, were to effect a
constitutional change of near revolutionary impact.
In the period in which the Lawrence controversy flared up, the mood of the
government was still dominated by anti-Jacobinism of the wartime period. Although
the French wars had finished, there was no guarantee in the period of post-war
depression that Britain would not experience a revolution. George III, 'an old, mad,
blind, despised, and dying king', as Shelley described him, was on the throne, and
the Prince Regent, capricious and dissipated, was estranged from his German wife
Caroline, exiled on the continent and a constant source of scandals. Princess
Charlotte, the only legitimate grandchild of George III and a brighter hope for the
monarchy, died in childbirth in 1817. The death of George III in 1820 brought on
the Queen's Trial, when the sexual behaviour of Caroline was scrutinised and her
role as the King's Consort was contested. The precarious state of the monarchy
weakened the confidence of the governing elite. Between 1790 and 1820, nineteen
Members of Parliament committed suicide, and more than twenty lapsed into
insanity. The strain on a governing elite haunted by fear that the masses would rise
37
Roger Ingpen, The Letters of Percy Bysshe Shelley (London, 1914), 11:716, quoting Mary Shelley.
England in 1819 and the 91-stanza narrative poem The Mask ofAnarchy were both written in response
to 'Peterloo', though published posthumously in 1832 and 1839 respectively.
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up should not be under-estimated. As Linda Colley suggests, 'the most corrosive
challenge to patrician confidence and authority' in these thirty years might not have
been 'the wars with Revolutionary America and France, or the exotic demands and
seductions of a new, predominantly eastern empire, or even the pace of
administrative and industrial change at home, but rather a calling into question of the
very legitimacy of the power elite'.38
Norman Gash has argued, what made the immediate post-Waterloo period so
difficult was not one but a combination of problems, including industrialization, the
great post-war slump in trade and manufacture, the unprecedented expansion of
population, and the increasing urbanization.39 The economic life of Britain in 1815
was in such a state that Elie Halevy has famously observed that 'if economic facts
explain the course taken by the human race in its progress, the England of the
nineteenth century was surely, above all other countries, destined to revolution, both
political and religious'.40 But it was not to be so. What kept a revolution at bay in
Britain then? It was not the political institutions, which Halevy describes as
'essentially unstable and wanting in order', but 'beliefs' - of which religion formed
the most crucial part.
Edmund Burke, who provided the chief conservative antidote to the radical
writings of Thomas Paine and William Godwin, offered a succinct summary in his
Reflections of the essential beliefs of the British people in the early 1790s, ideas that
would later help to ease the volatile domestic situation of 1816-1820 and the Chartist
unrest of the late 1830s and 1840s from taking a revolutionary course:
Nothing is more certain, than that our manners, our civilization, and
all the good things which are connected with manners, and with
civilization, have, in the European world of ours, depended for ages
upon two principles; and were indeed the result of both combined; I
mean the spirit of a gentleman, and the spirit of religion.41
In Burke's assessment, the spirit of the gentleman and the spirit of religion were the
principles that had preserved Britain as the bastion of good sense against the
seductions of revolutionary France. These principles prevailed into the pre-
38
Colley, op. cit., 152.
39
Gash, op. cit., 2.
40 Elie Halevy, A History of the English People, 3 vols. (1924, Harmondsworth, 1937), II: 236.
41 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790, Harmondsowrth, 1968), 173.
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Darwinian period, and were to the fore in shaping the responses to the scientific ideas
of Lawrence and Combe, and will be discussed in turn briefly here.
In discussing the spirit of religion during this period, the three most relevant
components were: the idea of Providence, Evangelicalism and Methodism. An
abiding belief in Providence helped to provide a divine sanction for government, a
sense 'that the law of God enjoins obedience to every government settled according
to the constitution of the country in which it subsists'.42 Dynastic legitimacy, the
authority of the king's government, Whig or Tory, and indeed the social hierarchy as
a whole existed with divine sanction.43 The idea of Providence helped the British
people to accept that 'particular kind of trials, at the hands of particular kinds of
enemies, were the necessary fate and the eventual salvation of a chosen people'.44
The latest French wars were interpreted as trials from Providence, and the victory
over Napoleon demonstrated God's special care for His chosen people - Protestant
Britain had won over Catholic as well as revolutionary France.45 The ceremony of
Lodging the Eagles on 18 January 1816 was the only state ceremony to mark the
victory of Waterloo. This date was also appointed as the day for 'General
Thanksgiving to Divine Providence on the re-establishment of peace in Europe'. The
significance of the ceremony of lodging the eagles (taken from the French at the
battle of Waterloo) was to deposit 'in a Christian Temple the tokens of victory, and
dedicating to the God of Battles, the memorials of a triumph'.46 The ceremony
concluded with the playing of 'God save the King', and the whole congregation
stood - a powerful expression of patriotism in which Providence and victory, nation
and monarch, were fused in the ceremonial grandeur.
It was not only during state ceremonies that belief in Providence found
expression. The extraordinary weather in the summer of 1816 - six weeks of
42 J.C.D. Clark, English Society 1688-1832 (Cambridge, 1985), 225, quoting Bishop George Home,
Discourse XXXII 'The Duty of Praying for Governors', preached in Canterbury Cathedral on the
anniversary of George Ill's accession, 25th October 1788.
43 See J.C.D. Clark, op. cit., 218-225, for interesting discussions on how eighteenth century was to
defend the intellectual viability of the idea of Providence, an active divine sanction for particular
governments, against the interpretation which Arians, Socinians and Deists wished to place on
Newtonian physics: that God, like a watchmaker, having created the universe, stood back to allow it to
run according to its unvarying natural laws.
44
Colley, op. cit., 28.
45 See Colley, op. cit., chapter one on how Protestantism was an important aspect in forging the
identity of Britain as a nation.
46 The Times, 19th January 1816, page 3, column b.
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incessant rain and cold weather all over the country, hail storms accompanied by
hurricane force of wind and floods affected Stafford, Norton, Lichfield and Carlile,
and minor earthquakes reported in many parts of England in March, and then in
Scotland in August - were regarded by some as visitations of Providence. An eye¬
witness of the earthquake in Aberdeen, which caused extensive damage to property
but no loss of lives, referred to the shock as an 'awful and unusual visitation of
Providence'. An account from Longpark, near Lichfield, referred to the hail storm as
'the most tremendous visitation of nature ever felt in that neighbourhood'. 47 In face
of natural calamities, Providence was invoked to encourage fortitude, as one
contributor to The Times exhorted:
Providence sends moments of distress to try how we shall conduct
ourselves in the discharge of our reciprocal duties. The community
suffers but the different classes encourage and assist each other in
endurance.48
The idea of Providence was prominent not only in those post-Waterloo years,
but during the cholera epidemic of 1831-2. An official day of fasting, prayer and
humiliation was appointed for 21 March 1832, which was to be a day of communal
confession. The epidemic was interpreted by many as a visitation form Providence
to recall people to religion. In the words of Bishop Blomfield preaching to his Royal
audience on that day from the book of Isaiah, 'When Thy judgments are in the earth,
the inhabitants of the earth will learn righteousness'.49 Others interpreted the
epidemic as a divine pronouncement against science, as a conflict caused by the
'cold and dreary materialism' of the men who were investigating scientific laws and
had ignored 'the principles of God's moral government'.50 It was the idea of
Providence that turned the British people to religion in the face of calamities.
While the idea of Providence emphasised the work of an active God, who
guides the affairs of His people, Evangelicalism placed its emphasis on the individual
47 See The Times, 23rd, 25th, 26th March 1816, for accounts of earthquake in England, for example, in
Bawtry, Blyth, Carlton, Sheffield, Chesterfield, Mansfield, Nottingham, Lincoln, Leicester,
Loughborough and Gainsborough; see 21st, 23rd and 27th August for accounts in Scotland: Morays,
Banff, Aberdeen, Kincardine, Forfar, Perth and Fife; see 30th and 31st July for storms and floods. Also
see Scots Magazine , 78 (1816), August issue for accounts of earthquakes in Scotland and weather on
the Continent.
48 The Times, 9th November 1816.
49
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50
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soul, which was to be saved through the acceptance of Christ's atoning sacrifice. In
1739, John and Charles Wesley, and George Whitefield began to preach the
evangelical gospel (that salvation of the soul was through a personal conversion) and
contributed to a major religious movement that swept across Britain, and indeed the
North Atlantic world, in the eighteenth century. The Evangelical faith 'emphasized a
heartfelt, Bible-centred gospel message, aimed at eliciting a personal decision for
Christ'.51 The followers ofWesley and Whitefield became known as the Methodists,
and they sought to remain within the structures of the established Church until their
break with the Anglican Church in 1791; even after this break, many Methodists
continued to attend some services in their parish church. Through the pattern of
itinerary preaching, the Methodists reached out to the mass of largely unchurched
humanity in the factories and mines, in the mills and the fields. Halevy described the
power of the Evangelical religion as the chief influence that prevented Britain from
experiencing revolutionary upheaval during this period of economic trials and social
neglect. The hopes of the lower orders in society usually lay in either Evangelical
religion or Radical politics. Sometimes the two conjoined, for many Nonconformist
preachers preached fundamental political reform as well. However, on the whole,
the force of Methodism was welded to the political conservatism of John Wesley.
The evangelicals who stayed within the established Church came under the
leadership of the Evangelical party, which emphasized personal piety and social
action and was a chief force in promoting liberalism in politics. One of such
distinguished evangelical leaders was William Wilberforce, whose fervent
evangelical faith was as important in the campaign that led to the abolition of slavery
in Britain in 1834 as was his adroit statesmanship. Amongst the middle-class
evangelicals, a distinctive piety developed, which 'fostered new concepts of public
probity and national honour, based on ideals of oeconomy, frugality,
professionalism, and financial rectitude'.52 Both Methodism and Evangelicalism
inherited 'almost intact the political theology of mainstream Anglicanism'. J.C.D.
Clark points out that 'the desire of the new movements to establish their
respectability, to shield their innovations from criticism, often led them to emphasise
this political orthodoxy, and even to represent themselves as more orthodox than the
51 Stewart J. Brown, The National Churches of England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1801-1846 (Oxford,
2001), 37.
52
Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement - The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic
Thought 1785-1865 (Oxford, 1988), 7.
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orthodox'.53 A powerful force for mobilising the religious beliefs of the higher
orders (through the Evangelical party within the Anglican Church), and of the lower
orders (through the field work and itinerary preaching of Methodism), was thus
harnessed to reinforce the political and social structures of Britain in the first half of
the nineteenth century. The centrality of the human soul in the Evangelical faith will
be essential for understanding the controversies being discussed in this thesis.
Finally, along with the spirit of religion, the ideal of the 'gentleman' had been
named by Burke as one of the two main principles preserving Britain from sliding
into revolution. The example of William Cobbett in some senses supports Burke's
diagnosis. William Cobbett was essentially a gentleman farmer, and the ideal of the
gentleman meant that Cobbett sought to direct rural disaffection into parliamentary
reform and not revolution. The aspiration to imbibe this ideal of the gentlemen was
translated during the first half of the nineteenth century into a spirit of self-
improvement among the lower and middle classes in Britain. On one level, the huge
popularity of George Combe's The Constitution ofMan was a precursor to Samuel
Smiles' Self- Help, published in the same year as Darwin's The Origin of the Species.
The spirit of self-improvement characterised Combe's own endeavours as he
elevated his social status from the son of a brewer to that of a Writer to the Signet.
Combe used phrenology to preach the gospel of self-improvement, and his audience,
the new generation of working men who were educating themselves to be mechanics
and engineers, imbibed this spirit of self-help. The popularity of phrenology fitted
into the 'general awareness of the importance of science in the intellectual life of the
nation ... at progressively lower levels of the social order'.54 Combe himself wrote
extensively on educational reform to emphasise the importance of a scientific
component in the general education for the masses. Up and down the country,
philosophical societies, halls of science, mechanics' institutes, and workers'
associations sprang up for the dissemination of science to the middle and lower
orders of society. It was in this respect that Henry Cockburn, the Whig Edinburgh
lawyer remarked on the new establishment set up in 1832, called 'The Edinburgh
Association for procuring Instruction in Useful and Entertaining Science':
This and similar institutions are strongly characteristic of the times. It
is a sort of popular endowed college, where lectures are given to all,
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male or female ... The lectures are on botany, geology, chemistry,
astronomy, physiology, natural philosophy, phrenology, and
education. It is a very useful establishment, giving respectable
discourses very cheaply to a class of persons for whose scientific
instruction and amusement there is no other provision ... George
Combe is their genius, and consequently phrenology is a favourite and
most productive branch. ... it is gratifying to see hundreds of clerks
and shopkeepers, with their wives and daughters, nibbling at the teats
of science.55
The efforts of the working classes at self-education through this kind of scientific
instruction were to diminish the anti-Jacobin fears of the previous generation. On the
one hand, it was the social utility of phrenology in this regard that marked its
widespread acceptance, not only by the populace, but also by the established order.
On the other hand, the potential for new scientific ideas to be deployed to further the
cause of radical politics, as in the Lawrence controversy, in the immediate years after
the victory of Waterloo was a genuine concern. Through the study of the three
episodes revolving round William Lawrence, George Combe, and the genesis of
Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, one of the aims of this thesis is to explore how the
social and political climate of the time influenced the reception of scientific ideas.
55
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Materiality, Mortality, and Morality
The great difference between mankind and the inferior animals consist in
their having immortal souls. The soul is that part of a human creature which
thinks. You wish me to describe the Soul to you, Henry; this, my dear, I
cannot do, any farther than that it is of a spiritual nature, and consequently
invisible, for a spirit has not bodily parts, and therefore cannot be seen with
the eyes; but I am convinced that I have a Soul by what passes within
myself, and that human creatures have Souls by what I observe in other
people ... And it is by means of the Soul, my dear children, that mankind are
capable of knowing God, and of paying that tribute of prayer and praise
which is due to the great CREATOR.
I told you, my dears, that the Soul is immortal, and so it certainly is, it will
live for ever; the Body is condemned to die, but the Soul will remain alive to
everlasting ages. Every human creature dies sooner or later; the Soul leaves
the Body, and the Body turns to corruption, but the Soul cannot die, for the
CREATOR has said it shall live.
Mrs Sarah Trimmer, 1741-18101
When the first edition of Mrs Trimmer's Easy Introduction to the Knowledge of
Nature and Reading the Holy Scriptures, adapted to the Capacities of Children
appeared in 1780, Louis XVI had been six years on the throne. Nobody foresaw the
French Revolution that would eventually condemn the French king to the guillotine,
or a Napoleon whose territorial ambition drove him well beyond the bounds of
French soil. When the fifteenth edition of Easy Introduction was published in 1817
with 'considerable Additions and Improvements', numerous battles had been fought
between Britain and France; the European map had been drawn and re-drawn, and a
new balance of power was in place to put France in check. The fifteenth edition of
Easy Introduction would suggest that its popularity not only had not waned over
those thirty-seven years, but might have surged in the reactionary climate in the
aftermath of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. The first edition of Easy
Introduction was dedicated to Lady Charlotte, who with young Henry, were charges
to Mrs Trimmer, their governess. The first and subsequent generations of children
brought up to believe in what Mrs Trimmer taught of the Body, the Mind, and the
Soul were in their prime by 1817, and some were leaders in society: Lords of the
1 Sarah Trimmer, Easy Introduction to the Knowledge of Nature and Reading the Holy Scriptures,
adapted to the Capacities of Children (London, 1817), 168.
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Upper House and members of Parliament, squires in the country, gentlemen of
professions, and the Reverends in their parishes. The genteel ladies like Lady
Charlotte, would be their spouses, mistresses of their households, and mothers of
their offspring. The contemporaries of Lady Charlotte and Henry would not only
have received the teaching of Easy Introduction as children themselves, but would
probably have instructed their children to read it. The quoted passage from Easy
Introduction would be a fair representation of what the majority of the upper and
middle classes were taught to believe of the Body, the Mind, and the Soul at the end
of the Napoleonic era.
The beliefs embodied in Mrs Trimmer's passage can be summarised as: (1)
the soul is of a spiritual, immaterial nature, and therefore distinct from the material
body; (2) at death, the soul leaves the body; being of matter, the body is subject to
corruption; while the immaterial soul will live for ever; (3) the soul thinks; and it is
the thinking soul2 which distinguishes mankind from the animals, making mankind
rational and moral creatures, capable of knowing God. It was a belief system which,
by denoting the nature of the body and the soul, affirmed the basis of a future life,
and prescribed the conduct of the present life. In other words, these beliefs
addressed issues pertaining to Materiality, Mortality, and Morality. If materiality is a
philosophical concept, mortality a religious concern, and morality a social necessity;
the three were nonetheless inextricably connected. A sermon on the parable of the
Prodigal Son, delivered by the celebrated Episcopalian preacher Archibald Alison in
1816, illustrated the way these three aspects of belief intertwined.3 After
enumerating the consequences of 'vice', and 'the indelible expectation of
punishment', the preacher asked the rhetorical questions:
Is it then the final termination of our weak and fallen nature? Is the
immortal mind of man so soon to lose all its hope of glory and
honour?
On saying 'No' to these questions, on the grounds that there was a Father in the
parable, symbolising designs of divine mercy and salvation over evils, the preacher
exhorted the congregation with the following words:
Let the young pause ... it is only while the mind retains its strength,
and the soul its vigour, that the prodigal child of nature can arise from
2 In the period of discussion, betweenl780-1830, there was much fluidity in the usage of 'mind' and
'soul'. Thinking was not exclusive to the mind or immortality to the soul; hence the phrases 'the
thinking soul', or 'the immortal mind', were common.
3 Scots Magazine, 78 (1816), 287-289; italics mine.
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the dust into which he has fallen.
'Nature' here pertained to materiality, the 'fallen' part of man which originated from
the dust; the hope of immortality and glory was for the mind and the soul; and the
certainty of a future state of retribution was a persistent reminder of the need for
godly conduct in this life. Like the legs of a tripod, the three aspects of this belief
system concerning materiality, mortality and morality, supported and reinforced one
another; an attempt to undermine any one of the three would be an attempt to topple
the whole system.
In Britain, towards the end of the eighteenth century, new challenges did
come to bear on this mainstream religious belief system as represented by Mrs
Trimmer's teaching. The influence of French philosophy of the late eighteenth
century was one of the factors very much guarded against by the British. From
science, the advances in physiological studies, and the rise of phrenology, were two
examples whereby a materialistic conception of life and the mind prevailed. In
religion, the writings by dissenters like Joseph Priestley, and Richard Price,
challenged the conventional view of immortality based on an immaterial soul. In
politics, the surge of seminal British thinkers such as Thomas Paine, William
Godwin, and Mary Wollstonecraft collectively called into question the status quo
and proffered a new order of morality for society.
By demonstrating how tightly the philosophical aspects of each of the three
entities were related to the religious concern for immortality, and the social necessity
for morality, this chapter provides the intellectual background to the debates on life
and the mind in the early nineteenth century. The central argument of this thesis is
that the controversies revolving around the philosophical foundations of the mind
and the soul in the early nineteenth century were ultimately driven by the concern for
a secure basis for morality. This chapter seeks to establish the interconnectedness of
immateriality of the soul, with the hopes of immortality, and the religious basis of
morality. It is because the three aspects of the beliefs were so intertwined that to
challenge the philosophical concept of immateriality would be to challenge
orthodoxy in religion, and in turn, undermine the accepted foundation for morality.
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II
Samuel Coleridge made a remark in 1830 which is of more than passing interest to
this section of the thesis. He coined the famous phrase, 'Two Classes of Men' by
stating that 'every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist'. He thought it was
impossible that any one born an Aristotelian could become a Platonist, and vice
versa, and besides these two classes, it was next to impossible to conceive of a third.4
Much has been written on the differences between Plato and Aristotle. By way of
summary, their differences can be ascribed to the fact that Plato is an idealist, and
Aristotle, an empiricist. For Plato, ideas are innate; truth is to be apprehended by
intuition through revelation. For Aristotle, there is no knowledge without an external
material world; ideas cannot be innate; and the apprehension of truth is by sense
perceptions through reason. For Plato, the visible physical world is a poor image of
the invisible world of Ideal Universals. The visible world is bound within a temporal
space in which things are finite and changeable, while the invisible world of Ideal
Universals is outside the temporal frame, it is eternal and immutable. For Aristotle,
the visible world is all that we have, and the universals are immanent in the material
world. For Plato, changes are viewed negatively as mutations and as a reflection of
the finite world. For Aristotle, change and development are viewed positively as a
law of life, as the dynamics of nature, for the fulfilment of a fruitful end, its teleos.
For Plato, truth is transcendent; for Aristotle, truth is immanent.
An article in 1815, published in the conservative, evangelical periodical,
Edinburgh Christian Instructor stated that 'it had indeed been the general opinion of
mankind in all ages, that man is a compound being, formed by the union of two
distinct substances, matter and mind'.5 The article was asserting a dualistic tradition
in western civilization which owes its root to the philosophy of Plato (427-347 B.C.).
At the heart of Platonism is the idea that the material world is a (poor) image of an
ideal world where Forms exist in their timeless perfection. Matter, being susceptible
to changes, is therefore intrinsically corruptible and less than perfect. In its more
4
S.T.Coleridge, Specimens of the Table Talk, 2nd July 1830; quoted in David Newson, Two Classes of
Men (Oxford, 1972), 7.
5
Anon., 'On the Immortality of the Soul,' The Edinburgh Christian Instructor, 11(1815): 155-160,
156.
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extreme form, matter for some Platonists is held accountable for the existence of evil.
Another article in the Edinburgh Christian Instructor related the origin of evil within
Platonism as:
The Platonist accounted for the existence of evil, from what they
called the essential corruption of matter. Matter they supposed to be
naturally and inherently evil. Accordingly, the human body, being
composed of matter, must be evil; and its close connection with the
soul must tend to its pollution. Besides, the material system with
which we are connected being inherently corrupt, evil, both moral and
physical, cannot fail to abound.6
Changes are considered seeds of evil; the essential corruptibility of matter renders
matter therefore inherently evil. The body, being of matter, is corruptible and
inherently evil. From the manuscript of a deceased clergyman, death was described
as 'the end' which would 'produce a great change upon our body':
... it will be dissolved in the dust. We must, 'Say to the Worm, thou
art my sister; and to corruption, thou art my mother.
If the material body is essentially corruptible, the need for dualism becomes
paramount - it is only by distinguishing an immaterial part in his make-up that man
stands a chance of transcending the inevitable fate of decay associated with matter.
To affirm an immaterial part in man becomes also the sine qua non for any possible
salvation from the realm of evil matter. In Plato's scheme, only the mind, by dint of
its divine origin, is immaterial and therefore incorruptible. An article 'On Death' in
the Edinburgh Christian Instructor in 1815 emphasized the lowly status of the body:
Soon the soul and body ... must separate - the spirit winging its way
to future worlds - but the body left a lifeless loathsome mass of
putrefaction, ... became the food of worms, and mingle with the clods
of the valley.8
By contrast, the mind's divine origin represented the basis for immortality because:
[God] is the Father of this rational and immortal mind, whose
wondrous faculties raise me so far above the level of the brutal tribes;
how strongly, then, am I bound to serve Him with my body and with
my spirit, which are not so much mine but his.9
The essential dualism in for the conception of the body, the mind, and the
6 Anon. 'On the Origin of Evil', The Edinburgh Christian Instructor, 10 (1815), 153-158, 153.
7 Practical Sermons No.25 by a deceased clergyman on Psalm xxxix 4, The Edinburgh Christian
Instructor, 10(1815), 25-37.
8 Practical Sermon No. 26, 'On Death', in The Edinburgh Christian Instructor, 10 (1815): 97-103.
9
Ibid., 102.
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soul is, to a large extent, the legacy of Plato's creation narrative, the Timaeus,. It was
the first of Plato's works available in Latin, translated by Chalcidus around AD350
'principally because the neo-Platonists believed [Timaeus] to be a religious tract'
because of its many parallels with Genesis.10 Plato's influence on Latin Christianity
remained largely unchallenged until the re-discovery of Aristotle (384-322B.C.) in
the twelfth century. Though a near contemporary to Plato, Aristotle's writings were
not circulated in the Latin West until around 1100. Despite being Plato's erstwhile
pupil, the master and pupil became rivals in their respective schools of thought,
epitomised by Aristotle's founding of the Lyceum in Athens to rival the Academy of
Plato. Their different approach to knowledge is exemplified in their views on the
life-matter problem. Aristotle's De Anima is his treatise on this problem, and a
critique of Timaeus.n Aristotle summarises rival theories of the soul as characterised
by three features: the production of movement, perception and incorporeality.
Aristotle comments that there is 'one absurdity' in common with all these theories
about the soul, namely:
The soul is connected with the body, and inserted into it, but no
further account is given of the reason for this, or of the condition that
the body is in. Yet this would seem to be required. For it is by
partnership that the body acts and the soul is affected, that the body
comes to be moved and the soul produces motion. And none of these
is possible for things whose mutual connection is contingent. But
most theories only try to say what sort of thing the soul is, making no
further specifications at all about the recipient body.12
The incorporeality of the soul, and therefore the need to have two natures to denote
the body and the soul, renders their mutual connection contingent. And this
'contingent connection', for Aristotle, is a chief obstacle for dualism. For Aristotle,
all matter is 'enformed'; and 'to think of something as matter is to think of it as the
matter of some kind of thing which by some definite process could be turned into
that sort of thing'.13 A living body is 'enformed' to exhibit life; life is the essence of
animate bodies. The 'Soul', for Aristotle, is a particular form of essence; it is the
10C.U.M. Smith, The Problem ofLife (London, 1976), 60
11 De Anima only became available to the Latin West between 1100 to 1270, when most of the
Aristotelian corpus was translated from Arabic and Greek. The only text by Aristotle known before
the twelfth century is Logica Vetus, translated by Boethius from Greek in Italy in the 6th century. See
A.C. Crombie, op.cit., 55-60.
12
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essence of animate bodies. For Aristotle, animate bodies are not matter with
something additional to animate it; being alive is the essence of the living bodies. In
this regard, Aristotle certainly would not maintain the separateness of the soul from
the body.
If Plato was the source of mind-body dualism, it was another rationalist
philosopher who was to bring dualism to a crisis. The founder of the mechanical
philosophy, Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was to make body and mind so
categorically distinct that it became easy for subsequent thinkers to dismiss the
relevance of Descartes' immaterial principle. Mathematics was at the centre of the
Cartesian philosophy, and the whole of physics and physiology were expounded in
mechanical terms, which were in turn further explained in geometrical ideas. In his
Treatise ofMan, Descartes declared that his subject was not Man but a Machine, not
a real one, but a hypothetical one such as God might have made. For instance, the
heart was likened to an engine in which God kindled 'a non-luminous fire', just like
that which caused 'damp hay to heat up when enclosed'. The lungs functioned as a
kind of condenser.
Descartes' mechanical philosophy resulted in 'a new concept of living
creatures as betes-machines, which always acted in strict accordance with the laws of
mechanics'.14 Descartes' view on the motion of the heart illustrates this point:
This motion [of the heart], ... follows as necessarily from the very
disposition of the organs [etc] ... as does the motion of a clock from
the power, the situation and the form of its counterpoise and of its
wheels.15
In the closing paragraph of his Treatise on Man, Descartes reiterated the same claim
more generally:
... all the functions that I have attributed to this machine ... imitate as
perfectly as possible those of a real man; I desire, I say, that you
should consider that all these functions follow quite naturally solely
from the arrangements of its parts neither more nor less than do the
movements of a clock or other automaton from that of its
counterweights and wheels.16
By drawing parallels between the physiological organs and mechanical devices like
mills, clocks, pumps, looms and fountains, Descartes put aside the question regarding
14 John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins ofModern Science (New York, 1997), 81.
15
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how matter comes alive by focusing instead on the structure of living matter.
Descartes' mechanistic account of living processes proved immensely
influential, but it was hard to see how it could account for generation and
development. How could an undifferentiated seed develop into a tree, with roots,
bark, wood, sap, leaves, and flowers? From where did the embryo emerge, and how
did it develop into a fetus, and then into a baby? The only viable solution seemed to
be the assumption that development, like life itself, was merely an illusion. Just as
the animal was really a machine, so the seed was merely a miniaturised version of
the machine. The tree, with all its different parts, was already present in the seed; the
embryo was a miniature adult, with all the features of the adult form compressed into
its shape. There was now no need to explain how the development of hair, nails,
teeth, bones, flesh, kidneys, lungs, and so on, took place from undifferentiated tissue.
They were already there, all that was required was that they should get bigger - this
was simply a matter of accretion, with the extra matter supplied by the food. This
was the theory known as preformationism - the idea that the offspring were always
17
contained, pre-formed, in the parent.
The implications of this were extraordinary. Preformationism effectively
rejected the earlier theory of generation known as epigenesis, postulated by William
Harvey (1578-1657) in De Generatione (1651). Epigenesis explained generation and
growth by the process of differentiation, whereby the foetus emerged gradually
emerge from the homogeneous mass of the egg. Since preformationism bypassed the
process of differentiation altogether, the adult form had to be present in the male
seed, or the female egg. Furthermore, the adult forms of the next generation of
offspring, had to be present in the seed, or eggs, contained in these miniscule adults.
Similarly, all subsequent generations had to be contained in seed or egg, within seed
or egg, within seed or egg, and so on ad infinitum. In this way, preformationsim led
to the theory known as emboitement, in which succeeding generations are seen as
contained within one another like an infinite succession of Russian dolls. It is a
testament to the power of the microscope, and the recent revelation of invisibly small
worlds, that this theory gained any credence at all. The corpuscularism of Cartesian
matter theory demanded the existence of particles which were invisibly small, and
17 Andrew Pyle, 'Animal Generation and the Mechanical Philosophy: Some Light on the Role of
Biology in the Scientific revolution', History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 9 (1987): 225-54;
Daniel Fouke, 'Mechanical and 'Organical' Models in Seventeenth-Century Explanations of Biological
Reproduction', Science in Context, 3 (1989): 365-82.
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the evidence provided by the microscope, and by the anatomical researches of Jan
Swammerdam (1637-80) on insects, in which he found clear structures from the
butterfly present in the caterpillar, seemed to support corpuscularism, and even
preformationism.18
Nevertheless, in spite of remarkable early success, the theories of
preformationism, and emboitement, soon proved to be the Achilles Heel of Cartesian
life science. The all too familiar fact that some children took after their mothers and
some after their fathers (and some an interesting mix of both) proved embarrassing to
preformationism. The discovery in the 1740s of what he called the hydra, by
Abraham Tremblay finally spelled the doom of Cartesian mechanism in the life
sciences. The fact that the hydra could regenerate from any excised part of itself
strongly suggested that, rather than offspring being preformed and held in a special
container in the adult, offspring were the result of a highly complex differentiating
process of which any living tissue was capable.19
It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the result was a
straightforward revival of a vitalistic approach which was inimical to, and would
have displaced mechanistic approaches. In fact, the result was far more nuanced.
Some thinkers placed emphasis on a more or less mysteriously operating vitalistic
principle, while others, reluctant to relinquish the hard-won scientific ethos which
Cartesianism had brought into the study of life, tried to explain vitalism in a more
materialistic, quasi-mechanistic way. Both ends of the spectrum seemed to accept a
Cartesian emergentism - the belief that life somehow emerged from the organisation
of matter. However, while some saw this as the result of nothing but organisation,
others felt that a particular kind of organisation must call up something extra. The
latter were able to point out, for example, that the organisation of the body of
18 For preformationism, see R. S. Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and
Mechanics (Cambridge, 1977), 97-104; John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of
Modern Science (Houndmills, 2002), 81-4. On Swammerdam, see, Edward G. Ruestow, The
Microscope in the Dutch Republic: The Shaping ofDiscovery (Cambridge, 1996); Catherine Wilson,
The Invisible World: Early Modern Philosophy and the Invention of the Microscope (Princeton,
1995).
19 See Thomas S. Hall, History ofGeneral Physiology, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1900, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1969)
on preformation and epigenesis; also V. P. Dawson, Nature's Enigma: The Problem of the Polyp in
the Letters of Bonnet, Trembley and Reamur (Philadelphia, 1987); Charles W. Bodemer,
'Regeneration and the Decline of Preformationism in Eighteenth-Century Embryology', Bulletin of
the History of Medicine, 38 (1964): 20-31; Shireley A. Roe, Matter, Life and Generation :
Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff Debate (Cambridge, 1981); Aram Vartanian,
'Trembley's Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism', Journal of the History
of Ideas, 11 (1950): 259-86.
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someone dying of 'natural causes' was precisely the same the moment before death,
as it was the moment after. In any case, the differences between exponents of the
new life science in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries often reflected
more fundamental differences, not in the technicalities of biological observations, but
in the wider preoccupations of the naturalists involved. It is beyond the remit of this
thesis to pursue this point further, but we shall see a clear example of these subtle
differences later, when we examine the theories of life advanced by John Hunter,
William Lawrence, and John Abernethy.
The significance of Descartes' mechanical philosophy, then, was to view life
as residing with, and emerging from matter. It followed, moreover, that there was no
need for Descartes to import the soul as an immaterial principle to animate matter,
and in this sense the Cartesian system, in spite of sharing a dualistic approach with
Plato, radically departed from the Platonist conception of life. If the soul was not
required for making matter alive, how did Descartes view the soul? Further, if all the
vital functions in animals and in man could be likened to machines, how did man
differ from the beast? The answers to these questions lead to the crisis in the
traditional dualist theology. By relinquishing the soul as the living principle,
Descartes did not intend to relinquish dualism in full. Instead, he pushed the frontier
of dualism to the furthest limit and rested it with the mind. For Plato, the soul was
the immaterial agent causing all the living functions, and responsible for all mental
functions as well. While the Cartesian soul owed its ancestry to the Platonic soul, it
is no longer responsible for animating the material body. Furthermore, the Cartesian
soul is not responsible for all mental functions either, but only the highest mental
functions, denoted as rationality and consciousness. Since sensations, images and
passions are mental faculties dependent on bodily stimuli, and common between man
and animals, Descartes distinguished man from the beast by reserving only the
highest intellectual faculties as the hallmarks of man. For instance, Descartes
concluded that though animals had vocal apparatus, they did not talk, and this
absence of communication implied an absence of rationality. It was man alone that
could come to self-consciousness and pronounce Cogito, ergo sum; and that ability,
peculiar to the human mind, singled man out from the beast. This particular
conception of the mind also conformed to Christian orthodoxy, which taught that the
soul was a gift from God to man alone, and was denied to the animals. In Descartes'
terminology, the mind referred to the highest of the mental functions - rationality
and consciousness.
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Though Descartes' mechanical philosophy denied the soul as an animating
principle, the conception of the Platonic soul being the animating principle was still
in currency in Christian orthodoxy in the early nineteenth century. To a large extent,
in the controversies being studied in this thesis, when the traditional conception of
the mind was defended, it was the Cartesian mind that distinguished man from the
animals that was being defended. When the traditional conception of the soul was
defended, it was the Platonic soul as the animating principle, and also of divine
origin, that was defended.
With regard to how the immaterial mind interacts with the material body,
Descartes described the function of the soul as dependent upon a go-between
messenger. The soul was conceived as having its principal seat in the small gland
located in the middle of the brain. From the little gland, the soul radiates through the
rest of the body, by means of the animal spirits, the nerves and even the blood. The
little gland, in which the mind is resident, somehow moves in the manner required to
produce the effects corresponding to volition.20 In respect of the location of the soul,
Descartes seemed to want to fix it at one place, but at the same time want it
everywhere in the body. Elsewhere in the Treatise, Descartes maintained that the
soul was 'really joined to the whole body' and that we could not probably say that it
existed in 'any one part of the body to the exclusion of the others'. Distinct as matter
and mind were to Descartes, he nonetheless described himself as 'very intimately
connected' to his body, so intermingled with it that he constituted 'an entire whole
with it'. Indeed, the Cartesian dualism is easier to maintain in theory than in
practice, in the sense that if mind and matter were so distinct, how the mind acted on
and interacted with the body becomes a deepening mystery. As Aristotle has pointed
out, 'the contingent connection' between the body and the mind remains the chief
obstacle for dualism.
Perhaps, the Cartesian soul was more akin to what we may describe as a
centre of cognitive control with nerves linking neurons to every part of the body.
Unwittingly, Descartes might have admitted more material reality to the soul than he
wished, in the sense that the Cartesian soul, in performing the functions of neural
control, seemed to have become more of a physical entity. It also illustrates the
difficulty, even for Descartes, in holding on to dualism and trying to explain the
interaction between an immaterial mind and the material body. Despite this
20
Descartes, The Treatise ofMan, Part 5, 143-6, 150-60.
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difficulty, Descartes could not let go of immateriality. For Descartes, the mind (res
cogitans) could not be destroyed by physical causes, and therefore, had to be other
than matter. Moreover, personhood (ego), epitomised in the consciousness of each
individual, was not divisible like matter. For these two reasons, Descartes defended
an immaterial mind, and would maintain that man was made of matter and mind.
By explaining all living functions in terms of mechanical arrangements,
Descartes seemed to have removed one aspect of the life-matter problem, only to
accentuate another aspect of the problem - in the mind-matter relationship. John
Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) highlighted the
difficulty in explaining the interaction between the material body and an immaterial
mind:
As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our
minds can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any
correspondence or connexion be found between them and those
primary qualities which ... produce them in us; so, on the other side,
the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How
any thought should produce a motion in body, is as remote from the
nature of our ideas, as how any body should produce any thought in
the mind.21
For Locke, all our ideas were derived from experience of the external world through
the senses and reflection. The Aristotelian leaning in Locke's epistemology rendered
the problems posed by Cartesian dualism more acute than for someone like Descartes
who considered ideas to be innate like Plato did. Locke also seemed to have a higher
regard for the external material world than a typical Platonist, and was able to
entertain the notion of 'thinking matter':
that GOD can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking,
... I see no contradiction in it that the first eternal thinking Being
should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless
matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense,
perception, and thought.22
Locke's solution of 'thinking matter' was not one that could have been
entertained by Descartes, who would hold on to an immaterial mind as the first
axiom. For Locke, God's omnipotence was the first axiom; his theology would
allow the omnipotent God complete freedom to act, so much so that God could make
21 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged and edited by John Yolton,
(1690, London, 1993), iv:3, sect.28.
22Ibid„ iv:3, sect. 6, 304-5.
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matter think if he so wished. Against the charge of promoting materialism by
confounding matter and thought with the notion of 'thinking matter', Locke's reply
was that the essence of matter did not change, but matter was distinguished by its
properties superadded to it.
the properties of a rose, a peach, or an elephant, superadded to matter,
change not the properties of matter; but matter is in these things
matter still. God may give to matter thought, reason and volition, as
IT
well as sense and spontaneous motion.
Though in his epistemology, Locke was an Aristotelian, in his theory of matter,
Locke was an atomist. He therefore used 'essence' differently from Aristotle. For
Aristotle, properties are not superadded to matter, and the 'essence' and the
properties are the same thing in Aristotelian system. Being an atomist, Locke saw
properties as residing in the peculiar arrangement of the constituent parts; properties
are therefore 'superadded' to matter by its arrangement. Locke referred to thinking
and the power of action as the two primary qualities or properties of spirit. Locke
was suggesting that thought or self-motion was not a natural property to either
material or immaterial substances, but if God so pleased, He could add the property
of thought or self-motion to either material or immaterial substances. This notion of
superaddition of properties to matter was employed by Locke to close up the
distinction between material and immaterial substances.
While Locke never categorically denied the existence of an immaterial spirit,
he did not affirm the existence of such an entity either. Locke seemed to use
immateriality to characterise certain properties, like thinking and self-motion, but he
was not sure an immaterial spirit or soul existed. Indeed, Locke repeatedly told
Bishop Stillingfleet that he would be pleased to have a proof that the soul was
immaterial, but he did not find any such proof.24 Given Locke's Aristotelian
epistemology, it was no surprise if he could not find a satisfactory proof for the
existence of the immaterial soul, since immaterial entities could not be subject to
proof by sense perception.
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to note the 'progress' (or
'retreat') of dualism from the position of Plato to that of Descartes, and from
23 Edward Stillingfleet, Mr Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to His Second Letter,
in Works, vol.4, p.460; quoted in John W. Yolton, Thinking Matter, Materialism in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (Oxford, 1984), 18.
24
Yolton, op. cit., 20.
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Descartes to Locke. For Plato, the immaterial soul was the animating agent, and the
source of emotions and mental activities. For Descartes, the soul no longer needed to
animate, nor were the emotions and most of the mental functions attributable to the
soul. The soul became the 'mind' and was responsible for only the highest of mental
activities, namely rationality and consciousness. For Locke, thinking was the
immaterial property, which could be superadded to matter if God so wished. In
entertaining the notion of 'thinking matter', Locke was still holding on to a form of
dualism. For Locke the philosopher, his epistemology was Aristotelian; but for
Locke the devout Christian, his dualism was a derivative of the Platonic tradition.
Tenaciously, Locke held on to his Platonic dualism against his Aristotelian system of
epistemology by holding fast to the belief of God's omnipotence. In Locke, we see
the attempt of philosophy and theology trying to come together, albeit fraught with
tension, and requiring Herculean efforts. If Locke had managed to hold on to
dualism until his death in 1707, many eighteenth-century thinkers would find such a
position untenable and let go of dualism altogether.
When Descartes declared his subject in Treatise of Man, not Man but a
Machine, albeit a hypothetical one such as God might have made, might he not
foresee that his hypothetical machine would one day become a de facto L'Homme
Machine in the hands of his fellow countryman? Julien de la Mettrie, writing a
century after Descartes, declared in his essay L'Homme Machine (1747) that all
mental activities, including thinking, were capable, in principle, of being explained
mechanically. In this man-machine, there was no place for the soul, all functions
resided with matter and its mechanical arrangements.
The term 'soul' is therefore an empty one...Given only a source of
motion, animated bodies will possess all they require in order to
move, feel, think, repent - in brief, in order to behave, alike in the
physical realm and in the moral realm... Let us then conclude boldly
that man is a machine, and that the whole universe consists only of a
25
single substance [Matter] subjected to different modifications.
L'Homme Machine was followed by L'Homme Plante in 1748, in which La Mettrie
reduced man further to be the same as a plant.
Anyone who looked on man as a plant was no more uncomplimentary
to that noble species than he would have regarded him as a mere
machine. Man grows in the womb by a process of vegetation; his
body runs down and is wound up again like a watch, either by its own
25 Toulmin and Goodfield, op. cit., 166, quoting La Mettrie.
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recuperative power...or by the skill of people who understand it, not
in this instance watch-and-clock makers, but biochemists.26
If man was essentially a machine, then, according to La Mettrie, 'we are no more
committing a crime when we obey our primitive instincts, than the Nile is
committing a crime with its floods, or the sea with its ravages'. Human behaviour
was a matter of physical necessity, and morality made no sense in La Mettrie's
conception of man.
Given the inflammatory nature of his remarks, it was not surprising that even
the audacious La Mettrie had the wit to publish his works anonymously. Another
French materialist, more subtle and learned than La Mettrie, was the tireless editor of
the Encyclopedic, Denis Diderot (1713-1784). In D'Alembert's Dream (1769),
Diderot unburdened his philosophic speculations to his friend D'Alembert. Diderot's
extensive scientific knowledge and his powers of imagination come to bear on the
text, to give it much persuasiveness, as in the following passage:
What is this egg? An insensitive mass ... How does this mass evolve
into a new organization, into sensitivity, into life? Through heat.
What will generate heat in it? Motion. ... And will you maintain,
with Descartes, that it is an imitating machine pure and simple? Why,
even little children will laugh at you, and philosophers will answer
that if it is a machine you are one too! If, however, you admit that the
only difference between you and an animal is one of organization, you
will be showing sense and reason and be acting in good faith; but then
it will be concluded, contrary to what you had said, that from an inert
substance arranged in a certain way and impregnated by another inert
substance, subjected to heat and motion, you will get sensitivity, life,
27
memory, consciousness, passions, thought.
D'Alembert's Dream was in many ways a dialogue with Cartesian dualism. The
important points made by Diderot were: (1) that there is only matter, and all living
and mental functions are the work of heat and motion upon matter; (2) that the
difference between man and animal is one of organization. Diderot was an atomist,
and by organization he would mean the special arrangement pertaining to each living
form of their constituent parts. Descartes maintained that consciousness and
rationality were attributable to an immaterial mind. Diderot argued that even
consciousness and thought arose by dint of organization of matter. Diderot's
materialism seemed to have eventually precipitated his move from deism to atheism.
26 Paul Hazard, European Thought in the Eighteenth Century (Harmondsworth, 1965), 138,
paraphrasing La Mettrie.
27 Denis Diderot, D'Alembert's Dream (1769, Harmondsworth, 1966), 158-9.
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Towards God, Diderot was filled with wrath, bitterness, and rage. In one of his
stories, a misanthropist hid himself in a cave in order to meditate on vengeance on
the human race, at length came out, shouting loudly 'God! God!'
His voice resounded from pole to pole, and behold, men fell to
quarrelling, hating, and cutting one another's throats. And they've
been doing the same thing ever since that abominable name [namely
God] was pronounced, and they will go on doing it till the process of
the ages is accomplished.28
Another prominent French materialist of this period was Baron d'Holbach
(1723-1789). His seminal text promoting materialism along with atheism was
entitled Le Systeme de la Nature, published in 1770. The chief tenets of d'Holbach's
argument are: (1) that experiment has shown that matter, supposed to be inert and
inanimate, if combined in a certain way can become active and endowed with life
and intelligence; (2) matter and motion suffice to explain everything; (3) that matter
is eternal and necessary; (4) that there is no God, and matter acts of itself by eternal
necessity.29 According to d'Holbach, 'the "soul" is in truth the body in its aspects of
thinking, feeling and willing'. In dealing with unbridgeable dualism of mind and
matter, d'Holbach proposed that it would have been more natural simply to say: 'As
man, who is material can think, therefore, matter is capable of thought'.30
French materialism of the eighteenth century often came with a strong flavour
of atheism, so much so that the warning that 'materialism and atheism go hand in
hand' was the uppermost concern for many in nineteenth-century Britain whenever
materialism was discussed. Priestley's materialism, however, offered a counter
example to the claim that 'materialism and atheism go hand in hand'.
Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), the prolific writer who discoursed widely on
philosophical, political, religious and moral issues, was a Dissenting minister and a
scientist of considerable eminence. As a clergyman, Priestley saw his role as a
defender of tme religion central to his calling and probably primary to his scientific
endeavours. The Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit (1777) was written with
the wish of purging Christianity of the 'corrupt leaven', in the form of the notion of
o 1
the immaterial soul." Priestley argued that the notion of the soul being of a
28 Hazard, 408, quoting Diderot, no reference given by Hazard.
29 Ibid., 142-3.
30 d'Holbach, quoted in Hazard, 143.
31
Joseph Priestley, Disquistions Relating to Matter and Spirit (London, 1782), xx.
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substance distinct from the body was pagan in origin, and was opposed to the true
system of revelation. Priestley traced this corrupt leaven to the system of philosophy
to ancient Egypt, to Greece and Rome, and as eastward as India.32 Priestley argued
that unless the corrupt leaven (the immaterial soul) was purged from Christianity,
true religion would not prevail.
On a personal level, Priestley had journeyed through the centuries of ideas
covered in this section. He confessed that he had been educated 'in the very straitest
principles of reputed orthodoxy', and 'zealous he once was for every tenet of the
system' - the system of an immaterial soul and a dualistic conception of man.33
Priestley maintained, that when the Cartesian hypothesis was properly considered,
one could only admit that the difficulty was in fact impossibility.34 He also examined
Locke's position and chided Locke for not being prepared to subscribe to the logical
conclusion that man was of one uniform substance.35
The conclusion that Locke was not prepared to draw in order to hold on to
dualism was embraced by Priestley as the only consistent option forward. Priestley
was able to come to a monistic conclusion by abandoning a certain notion of matter
that was indispensable to the dualists. He saw the chief obstacle in the 'thinking
matter' debate as the vulgar (common and wrong) view of matter as solid,
impenetrable and completely inert. If one could abandon this notion, then there
would be no need for the concept of two substances in order to explain thought and
sensation. Priestley's 'new supposition' was that 'matter is not impenetrable', but
consisted of physical points, endued with powers of attraction and repulsion.
Priestley referred to this new concept of matter as the 'immateriality of matter'.37
Priestley resolved the 'thinking matter' debate by immaterialising matter on
the one hand, and materialising ideas on the other. Priestley's epistemology




Ibid., in his dedication to the Rev. William Graham.
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Priestley's new proposition of matter was influenced by Boscovich's hypothesis contained in
Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis 1758, English translation in 1763 as A Theory ofNatural Philosophy.
It would appear that Boscovich was also an atomist, if he considered matter as consisted of physical
points.
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Joseph Priestley, History and Present State ofDiscoveries Relating to Vision (London, 1772), 18;
quoted in Yolton, op.cit., 113.
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suppose that a man can think out of the body, than he can hear sounds, or feel cold,
out of the body'.38 Granted that ideas came to us through our senses of the external
world, Priestley argued that ideas were therefore divisible, because the external
objects which generated the ideas in the first place, were divisible:
[ideas] are produced by external objects, and must therefore
correspond to them; and since many of the objects or archetypes of
ideas are divisible, it necessarily follows, that the ideas themselves are
on
divisible also.
From arguing ideas being divisible, Priestley then argued that ideas could not have
come from a substance whose nature was indivisible.40 He then firmly rested the
powers of perception and thinking with an organized system of matter, which he
identified as the brain.41 To Priestley, the 'proper and direct proof, that the seat of
the sentient principle in Man, is the material substance of the brain'.42 Elsewhere, he
made more direct statements about the brain, for example, that 'there is just the same
reason to conclude that the brain thinks, as that it is white and soft'.43 The notion of
'thinking matter' Locke had proposed under the auspices of God's omnipotence,
Priestley advanced into a statement of fact, and by establishing that matter could
think, Priestley was able to conclude that man was of one uniform substance:
I rather think that the whole man is of some uniform composition; and
that the property of perception, as well as the other powers that are
termed mental, is the result (whether necessary, or not) of such an
organical structure as that of the brain.44
It is important to distinguish, however, that Priestley's materialism was not the same
as that advanced by his contemporary French materialists. Priestley himself tried to
state some of the differences in his Disquisitions, by asserting:
It is a gross mistake of the system of materialism to suppose ... that
the vibrations of the brain are themselves the perceptions. For it is
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While French materialism resulted in materialising man, Priestley's materialism
ended in immaterialising matter. The important distinction of Priestley's materialism
from his French contemporaries was lost to his generation. As a result, 'Priestley's
fascinating suggestions were not taken up and extended', and 'no one gave the
emerging view of man as one substance - foreshadowed by Priestley - a systematic
articulation'.46 The fear of materialising man like the French school was too
uppermost in the public minds to register Priestley's notion of immaterialising matter
properly. Another distinctive feature of Priestley's materialism that was lost to his
generation was how it was integrated with his religion. Priestley was a Dissenter,
who took his religion seriously and was prepared to suffer all the disabilities for what
he believed to be the true religion. Descartes, Locke and Priestley were in fact all
religious men trying to make better sense of their epistemology and their faith.
To a large extent, McManners' remarks on the French theologians of the
eighteenth century are pertinent to the British scene at the turn of the nineteenth
century too:
The French theologians of the eighteenth century had inherited and
were engaged in refining a Platonic doctrine of the soul, as against an
Aristotelian one. They did not think of the soul as the 'form' of the
body, they did not take seriously the part played by the vicissitudes of
the body in the formation of the personality, and they had no insight
into the process by which individuality grows and defines itself;
individuality, to them, was an initial gift which undergoes
modifications. They thought of the soul as a substance, albeit spiritual
and ethereal. There was, implanted in the body, an immaterial,
substantial self, which could well have existed long before and which
certainly carried on for ever after the body had disappeared.47
McManners laments the unfortunate outcome for the French theologians in holding
on to a Platonic soul in the dawn of various scientific discoveries; that 'the ghostlike
Platonic soul of the Christian apologists could not be enriched or diversified by new
discoveries, nor could it play any part in new hypotheses'. He further analyses that
because the Platonic soul could not be incorporated or enriched by new systems of
thought, it also could not be contradicted by them. It was therefore 'in the powerful
48
defensive position, from the point of view of abstract logic, of being irrelevant'.
McManners' comments suggest that the development of French materialism in the
46
Yolton, Thinking Matter, 125.
47 John McManners, Death and the Enlightenment (Oxford, 1981), 148.
48 Ibid., 149.
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eighteenth century was perhaps an aberration of this century-old debate between
Plato and Aristotle. It was an aberration because French materialism de-railed the
debate from the track of philosophy into an anti-religious movement, conjoining
materialism with atheism. Furthermore, the political turmoil of the Revolutionary
and Napoleonic eras reinforced this aberration in the minds of the public - that
materialism promoted atheism and revolutions. At the dawn of scientific discoveries
in the life sciences, the life-matter debates that flared up in Britain in the early
nineteenth century were, in essence, a continuation of the century-old debate between
Platonism and Aristotelianism. But the course of the debates became heavily
influenced by the anti-religious flavour of French materialism and the protean
politics in France. An important aspect of the debates, which was the Platonic soul
clashing with Aristotelian epistemology, was lost in the midst of safeguarding a
religious basis for morality.
Ill
The suspicion with which French philosophy was held that had prevented a fair
appraisal of Priestley's materialism was eloquently expressed in Samuel Drew's
Essay on the Immateriality and Immortality of the Human Soul (1802):
The progress of French philosophy, perhaps, has been more
destructive to public morals, than the armies of France have been to
the nations of Europe. By appealing to the more vulnerable parts of
human nature, we suffer our principles to be undermined by
imperceptible degrees, till we barter truth for error; and, by adopting
sentiments which originate in plausible appearance, a superficial mind
is tempted to place the reasoning by which it has been seduced,
among the recondite depths of science.49
Samuel Drew's octavo publication of An Original Essay on the Immateriality and
Immortality of the Human Soul in 1802 was a 364-page long treatise, and was avidly
perused by his contemporaries. The second edition was released in 1803 with two
new sections added on the Omnipotence and Omniprescence of God. It went
through two impressions in England and two in America before its third edition in
49 Samuel Drew, An original Essay on the Immateriality and Immortality of the Human Soul, founded
solely on physical and rational principles (1802, 5th edn., 1831), x; quoting from the preface of the
first edition.
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1811. It went into a fourth edition in England and America, and was even translated
and published in France before the launch of the fifth edition in 1831. The
popularity of Drew's work would suggest not only the eagerness with which his
generation dwelt on the subject of immortality, but also that his opinions were 'fully
proved by the numerous testimonies of respectful approbation ... from men of
distinguished character in various depths of literature.'50 The salient points of
Drew's treatise were: first, that the notion of immortality was a religious sentiment
inspired by and underpinned by an almighty God; secondly, that human immortality
took the form of a continual existence of an immaterial soul after death; and thirdly,
that to harbour such a notion was a proof that men were superior to the beasts.
'If immortality be not true, then no God but a mocking fiend created us' is a
famous line from the poem The Immortality of the Soul by the Victorian Poet
Laureate Lord Tennyson. A similar argument was employed by Drew in his Essay.
The fact that we had the idea of an immortal God, argued Drew, must therefore
presuppose the existence of such a God. Furthermore, to be God, He is necessarily
immortal:
If, therefore, our idea of the being of a God be simple, it plainly
follows, that a God must be in existence... Among the essential
attributes of God, we must include his immortality, it being as
impossible to conceive God to exist, abstracted from immortality, as it
is to conceive him to exist, abstracted from omnipotence or holiness.
For that which is not necessarily immortal, cannot be God. 1
From the immortality of God, Drew proceeded to establish the immortality of the
human soul:
Our idea of immortality being thus ascertained, a question arises
whether this idea can be extended beyond Deity, in its application. So
far as finite can assimilate to infinite, we find in the human soul all the
radical principles of an immortal nature; it is immaterial, and includes
consciousness and will.
Drew clearly considered that such an application subsisted. Having established the
'distinct notions of the certainty of immortality', and 'of the existence of the human
soul', the next stage in Drew's argument was 'to trace out those intermediate ideas'
necessary to 'connect the two simple conceptions together'. He stated that the
50 Drew, op. cit., vii.
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'unquenchable desire which every man feels after happiness' appeared to him most
likely to be the connexion:
... from a consciousness of future punishment, there is, in every
human mind, an insatiable desire after the greatest degree of possible
happiness, which embracing perpetuity, certainly includes the idea of
immortality.52
The second feature concerning the notion of human immortality pertained to
the belief of a separate existence of the disembodied soul after death. In Drew's
Essay he commenced with the proofs of the immateriality of the soul and asserted
that man was 'compounded of matter and spirit'. He argued that 'the powers of the
soul', by which he meant 'consciousness, volition, judgement and perception', were
immaterial, and they must inhere in a substance other than matter; hence, not even
God could make matter think. From establishing the immateriality of the soul, the
Essay proceeded to define death as the dissolution of the bodily organs, which were
as 'nothing more than mere instruments to the mental powers'. The soul, by dint of
immateriality, was 'inaccessible to corruption from any thing contaminating, either
internal or external'. Drew's arguments led him to conclude that:
The soul cannot perish by dissolution, because [it is] devoid of parts;
nor by privation, because its mode of existence undergoes] no
internal change; nor by annihilation, because it can have no tendency
to it, and is inaccessible to all external forces.53
Even if the soul's incorruptibility owing to its immateriality was to be readily
conceded, what appeared to be a graver issue for Drew and his generation was the
retention of identity for a disembodied soul. As Drew stated it:
Consciousness distinguishes an immaterial substance, both from
matter and non-entity. - A lifeless, unconscious, immaterial substance
cannot be comprehended within the definition either of matter or
spirit. - The removal of consciousness from an immaterial substance
destroys its identity. - Identity and existence inseparable.54
Consciousness conferred identity, and identity and existence were inseparable. For
Drew, the individual's consciousness seemed to be encapsulated in the disembodied
soul, and this 'capsule of consciousness' had to have some form of existence, for
without existence, there could be no retention of identity. Drew stopped short of
fanciful speculations by saying, 'We have no conception that an immaterial
52 Drew, op.cit., 219.
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substance can exist, abstractedly from all life and consciousness', though he
absolutely maintained that 'existence and identity' were inseparable.
A pamphlet published in 1772 by a rector in the Carribean, Archibald
Cockburn, offers further insight into the extent of interest in and speculation on the
existence of the soul after death in the late eighteenth century.55 A Philosophical
Essay concerning the Intermediate State of the Blessed Souls is the title of the
pamphlet, and the concern of Cockburn's essay was the existence of 'the Spirits of
the Just Men made Perfect' in a state of 'Estrangement from their Bodies, and
Independency of all material Beings'.56 Cockburn professed that his attempt to
'penetrate into the Condition of Separate Spirits, residing in the Happy Regions' was
to resolve some enquiries concerning these 'Spirits of Just Men made Perfect' with
as much 'Light and Perspicuity' as he could draw from his understanding. He listed
six enquiries which he addressed in turn. Some of these enquiries were of such
practical concerns as whether these souls of Just Men were distinguishable one from
another, and whether they were distributed into various ranks and orders according to
a regular gradation. The answers to these questions were in the affirmative; and
Cockburn maintained that 'acquired differences super-induced on Souls by Culture
57
and Improvement' would be 'lasting marks of Distinction in another Life'.
Another enquiry concerned whether the 'good and virtuous Souls' upon their
separation form the Body, would 'transmigrate into a subtiler corporeity', and set
into 'living frames of air and aether', as the 'Vehicular Hypothesis' represented.
According to Cockburn,
Doubtless a Soul incarcerated in such a system, where Fire and Flame
is the circulating Fluid, must receive perpetual Sensations of
Combustion, and groan under Torments insupportable. And there
wants no more to be said, to overthrow Aetherial Vehicles, since they
are inconsistent as Hell itself, with the State of the Blessed.58
55 The name Archibald Cockburn, designatory MA, suggests that the author might be Scottish,
educated in one of the four ancient Scottish Universities. He was rector of the parishes of St. Mary
Cayon and Christ's Church, Nichola Town, in St. Christophers, likely to be somewhere on Carribee-
Islands in colonial America. The Essay was dedicated to William Mathew, 'Lieutenant-General over
His Majesty's Leeward Carribbee-Islands in America'. The obsequious language of Cockburn's
dedication to his patron would make Mr Collins in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice true to life
rather than a caricature.
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Contrary to what the Vehicular Hypothesis implied, Cockburn affirmed that the
'Aetherial Systems' were unnecssary in the future existence, because the Soul could
operate without them. He informed us that the hypothesis was derived to 'provide for
the security of our perceptive powers', when their present fence (namely the body)
was broken down and levelled with the dust. He argued that such a hypothesis was
only necessary if the soul were only a modification of matter and derived its
sensibilities from organic structure, but since the soul was not of matter, the
preservation of its sensibilities by aetherial systems was superfluous. All these
speculations about the souls being set in aether may sound ridiculously ethereal to us,
but they reflected how substantially the state of disembodied existence for the soul
occupied the minds of those living in the late eighteenth century. The details with
which they embellished their conjectures seemed to help them add reality to their
future state. The separate disembodied existence of the soul was no mere
philosophical concept; it attained the status of reality for some who were prepared to
let their speculations go further.59
The third strand in the notion of immortality concerns the distinction between
man and the beast. Any discussion on human immortality in this period seemed to
be incomplete without some observation of man's superiority over the beast in two
respects. First, it was claimed that mankind possessed reason while animals had only
instinct. Secondly, animals were considered to live only in the present and the ability
to conceive of a future state was deemed to be peculiar to man. Common to both
man and brutes was animation; it was the possession of mental powers, such as
reason and recollection, which set man apart. Drew concentrated on establishing the
immaterial origin of these mental powers, and left the link between an immaterial
principle and man's claim or hope for immortality unclear.
A more cogent link between immortality and human intellect is offered by
Vindicie Mentis - An Essay of the Being and Nature of Mind, published
anonymously in 1702 by the author who merely called himself a Gentleman. He was
arguing the case for a form of human immortality, probably within a Reformed
tradition. His Essay was directed against the Materialists, who opposed the view of
59 Cockburn in his last enquiry addressed the issues of 'happy souls having after Death been invested
with Bodies', what was commonly called Apparitions. Here the Scriptures, Homer, Virgil and
personal accounts were cited in turn as strong grounds for the re-assumption of bodies. It indicated
how far the speculations could go to still stay within the bounds of respectability. Cockburn did not
publish anonymously, and at least the author thought it a respectable work to dedicate to his patron.
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man being the union of mind and body; the Mortalists, who advanced the soul-
sleeping doctrine to account for the state of existence of the soul after death; and
various Popish doctrines like saying masses for the deceased. There is little doubt
that the author was a religious man. He was also an intellectual offspring of
Descartes, as was witnessed in the following assertions:
That Mind is, or that there is Mind; is to me and others most certain, if
I have a certainty of my own Being.... it matters not, this will
infallibly remain a Truth to me, That I am.
What I am: the Mind is known to its self, and perceives all that is in it,
and it is known no otherwise than as Thinking; and by Thinking
however considered. 0
From Vindicie Mentis, one may be able to deduce that Cartesian thought provided the
missing link between the emphasis on the superiority of the human mind and the
claim for human immortality.
Before Descartes, the mind, the soul and the spirit were all conceived of
being immaterial in their nature. After Descartes, the mind was elevated to be the
immaterial principle in man; and if Descartes referred to the soul, what he meant was
the mind alone and nothing else. The need to emphasize the distinction between man
and the animals was itself a Cartesian legacy. After all, Descartes so successfully
reduced all life functions to mechanical explanations that there was truly nothing to
distinguish man from the ape on that level. The missing logic behind the connection
of man's superior intellectual capacity and his hope for immortality is perhaps
something along the following line: that man and animals as life forms exhibit the
same degree and quality of animation; the exhibition of his superior intellectual
abilities distinguishes man from the animals, and points to the existence of an entity
denoted as the mind; in the Cartesian tradition, the human mind was an immaterial
principle, differentiating man from the bodily matter which he shares in common
with the animals; the mind survives the physical dissolution of bodily matter on
death; man attains immortality while animals are doomed to complete annihilation,
bodily matter being all that the animals have. In a nutshell, man distinguishes
himself from the animals by possessing an immaterial mind, which confers on him
immortality. The connection or association between human immortality and man's
superior mental powers to animals is thereby forged. In the words of a contemporary
minister, possibly a Reverend J. Peddie of Edinburgh, in his enterprising article
60
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'Sacred Zoology' published in 1816, the association of man's rational faculties with
his claim to immortality appeared to be self-evidently the case from the Scriptures:
The Scriptures ascribe a soul, or spirit, to animals; but it must be
evident, from what has been said, that it must be a soul of an inferior
order, a spirit of a less noble kind, than what belongs to man. In
respect of the body, ... which at length dies, and is resolved into dust,
the brute animals are on a level with man: But, in respect to the soul,
or spirit, man possesses great advantages over them, being endowed
not only, as we have seen, with reason, but with immortality. He
alone survives death, and in a future world enters on a state of being,
in which he enjoys everlasting felicity, or suffers endless woe.61
John Fearn's Essay on Immortality, published in 1814, made even stronger a
case of this peculiar aspiration in man to a future state as a sound basis for his hope
of attaining immortality.
I will here present a speculation, limited to the Human Species itself;
to prove that the grand characteristic of MAN, as
contradistinguished from the brute order, is very certainly designed to
force him above the ignoble happiness of brutes; ... his characteristic
endowment, does by its proper essential operation lead him to
discover, and to endeavour to deserve, a higher happiness in a future
state.62
Whether it is man's superiority that drives him to quest for immortality, or his desire
for immortality is a proof of his superiority over the animals, are largely two sides of
the same coin, and the argument is in fact a circular one. That the notion of human
immortality should become so enmeshed with the necessity for an immaterial mind
to assert human superiority over the beasts provides the intellectual background to
understand the wide-ranging implications of any attempts to level the mind with the
brain. Such an alignment not only threatened to remove man's superiority over the
beasts, but also undermined the foundation for the hopes of human immortality.
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For an alternative to human immortality based on an immaterial soul, it was
Priestley again who offered the most cogently argued alternative. It is important to
note the differences between Priestley's form of materialism and the French
materialism in respect of human immortality. To the French materialists there was
no more to man than bodily matter: with the dissolution of his bodily upon death,
man was no more. Preistley's materialism was singular in that he proposed a higher
view of matter by questioning the common assumptions concerning the corruptibility
of all matter on the one hand, and the incorruptibility of immaterial substance on the
other:
All things material are not liable to corruption, if by corruption be
meant dissolution, except in circumstances to which they are not
naturally exposed. It is only very compound bodies that are properly
liable to corruption, ... till we know something positive concerning
this supposed immaterial substance and not merely its not being
matter, it is impossible to pronounce whether it may not be liable to
change, and be dissolved, as well as a material substance.63
By exalting matter, Priestley was able to work out a future for matter, and of the
body of man, which to him was compatible with the Scriptures. He distinguished
between 'a candle extinguished' and 'a candle annihilated'; a candle extinguished
could still be re-lighted, but a candle annihilated had nothing left to light again.
When a man died, it was analogous to a candle extinguished:
... though a man may be said, figuratively speaking, to become extinct
at death, and his capacity for thinking cease, it may only be for a
time: for no particle of that which ever constituted the man is lost,
whatever decomposed may certainly be recomposed, by the same
almighty power that first composed it,... and the powers of thinking,
whatever depended upon them, will return of course, and the man will
be, in the most proper sense, the same being that he was before.64
Consistent with his view that man was composed of one uniform substance, Priestley
believed that the whole person died at death. For Priestley, human immortality had
nothing to do with an immaterial soul, which supposedly had never died in the first
place. Priestley's hope for human immortality was founded on the resurrection of
the whole material body after death:
by any possible construction of the words, be called a resurrection of
the dead; which certainly requires that it is something that dies, and is
put into the grave (and an immaterial soul is never supposed to die at
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all) that must revive; and rise again out of it.
He emphasised that for the 'resurrection of the dead' to make any sense, the whole
person would die, but matter had a future, in that 'whatever decomposed would
recompose by the almighty God'. As with his investigation into the nature of man,
Priestley's view on human immortality was arrived at in the process of purging
Christianity from all pagan influences. He stated unequivocally that 'the Apostle
Paul's idea of the resurrection of the dead was the only foundation for a future life'.65
Priestley's view of immortality would indeed be closer to Christ's resurrection, and
would appear to be a more faithful interpretation of the Scriptures in respect of any
future state for man. The notion of some form of restoration of the material creation
was present to a certain extent within mainstream Christianity. For example, Samuel
Horsley, Bishop of Asaph, commented on Christ's existence after his resurrection in
the following terms:
[Christ] was become the inhabitant of another region, from which he
came occasionally to converse with his disciples. His visible
ascension, at the expiration of the 40 days, being not the necessary
means of his removal, but a token to the disciples that this was his last
visit; an evidence to them that the heavens had now received him, and
that he was to be seen no more on earth with the corporeal eye till the
restitution of all things.66
Horsley mentioned the restitution of all things, and for many, it was not difficult to
conceive of the material world being renewed, but it fell short of including human
beings in this restitution. The reason for this inability to include mankind within the
material world was most likely due to the legacy of the Platonic soul and the
derivative Cartesian mind. Priestley's view of human immortality in the form of
bodily resurrection was only possible if, and only if, the Platonic view of matter
(lowly and evil) was abandoned. But so long as the Platonic ghost lingered on within
the system of Christian theology, the future of matter remained blighted. The
corollary was the need for dualism, for a form of human immortality that did not
involve matter. Unless the Platonic soul was relinquished, dualism would prevail
and continue to smother the alternative to human immortality that involves the
restoration, restitution, or resurrection of the material body.
65 Ibid., 204.
66 Samuel Horsley, as the late Lord Bishop of St Asaph, Horsley's Sermons - a Series of Nine
Sermons on the Nature of Evidence by which the fact of our Lord's Resurrection is Established
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IV
On 7 May 1815, Daniel Dewar, D.D., Minister of the College Church, Aberdeen,
delivered a sermon on 'The Glory and Happiness of Heaven'. The subject matter of
the sermon might have been expected to direct the gaze of his congregation heaven¬
ward, to contemplate eternal bliss in the after-life. If that was what Dewar's
congregation expected, they were very soon brought back to earth. The chief aim of
the sermon was to remind the congregation that there was 'no such thing as heaven to
[them], guilty creatures as [they were]'; and that there was 'no such thing as [their]
being introduced into heaven, except through the sanctifying influences of that
Divine Spirit'. Sin and guilt seemed to come to the fore in the contemplation of
heavens, and 'the removal of all evil, moral and physical' was a pre-condition for
any heavenly happiness.
Immortality presupposed morality, a presumption that was evidenced in
contemporary writings. A letter from a lady on the death of her mother, dated 19
December 1811, recorded the final hours of her dying mother.68
But she [the dying mother], dear humble soul, would only reply, 'I am
a poor creature. I am poor and ready, I plead guilty. "I wait for God,
my soul doth wait". I have surely obliged for thy salvation, O Lord!'
'O yes!' I [the daughter] replied, 'and in a little you will, "receive the
end of your faith, the salvation of your soul".'
'God grant it may be so,' she replied.
In her state of physical suffering, the removal of guilt seemed to preoccupy the mind
of the dying in her last hours. It was as if her earthly life was a long journey towards
this 'end of faith', the 'salvation of the soul' by the absolution of all sins. Her
passing was described by her daughter as: 'without a groan her spirit, redeemed to
Jesus by his own blood, took its station where her heart and conversation had long
been'. To the daughter, 'Heaven is the country where [her] best kindred dwell'. She
referred to this world as 'a dark world', and until she through grace also got to
heaven, she never expected 'to see a lovelier sight than [her] mother in life and in
death'. What was being recorded in the letter was also the presence at the deathbed
as a ritual, the significance of which was captured by Philippe Aries in The Hour of
Our Death:
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Presence at the deathbed in the nineteenth century is more than a
customary participation in a social ritual; it is an opportunity to
witness a spectacle that is both comforting and exalting. ... In the
bedrooms of the most ordinary middle-class Western homes, death
has come to coincide with beauty.69
The beautification of death, with its association of a 'better' existence in heaven
thereafter, was the 'comforting and exalting' thought dominating the account of the
daughter. However, as Aries points out, the beautified death was an 'apotheosis' that
should not blind us to the contradictions it contained; that death was hiding under the
mask of beauty. Indeed, Aries reminded the readers that 'in Christian doctrine and in
ordinary life, death had been seen as a manifestation of evil, an evil that insinuated
itself into life and was inseparable from it'. For Christians, 'death was the moment
of a tragic confrontation between heaven and hell that was itself the most banal
expression of evil'.70
The notion of heaven as a homecoming for the righteous, and hell as a means
of retribution for the wicked, was prevalent at the turn of the nineteenth century. An
article entitled, 'On Judging of the Dead', published in the Edinburgh Christian
Instructor in 1816, deliberated on 'the purposes of religion' as 'better served, by
observing that awe which [gave] confidence to none of the living, and [threw]
11
despair to none but sinners, and [warned] all to flee to God'. The joys and sorrows
in the home of immortality were dwelt in great detail in a 'practical' sermon, from
the manuscript of an anonymous, deceased clergyman in 1815. Perhaps prompted by
his own end, the clergyman's writing was full of details, as what he envisaged would
happen after death: 'the body [was] laid in the grave and [was] dissolved in dust; but
the soul exist[ed] in a separable state, in a capability of misery or happiness'. The
clergyman pronounced death as 'a sad and awful end' for the wicked, for it was the
end of their hopes and the beginning of their eternal misery. The wicked would
'have no more offer of mercy - no farther opportunity of being interested in Christ
and salvation'.72 Judgement followed death immediately, according to this
clergyman. For the wicked, the judgement brought the beginning of their misery,
which was dramatised as:
the gnawing of 'the worm that dies not, and as the burning of fire that
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cannot be quenched'. And the effect of this misery is expressed by
'weeping, and wailing, and gnashing of teeth'.73
For the godly believers, death was pictured as a kind of deliverance on two scores -
firstly, the bodily deliverance from the doom of the material body; and secondly, a
spiritual deliverance for the soul from the trials and toils of this life. 'As the souls of
the believers are made perfect in holiness, so they immediately pass into glory.'74
The doctrine of 'Eternal Torments' was the subject matter by the anonymous
author of Eternal Punishment proved to be Not Suffering but Privation (1817), who
identified himself as 'a member of the Church of England'. According to the author,
the doctrine of 'Eternal Torments' was preached on successive Sundays in the village
where he lived, and the difficulties he had regarding this doctrine prompted him to
his own research on this subject. In his preface, the author declared his former
prejudice in favour of the doctrine of which he now opposed. Overall, the author
gave the impression that he wanted to stay within the folds of the Anglican Church,
but was deeply troubled by the difficulties of the doctrine of 'Eternal Torments'
which was upheld as orthodoxy by the Church. The inclusion of an appendix of
Bishop Jeremy Taylor's Contemplations on the State ofMan provides some ideas of
what the doctrine of 'Eternal Misery' consisted of:
The damned would take it for a great regale to have a dunghill for
their bed, instead of the burning coals of that eternal time.
The tyrants of Japonia bury those who confessed Christ with their
heads downwards, half their bodies in a hole in the earth, filled with
snakes, lizards, and other poisonous vermin; but even those were
better companions than the infernal dragons.
Besides, the bodies of the damned, after the final judgement past,
shall be so crowded together in that infernal dungeon that the holy
scripture compares them to grapes in the wine press, which press one
another till they burst.75
One of the great difficulties experienced by the author in subscribing to the doctrine
of 'Eternal Misery' was its inconsistency with divine goodness. He was aware that
in denying the doctrine of 'Eternal Torments', he might be accused of denying
morality. He laboured over the point that in denying the doctrine of 'Eternal
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inconsistent with divine goodness. The author in no way wanted to challenge the
necessity for morality, but he cast doubts as regards the efficacy of the doctrine of
'Eternal Torments' as a means to enforce morality or to prevent gross sins. His
doubts were crouched in the form of a statement:
To shew that the doctrine is necessary to uphold morality, it must be
proved that it is generally believed, and that, where believed, it is
effectual to this purpose.76
For the purpose of this thesis, the significance of the Eternal Torments was to inform
us of the dissemination of the doctrine as a means to enforce morality. But the
author also rightly pointed out, the efficacy of the doctrine depended upon it being
generally believed. As we shall see later in this section and in the rest of the thesis,
the author was not alone in his doubts; others had questioned, challenged and
rejected such basis of morality wrought by religious fears.
An example from the French materialist was Baron d'Holbach. He
characterised religious morality as a vice because it was 'the art of intoxicating men
with enthusiasm, so as to divert their attention from the evils with which their rulers
load them here on earth'; it was falsity because 'men are made to hope that if they
agree to being unhappy in this world, they will be happier in the next'. In
Christianisme Devoile, d'Holbach advocated natural morality as the ultimate
alternative to religious morality:
Instead of prohibiting debauchery, crime and vice, because God and
religion forbid them, we ought to say that all excess is harmful to
man's conservation, makes him despicable in the eyes of society, is
forbidden by reason, which wants each man to conserve himself, and
is forbidden by nature, which wants him to work for his lasting
78
happiness.
In his attempt to abandon religion and embrace atheism, D'Holbach's mission in his
had managed to make Nature his new religion. To d'Holbach, what would have been
odious as divine purpose became admirable as natural law.
As for Priestley, his doctrine of Necessity seemed to take the middle course
between the conventional moral system based on the doctrine of Eternal Misery on
the one hand, and the atheistic moral determinism of the French materialists on the
76 Ibid., 17.
77 Baron d'Holbach, Christianisme Devoile, quoted by Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century
Background (London, 1940), 161.
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other. Instead of the determinism that could degenerate into moral indifference,
Priestley believed in the perfectability of motives and saw his role as a minister in
exalting his fellow Christians to exert themselves towards moral perfection. By
Necessity, Priestley meant in events where 'will' and 'choice' were supposed to play
a part, there was a kind of mechanism which he likened to the working of a
mechanical device like a balance.
But still, if there be a real mechanism in both cases, so that there can
be only one result from the same previous circumstances, there will be
a real necessity, enforcing an absolute certainty in the event. For it
must be understood that all that is even meant by necessity in a cause,
is that which produces certainty in the effect.79
Once moral mechanism was in place, necessary determinism followed; that is to say,
a person, given his particular state of mind, views of things, and strength of passion,
would always voluntarily make the same choice and come to the same determination.
Priestley's reference to 'fixed laws of nature respecting the will' would be
familiar language to the French materialists. Indeed, Priestley was charged for
atheism on this point. Many, like Priestley's friend, Richard Price, or the Scottish
common-sense philosopher, William Hamilton, would argue that absolute free will
on the part of men to act, in the sense of being held fully accountable for one's
action, was the only basis of morality and where rewards and punishments could be
deemed just. Priestley would argue that if men were not placed in a state of moral
discipline where motives were laid upon them, such scheme of retribution as Price's
lost its effect. For Priestley, God was responsible for laying upon such motives in
men to act in such a way towards the greatest happiness of all; thereby placing men
in a state of moral discipline.
If d'Holbach saw in nature, and Priestley devised the doctrine of Necessity,
for an alternative basis of morality, others had looked to reason as an alternative to
religion for a basis of morality. Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) the French philosopher
who asked whether it was possible for a society of atheists to live together in
harmony, answered in the affirmative.80 Behind this question was the search for an
alternative basis of morality other than religion. Bayle concluded that it was possible
for a society of atheists to live in harmony because they could arrive at a moral code
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by the use of reason. Other seventeenth and eighteenth-century thinkers had asserted
likewise, some of whom were religious men who saw in reason an endowment from
God. For such thinkers, to employ reason as a basis for morality was in no way
contradictory to being a believer. For instance, the remark of the Archbishop of
Canterbury, John Tillotson (1630-94), in 1692 illustrates this point:
Nothing ought to be received as a revelation from God which plainly
contradicts the principle of natural religion. Nothing ought to be
received as a divine doctrine or revelation without good proof that it is
81
so.
John Locke (1632-1704) who postulated on 'thinking matter' had a high regard for
reason as a basis for morality:
Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is capable
of demonstration, as well as mathematics since the precise real
essence congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be
certainly discovered in which consists perfect knowledge.82
David Hartley (1705-57) in Observations on Man (1749) put forward the proposition
that the empirical method employed by Newton to unravel the physical universe
should likewise be employed to unravel the moral universe:
The proper method of philosophising seems to be, to discover and
establish general laws of action, affecting the subject under
consideration, from certain select, well defined and well attested
phenomena, and then to explain and predict the other phenomena by
these laws. This is the method of analysis and synthesis
recommended and followed by Sir Isaac Newton ... It is of the utmost
consequence to morality and religion that the Affections and Passions
(feeling and emotion) should be analysed into their simple
compounding parts, by reversing the steps of the Association which
concur to form them. For thus we may learn how to cherish and
improve good ones, check and root out such as are mischievous and
immoral, and how to suit our manner of life, in some tolerable
measure, to our intellectual and religious wants.83
The same scientistic attitude was adopted by David Hume (1711-1776).
Hume placed himself amongst the list of empirical philosophers like Locke,
Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson and Butler, who had all made some attempts to
work out an empirical science of man. None of these empirical philosophers,
however, had systematised a science of man, which was what Hume set out to
achieve with A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). As the greatest Scottish (and
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British) philosopher, Hume was himself most impressed by another Scottish
philosopher, Hutcheson, in this endeavour. According to Hutcheson, man was
endowed with more than the five senses associated with sense perception, and the
moral sense was one of these additional senses. Just as our sense of taste will discern
whether an orange is sweet or sour, our moral sense will discern in actions those
which tend to happiness and those which tend to unhappiness; and these feelings are
expressed by calling the actions 'good' or 'bad'. It was in this light that Hume
characterised moral evil:
The moral Evil or vice of a given Action is as the degree of misery
and number of sufferers; so that, that Action is best which
04
accomplishes the Greatest Happiness for the Greatest Number.
It was in this respect that Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) found in Hume's
moral theory the inspiration for his doctrine of Utilitarianism. Joseph Priestley
(1733-1804) in his political philosophy, had expressed similar views to those of
Hume's, by stating that 'the "grand criterium" for settling all political questions
should be: 'the good and the happiness of the members, that is to say the majority of
the members, of a State'. Priestley saw in this 'grand criterium' the one general idea,
which when suitably followed up, would throw' the greatest possible light on the
oc
whole system of politics, and of morals, and of theology'. '
This distaste was experienced not just by the author of Eternal Punishment
proved to be Not Suffering but Privation (1817) who could only identify himself as
'a member of the Church of England', but by the protagonists studied in this thesis.
Lawrence was most probably a dissenting Freethinking Christian, who was not
unconcerned with morality, but would have found the enforcement of morality by the
vista of the future state disagreeable and unacceptable. Combe, in his deployment of
phrenology to derive a code of morality based on natural laws. Mary Shelley's
humanist morality was to take rational morality one step further. Her vision of
morality was not based on reason par excellence, but by affirming spirituality as an
essence of humanity, and to assert morality as the outflow of human spirituality.
84 David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature, (1739, Glasgow, 1962), iii: 3, sect.l.
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V
This chapter highlights the inherent differences in the two systems of philosophy
instituted by Plato and Aristotle. Plato influenced the formation of Christian
doctrines, for instance, of the immaterial soul; whereas Aristotle's approach to
knowledge was more directly useful in scientific enquiries. By highlighting the
Platonic origin of religious beliefs on the one hand, and the dominance of the
Aristotelian outlook in scientific enquiries on the other, this chapter helps to build up
the argument that in some cases, where religion was opposing science, the opposition
had its root in the differing approach to knowledge between Plato and Aristotle.
Secondly, a brief sketch of the history of dualism from Plato to Descartes
provides the context to understand French materialism of La Mettrie, d'Holbach, and
Dideort. Their materialism was born out of the extreme dualism in Cartesianism. By
attempting to explain a greater body of living phenomena with the mechanical
philosophy, Descartes paved the way for the French materialists to discard the notion
of an immaterial soul altogether. In rejecting the soul, the French materialists
rejected also the belief of a God as a spiritual being. In the case of the French
materialists, materialism and atheism go hand in hand. In rejecting a religion
founded on the belief of a spiritual God, the French materialists gave Nature the
place of prominence, and in the case of d'Holbach, Nature became his new religion.
In rejecting the contemporary religious morality
Lastly, this chapter has illustrated how the traditional belief in immortality
depended upon the immateriality of the soul. Immortality as a religious concern also
provided the religious basis for a morality in which the scheme of reward and
retribution in the next life were the vehicle for enforcing morals in this life. In this
respect, the immateriality of the soul, the belief in immortality, and the need for a
basis of morality were inter-dependent to the extent that much more was at stake
when the immateriality of the soul was challenged. In establishing this inter¬
dependence, this chapter provides the necessary background to understand the
responses to scientific materialism arising in Britain in the early nineteenth century.
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Two Theories of Life
Life is the result of the organization—and the two are consequently
connected, as cause and effect. ... Organization means the peculiar
composition, which distinguishes living bodies; in this point of view they are
contrasted with inorganic, inert, or dead bodies.
William Lawrence, 18161
[Hunter] inferred that Life was a principle, active in all its functions, that by
acting in various modes and degrees it produced the diversified phaenomena
by which it is characterised. ... that there was a subtle substance belonging
to living bodies, a principle of life, which had the amazing power of kindling
and controlling the destructive element of fire, and regulating the actions of
that still more sudden and powerful agent, electricity.
That organization alone does not produce the functions which belong to life,
must, I think, ... be granted.
John Abernethy, 18172
I
What is the nature of Life? How does matter, of which the body is composed, in
plants, animals and humans, come to exhibit the phenomena of being alive? In other
words, how does inanimate matter become animated? As discussed in the previous
chapter, the varying views on the nature of life as expounded by Plato's Timaeus and
Aristotle's De Anima have influenced the course of discourse on life-matter issues in
western Christendom from Hellenistic to present times. Broadly speaking, Plato
considered the cause of life as attributable to a principle or force totally distinct from
matter. By contrast, Aristotle's theory of life was firmly focused on matter. To
Aristotle, all matter was 'enformed' and he saw the essence of life as ultimately
residing with the combination of matter and form - the organization of matter in the
living body. A succinct summary of the varying positions derived from Plato's and
1 William Lawrence, An Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology (London, 1816), 115
&120.
2 John Abernethy, Physiological Lectures, exhibiting a general view ofMr Hunter's Physiology and of
his Researches in Comparative Anatomy (London, 1817), 29, 34 & 44.
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Aristotle's theories of life was offered by a nineteenth-century physiologist, who
remarked that of all 'the opinions that have yet been enumerated respecting the cause
of vital phenomena, we have met with none in which they are not ultimately ascribed
to one or other of two causes; to a certain organization of the materials of which the
visible structure is composed, or to a principle totally distinct'.3 At the turn of the
nineteenth century, this visible structure was termed 'organization', referring to 'the
peculiar composition which distinguishes living bodies'.4
'Is organization the cause or the effect of life?' This was essentially the
physiological question at the heart of an intense debate that took place between
William Lawrence (1783-1867) and John Abernethy (1764-1831), fellow professors
at the Royal College of Surgeons in London, in the immediate wake of the
Napoleonic wars. Lawrence, the eldest son of a prominent surgeon in Gloucester,
was Abemethy's erstwhile pupil. As was the custom, Lawrence started lodging with
Abernethy from 1799 when he was apprenticed to Abernethy, who was then assistant
surgeon at St. Bartholomew's Hospital. When Abernethy became a lecturer on
anatomy at St. Bartholomew's in 1801, he appointed Lawrence as his demonstrator,
an office which Lawrence held for 12 years until 1814. While still an apprentice to
Abernethy, Lawrence started contributing articles on anatomical and physiological
subjects for Abraham Ree's Cyclopaedia, and continued until the work was finished
in 1820. His erudition was evidenced by his translation of Professor Murray's
Arteries of the Human Body from Latin, published in 1801, and of Blumenbach's
Comparative Anatomy from German, published in 1808-9. His essay on The
Treatment ofHernia was awarded the Jacksonian prize at the College of Surgeons in
1807; and he also contributed to journals like the Edinburgh Surgical and Medical
Journal. Lawrence's progression through the surgical career was swift. In 1813, he
was elected Fellow of the Royal Society, and received his first hospital appointment
as assistant-surgeon at St. Bartholomew's. He was appointed surgeon to London
Infirmary for Diseases of the Eye in 1814, and in 1815, to the Royal Hospitals of
Bridewell and Bethlem. Admitted to membership of the Royal College of Surgeons
in 1805, Lawrence was appointed a professor by the College in 1815, a year after
Abernethy's professorial appointment by the Royal College. Nearly twenty years
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Abernethy's junior, Lawrence became Abernethy's equal colleague at the age of
thirty-two.5
Publicly, Lawrence had acknowledged his 'good fortune to be initiated in the
profession by Mr. Abernethy, and to have lived for many years under his roof. He
assured his audience that 'however highly the public may estimate [Abernethy]', he
had 'reason to speak still more highly of the Man and the Friend'.6 It was no flattery
on Lawrence's part, Abernethy was highly esteemed by his contemporaries, perhaps
far more so than by posterity.7 As a teacher, his lecture course on anatomy at St.
Bartholomew's was so successful that a new lecture theatre was built to
accommodate his classes. Despite his notorious brusqueness, Abernethy's private
practice was a lucrative concern, attracting patients from high society and as far as
from Scotland. Around 1816, Abernethy was probably at the zenith of his career; 'in
addition to a successful school, a large and attached class, a solid and world-wide
o
reputation', he might even have been offered a baronetcy by Lord Liverpool. An
honour Abernethy declined, a decision ascribed to his egalitarian principles by
Macilwain, his biographer and a grateful former pupil. Referring to the controversy
with Lawrence, Macilwain described it as 'the source of much suffering to
Abernethy', especially because Abernethy had been Lawrence's mentor, helping him
to develop his talents and fostered his progress and prospects in life.9
The controversy originated with two Introductory Lectures delivered in
March 1816 by Lawrence as the newly appointed Professor of Anatomy and Surgery,
at the Royal College of Surgeons in London. To an audience of aspiring young
medical students, Lawrence expounded a theory of life based on 'organization',
5
Dictionary of National Biography, 32 (1892), 286-287; and L.S. Jacyna, 'Lawrence, Sir William,
first baronet (1783-1867)', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford, 2004) [accessed 18
Nov 2004: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16191]
6
Lawrence, (1816), 3. Privately, Lawrence described his sojourn with Abernethy as 'an inmate of his
house; that Abernethy 'then resided in a small dirty, gloomy house looking into the Grave Yard of St.
Mildred's Court in the Poultry, with a domestic establishment too mean for a general practitioner of
the present day'. Letter of 25 February 1860, to Abernethy's godson, J.A. Kingdon (1828-1906),
Lawrence's former house surgeon. See John L. Thornton, John Abernethy (London, 1953), 136.
Abernethy moved from Mildred's Court to Bedford Row in October 1799; (Lawrence's
apprenticeship started in February 1799).
7 Three biographies eulogising Abernethy by his near contemporaries exist, while no biographies seem
to have been attempted for Lawrence.
8
George Macilwain, Memoirs of John Abernethy (3rd edn., London, 1856), 169-170. Testimony by
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supporting the claims of the French school of physiology.10 Simply stated, life
resided with the organization of the bodily matter; life was immanent in matter.
Lawrence further praised the French government for their support in the research
efforts of the French zoologists, naturalists and physiologists throughout the
Revolutionary era. In contrast, Lawrence criticised the theory of life of the English
school, based on an invisible vital principle as a 'pretended explanation' that
advanced no understanding, and predicted it would lie 'in cold obstruction among the
rubbish of past ages'.11 Turning to Britain, Lawrence lamented that despite her
colonies and commercial establishments, there were no public provisions to teach
natural science or support research. These introductory lectures, written initially not
with a view to their publication, were printed in consequence of repeated requests for
copies.
Understandably, Abernethy considered Lawrence's 1816 lectures as a direct
affront to his 1814 lectures, given under similar circumstances when Abernethy
succeeded Sir William Blizard as Professor of Anatomy and Surgery. With these
'inaugural' lectures, subsequently published as An Inquiry into the Probability and
Rationality ofMr Hunter's Theory of Life, Abernethy effectively styled himself as
the champion of the Hunterian theory of life based on a vital principle. Not
surprisingly, Abemethy used his 1817 series of lectures as the next available
opportunity to defend the Hunterian theory against the criticism contained in
Lawrence's 1816 lectures. Addressing his audience as 'Gentlemen of the Jury',
Abernethy staged the lecture hall as a courtroom, and assumed the role of 'an
advocate in the cause of Hunter' versus the French school and its English followers
(branded as the 'Modern Sceptics').12 Abernethy represented John Hunter's view as
dependent on the 'vital principle', a subtle substance that animated matter and
prevented the destructive process of decay from happening to the body. His defence
of Hunter's theory was not conducted on scientific grounds alone, but became
conflated with patriotic and moralistic appeals. Hunter was extolled as the founder
of English physiology, and the 'French anatomists and physiologists' were decried
10 The lectures were probably attended by both surgeons-in-training and physicians-to-be.
Abernethy's 1817 lectures addressed the same group of audience concerning 'the education and




Abernethy, Physiological Lectures (London, 1817), 16; especially lectures 1, 2, 6, & 7 for
Abernethy's rebuttal.
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alongside 'French philosophers and wits, which had greatly contributed to
demoralize the people'. His concluding remarks to his 'jury' of medical men
foretold the reprobation that Lawrence was to suffer under the medical
establishment:
Whoever therefore inculcates opinions tending to subvert morality,
benevolence, and the social interests of mankind, deserves the severest
reprobation from every member of our profession, because his
conduct must bring it into distrust with the public.13
Abernethy's 1817 lectures were published as Physiological Lectures,
exhibiting a general view of Mr Hunter's Physiology and of his Researches in
Comparative Anatomy, adding to the corpus of literature that fuelled the debate on
the theory of life. The drama within the four walls of the Royal College of Surgeons
intensified when it was Lawrence's turn to deliver a series of lectures on physiology
in 1818. In fifteen lengthy lectures, Lawrence mounted a robust rebuttal of
Abernethy's charges, substantiating his views with comprehensive accounts of the
latest state of knowledge in physiology and pathology, in comparative anatomy and
the history of species. If Lawrence's 1816 lectures assumed the appearance of
academic impartiality, the tone of his 1818 lectures was overtly confrontational.
Defiant and combative, Lawrence proceeded to clear himself of the allegation of
being a party of the modern Sceptics, 'co-operating with a no less terrible band of
French physiologists, in the diffusion of noxious opinions for the purpose of
demoralizing mankind':
I plead, not guilty. ... Where, Gentlemen! shall we find proofs of this
heavy charge - ... What are the overt acts to prove this treason against
society?... it can only be established by the clearest and most
unequivocal evidence: not by bold assertions and strained inferences -
not by declamatory commonplaces on morals - nor by all the pangs
and complaints of mortified self-love.14
In the preamble to his defence, Lawrence staunchly decried the charges made against
him as an infringement on the freedom of inquiry and speech, and that:
However flattering it may be to my vanity to wear this gown [of a
professor], if it involves any sacrifice of independence, the smallest
dereliction of the right to examine freely ... and to express fearlessly
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Published under the title Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and the Natural
History ofMan in February 1819, these lectures seemed to precipitate 'the severest
reprobation from every member of [his] profession' as Abernethy had forewarned.
By April 1819, Lawrence was suspended from his appointment as surgeon to
Bridewell and Bethlem Hospitals, and was threatened with a similar prospect by St.
Bartholomew's. Reading between the lines from Lawrence's letters to the governors
of the Hospitals, the grounds for the reprobation would appear to relate to the 1819
published lectures, which were considered to be subversive to morality and to the
established Christian faith. Similar charges were levied against Lawrence by the
religious establishment. The Reverend Thomas Rennell (1787-1824), in his office as
the Christian Advocate of the University of Cambridge, published Remarks on
Scepticism in 1819, addressing directly the religious implications of a theory of life
based on organization contained in Lawrence's lectures. Rennell's Remarks
coalesced voices from different sections of society into a religious force in decrying
Lawrence's lectures as seditious and immoral. The drama culminated in a Chancery
lawsuit of 1822, in which Lawrence failed to obtain protection from the law for his
copyright over the 1819 lectures, on the grounds that they were blasphemous, and
could receive no protection of the law.
The controversy was dissipated through Lawrence's resignation from his
professorship, the suspension of his hospital appointments, and the procurement of a
categorical retraction of those of his views which had caused such public outcry.
Consequent to his retraction, Lawrence was reinstated by the hospitals and proceeded
to have a distinguished surgical career, rising to become the Sergeant-Surgeon to
Queen Victoria and was twice elected President of the Royal College of Surgeons.
Public recognition of his achievements was crowned by his baronetcy, conferred
shortly before his death in 1867.
Writing in 1892, Lawrence's biographer in the Dictionary of National
Biography referred to the whole debacle surrounding his 1816 lectures as follows:
the remarks, which at the time excited so much feeling, now seem
commonplace attempts to startle his audience, and are of no
philosophic value.16
Scholarship in the last three decades tends to disagree with the assessment that
16
Dictionary ofNational Biography, op. cit., 286.
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Lawrence's lectures were 'of no philosophic value'.17 In many respects, these
lectures are regarded as providing a crucial link in the development of a truly
scientific physiology in England. Temkin (1963) examines the definition of 'Life' in
the Lawrence -Abernethy debate against the wider European concern for this subject
in the early nineteenth century. Goodfield-Toulmin (1969) gives an account of the
debates over physiological method and explanation for the new-born science at that
time, using the Lawrence episode as a case-study illustration. Wells (1973) studies
the pre-Darwinian ideas on heredity and variation in Lawrence's lectures and
discussed their influence on Darwin. Bynum (1974) devotes a chapter in his thesis
on the 'Chain of Being' to the Lawrence affair, judging it an important episode in
British natural historical sciences in the pre-Darwinian era. Figlio's (1976) masterly
study of the metaphor of 'organization' teases out the philosophical, ideological and
social nuances of the metaphor, illustrating how it supplies the 'scientific'
vocabulary for an ideological dispute in the Lawrence-Abemethy debate. On a wider
front, Jacyna (1983) uses the Lawrence episode to illustrate the two concepts of
transcendence and immanence in cosmic and moral orders that were in currency in
the early nineteenth century. Desmond (1989) examines Lawrence's ideas in the
context of 'dissident' science in the pre-Darwinian era, aligning Lawrence with the
radical social factions whose science was deemed 'politically revolutionary'.
Referring to the growing literature on the Lawrence affair, Corsi (1988) remarks,
'Various commentators have pointed out that the multiform dimensions of this
dramatic debate can only be understood within the context of English social, political
and intellectual life at the end of the Napoleonic wars', but that such an exercise has
not been seriously attempted.18
In response to Corsi's remark, two chapters of this thesis study the Lawrence
episode in the context of science, religion and society in post-Napoleonic England.
17 O. Temkin, 'Basic Science, Medicine, and the Romantic Era', Bulletin of the History ofMedicine,
37 (1963):97-129; J. Goodfield-Toulmin, 'Some Aspects of English Physiology: 1780-1840', Journal
of History of Biology, 2 (1969):283-320; K.D. Wells, 'Sir William Lawrence, A Study of Pre-
Darwinian Ideas on Heredity and Variation', Journal ofHistory of Biology, 4 (1971):319-361; W.F.
Bynum, 'Time's Noblest Offspring: the Problem of Man in British Natural Historical Sciences, 1800-
1863' (Univ. of Cambridge D.Phil.,1974): 111:118-160; K. M. Figlio, 'The Metaphor of Organization:
An Historiographical Perspective on the Bio-Medical Sciences of the Early Nineteenth Century',
History of Science, 14 (1976): 17-53; L.S. Jacyna, 'Immanence or Transcendence: Theories of Life
and Organization in Britain, 1790-1835', Isis 74 (1983):311-329. Adrian Desmond, The Politics of
Evolution, (Chicago, 1989).
18 Pietro Corsi, Science and Religion, Baden Powell and the Anglican Debate, 1800-1860 (Cambridge
1988), 56.
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The reaction of the religious establishment and society at large forms the focus of
discussion in the next chapter, while this chapter addresses the response from the
scientific establishment. The two theories of life as represented by Lawrence and
Abernethy are first discussed, with special reference to their lectures delivered
between 1814 and 1818. This is followed by an analytical review of the two
opposing theories to highlight their substantive differences, and to allow for a critical
assessment of the real issues that were at the centre of the controversy. Finally, this
chapter examines other factors, political, social, and institutional, which helped to
shape the response of the scientific establishment. By concluding that factors other
than the absolute substance of the theories per se had influenced their reception by
the scientific community, it paves the way for a more encompassing discussion of the
social and religious response to the Lawrence-Abernethy debate in the next chapter.
II
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the science of life within the discipline of
'biology', was only at its inception. It was in 1802 that the term 'biology' was first
coined by a German naturalist, Gottfried Reinhold. Lawrence's command of the
scientific literature in German was evidenced by his translation of Blumenbach's
Comparative Anatomy in 1808. It was therefore no coincidence that he was credited
as the first to use 'biology' in English, to denote the study of 'organized beings or
animals and plants, their morphology, physiology, origin, and distribution'. In his
1819 lectures, in preference to the term 'physiology', Lawrence referred to the fact
that 'a foreign writer has proposed the more accurate term of biology, or science of
life', thereby introducing the use of 'biology' in the scientific sense.19 As an
emergent science, biology was still formulating its first principles. The unifying
concept of universal gravity in Newtonian physics, which explained both the
movement of celestial bodies and the motion of earthly objects, became a standard
for other sciences to emulate. For the new science of life at the turn of the nineteenth
19 The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn., on Compact Disc. The very first appearance of biology in
English was in J. Stanfield's Biography in 1813, used in the sense of 'the study of human life and
character', not as the science of physical life.
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century, the search for a unifying concept focused on the nature of life. In other
words, how does matter become alive?
This is the very question at the heart of the life-matter debate, and its history,
stretching from ancient Greece to modern times, is succinctly chronicled by Thomas
Hall in Ideas of Life and Matter. The generic solutions that have been offered are
broadly designated as: (1) Life as identical; (2) Life as imposed; and (3) Life as
organization.20 The first model encompasses all the variations in perceiving life as
immanent in matter. The second model owes its origin to Plato, who 'viewed life-as-
soul as a distinct but nonmaterial entity', bonded to matter and inducing life as an
ensemble of behaviour (life-as-action). The third model is pioneered by Aristotle,
who equated life-as-soul with form, or the special arrangement which permits matter
to become alive. A variation of this is to view life as an emergent consequence of
organization. These three formulations of the life-matter relationship provide a
useful framework for discussing the Lawrence-Abernethy debate.21
In the second of his 1816 Introductory Lectures entitled 'On Life', Lawrence
summarised his views on the subject, which in parts corresponded to Xavier
22Bichat's. The precocious son of a physician, Bichat (1771-1802) was born into a
bourgeois family in Lyon. Trained in surgery, Bichat made significant contributions
to anatomy and physiology in his short life, lived largely against the vicissitudes of
the protean politics during the Revolutionary eras. His study of anatomy founded the
science of histology, and with which he concluded that 'tissue', not organs, was the
more basic structural and organizational unit of the body.23 Behind each visible
tissue, Bichat inferred an invisible 'property' or 'properties.' He viewed life as 'the
20 T. S. Hall, Ideas ofLife andMatter: Studies in the History ofGeneral Physiology 600 B.C. to 1900
A.D., 2 vols. (Chicago, 1969), 1:18-9.
21 Hall actually gives five formulations: (1) Life as identical; (2) Life as immanent; (3) Life as
imposed; (4) Life as organization; and (5) Life as an emergent consequence of organization. Hall
admits that (1) and (2) are not easily distinguishable. As a concept, (4) preceded (5); but the
distinction is important; it is between equating life with organization, or to see life as the result of
organization. Model (5) has prevailed in the post-evolutionary era. Lawrence is a subscriber of (5),
but as the Lawrence controversy did not concern the distinction of (4) and (5), for the current
discussion, the short-hand provided by the three classifications should be sufficient.
22 Lawrence acknowledged both Bichat and Cuvier in his preface. Only Bichat is here discussed,
because Bichat, more than Cuvier, addressed directly the nature of life. Cuvier's influence was more
on the subjects of comparative anatomy, palaeontology, and the fixity of species.
23 Elizabeth Haigh, Xavier Bichat and the Medical Theory of the Eighteenth Century (London, 1984).
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assemblage of those functions which resist "death"',24 and the vital functions are
carried out by the tissues specially modified for such purposes. In the words of a
later French physiologist, Bichat 'decentralised life and incarnated it in the tissues'.25
These strands of Bichat's thought re-appear in Lawrence's lecture 'On Life'. Hailed
as 'a specimen of the most clear and comprehensive logic we have ever read', the
lecture was given an unreserved accolade by the Edinburgh Medical and Surgical
Journal.26 Lawrence starts by defining the science of anatomy as the study of animal
structure and its organization, and physiology, the study of life and its functions. He
proceeds to relate the two disciplines by describing 'functions as offspring of
structure', and that 'Life is the result of the organization'. By organization,
Lawrence means 'the peculiar composition, which distinguishes living bodies'.27 In
Lawrence's system, the world of matter is divided into two classes: 'living and dead'.
Dead matter is all matter inorganic and inert, and 'is governed by physical laws, such
as attraction, gravitation, chemical affinity; and it exhibits physical properties, such
as cohesion, elasticity and divisibility'. He further distinguishes living matter as
follows:
Living matter also exhibits these properties, and is subject in great
measure to physical laws. But living bodies are endowed moreover
with a set of properties altogether different from these... These are the
vital properties or forces, which animate living matter, so long as it
continues alive, are the source of the various phenomena, which
constitute the functions of the living animal body and distinguishes its
history from that of dead matter.28
Vital properties of living bodies, such as sensibility and irritability,
correspond to the physical properties of inorganic bodies, such as cohesion and
elasticity. Lawrence conceives the vital properties as the means by which
'organization is capable of executing its purposes'. These purposes are the functions
'which any organ or system of organs executes in the animal frame; and life is the
assemblage of all functions'. The relationship of the four expressions is summarised
as: 'organization is the instrument; vital properties are the acting power, function is
24 Bichat: ia vie est l'ensemble des functions qui resistent a la mort', from Bichat's Recherches
physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (Paris, 1800); quoted in Thomas Rennell, Remarks on Scepticism
(London, 1819), 60.
25 The comment is by Claude Bernard (1813-1878), a prominent French physiologist who studied life
as a physio-chemical phenomenon; quoted in Hall, op. cit., II: 129.
26
Bynum, op. cit., 125, quoting Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal, 12 (1816): 58-67.
27
Lawrence, (1816), 115.
28 Ibid., 121; italics mine.
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the mode of action, and life is the result'.29 The causal relation between life and
organization is: 'Life is the result of organization - and the two are consequently
related, as cause and effect'.
Crucially however, Lawrence does not explain how matter becomes the living
body in his scheme. Nor is he explicit in stating whether matter is already endowed
with vital properties, or whether the endowment only applies to living bodies. What
is unequivocal is that Lawrence thinks of living bodies as endowed with vital
properties. But to answer at which point vital properties emerge in living matter or
bodies, we have to turn to Lawrence's discussion of the characters of inorganic
substances and living bodies.
The character of an inorganic substance is to be found in the
properties of its integral particles; ... that nature residing completely
in each of the particles of which the whole is an aggregate. Thus a
simple grain of marble has the same characters as an entire mountain.
A living body, on the contrary, derives its character from the whole
mass, from the assemblage of all the parts.30
These comments suggest that matter per se does not possess vital properties in
Lawrence's view. The vital properties do not reside completely in each of the
particles but emerge from the assemblage of all the parts. In other words, new
properties develop from the gathering of the particles as a 'mass', conferring certain
properties on the unit as a whole unattainable from individual particles taken on its
own. 'Organization', for Lawrence, is the process whereby matter becomes living
bodies; ipso facto it is the process of 'organization' which allows vital properties to
emerge in living bodies. In conclusion, matter does not possess vital properties per
se, but that 'living' characteristics of such matter is manifested by dint of
organization. Such an interpretation is consistent with similar assertions in
Lawrence's later lectures:
The distinguishing characters of living beings will be found in their
texture or organization; in their component elements; in their form; in
their peculiar manifestations or phenomena; and in the limits, that is,
in the origin and termination of their vital existence.31
29
Ibid., 120.
30 Ibid., 124; italics mine. Lawrence's view in this respect was advanced for his time and has parallels
in the physical science. Nowadays, there is an increased interest to study physical properties as an
emergent consequence from the 'whole mass'. For instance, one grain of sand does not behave like
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Organization plays two vital roles as an 'instrument', the term used by
Lawrence in his scheme. First, it is the instrument that allows vital properties to
emerge. Secondly, organization is the instrument that maintains life, and vital
properties are 'the means, by which organization is capable of executing its
purposes'; these purposes are the vital functions that sustain life:
Living bodies exhibit a constant internal motion, in which we observe
an uninterrupted admission and assimilation of new, and a
correspondent separation and expulsion of old particles. The form
remains the same; the component particles are continually changing.
While this motion lasts, the body is said to be alive; — when it has
irrecoverably ceased, to be dead. The organic structure then yields to
the chemical affinities of the surrounding agents, and is speedily
destroyed.32
Life is conceived as 'sustained' by a continuous process of assimilation of new, and
expulsion of old, particles. The net effect of this process is to prevent the organic
structure from yielding to the chemical affinities of the surrounding agents. Echoing
Bichat, Lawrence sees life as 'the assemblage of functions that resist death'. To
summarise Lawrence's views: organization configures (potentially) living matter into
living bodies; the configuration allows vital properties to emerge; once the vital
properties are 'activated', they are the means whereby organization executes those
vital functions; these functions sustain life by arresting the process of death - the
process whereby the organic matter yields to the chemical processes of its
surrounding agents.
Granting the internal consistency of Lawrence's system, two important
questions remain unanswered. The first is, between organization and vital properties,
which has primacy? If organization brings vital properties into action, organization
appears to have primacy over vital properties; that is, vital properties depend on
organization to come into action. However, Lawrence also maintains that vital
properties are the means whereby organization executes its purposes. On further
analysis, the dependence of organization on vital properties is a dependence of a
means to an end, whereas the dependence of vital properties on organization appears
to be a sine qua non\ that is, without organization, vital properties cannot be realised.
In this respect, organization does have primacy over vital properties.
The second question, one often raised by Lawrence's critics, is how
organization can be the cause of life, if the arrangement of living matter before and
32 Ibid., 82.
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after death appears to be identical? Lawrence does not seem to have addressed this
question directly. A clue to his likely reply may lie in his conception of the
relationship between vital properties and vital functions, which he describes as:
These vital properties are the causes ofvitalfunctions in the same way
as chemical affinity is the cause of the combinations and
decompositions executed among the component particles of bodies, or
as attraction is the cause of the motion that occurs among the great
masses of matter.33
Taking the assertions as a whole, the logical conclusion is that organization is not the
direct cause of vital functions. Vital functions are directly caused by vital properties.
Organization is the cause of life only insofar as, without organization, vital properties
will not emerge. If death is the cessation of those vital functions that resist
decomposition, death is the point upon which vital properties cease to act. The
arrangement of the bodily matter before and after death remains the same, but at
some point, the vital properties, denoted by Lawrence as 'the acting power', cease to
act. Organization is the cause for vital properties to emerge; but it is not the cause
for vital properties to cease to act. While organization can be described as the
primary cause in the life-maintaining process, causing vital properties to emerge,
which in turn, causes vital functions to take place, it is not responsible for switching
off the 'acting power' of the vital properties. The following assertion from
Lawerence's 1819 lectures reinforces this interpretation.
to call life a property of organization would be unmeaning - it would
be nonsense. The primary and elementary animal structures are
endued with vital properties; their combinations compose the animal
organs, in which, by means of the vital properties of the component
elementary structures, the animal functions are carried on.34
While Lawrence asserts a causal link between organization and life, he does not
assert any link between organization and death. The second question therefore
makes no sense in Lawrence's scheme, for death is not a reversal of organization.
Lawrence explains death as the termination of vital functions, a mechanism built into
the system of life:
The very nature of life is to produce, after a time, which varies in the
different species, a state of the organs incompatible with the
33
Lawrence, (1816), 150; italics mine.
34
Lawrence, (1819), 71.
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continuance of their functions; this mode of termination, by death, is
therefore one of the laws, to which organic beings are subject.35
If Lawrence's views on life and death are acceded to, then the question on the
origin of life-giving functions should centre on why vital properties emerge and why
they cease to act. On the origin of life, Lawrence has made two important remarks.
Positively, he asserts that only living beings can beget living beings, and that the
origin of life lies with the parents:
From these parents, they have received the vital impulse; and hence it
is evident that in the present state of things, life proceeds only from
life and there exists no other but that, which has been transmitted from
or
one living body to another by an uninterrupted succession.
Negatively, Lawrence admits that 'in physiology, as in the physical sciences, we
quickly reach the boundaries of knowledge whenever we attempt to penetrate the
first causes of phenomena'.37 The parallels Lawrence tries to draw between
physiology and physical sciences are made even more specific in relation to vital
properties:
We are thus led to admit the vital properties, ... as causes of the
various phenomena; in the same way as attraction is recognised for the
cause of various physical events. We do not profess to explain how
the living forces in one case, or attraction in the other, exert their
agency.3
In Lawrence's opinion, to ask how the vital forces exert their agency is an ultimate
question that takes us to the boundaries of knowledge. The parallel with Newton is
that Newton has explained how motion is due to gravitational attraction, but has left
the question of the cause of gravity unanswered. Lawrence's counsel in the face of
such ultimate questions is one of acceptance:
The most we can accomplish is, to make gradual conquests from the
territories of ignorance and doubt; and to leave under their dominion
those objects only which our reason has not reached, or is not able to
reach.39
To acknowledge these ultimate boundaries to knowledge is, for Lawrence,
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and unexaminable entities as supposed causes. Lawrence describes an immaterial
vital principle as a 'pretended explanation' and 'a reference to something which
cannot be received as a deduction of science, but must be accepted as an object of
faith'.40 He probably means that given that an immaterial principle cannot be studied
by the methods of science, it is a theory that would not assist in advancing
knowledge. To distinguish between philosophy and science, Lawrence maintains
that he 'only oppose[s] such hypotheses when they are adduced with the array of
philosophical deduction, because they involve suppositions without any ground in
observation and experience, the only sources of our information in these subjects'.41
Lawrence is clear that the future of physiology lies in it being established as a
credible science, as distinct from a discipline for philosophical speculation.
... the science of physiology, in its proper acceptation, is made up of
the facts, which we learn by observation and experiment on living
beings, or on those which have lived; of the comparison of these with
each other; of the analogies which such comparison may discover, and
the general laws to which it may lead.42
Furthermore, an appeal to a vital principle will neither advance physiology as a
science, nor natural theology, for it is again an illustration of man's ready recourse to
a divine being (a 'God of the gaps') when no other explanation is obvious:
... this hypothesis, or fiction of a subtle invisible matter, animating the
visible textures of animal bodies, and directing their motions, is only
an example of that propensity in the human mind, which had led men
at all times to account for those phenomena, of which the causes are
not obvious, by the mysterious aid of higher and imaginary beings.43
Lawrence's acceptance of limits is, nonetheless, tempered by a sanguine
caution that to say 'we can never arrive at the first cause of the vital phenomena
would be presumptuous'. But in the final analysis, his lecture 'On Life' ends in a
note of acquiescence with Lucretius' remark in Latin:
Ignoratur enim quae sit natura anima;
Nata sit, an contra, nascentibus insinuetur,
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta ,
An tenebras orci visat, vastasque lacunas.44







Lawrence, (1816), 178; rendered in English: 'It is not known what the life-soul is by nature,
whether it is born or on the contrary inserted into those being born, and perishes at the same time with
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In Lucretius' terms, Lawrence's view falls loosely into the category that one is born
with the life-soul, and Abernethy's view is that the life-soul is 'inserted into those
being born'. Of the three models for life-matter relations discussed earlier,
Lawrence's theory follows most closely that of life as an emergent consequence of
organization, as a variation of the model pioneered by Aristotle, which equates life
with form. 'Organization' in nineteenth-century physiology referred to the special
'form' whereby matter is arranged to permit it to behave in a 'lively' manner. In
contrast, Abernethy's theory of life, which considers the life-soul as a vital principle
superadded to the material body, is Platonic in origin. The inherent differences
between the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches, between whether life is
transcendent to, or immanent in matter, were at the heart of the disagreement
between Abernethy and Lawrence in this debate.
Ill
In propounding a theory of life based on a vital principle, Abernethy insisted that he
was upholding Hunter's theory of life. John Hunter (1728-1793) was the last runt of
thirteen children born to a Tittle laird' in Long Calderwood, near East Kilbride; only
seven of the children survived their parents. Partly due to his poor constitution,
Hunter was largely self-taught. Brother William, John's senior by ten years, had a
more formal education and the fortune to be apprenticed to the celebrated Scottish
physician, William Cullen. It was through the tutelage of his brother William that
John became a surgeon, with his own practice. Outside surgery hours, John the
anatomist dissected and classified; at death, his anatomical collections were of a
scale worthy of a museum. Hunter the physiologist published treatises on diseases
and offered private lectures; it was through attending these lectures that Abernethy
became his disciple.45
But the so-called Hunterian theory of life, which Abernethy so staunchly
defended as 'not only probable and rational, but also verifiable', was to Lawrence,
'no where to be found in the published writings of John Hunter'.46 Abernethy's
us, rent apart by death, or whether it visits the darkness of Hades, and the vast watery depths.'
Lawrence's erudition is evidenced by his wide-ranging knowledge of the literature on life-matter
issues and allusions to ancient and foreign philosophers.
45 See John Kobler, The Reluctant Surgeon (London, 1960).
45
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exposition remains an interpretation of Hunter's ideas, interpolated with his own
opinions on the subject. The interpolation was perhaps inevitable, given that Hunter
was not renowned to be a clear writer, a deficiency Lawrence attributed to Hunter's
'unfortunate want of early education'.47 Abernethy admitted that there was 'an
48
obscurity in Mr Hunter's writings, the result even of perplexity of thought'. This
perplexity remained evident to the anonymous reviewer of Edinburgh Review, whose
forthright criticism of Abernethy's 1814 lectures, published as An Enquiry into the
Probability and Rationality ofMr Hunter's Theory ofLife, was unsparing:
... really these Lectures appear to us exceedingly deficient, both in
sound reasoning and good taste;. They are a collection of bad
arguments, in defence of one of the most untenable speculations in
physiology; interspersed with not a little bombast about genius, and
electricity, and Sir Isaac Newton.49
The Quarterly Review, a Tory answer to the Whig Edinburgh Review, published a
lengthy survey by the Reverend George D'Oyly, of the major literature in the
Lawrence-Abernethy debate up to July 1819.50 D'Oyly praised Abernethy as 'a
medical gentleman of the highest eminence'; and endorsed his espousal of Hunter's
theory of life, which D'Oyly paraphrased as 'some principle of activity added by the
will of Omnipotence to organized structure', as a theory to 'which our reason can
carry us'.51 D'Oyly was meriting the theory for its ability to support the religious
belief of an immortal soul superadded to the body, allowing scope for an Omnipotent
God to be the First Cause. As a scientific theory, the Edinburgh Review judged that
it was of little merit, but as D'Oyly pointed out, Abemethy's theory was the one that
could easily be made to dovetail with the religious belief of an immortal soul.
Despite the logical flaws apparent in Abemethy's exposition of life, it deserves an
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religious and scientific establishments, in a crucial period of intellectual history for
the development of life science in England.
As if to clear the grounds, Abernethy's exposition of Hunter's theory in his
1814 lectures began by refuting the theory of life based on organization:
In surveying the great chain of living beings, we find life connected
with a vast variety of organization, yet exercising the same functions
in each; a circumstance from which we may I think naturally
conclude, that life does not depend on organization.52
Abernethy's interpretation on 'organization' seemed to be guided by a similar claim
in Hunter's Essays and Observations, published posthumously in 1861:
In contradiction to organization being a cause, we find in general that
the least organized are the most tenacious of life. ... the most
imperfect animals are the most difficult to be killed, when the actions
of the parts are stopped upon which life is continued. But this is not
constantly so, therefore peculiarity of organization is not the least
necessary.53
Hunter continues by giving a 'still stronger proof that organization is not essential to
life' - 'that different animals with the same organization are very different with
respect to their being easy or difficult to be killed by the stoppage of those operations
that continue life'. For instance, an eel will live out of water for many days, while a
mackerel dies instantaneously.54
Both Bichat and Hunter were famous for their anatomical labours as the basis
of their knowledge; yet the two masters drew very different conclusions from their
studies. Bichat, in the Aristotelian fashion, focused on matter and its form, and
concluded that life was dependent on organization. Hunter, in the Platonic cast,
deduced that life could not have been caused by organization; that the study of the
structure of living bodies would not yield the secret of life, for the simplest life-forms
were actually the most tenacious of life. Hunter's observations led him to assert that
'whatever Life is, it most certainly does not depend upon structure or organization'. 5
The size of Hunter's anatomical collections justifiably lent him authority when he
drew conclusions about the phenomena of life from his studies.50
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53 Hunter, Essays, 1:114.
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55 Ibid., 1:114, italics mine.
56 Hunter's anatomical collections conferred on the Royal College of Surgeons consisted of 10,563
specimens; those subsequently added by the College amounted to 12,347 as in 1846. Lawrence,
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Chapter 3 Two Theories of Life 80
However, the structural view of organization by Hunter the anatomist has to
be balanced against other levels of organization identified by Hunter the
physiologist. In Principles of Surgery, Hunter discusses life and organization in a
way, which suggests that his view of organization on another level is closer to
Lawrence's than Abernethy has appreciated.
Animal matter is endowed with a principle called ... life; ... [which]
appears to be something superadded to this peculiar modification of
matter; or this modification of matter is so arranged that the principle
of life arises out of the arrangement, and this peculiar disposition of
parts may be destroyed, and still the modification, from which it is
called animal matter, remains the same.57
It appears that there are three levels of organization in Hunter's terminology: (1)
modification, (2) arrangement, and (3) structure. In Surgery, Hunter spoke of matter
as something which could be differently modified and arranged. In Essays, Hunter
discusses matter as differently structured. By modification, Hunter means the way
matter is organized into different life forms, for instance, into vegetable or animal.
He dismisses the possibility of life emerging from modification because at point of
death, that peculiar modification that has fashioned matter into different life forms
remains unchanged. Hunter concludes, therefore, 'that the principle called life
cannot arise from the peculiar modification of matter, because the same modification
exists where this principle is no more'.58 Likewise, Hunter dismisses the possibility
of life emerging at the gross anatomical level based on structure, as pertaining how
different parts of an animated body are assembled. In respect of these two levels of
organization, Hunter's position is 'vitalist'; in that it looks on life as imposed - or
superadded - and not as emergent.59 However, Hunter admits that it is conceivable
that in certain living bodies, matter is 'so arranged, that the principle of life arises out
of the arrangement'. Tentatively, Hunter continues in the following vein:
If the latter be the true explanation, this arrangement of parts, on
which life should depend, would not be that position of parts
necessary to the formation of a whole part or organ [at the anatomical
level], ... but just a peculiar arrangement of the most simple particles,
57 John Hunter, Lectures on the Principles of Surgery, in The Works of John Hunter, ed. James
Palmer, 4 vols. (London, 1835), 1:221-2. Volume I contains a biography of Hunter by Palmer, and
Lectures on Surgery, delivered in 1786 and 1787 by Hunter. The texts are based on the short-hand
notes of Nathaniel Rumsey of Chesham, complete with examples, which led the editor to suppose that
Rumsey had access to the Hunterian manuscript. Volumes II-IV are a collection of Hunter's
published treatises, with editor's notes.
58 Hunter, Surgery, 221.
59 See discussion in Hall, Ideas ofLife and Matter, II: 111-2.
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giving rise to a principle of preservation; so that matter so arranged
could not undergo any destructive change till this arrangement were
destroyed, which is death.60
Hunter's speculation on organization at the corpuscular level as 'a peculiar
arrangement of the simplest particles, giving rise to a principle of preservation' is in
fact close to Lawrence's definition of organization 61. As a follower of Bichat, who
pioneered the science of histology, Lawrence probably looked at tissues as the most
fundamental units. Hall's summary of Lawrence's views seems to confirm this: 'The
uniqueness of living systems resided, according to Lawrence, in the properties of
their textures or tissues, these properties permitting life-as-action. He saw the
properties of each tissue as correlated with its distinctive (physicochemical)
organization'.62
Abernethy would appear to understand Hunter's view on organization only on
the structural level, and refuted organization as the cause of life based on the
observations yielded by comparative anatomy. Though Lawrence perceives
organization as more than mere structure, he argues that 'comparative anatomy
affords the strongest and most numerous proofs of the dependence of function on
structure'. To Lawrence, 'every variation of the construction of an organ is
accompanied with a corresponding modification of function, and whenever an organ
ceases to exist altogether, its office also ceases'. For Abernethy, 'the natural
inference to be drawn from this great chain of being' is that 'life must be something
independent of organization, since it is able to execute the same functions with such
diversified structure, and even in some instances with scarcely any appearance of
organization at all'.64 A comment from Abernethy's 1817 lectures further confirms
this: 'Those who think the phenomena of life depend on organization, must
necessarily suppose as many kinds of life as of structures, and still assign no cause to
the production of such structures'.65 A structural view of organization was reiterated
in the Abernethy's 1819 Hunterian Oration: 'Mr Hunter was convinced that life was
not the result of organization; and though many may have conjectured life to be
something not dependent on structure, Mr Hunter was the first who deduced the
60
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opinion'.66 To Abernethy, life is something independent of structural organization,
and that something is what Abernethy calls the vital or living principle.
In Abernethy's interpretation, Hunter 'inferred that Life was a principle,
active in all its functions, that by acting in various modes and degrees it produced the
f\7
diversified phenomena by which it is characterised'. Hunter's own words on the
living principle are not particularly illuminating. In Surgery, Hunter states that
animal matter is endowed with a principle called life. He reasons that since life does
not arise from modification, life then appears 'to be something superadded to this
peculiar modification of matter'. In Essays of Observations, Hunter describes the
living principle as 'not simply diffused, but it is combined, or makes one of the
constituent parts of the whole, and the variety of action arises from the construction
of the parts'.68 To the question 'How do parts of a living body grow into one
another', Hunter's reply is:
I should suppose that this is entirely owing to the simple Living
Principle; that whenever two parts which have an affinity ... come
into contact, ... the effect on both must be the same, ... The result of
which is, that they come into mutual opposition, vessel to vessel, and
the two become one substance.69
Hunter's remarks suggest that he considers the living principle the key to building
matter into a living body. His views on matter shed light on what the role of the
living principle may be. 'The universe has been divided into Matter and Spirit',
according to Hunter:
Matter being endowed with properties which become the cause of our
sensations, and the modes of action of those properties being hardly
known, these properties become the foundation of the idea of spirit,
66
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viz. a species of intelligent quality that presides over and directs the
actions of Matter.70
Hunter then comments on the distinction between common and animal matter. In the
former, that as 'causes and effects of matter seem to be entirely connected with
matter itself, and to be a property inherent in and inseparable from it, ... the
presiding 'spirits' are every day vanishing'. However, 'because the action of animal
matter is much more extensive and has two states, — the living and the dead; and as
there is no difference in the visible mechanism between the two states, it was natural
71
to suppose that there was what is called an animating or living spirit'. Inferring
from these comments, the animating spirit is the intelligent quality that presides over
and directs the actions of living matter. It is something superadded to animal matter
when it is alive, and absent when it is dead. Hunter admits that 'this simple principle
of life can with difficulty be conceived', and he proceeds to draw parallels between
'this simple principle' and magnetism:
... but to show that matter may take on new properties without being
altered in itself as to the species of matter, .... Perhaps magnetism
affords us the best illustration we can give of this. A bar of iron
without magnetism may be considered like animal matter without life;
set it upright and it acquires a new property, of attraction and
repulsion, at its different ends.72
Hunter's analogy of the living principle with magnetism would appear to
have heavily influenced Abernethy in his interpretation of the vital principle. In his
1814 lectures, Abernethy aims 'to show that Mr Hunter's Theory of Life was
verifiable, and that it afforded the most rational solution of the cause of irritability,
which had hitherto been offered to the public'.73 The property of irritability is
crucial in Abernethy's understanding of living matter. He reasons that all common
matter has the property denoted by Newton as vis inertiae, namely, 'an indisposition
to move unless compelled to motion, and a disposition to continue in motion unless
retarded'.74 Irritability counteracts vis inertiae, and is the singular sign that the
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... is the effect of some subtile, mobile, invisible substance,
superadded to the evident stmcture of muscles, or other forms of
vegetable and animal matter, as magnetism is to iron, and as
electricity is to various substances with which it may be connected.75
Since common matter is inert, there is 'the necessity of supposing the superaddition
of some subtile and mobile substance'.76 He asserts that 'Mr Hunter doubtless
thought', that 'in magnetic and electric motions, as subtile invisible substance, of a
very quickly and powerfully mobile nature, puts in motion other bodies which are
77
evident to the senses, and are of a nature more gross and inert'. Abernethy seems
to have identified the living principle as the 'subtile, mobile, invisible substance';
and he draws a close analogy between this invisible substance and electricity as
follows:
Electricity may be attached to, or inhere, in a wire; it may be suddenly
dissipated, or have its powers annulled, or it may be removed by
degrees or in proportions, ... So life inheres in vegetables and
animals; it may sometimes be suddenly dissipated, ... though in
general it is lost by degrees, ... The motions of electricity are
characterised by their celerity and force; so are the motions of
irritability. The motions of electricity are vibrating; so likewise are
those of irritability.78
To Abernethy, the phenomena of life denoted by irritability closely
79
corresponded to those phenomena on dead 'living-matter' procured by electricity.
Indeed he comes close to identifying the vital principle as electricity by suggesting:
If the vital principle of Mr. Hunter be not electricity, at least we have
reason to believe it is of a similar nature, and has the power of
80
regulating electrical operations.
However, elsewhere in his 1814 lectures, Abernethy inserts his caveat that 'it is not
meant to be affirmed, that electricity is life'.81 Rather, he maintains that by
comparing the vital substance with electricity, it might be possible 'to prove that Mr
Hunter's Theory is verifiable'. The power of electricity is verifiable though its
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irritability in living matter, by analogy to electricity, can also attain the status of
being verifiable:
... by shewing that subtile substance [that is, electricity] of a quickly
and powerfully mobile nature seems to pervade every thing, and
appears to be the life of the world; ... therefore it is probable that a
similar substance pervades organized bodies, and produces similar
effects in them.82
In his 1817 lectures, Abernethy perhaps makes it somewhat clearer that not only does
he not mean 'to affirm that electricity is life', but that he thinks the vital principle is
able to regulate the power of electricity:
If science were eventually to demonstrate that heat, light and
electricity are different things, that there are various kinds of subtile
substances, then I should be obliged to suppose that there was also a
subtle substance belonging to living bodies, a principle of life, which
had the amazing power of kindling and controlling the destructive
element of fire, and regulating the actions of that still more sudden
and powerful agent, electricity. 3
In the final analysis, Abernethy probably thinks that the relationship between
electricity and the vital principle is one of similarity rather than identity. What is
clear, however, is that the idea of the vital principle being electricity or like
electricity is Abernethy's and not Hunter's.
Lawrence was scathing in his critique of Abernethy's hypothesis which
likened vital principle with electricity:
It is singular also that the vital principle should be like both
magnetism and electricity, when these two are not like each other. ...
The truth is, there is no resemblance, no analogy between electricity
and life: the two orders of phenomena are completely distinct; they are
incommensurable. ...Electricity illustrates life no more than life
illustrates electricity. We might just as well say that an electrical
machine operates by means of a vital fluid, as that the nerves and
muscles of an animal perform sensation and contraction by virtue of
an electric fluid. ... Identity and similarity of cause can only be
inferred from identity or resemblance of effect.84
In his 1819 lectures, Lawrence denounced the 'electro-chemical doctrine of life', and
stated that he could not 'adopt this hypothesis until some proof or reasoning of a very
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supposition that the body contained an invisible matter or principle was, to
Lawrence, driven by the wish to 'draw aside the veil from nature, to display the very
essence of the vital properties and to penetrate their first causes'. His critique of vital
principle represented the other side of his argument that one should be content to
stop at the point of reaching questions of the first causes.
Though Lawrence did not name Abernethy as the author of the theory that he
publicly discredited, the reference was plain for all to deduce. In the very same
lecture theatre that Lawrence decried the 'vital principle' in 1816, Abernethy had
postulated his Hunterian Theory of Life in 1814. Not only had Lawrence discredited
Abemethy on a professional level, but judging from the course of the debate, wider
issues were at stake for Abernethy than mere personal honour bound up with his
espousal of a theory that was being discredited by his erstwhile pupil.
IV
When Abemethy delivered his 1814 lectures, no one had the assurance of an
imminent closure of the long-lasting state of enmity that had existed between Britain
and France. When Lawrence delivered his lectures in 1816, the decisive victory of
Waterloo had assured a more long-term peace with France, but anti-French
sentiments, that had been part of the national psyche for over a quarter of a century,
remained strong in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. Lawrence's 1816 lectures were
given against the economic distress of the post-war depression in which rioting was
common, and the fear of Jacobinism was intensified by the riots spreading from rural
countryside to industrial areas. Patriotism apart, Lawrence's Francophile sentiments
liberally expressed in his 1816 lectures, however sincere they might be, were ill
judged.
His admiration for the achievements of individual French scientists was
coupled with his praises of the foundation of such institutions as the Academie
Royale des Sciences, and of the Jardin des Plantes, a botanical and zoological
museum, which were expressly supported by the French government. The twenty
volumes of the Annals of the Museum of Natural History, completed by French
naturalists in just a few years, represented to Lawrence 'one of the most valuable
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accessions that zoology had ever received'. A voyage of discovery to New Holland
and the adjacent countries was commissioned by the French government which
enabled Peron to seal his achievements in natural history by obtaining over 2,500
new species and more than 100,000 animal specimens. In a footnote to his 1816
lecture, Lawrence remarked that 'for the advancement of natural knowledge, and the
uniform encouragement of talent', 'science will ever be indebted to the late French
government'.87 Furthermore, Lawrence's eulogy of the French establishments was
juxtaposed against some scathing remarks of their English counterparts:
I return to our own country, and am ashamed to find, that although her
colonies and commercial establishments are found in every region and
every climate, we have no collection of living animals, no museum of
natural history, no public institution for teaching natural sciences...
what excuse shall we find for the modem universities as they are
called, of a nation [which] fancies itself the most enlightened in
Europe?88
Lawrence's declaration of Francophile sentiments at the expense of the English
establishments seemed to have excited Abemethy to retaliate for patriotic reasons. In
styling himself as the custodian of Hunter's legacies, Abemethy acted as if he were
defending a national heritage. He pleaded to his 1817 audience 'for the restitution of
a great and accumulated income of reputation' due to Hunter for his literary and
intellectual properties that Lawrence had defamed.89
While Lawrence was correct in stating that the state support in France had
greatly advanced the knowledge of life science in the half-century before the end of
the Napoleonic wars, Abernethy was keen to stress that it was wars that had
motivated such a support. Louis XIV, 'from being continually engaged in war',
seemed first to 'have clearly discerned the nature and importance of surgery, and the
proper measures by which it might and ought to be promoted'. Apart from
establishing hospitals, colleges, and professorships, the government of Louis XIV
also decreed that 'bodies for dissection should be liberally supplied'.90 This state of
affairs continued under the Revolutionary government. An entry in Bichat's
Recherches Physiologiques illustrates the support of the French government in this
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protean period of French politics and that it was not without an extra gruesome
aspect: 'I had authority, during the winter of the year 7 (1798) to make different
experiments upon the bodies of those guillotined. They were at my disposal thirty or
forty minutes after the execution'. In less than six months, he had dissected over 600
bodies.91 To Lawrence's charge that he was 'blinded by national prejudice to the
merits of persons of other countries', Abernethy's retort was:
The sons of science may more particularly be regarded as of one
family, and their residence in different countries cannot annul their
fraternity. Yet surely it is allowable in one to suppose that the notions
of our brother physiologists in France may have been influenced by
the state of public opinion in that country.9"
Though not explicitly stated, it would appear that in Abernethy's mind, the state
support of the French government for its scientists might have the tendency of
'corrupting' the science, and it was legitimate to hold French physiology and French
politics as equal suspects. In Abernethy's 1817 lectures, there was next to no
discussion of the French school of 'Life-as-organization' on scientific grounds,
instead moral arguments were employed in denouncing the French school:
That in France, in a nation where the writings both of its philosophers
and wits have greatly contributed to demoralize the people, I do not
therefore wonder that those of their anatomists and physiologists
should represent the subject of their studies in a manner conformable
to what is esteemed most philosophical or clever.93
What Abernethy failed to note was that the political conduct of the French
scientists was singular amongst all the groupings of intellectuals, such as writers,
artists, or philosophers. The historian Charles Gilliespie highlights that the French
scientists at the end of the ancien regime were the only group who were 'pressed into
the service of each successive regime', without regard to their political distinctions of
left and right, or of liberty and tyranny. The state wanted 'instrumentalities, powers
but not power' from the scientists. The scientists wanted support in the form of
funds, instutitionalization, and authority for the legitimation for its existence and
activities, — in short, professional status. Between the French government and her
scientists, the relationship was 'one of partnership', not 'partisanship'. In return of
their uncritical support to the government, the French scientists received increasing
91 Bichat, Recherches Physiologiques sur la vie et sur la mort (Paris, 1800); quoted in S. Vasbinder,
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institutional benefits from each successive government.94 In decrying his 'brother
physiologists in France' along with their government, Abernethy was probably
unaware of the fact that he himself was pursuing quite the same agenda as his French
counterparts. In defending Hunter's theory, Abernethy was explicit that he was
defending national honour. Other more practical concerns, however, were
inextricably linked with this line of defence - state support, institutional image, and
professional respectability were amongst the ultimate motives as well.
Hunter's lifetime work, epitomised by his anatomical collections, was a
statement of the incredible feat of an individual, and of the lamentable absence of
state support in such an enterprise. Apart from hours of personal labour, the 10,500
anatomical specimens had cost Hunter some £10,000, not to mention the lease of the
land and the construction of a building to house his collections. Not surprisingly,
when Hunter died in 1793, there was not enough left in the estate to support his
family without selling his collections. Hunter provided that the museum was to be
first offered to the British nation on reasonable terms, and if the British state refused,
then to some foreign state, or in one lot by auction. When the collections were
offered to Parliament for purchase, Mr Pitt, then the Prime Minister, was reputed to
have said, 'What! buy preparations; I have not money to buy gunpowder'.95
Parliament eventually took an interest in hearing evidence that the collection was
worth much more than the £15,000 offer price, and the sum was eventually voted by
Parliament in June 1799.
The procurement of Hunter's anatomical collections represented the first
major step in securing the government's support for the science Hunter came to
represent. By trade, however, Hunter was a surgeon; and surgeons in 1800 enjoyed
neither the institutional standing nor the professional respectability of the physicians.
The disparity in respectability between physic and surgery was evidenced by the fact
that a physician 'never demeaned himself by attempting, or wishing, to practise
surgery, though legally he possessed the right to do so'.96 The response towards
Hunter's collections from the elite scientific community spoke of their disdain
towards Hunter's trade. The President of the Royal Society judged that Hunter's
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museum was not 'an object of importance to the general study of natural history',97
and the Royal College of Physicians refused the gift of the Hunterian collections
when first offered by Parliament. On their refusal, the collection was then offered to
the Corporation of Surgeons. It was no coincidence that the turn of fortune for the
surgical community happened with the conferment of the Hunterian museum.
Parliament had no wish to finance the maintenance of the museum after
laying out the capital in procurement. It was probably a relief to the government
after the refusal of the Royal College of Physicians to find a keeper in the
Corporation of Surgeons. James Palmer, Hunter's first biographer, remarked that
during this period, the company's funds were 'in an extremely low state; nor were
the fame and public reputation of the body in a much more flourishing condition'.
Nonetheless, the Council still cast the unanimous vote on 23 December 1799, to
no
accept the Museum on the terms proposed by the Government. As a means to raise
the finances for the upkeep of the Collection, the Corporation of Surgeons applied
for a new charter from the Crown, which would entitle them to be a Royal College,
with permission to examine for diplomas. One could argue that the conferment of
the museum was the cause for the granting of the Royal Charter on 22 March, 1800.
Speaking of the increase of public reputation, and consequent wealth, Palmer
remarked that this 'must no doubt mainly be attributed to the celebrity which
necessarily accrued to the College from possessing a new charter, and from being
appointed the public guardians of the Hunterian Collection'.99 It would be no
exaggeration to suggest that the Royal Charter was granted in consequence of the
guardianship of the Hunterian museum. In this respect, Lawrence echoed Palmer's
assessment. Speaking of the Hunterian Museum, Lawrence publicly commented:
the magnificent and invaluable collection [of Hunter] ... finally
rescued surgery from the state ... of a mechanical and subordinate
department of the healing art, and have elevated it to its proper rank of
an independent science.100
97 'John Hunter', Dictionary ofNational Biography, 28 (1892): 287.
98 James Palmer, The Life ofJohn Hunter, op. cit., 1:142.
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the granting of the diplomas were no less than £11,116 per annum, and the costs for maintaining and
augmenting the Collection, up to August 1833, were upwards of £36,000.
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Lawrence was referring to the emerging respectability of the surgeons as a class of
professionals on a par with the gentlemen-physicians. In view of these comments, he
was perfectly aware of the social agenda for the surgical community to safeguard the
Hunterian legacies, in the form of his museum, and his intellectual property, which
had conferred this elevation in status upon the hitherto 'barber-surgeons' of the
manual order.
At the turn of the nineteenth century, English society was a 'finely graded
hierarchy' in which 'the crucial divide in this scale was between the "gentleman" and
the "commoner"'.101 The former did no manual work, while the latter worked with
their hands. The physicians, clergy and lawyers belonged to the gentle rank along
with the landed class. Physic required an education which cultivated the mind; their
governing institution had been granted a Royal Charter since 1663.102 The physicians
were normally graduates, and typically recruited from amongst the second sons of
the gentry or the sons of clergy. An exclusive class of professionals, the physicians
virtually had a monopoly in providing medical care for the rich.103 By contrast,
surgery had been a trade; and the 'barber-surgeons' were commoners, manual
workers of the artisan class; entry into the trade required only training for manual
skills through apprenticeship, not an education of the mind; the governing institution
was 'The Company of Surgeons of London', not a 'Royal College'. When
Abernethy gave the Hunterian Oration in London in 1819, he asserted that the 'co¬
partnership between surgery and shaving [had] been but newly dissolved in this
country.'104 The origin of barber-surgery stemmed from medieval times, when the
priests were the principal physicians. The priests employed the barbers who shaved
their heads according to the uniform of their order, and to also shave the heads of
their patients. The priest-physicians taught the barbers to bleed and perform little
operations with their edged tools. The image of surgery as a manual art persisted for
101 L.S. Jacyna, 'Images of John Hunter in the Nineteenth Century', History ofScience, 21 (1983): 85-
108,95-6.
102 Harold Cook, The Decline of the Old Medical Regime in Stuart London (Cornell, 1986), 137. The
royal association for the College of Physicians came with the new charter written on 23 January 1633,
which passed the Privy Seal in March, styling the College as 'King's College of Physicians in the City
of London'.
103 In 1800, the number of physicians recognised by the Royal College in London was very small, just
a few hundred in a population of about eight and a quarter million. The fees they could charge were
high - fifty guineas for a visit to the country; successful practitioners could amass large fortunes. See
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three centuries, and perhaps in an attempt to separate the two trades, the Company of
Barber-Surgeons in London renamed itself the Corporation of Surgeons in London in
1745. But it was the Royal Charter in 1800 granted by King George III that finally
conferred the much-coveted status of 'Royal College' to 'The Corporation of
Surgeons'. In Abernethy's mind, John Hunter had done more than any other man in
elevating surgery to a profession, and in turn, the social status of the surgeons.105
Secondly, Abemethy credited Hunter's anatomical studies for laying the
foundations of comparative anatomy and physiology in Britain. Hunter's
postulations, embodied in his literary remains, were respected by all, and revered by
some like Abernethy. To defend Hunter's ideas was no less than defending the new
respectability of surgery as a scientific study, and the means with which surgery
could cast off the stigma of its manual association. On the one hand, the 'vital
principle' as the theory of life ascribed to Hunter formed part of his legacies for the
community of surgeons; and to safeguard the Hunterian legacies was a remit
motivated by both professional interest and indebtedness to Hunter. On the other
hand, the budding respectability that the surgical profession was enjoying in the post-
Napoleonic era could have been easily tarnished by any speck of support for the
French school. The victory of Waterloo did not remove the deep-seated distrust of
the French; this distrust permeated all aspects of life, from philosophy to literature,
from manners to amusement. In 1815, a British Critic reviewer of the two-volume
work by Hookman, entitled Paris Chit-Chat, or a view of the Society, Manners,
Customs, Literature and Amusements of the Parisians, fully approved of the tone of
English superiority adopted by Hookman over the 'corrupt flippancy of the French'.
The reviewer drew attention to the 'hideous change' in the national character of
France in the space of twenty-five years of war, and concluded that 'Napoleon was
adored [by the French] not so much as he flattered their vanity, but as he satisfied
their rapacity'. The chief effect related of the hideous change in the French character
on Britain was:
... that it has preserved the purity of our own; that we return to our
native shores with the dignified simplicity of our native character
unencumbered with the frippery and frivolity of ancient days.106
105 See Geoffrey Holmes, Augustan England: Professions, State and Society, 1680-1730 (London,
1982), for other factors that contributed to the professionalization of surgery.
106 British Critic, 3 (N.S. 1815): 517-526, 525.
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Echoing the tone of the British Critic reviewer, Abernethy stressed the English as the
bastion of good sense against any French influence. France was described as 'a
nation where the writings both of its philosophers and wits have greatly contributed
to demoralize the people', and the studies of the French physiologists and anatomists
as showing 'pernicious tendency'.107 The respectability of the surgical profession
depended upon the collective action of all its members in maintaining the trust of the
public as 'sober-minded, moral and benevolent'; promoting French physiological
ideas would have been antithetical to this end.
Finally, there was a moral dimension to the Lawrence-Abernethy debate that
went beyond the scientific merits of the respective theories of life being defended.
Lawrence objected vehemently to the charge of being a member of a party of
'modern sceptics, co-operating in the diffusion of noxious opinions' with a 'terrible
band of French physiologists, for the purpose of demoralizing mankind'.108
Lawrence maintained that 'to fair argument and free discussion, [he would] never
object, even if they should completely destroy [his] own opinions.' But in
Abernethy's charges against him, Lawrence considered that argument had been
abandoned, and 'its place supplied by an enquiry into motives, designs, and
tendencies', and the case was altered.109 To Lawrence, Abernethy had conjoined the
debate of a scientific theory with morality. However, the case of linking the study
and education of science with morality was advanced not only by Abernethy, but by
Lawrence as well. In his 1816 lectures, Lawrence was emphatic in assigning a moral
agenda to the study of science:
The contemplation of nature, however, is not recommended solely by
its reference to intellectual objects; it exerts a beneficial and important
influence on the moral dispositions. ... Its innocent pleasures are well
calculated to detach us from the frivolous and destructive pursuits of
dissipation or debauchery.110
Regarding the education of his audience, Lawrence expressed his gratitude to
Abernethy and his predecessor, 'on public grounds for the pains they have taken to
improve surgical education', and consequently 'the respectability of surgeons'.1"
Given the political context of 1816, and the significance of the Hunterian legacies to
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the institutional standing of the Royal College of Surgeons, it should have come as
no surprise to Lawrence that his 1816 and 1819 lectures should have incited 'the
severest reprobation from every member of [his] profession'. The moral
respectability to be conferred upon his own profession through upholding the
Hunterian legacies would appear to be a sentiment that Lawrence eventually came to
share in his later career. In 1846, Lawrence delivered the Hunterian Oration with the
following pronouncement:
Surgery ... and every part of medical science has felt the vivifying
influence of the physiological principles emanating from the bold and
inventive genius of Hunter.112
It was a pronouncement that could have come from Abernethy. In fact, Lawrence
and Abernethy had equally stressed the role of surgical education as a vehicle to
build up the moral character of the young entering the profession; and that the
respectability of the profession as a whole depended on the moral respectability of its
individual members. In the words of Abernethy:
The education and course of life of medical men tend to make them
sober-minded, moral, and benevolent; and their professional
avocations equally require, that they should possess such characters
and dispositions. Whoever therefore inculcates opinions tending to
subvert morality, benevolence, and social interests of mankind,
deserves the severest reprobation from every member of our
profession, because his conduct must bring it into distrust with the
public.113
The institutional context in which Lawrence's lectures were delivered accentuated
their implications for the moral education of their immediate audience. It was for
this reason that Lawrence's lectures received the severest reprobation from every
member of his profession.
In the first instance, the Lawrence-Abernethy debate appeared to be precipitated by
two opposing theories of life. Lawrence's theory of life based on organization
placed him within the tradition of conceiving life as immanent in matter.
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superadded to the bodily matter suggested that he viewed life as transcendent of
matter. On closer examination, it can be seen that there was an element of vitalism
in Lawrence's materialism, and there was an element of materialism in Abernethy's
vitalism.
Lawrence's theory of life as dependent on organization had, nonetheless,
placed limitations on organization as the ultimate 'cause' of life. To Lawrence,
organization alone was not sufficient for life to emerge; organization was a pre¬
condition for vital properties to emerge, but it was not itself the cause of vital
properties. Though Lawrence asserted the primacy of organization in causing life,
the primacy was one of a pre-condition, not the cause itself. Hunter used the notion
of 'superaddition' in recognition that the principle of life could not have arisen from
the peculiar modification of matter, because the same modification existed before
and just after death. Life therefore appeared to Hunter to be something superadded
to organization. Hunter resorted to the concept of superaddition because he
concluded, like Lawrence did, that organization itself was not sufficient to cause life.
In this respect, there was some common ground between Lawrence's view of life as
organization and Hunter's conception of life involving a superadded principle.
Furthermore, there was a material element in Hunter's conception of the vital
principle that rendered the Hunterian theory of life not as transcendent of matter as it
appeared to be. According to Lawrence's interpretation, 'Mr Hunter has a good
substantial sort of living principle; he seems to have had no taste for immaterial
agents, or for subtile matters. His materia vitae is something tangible; he describes it
as a substance like that of the brain, diffused all over the body, and entering into the
composition of very part'.114 Abernethy went further by suggesting that the subtile
substance was an electric fluid. The material element in the Abernethy's
interpretation of the vital principle meant that the external agency which superadded
life to matter was not a transcendent agent, but a material agent. On closer
examination therefore, neither Hunter's 'materia vitae', nor Abernethy's subtile
fluid, was totally free from matter. The 'materia vitae' might be invisible but it was
still a substance; the electric fluid might be subtile like the force of gravity, but it still
involved the medium of matter.
Abernethy's Reflections on Gall and Spurzheim's System of Physiognomy
114
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and Phrenology (1821) would support the interpretation that there was much more
materialism in Abernethy's appreciation of the nature of life and the mind than has
been hitherto noted in other studies on the Abernethy-Lawrence debate. Abernethy
admitted that he admired the simple proposition from phrenology that 'man and
animals resemble one another, in each possessing, in various degrees, instinctive and
urgent propensities', but that Gall and Spurzheim had also shown, that man differed
from animals in possessing 'superior rational faculties and sentiments'. Furthermore,
Abemethy indicated that he saw no objection to the classification (arrangement) of
these superior faculties into comparison, analysis or causation, or to the localisation
of these faculties to particular 'organs' of the brain:
this arrangement refers to all the intellectual powers cognizable in the
actions of the human mind: powers which seem exclusively to belong
to man. I am even pleased with the station which the organs supposed
to be productive of these powers are said to occupy.115
The occasion for Abernethy's reflections on phrenology was to address the court of
assistants of the Royal College of Surgeons in June 1821. Was Abernethy not
therefore espousing his support for a materialistic theory of the mind in an
institutional context - just as Lawrence had done in 1816 and 1818? If there were
parallels, the outcome was very different. Abernethy's Reflections did not lead to
any Remarks from the religious establishment, or engendered any debates within the
scientific community. The contrasting reception of Lawrence's Lectures and
Abernethy's Reflections by the Royal College of Surgeons reinforces the conclusion
that factors other than the absolute objection to materialism were at work in shaping
the responses of the scientific community.
Despite initial appearances, therefore, it was not materialism that was the
ultimate issue in the debate on the two theories of life, but differing concerns with
the related issues of immortality and morality. For Abernethy, Lawrence's approach
seemed to provide hostages to atheists, and was therefore irresponsible. In a world
where morality was still dependent upon religious belief, Lawrence's views could be
seen to undermine morality. Abernethy did not so much respond by developing a
new immaterialist science of life, but by developing a rhetorical presentation of his
theory of life which seemed to deny a foothold for atheists. The importance of what
might be regarded as image, rather than substance, in the debate can be seen in the
115 John Abernethy, Reflections on Gall and Spurzheim's Systems of Physiognomy and Phrenology
(London, 1821), 33.
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concern for the professional public image of surgeons, and the institutional
respectability of the Royal College of Surgeons. Abernethy was motivated to act as
an advocate of Hunter because he believed Hunter could serve as a respectable role
model, and his medical theories could be made to serve the traditional alliance
between religion and morality. Lawrence, by contrast, was more concerned to
separate science and religion. Seeing vital properties as physical, yet inexplicable,
entities, analogous to Newtonian gravity, Lawrence used notions of scientific
methodology to suggest that it was impossible to go further, as a scientist:
The most we can accomplish is, to make gradual conquests from the
territories of ignorance and doubt; and to leave under their dominion
those objects only which our reason has not reached, or is not able to
reach.11
The wish to separate science from theology, which was being voiced by Lawrence
during the controversy, was largely ignored by his contemporaries. The separatist
stance, however, was to appeal to more practitioners of science, and even leading
voices within the established church, as the nineteenth century progressed.
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Materialism and Atheism go hand in hand
Mr Lawrence has plainly told his hearers that medullary matter is capable of
sensation and thought - that there is no independent living principle
superadded to the structure of animal bodies - that life is the result of
organization. ... Materialism and Atheism go hand in hand; ... For when we
have argued ourselves out of the existence of our soul, which is a spirit, by
the very same process, we argue ourselves out of the existence of the
Almighty, which is a spirit also.
The Reverend Thomas Rennell, 1819.1
That life then, or the assemblage of all the functions, is immediately
dependent on organization, appears to me, physiologically speaking, as clear
as that the presence of the sun above the horizon causes the light of day; ... I
say, physiologically speaking; and beg you to attend particularly to this
qualification: because the theological doctrine of the soul, and its separate
existence, has nothing to do with this physiological question, but rests on a
species of proof altogether different.
William Lawrence, 1819
The formal opening of the Lawrence episode can be dated 21 and 25 March 1816,
when Lawrence delivered the two Introductory Lectures that sparked off the debate
on life. By coincidence, a symbolic closure to the episode happened on the sixth
anniversary of these lectures, when the case 'Lawrence versus Smith' was heard at
the Chancery Court, on 21, 25 and 26 March 1822.3 The case concerned the
copyright of the series of lectures delivered by Lawrence in 1818, and first published
in February 1819 as Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and the Natural History of
Man. As related in the previous chapter, the publication of these lectures seemed to
have precipitated the approbation of the medical establishment. By April 1819,
Lawrence was suspended from his appointment as surgeon to Bridewell and Bethlem
Hospitals, and was threatened with a similar prospect regarding his position as
assistant-surgeon at St. Bartholomew's. Bowing to the pressure, Lawrence pledged,
1
Thomas Rennell, Remarks on Scepticism (London, 1819), 64.
2
William Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology (1819, London, 3rd edn., 1823), 6-7.
3 The English Reports (Edinburgh, 1904), 37: 928-9.
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in a letter to a governor of the hospitals, 'to suppress and prevent the general
circulation of both sets of lectures, and to refrain from ever lecturing again on these
subjects'.4 The pledge to suppress the circulation of the lectures procured the desired
effect, and Lawrence was reinstated by Bridewell and Bethlem in June. The
withdrawal of the 1819 lectures from public sale, however, directly led to the
flourishing of a black market. The Monthly Magazine reported a quadrupling in the
price for the 1819 lectures before the end of 1819: 'Such [was] the eagerness to
possess it, that its price had risen from one to four guineas'.5
The black market circulation of Lawrence's lectures eventually led to the
Chancery lawsuit of 1822. Early that year, a bookseller James Smith in the Strand
published a pirated edition of Lawrence's 1819 lectures. It is important to note that
the suppression of Lawrence's lectures was not enforcement by the law but the
author's decision; hence, the pirated edition was not illicit because of the
suppression, but as an infringement of copyright. The case was brought to the court
because Lawrence sought an injunction to restrain the sale of the pirated edition to
ft 7
protect his of copyright. Smith's Counsel, Sir Charles Wetherell, built upon the
latest precedent set by Lord Byron's case of February 1822, in which Byron lost his
copyright over a pirated edition of his poem Cain. The verdict, with reference to two
antiquated Acts,8 was that no property could be vested with the author where the
manuscripts were blasphemous, seditious, or immoral. In a similar vein, Wetherwell
argued that Lawrence's 1819 lectures were 'hostile to natural and revealed religion,
and impugned the doctrines of the immateriality and immortality of the soul',
4
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7 Wetherell, Sir Charles (1770-1846), Dictionary ofNational Biography 60 (1892): 385; described as
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practice of the Courts of Chancery against all criticism or proposals for reform. ...staunch to the
extreme protestant cause, voted against the Roman catholic emancipation bill.'
8 1637 (11 July) the Star Chamber of Charles I passed an act requiring all printers and publishers to be
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offensive books or pamphlets'; (2) all publications must bear the name and address of the publisher
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decrying them as the 'poison disseminating' from Lawrence's pen.9 In
communicating his judgement, Lord Eldon conceded to Wetherell's argument and
judged that:
Looking at the general tenour of the work, and at many particular
parts of it, recollecting that the immortality of the soul is one of the
doctrines of the Scriptures; considering that the law does not give
protection to those who contradict the Scriptures, ...I cannot continue
the injunction.10
Eldon was fully aware of the paradox of his decision in stating that 'if the injunction
be refused, it [had] the effect of increasing the number of copies'. 'The answer to
that is', continued Eldon, 'that I have nothing to do with it as a crime'. He contented
himself with addressing the case concerning only 'the civil right of property'. In
deciding it was more imperative to condemn the adjudged blasphemy than to
suppress its circulation, Lord Eldon's verdict unwittingly overturned the containment
strategy enforced by the medical establishment on Lawrence in 1819.11 Deprived of
his copyright to restrain the public circulation of the pirated editions of his Lectures
by the Chancery Court, Lawrence was to pledge to suppress the private circulation of
his works within days of Eldon's decision.
On 2 April 1822, Bridewell and Bethlem Hospitals suspended Lawrence for
the second time when it transpired that Lawrence had been distributing his 1819
Lectures privately since 1819. Lawrence defended his action on the grounds that
some 400 copies had been 'granted only as a matter of favour in individual instances,
to professional men, particularly foreigners, or to scientific and literary characters'.12
In terms categorical and definite, Lawrence made another retraction by letter to the
Governors of Bridewell and Bethlem:
Further experience and reflection have only tended to convince me
more strongly that the publication of certain passages in these writings
was highly improper, to increase my regret at having sent them forth
to the world; to make me satisfied with the measure of withdrawing
9 The English Reports, 37: 929.
10 Ibid., 929.
11 'Lord Eldon (John Scott), (1751-1838)', Dictionary of National Biography, 51(1892):55. His
biographer described Eldon's 'gravest error was the extent to which he pushed the principle that the
court will not protect by injunction works of an immoral, seditious, or irreligious tendency'; in his
decision in cases regarding Byron, Lawrence, Southey, and Wolcot.
12 Lawrence's letter to Sir Richard Glyn, quoted in Gentleman's Magazine, 83 (1822): 441-443; italics
Lawrence's. The foreigners would include the copy in the Royal Society of Science in Stockholm,
and one to the New York Academy of Medicine. This edition also contains the two lectures delivered
in 1816. (See Goodfield-Toulmin, op. cit., footnote 41, 308.)
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them from public circulation; and consequently firmly resolved, not
only never to reprint them, but also never to publish any thing more on
similar subjects.
Having reiterated his commitment to suppress his own works, Lawrence alluded to
the 'trouble and expense of a chancery suit' that he had incurred in order to uphold
his previous pledge (in 1819) to suppress his Lectures from public circulation. He
concluded the letter by addressing 'the charge of irreligion hinted at in the Court of
Chancery', and instead of refuting the charge, Lawrence adopted the tactic of
confirming the orthodoxy of his beliefs:
I am fully impressed with the importance of religion and morality to
the welfare of mankind - that I am most sensible of the distinguishing
excellence of that pure religion which is unfolded in the New
Testament; and most earnestly desirous to see its pure spirit
universally diffused and acted on.13
The retraction had the desired effect for the second time, and Lawrence was
reinstated on 8 May 1822. The sequence of events had to be understood in the
context that the hospitals of London at this time were, in the main, very wealthy,
which also meant very powerful. The Governors of these hospitals were drawn from
the class of noblemen and gentlemen of 'the more wealthy sections of the mercantile
and trading classes',14 who were the social elite and politically influential.
Lawrence's second retraction appeared to have been driven by political expediency,
in contrast with the defiant spirit apparent in his address in 1817, made soon after the
mock-trial by Abernethy of his Introductory Lectures'.
Without this freedom of enquiry and speech, the duty of your
professors would be irksome and humiliating: they would be
dishonoured in their own eyes, and in the estimation of the public.
These privileges, Gentlemen! shall never be surrendered by me: I will
not be set down nor cried down by any person, in any place, or under
any pretext.15
Between a principle and a future within the establishment, Lawrence had chosen the
latter. On a wider front, the verdict of the lawsuit eloquently testified to the force of
concern for Lawrence's generation in their appreciation of scientific ideas for their
religious and social implications. Eldon's decision was a symbolic pronouncement
from the ruling establishment on Lawrence's lectures. In judging the lectures as
13 The letter to the Governors of Bridewell and Bethlem was quoted in part in a letter of 16 April 1822
to Sir Richard carr Glyn, President of the two hospitals. See Gentleman's Magazine, 83 (1822):443.
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contradictory to the Scriptures, Eldon's decision reinforced the main tenets of the
campaign against Lawrence's lectures since 1817. Primarily with his Remarks on
Scepticism, the Reverend Thomas Rennell emerged as the leading voice in this
campaign. 'Materialism and Atheism go hand in hand' was the charge that
encapsulated Rennell's arguments against Lawrence's lectures, and was echoed in
the pamphlet literature, through which the wider public joined in the debate. By
examining the pamphlet literature and a close study of the Remarks, this chapter
attempts to tease out the religious and social implications of Lawrence's lectures for
his contemporaries.
II
Son of a cleric, a Hackney protege, educated in Cambridge, and ordained into the
Anglican Church, Thomas Rennell (1787-1824) was groomed to become a
quintessential High-Church, Tory cleric.16 The Rennells belonged to the Hackney
Phalanx, a political designation for the enclave of families based in a village north¬
east of London, who were renowned for their staunch support of the constitutional
alliance of the Church and State.17 The Phalanx sought to revive the social authority
of the established church, and influenced the appointments to bishoprics,
archdeaconries, and prebendaries through the influence they had with Lord
Liverpool, the Tory prime minister form 1812 to 1827, and on Charles Manners-
Sutton, archbishop of Canterbury form 1805 to 1828. At the age of twenty-four,
Rennell was already an editor and a frequent contributor to British Critic, the literary
16 The Tories were in government in 1815, and they held their majority until 1830. The party had the
support of most of the gentry and the landed families, the universities, the services, the unreformed
municipal corporations in towns. They wanted to keep their authority and privileges as supported by
the status quo. By 1822, when anti-Jacobinism began to ebb, Toryism also started to change into
Conservatism, and the process of parliamentary reform gradually set in.
17 The two main groupings within the United Church of England and Ireland were the High Church
party and the Evangelical party. In the early nineteenth century, the High Church party was
dominated by a group of influential London-based clerics and lay members called the 'Hackney
Phalanx', while the Evangelical party was dominated by a similar grouping designated as the
'Clapham Sect'. The High Church party placed emphasis on the visible Church - its sacraments,
traditions, doctrines, and ceremonies; they viewed the Church of England as a branch of the holy
catholic and apostolic Church; they rejected Calvinism because it encouraged the spiritual pride of the
'elect'; they believed government existed with divine sanction, and the social hierarchy was also
ordained. The Evangelical party embraced causes like in social action, like the abolition of the slave
trade, and the spread of the gospel through missionary activities in the expanding British Empire. See
discussions in Stewart J. Brown, The National Churches of England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1801-
1846 (Oxford, 2001), 51-62; J.C.D. Clark, English Society, 1668-1832 (Cambridge, 1985), 121-140.
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vehicle for the Tory High-Churchmen. In the year 1816, when Lawrence gave his
controversial lectures, Rennell was appointed the vicar of Kensington by the Bishop
of Lincoln, and elected to be the fourth Christian Advocate of Cambridge University.
It was in his office as the Christian Advocate that Rennell became involved in the
Lawrence debate. The five years Rennell devoted to the campaign against
Lawrence's lectures represented the single, most important theme amongst all his
endeavours. The Remarks on Scepticism represented the pinnacle of Rennell's
achievement, and it was primarily for this work that Rennell was elected a Fellow to
the Royal Society in London in 1822.18 Not only did the work gain the endorsement
of the scientific and ecclesiastical establishments of his time, it was also the only
systematic attempt to offer a scientific critique of Lawrence's ideas. Furthermore,
compared with Abemethy's eclectic responses in which the scientific content was
thin, Remarks had a higher degree of engagement with the science, albeit the
motivation for such an engagement was to tease out the theological implications.
As early as 1817, Rennell set the tone for the clerical response with an article
published in British Critic}9 The gist of Rennell's criticism was that Lawrence's
lectures showed tenets of scientific materialism, and 'Materialism and Atheism go
hand in hand'. Amongst the impressionable young men in Lawrence's immediate
audience, Rennell cautioned that scientific materialism would lead to religious
scepticism, and in its turn, atheism, which was 'the pander of profligacy', and free
thinking, 'another word for not thinking at all'.20 Under the auspices of his office as
the Christian Advocate, Rennell expanded the article into a 150-page pamphlet,
published as Remarks on Scepticism, in 1819. What motivated Rennell to pen the
Remarks was what he saw as a need 'to call the attention of the Public to the
mischievous tendency of such opinions'. Lawrence's treatises, according to Rennell,
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struck 'deep at the root of all Religion, both natural and revealed'. Despite
Lawrence's qualification that 'the theological doctrine of the soul, and its separate
existence, has nothing to do with the physiological question [of what life is]',
Rennell judged Lawrence's lectures to be subversive to religion and morality. As the
18 Rennell was proposed by his father, Thomas Murdoch, George D'Oyly and Henry Harvey Baker,
who were all clergymen. Bynum interprets Rennell's fellowship proposal as forcing the scientific
establishment 'into a kind of collective pronouncement on the situation', given that Rennell's only
claim to scientific distinction was Remarks on Scepticism. Bynum, op. cit., 158.
19
Rennell, 'Lawrence's Introductory Lectures', British Critic, 8 (N.S., 1817): 63-73.
20 Rennell, (1817), 73.
21
Rennell, Remarks (1819), preface.
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Hulsean lecturer for 1821, Rennell gave a series of lectures in Cambridge on the
same subject as the Remarks?2 Fulfilling its remit of drawing the public's attention
to these 'mischievous opinions', the Remarks seemed to engender a pamphlet war in
which the wider public joined in the debate. Indeed, between 1817 and 1821, a
sustained campaign against Lawrence's views can be traced through Rennell's
personal efforts and the pamphlet literature.23
The clerical voice of Rennell was joined by the Reverend George D'Oyly,
predecessor to Rennell as the Christian Advocate, in a survey in the Quarterly
Review (1819), of all the major literature in the Lawrence debate. D'Oyly rebuked
Lawrence's disclaimer that 'the theological doctrine of the soul and its separate
existence has nothing to do with [the] physiological question' of life as organization,
and charged Lawrence with placing the 'valuable science [of physiology] into the
service of infidelity'.24 With his 'doctrine of materialism', Lawrence was accused of
invalidating 'those other proofs of the immaterial and immortal nature of the soul,
which, in reality, [physiology] is calculated to support'. Those other proofs in
physiology that supported the immaterial and immortal nature of the soul were to be
found in Abernethy's theory of life, as interpreted by D'Oyly:
... that life, in general, is some principle of activity added by the will
of Omnipotence to organized structure - and that, in man, who is
endowed with an intelligent faculty in addition to this vital principle
possessed by other organized beings, to life and structure an
immaterial soul is superadded.25
In conclusion, D'Oyly stated that it was imperative for the satisfaction of the public
and the credit of the Royal College of Surgeons, that the College should stipulate
constraints on Lawrence's future lectures, and that 'all those obnoxious passages
which have given such deserved offence' in the published lectures should be
22 The Hulsean lectureship and the office of Christian Advocate were both endowed on the University
of Cambridge by John Hulse. The lectureship continues to this day, but the office of Christian
Advocate lasted only for half a century, and only once were scientific works being singled out as
sources of 'new or dangerous error', and that was in 1819 with the publication of the Remarks.
73
Bynum has identified two later pamphlets on Lawrence. An Essay upon the relation of Cause and
Effect (1824) emphasized the influence of David Hume's philosophical scepticism on Lawrence. From
the title of the second pamphlet Thought not a Function of the Brain (1827), I infer that it probably
was an attempt to refute Lawrence's claim that medullary matter can think. Without giving further
reasons, Bynum dismisses 'these pamphlets [as] irrelevant to the mainstream of the debate'. Bynum,
op. cit., 148. I have not been able to locate these pamphlets to assess Bynum's judgement.
24
George D'Oyly, 'Abernethy, Lawrence, &c. on the Theories of Life', Quarterly Review, 22 (July
1819), 1-34, 31.
25 Ibid., 2.
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expunged.** The Reverend Edward Grinfield went further with his 'instructions'. In
a pamphlet published in May 1819 by campaigning for the complete withdrawal
from circulation of all Lawrence's lectures.27 Significantly, these 'instructions' had
been anticipated by the establishment, for by June 1819, Lawrence had resigned from
his professorship, submitted his (first) retraction, and withdrawn his two series of
lectures, published in 1816 and 1819 respectively, from public circulation.
Aside the clerics, reputable periodicals and private pamphleteers were swift
to join the debate. Lor instance, the Tory, High-Church Anti-Jacobin Review
published a three-part review in 1819, identifying Lawrence's work with the
'atheistical tenets', 'assassination', 'plunder', 'adultery' and 'sodomy' of
Jacobinism.28 The Eclectic Review accused Lawrence of 'an attempt to convert
physiology into an engine of attack against Christianity'. The reviewer called this
'an attempt of flagitious nature' in common with all the infidel mathematicians,
geologists and anatomists, which was to annihilate 'that vast, omnipresent, ever
9Q
pressing idea of Deity, to bar it out from all the avenues of science'. In its review
of Rennell's Remarks, the Edinburgh Monthly Review praised Rennell's efforts as of
'absolute merit', and the 'moral and religious principles which pervade it', as 'the
most pure and most rational'. In contrast, the 'sects of infidels and sceptics', to
which Lawrence belonged, were 'men of very inferior faculties to their
predecessors'. Lawrence was censored for confounding life with organization, and
for arriving at the 'ridiculous conclusion' that 'the brain is of itself capable of
thought'. The reviewer continued, that 'if there be any faith which is truly
miraculous, surely it must be that which believes in such a doctrine as this — that the
• • Qf)
mind is mere matter, and that a man has no other soul than his brain'.
The sagacity of the Edinburgh Monthly Review offered a contrast against the
sentimental banality of an article in the British Critic. Published in 1819, the
reviewer found scope in absolving Bichat for his physiological speculations but was
resolved to condemn Lawrence's:
26 Ibid., 34.
27 Reference from Bynum, op. cit., 148.
28 Anti-Jacobin Review, 56 (1819): 313-23, 408-15, 514-21; a three-part review of Lawrence's lectures
as cited in Bynum, op. cit., 147.
29 'Lawrence and Pring on Physiology', Eclectic Review, 35 (1822): 481-505, 482.
30 The Edinburgh Monthly Review, 3 (1820): 69-88, 69 & 84.
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Melancholy it is indeed to think that Bichat has mixed up with his
physiological speculations, ... but it must be considered as an apology
for the man, ... that he was only 7 years of age [sic] when the French
Revolution broke out. ...With respect however to Mr Lawrence, he
... was extremely wrong and censurable in supposing that because a
French professor, in a country and at a time when all principles of
every kind were treated with ridicule, might talk atheism to his pupils,
and treat the religion of Christianity with contempt, that therefore an
English professor may ... take the same liberty.31
The apology offered to Bichat might not have been valid had his age been calculated
correctly. Born in 1771, Bichat was 17 when the French Revolution broke out. That
error aside, the British Critic was representative in linking Lawrence's ideas to the
dangers of the French Revolution. Other pamphleteers dwelt on the same theme.
For instance, Oxonian, a pseudonym for an active member of the Bible Society who
might also be in orders, coined the term Radical Triumvirate to denote infidels like
Lawrence, Thomas Paine, Richard Carlile. Indeed, Oxonian named Lawrence as the
most dangerous of the Radical Triumvirate, for by asserting that 'the soul is only the
brain', Lawrence challenged the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and in turn,
questioned the existence of a future state. To this threat, Oxonian asked the
rhetorical question:
Who does not know that we must attribute the French Revolution,
with all its horrible attendants of anarchy, despotism and murder, to
the persuasion that there was no future existence?
By imbibing the texts of these radicals, Oxonian warned of the prospect when 'the
very footman will become as eloquent as his master in abuse of religion'. With his
language edging closely to hysteria, Oxonian continued:
Tom Paine's open and undisguised blasphemies, ... Carlile's Mock
Trial and his Rampant Republican, Don Juan's bold and merry
profanities ..., or Lawrence's surgical demonstrations that the soul is
only the brain; will lie in the summer house, ready for the gardener to
read at leisure, to counteract the lessons of religion which Nature and
Nature's God may teach him, and to justify his adroit frauds upon the
hot-house, and other immoralities.32
Defenders of Lawrence were few; many sympathisers would either keep their
silence or not wish to be known by name. For instance, the pro-Lawrence author
adopted the pseudonym of 'Do Wylke Edwinford' in his Review of Rennell.
31 British Critic, 12 (N.S. 1819): 95; Bichat was born in 1771, and was 18 years of age in 1789 when
the French Revolution broke out.
32 Oxonian, Radical Triumvirate (1820), 7-8; quoted in Bynum, op. cit., 145-6 and 157.
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Edwinford criticised Rennell for 'confounding Deism with Atheism', and described
the theological opinions of the time as showing 'ample signs of narrowness and
bigotry', and that to deny Lawrence the right of free inquiry was to return to the
atmosphere of the Inquisition.33 Thomas Foster, a Catholic who published under the
pseudonym 'Philostratus', maintained that the Bible should not be used for scientific
knowledge, and reminded his readers of the precedent of Galileo 'imprisoned in a
dungeon for truths afterwards confirmed by Newton'.34 Foster pleaded that
'physiology should be allowed free and unshaded inquiry which need not be feared,
35since religion did not need the support of science'.
The Monthly Magazine was unusual in its unreserved support of Lawrence.
With Lawrence's first retraction in 1819, the readers were reminded of the
'ridiculous affair of Galileo and the Church of Rome'. Lawrence's opponents were
likened to the zealots, 'who, by a palpable mistake of the question, in opposing
theological truth to philosophical truth, have rendered any service either to God or
or
religion'. In 1822, the magazine printed Lawrence's letter of second retraction in
parallel columns with the 'never-to-be-forgotten adjuration of Galileo'.37 The
Quarterly Journal of Foreign Medicine and Surgery, while insisting that they could
not defend Lawrence because they differed from him, but would 'scorn to sanction
anything which strikes at the liberty of thought and speech'; for 'it is too like Galileo
oo
and the Inquisition'."
Repeatedly, Galileo and the Inquisition were cited in this debate to epitomise
the obstructionist efforts on the grounds of religion. The common theme that
emerged amongst Lawrence's defences was the plea to allow science to conduct free
enquiry unhindered by religious considerations. This freedom was to be observed by
marking out the boundary between science and religion. As Lawrence maintained,
the theological doctrine of the soul and its separate existence was not for the
33
Edwinford, 'Review of Rennell', The Republican (1819), 67, published by Richard Carlile; quoted
in Bynum, op. cit., 146.
34 Philostratus (Foster of Chelmsford), Somatopsychocologia, showing that Body, Life and Mind
considered as Distinct Essences cannot be deduced from Physiology (London, 1823), 116; quoted in
Goodfield-Toulmin, 'Aspects of English Physiology', op. cit., 317.
35
Ibid., quoted in Temkin, 'Basic Science, Medicine, and the Romantic Era', Bulletin of the History of
Medicine, 37 (1963): 97-129, 110.
36 The Monthly Magazine, 47 (1819): 451.
37 The Monthly Magazine, 53 (1822): 542-543.
38 The Quarterly Journal ofForeign Medicine and Surgery, 2 (1819-20): 227-8; quoted in Bynum, op.
cit., 56.
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physiologists to answer, 'but rests on a species of proof altogether different'. The
Monthly Magazine seemed to find it possible to keep the religious soul undisturbed
by the implications of philosophical (scientific) enquiries:
... for the purpose of teaching the doctrine of a future state ... is a
point of theological faith, which rests on its own evidence. A question
however of pure philosophy has arisen, whether the mental powers
and principle of life in men and animals are analogous; or whether
reasoning is a result of material secretion, or is an energy distinct from
matter. On either of these hypotheses the main theological dogma
remains undisturbed.40
This kind of demarcation, however, went against the long tradition of natural
theology in Britain, founded on the glittering achievements of natural philosophers
such as Newton, Boyle, and Bacon. From nature to nature's God, the study of the
book of nature was to reveal divine wisdom and power, as eloquently (if not more
unequivocally) as the Bible. The tradition of natural theology was given a new
impetus and synthesis with William Paley's celebrated work, Natural Theology.
First published in 1802, it was in its sixteenth edition by the time Lawrence gave his
1816 lectures, testifying to the popularity of Paley's arguments. Its pervasive
influence on the collective thinking of the Anglican priesthood was also borne out by
the fact that Natural Theology soon became a set text for those training for
ordination. One could safely presume that Rennell and his generation of clerics
would have deeply imbibed Paley's Natural Theology. At the turn of the nineteenth
century, Paley named human anatomy as his favourite for 'the proof of an intelligent
creator' amongst all the disciplines in the study of nature.41 Indeed, Lawrence
himself reiterated Paley's view in enumerating the importance of comparative
anatomy in his 1816 lectures:
... to the natural theologian, who discovers in the modifications of
structures, according to situation and circumstances, and its constant
relation to the wants, habits, and powers of animals, the strongest
evidence of final purposes, and therefore the strongest proof of an
intelligent first cause.
While Lawrence might not whole-heartedly endorse the use of anatomy as proof of
an intelligent creator, he was nonetheless fully aware of the importance of
39
Lawrence, (1819), 6.
40 The Monthly Magazine, 47 (1819): 451.
41 William Paley, Natural Theology; or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity -
collected from the appearance ofNature, (1802, London, 1816), 458.
42
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comparative anatomy to natural theology. Not surprisingly, Lawrence's plea for the
boundary of knowledge was not to be readily heeded by his contemporaries.
Rennell's Remarks has to be appreciated in the context of the prevalent
culture of natural theology. In penning the Remarks 'to reconcile the views of the
philosopher and the Christian',43 Rennell was acting within a well-established
tradition as an amateur 'clergyman-scientist'. Not only was the boundary not
observed in the early nineteenth century, many scientists in fact 'considered the
moral and metaphysical imperatives of natural theology as a proper and integral part
of their vocation and not as an intrusion of extraneous categories imposed by outside
institutions'.44 To describe Rennell as 'invading a physiological issue with
theological arguments' would be anachronistic.45 In playing the role of the
clergyman-scientist, Rennell was acting within a well-established tradition in British
science. As Frank Turner points out, 'ever since the seventeenth century the parson-
naturalist and the academic clergyman-scientist had played a major and by no means
inglorious role in British science, as names of John Ray, Joseph Priestley, John
Stevens Henslow, Adam Sedgwick, and William Whewell attest'. For the clergyman-
scientists, 'natural science and natural theology, the clerical and the scientific
callings, were not simply compatible, but complementary'.46 Amongst the critics of
Lawrence, it was Rennell (not Abernethy) who actually seriously engaged with
Lawrence's science in his critique. While the comments and rhetoric of the pamphlet
war offered us a glimpse of the emotions evoked during the controversy, it was in the
Remarks that we may find some more concrete answers as to why Lawrence's
lectures were adjudged to be blasphemous by his contemporaries.
Ill
The full title of the pamphlet was Remarks on Scepticism, especially as it is
connected with the subjects of Organization and Life, being an answer to the Views
of M. Bichat, Sir T.C. Morgan, and Mr. Lawrence, upon those points. Both
43 Rennell, (1819), preface to Remarks.
44 Frank Turner, 'The Victorian Conflict between Science and Religion: A Professional Dimension',
in Gerald Parsons (ed.), Religion in Victorian Britain (Manchester, 1988), 176.
45
Quoted in Goodfield-Toulmin, op. cit., 316.
46 Frank Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority (Cambridge, 1993), 183-4.
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Morgan47 and Lawrence were influenced by Bichat, but it was Lawrence's 1816
Introductory Lectures which received the most extensive treatment by Rennell.48
The institutional authority bestowed on Lawrence's lectures rendered them all the
more 'dangerous' because of the profile of Lawrence's immediate audience,
described by Rennell as:
By far the larger part of those who look up to Mr Lawrence for
instruction, as far as intellect is concerned, have received no education
at all. At the age of fourteen all general instruction has in their case
been concluded, and their views have been unceasingly directed to the
study and practice of their future profession.49
The motive ascribed by Rennell to Lawrence for the adoption of the French school of
thought was perhaps more generous and less censorious than many others: 'From an
admiration perhaps of the professional attainments of the French physiologists, Mr.
Lawrence has incautiously admitted some of their most dangerous tenets'.50 These
dangerous tenets as perceived by Rennell were: 'that medullary matter is capable of
sensation and thought - that there is no independent living principle superadded to
the structure of animal bodies - that life is the result of organization'.51 These were
scientific ideas pertaining to the nature of the mind and the cause of life, which
Rennell judged to be impinging on the theological doctrines concerning (1) the moral
distinctiveness of man and the existence of free will, (2) the immorality of the soul
upon which the Christian message of salvation was founded; and (3) the existence of
a transcendent God as the cause of life. To summarise, if the Lawrence-Abernethy
debate centred upon the Life-Matter problem, the Lawrence-Rennell debate
47 Sir Thomas Charles Morgan (1783-1843), a Cambridge M.D. and a Fellow of the Royal College of
Physicians. Like Lawrence, he was a Francophile and was actively engaged in liberal political issues.
Influenced by the monistic philosophy of the ideologue school, he espoused one central idea of
ideologue in particular, that 'the activity of the most elemental organic processes foreshadowed
conscious choice and reason'. (Jacyna, 'Immanence and Transcendence', /sis, 74 (1983):311-329,
314). Morgan was a true contemporary of Lawrence; (born in the same year) and in 1819, Morgan
published Sketches on the Philosophy of Life. To all intents and purposes, Morgan and Lawrence
could easily have shared the same fate with regard to their publications and careers, but for two
factors. First, the institutional context of Lawrence's lectures gave rise to the drama and exerted more
urgency to their condemnation. Morgan's publication was in the name of a private individual and was
not so much caught up in the polity of the scientific establishment. But then, Lawrence's retractions
saved his career; Morgan maintained his views and in the end, had to close down his medical practice.
48 Lawrence's lectures in 1817 and 1818 were published in 1819, and that was why in Rennell's
Remarks of 1819, only Lawerence's 1816 lectures were referred to.
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originated in the Mind-Brain duality, which in itself was an acute manifestation of
the Life-Matter problem.
The conventional outlook of the time was that the human mind was bestowed
by God on man alone. It was often thought of as the only part in man that was of
divine origin, and as such, the mind had to partake of the immaterial nature of God,
who was conceived of as an immaterial, spiritual entity. The immaterial nature of
the mind guaranteed that it was capable of an independent and separate existence
from the bodily frame. The independence carried with it the connotation that the
mind was above the material body, and could govern the body in guiding and
guarding its impulses; the independence of the mind was therefore the basis for
morality. The separate existence of the mind meant that it was not bound by the
body and was capable of continuing its existence in a separate state after the death of
the body, thereby attaining immortality. In this sense, the mind was synonymous
with the 'soul'. The independence and separateness of the mind hinged on its
immaterial nature; independence was essential for morality, and separateness, for
immortality. To challenge the immaterial nature of the mind was therefore to bring
into question the basis for morality and immortality.
Rennell identified that in asserting that 'medullary matter is capable of
sensation', Lawrence was challenging the immaterial nature of the mind by equating
the mind with the organization of the brain. In challenging the immaterial nature of
the mind, Lawrence was forcing a recognizance of certain moral issues. For
instance, the majority of Lawrence's contemporaries regarded insanity as a disease of
the mind, or a derangement of the will; the cause of insanity was considered to be
moral and not physiological, as Lawrence analysed:
They who consider the mental operations as acts of an immaterial
being, and thus disconnect the sound state of mind from organization,
act very consistently in disjoining insanity also from corporeal
structure, and in representing it as a disease, not of the brain, but of
the mind. Thus we come to treat the disease of an immaterial being,
for which, suitably enough, moral treatment has been recommended.
Lawrence's view on the cause of insanity radically departed from his
contemporaries. His unequivocal conclusion on insanity as the disease of the brain
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I firmly believe, on the contrary, that the various forms of insanity,
that all the affectations comprehended under the general term of
mental derangement, are only evidences of cerebral affectations,
disordered manifestations of those organs whose healthy action
produces the phenomena called mental; in short, symptoms of
diseased brain.
If Lawrence's view on insanity was conceded, it would mean the huge stigma
attached to insanity as a kind of moral depravation was unjustified. Rennell did not
directly address Lawrence's view on insanity in Remarks, but in a similar vein,
Bichat had argued that passions were organic impulses, and this point was identified
by Rennell as morally subversive.54 In seeking a physical cause for passions or
insanity, both Bichat and Lawrence were moving human behaviour into the area of
physiological determinism. Moral responsibility presupposes a genuine existence of
free will; any form of determinism questions the genuine existence of free will, and
in turn, the basis of moral responsibility.
Though Rennell did not argue for the existence of free will as the
concomitant of moral responsibility, he was concerned by Bichat's exertions that:
The character... is the physiognomy of the passions; the temperament
is that of the internal functions: as both are constantly the same, and
not influenced by habit and exercise, they cannot be affected by
education.55
Drawing an analogy with circulation and respiration, which are not under the influence
of the will, Bichat observed that 'the character, and consequently the passion ... are
the produce of the actions of all the internal organs'. This notion was carried to its
fullest extent by Sir T. C. Morgan, who asserted that 'good and evil are principles
intelligible only as they relate to the laws of organic existence'.56 Rennell maintained
that if this line of reasoning was to be consistently applied, then a man was not
different from a cabbage, for Bichat had also represented 'organic life as the
assemblage of those functions which the animal has in common with the vegetable'.
53 Lawrence, (1819), 97.
54 Lawrence's lectures containing his view on insanity and thought were published in 1819, same year
as Remarks was published, which might have explained why Rennell did not address the subject of
insanity directly.
55 Bichat, Recherches sur la vie et la mort (Paris, 1800); quoted in Rennell, Remarks, 56; the
translation is from Dr Rees' Encyclopaedia, 121. How faithful the translation was is perhaps
secondary to our discussion, which focuses on Rennell's interpretation of Lawrence's ideas as
influenced by Bichat.
56
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Applying the rules of logic, Rennell argued that if passions were mere organic
impulses, then according to Bichat:
... a cabbage and a man, having the functions of organic life in
common, and the passions being among those functions, it follows
that jealousy, anger, revenge, and love are the common affections of
the man and the cabbage.57
Rennell was concerned that the views of life after Bichat would inculcate a morality
for the young students in Lawrence's immediate audience in which 'all attempts to
soften and exalt the passions [were deemed] useless'.58
Apart from its direct moral implications, Rennell was concerned that human
distinctiveness would be blurred, if not lost, if man and cabbage were equally
governed by organic impulses. To Rennell, the human mind was what set man apart
from all other living forms. Bichat classified all life into two tiers: vegetables and
animals, with the possession of volition in animals being the distinguishing principle.
Rennell modified the classification into a three-tier structure, allowing a further
distinction between man and animals, introducing a third principle of life,
understanding, as peculiar to man alone. In the lower classes of animals, volition took
the form of instincts; in higher forms of animal life, volition was exhibited in varying
degrees of 'sagacity, docility, instinct, and even into a species of practical judgement'.
However, it was understanding that 'forms one of the most striking distinctions
between the two creatures [animals and man], as it proves the animal destitute of that
leading quality, which marks the human understanding, moral responsibility'.59
Rennell's objections to the removal of mind-brain duality, while primarily
moral in nature, were underpinned by his metaphysical concerns. He went as far as
affirming that 'there is a close connection between the power of thinking and the
brain, but it by no means follows, that they are, therefore, one and the same', — for
'connection is not identity'.60 He argued that properties common to matter like
extension, hardness, impenetrability, divisibility could not be used to denote thought?
How could medullary matter think, when thought and matter shared no common
properties at all? Furthermore, Rennell maintained that the mind must have an
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impairment of certain parts of the brain caused no impediments to the mental
faculties. 'Portions of the brain', argued Rennell, 'various in situation and size, have
been found to have been entirely disorganized, yet no single power of the mind was
impaired, even to the very day of the patient's death'.61
Essentially, Rennell considered the brain as the link between the immaterial
mind and the material world: 'The brain is the organ or instrument by which the
mind operates on matter', and it is 'the chain of communication between the mind
and the material world'.62 But he staunchly maintained the independent and separate
existence of the mind from the brain. Aware of the many difficulties posed by
adopting mind-brain duality, Rennell continued, 'How indeed the brain and the
thinking principle are connected, and in what manner they mutually affect each
other, is beyond the reach of our faculties to discover'. He was more concerned,
however, by the questions raised by the monistic position of identifying the mind
with the brain. For instance, Rennell observed that in common with bodily matter,
the brain underwent within itself precisely the same changes as the remainder of the
body. If the brain was the mind, the brain particles would be undergoing changes all
the time, how could the continuity of thought and memory be maintained? To
Rennell, an identity of the mind with the brain raised all sorts of questions
concerning the continuity of consciousness and personality, issues that remain
pertinent for the philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists in our time.
If the particles of the brain, either separately or in a mass, were
capable of consciousness, then after their removal the consciousness
which they produced must for ever cease. The consequence of which
would be, that personal identity must be destroyed, and that no man
could be the same individual being that he was ten years ago ... it is
something beyond the brain that makes the man at every period of his
life the same: it is consciousness, that amidst the perpetual change of
our material particles, unites every link of successive being in one
indissoluble chain.64
This 'something beyond the brain' for the intellectual life was described by Rennell
as an 'independent principle, capable of a separate existence'. In a like manner,
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instrument, there must be something beyond to bring these instruments into action'.65
As strongly as he had argued against the mind being the same as the brain, Rennell
argued that life could not be the result of organization. The 'something beyond'
organization was the soul. In his 1817 article in British Critic, Rennell effectively
equated the living principle with the soul as follows:
The existence of an independent living principle superadded to our
animal structure, is strongly denied by Mr Lawrence; ... by this denial
he controverts also the very existence of the soul; so that after having
lived for our natural time, and having re-produced our kind, we have
answered the purpose of our creation, and — are no more.66
The living principle, supposed to be a subtile, immaterial substance, conformed to
the prerequisite of the religious soul. The concept of 'superaddition' of the living
principle was all important in religious terms, for it conveniently allowed for a
separate existence of the soul from the body.67 In this respect, Rennell seemed to
distinguish between the mind and the soul by observing that there were two lives in
man: the external life and the intellectual life. A certain hierarchy seemed to subsist
even between the soul and the mind, with the former being 'only a power' and
required a substance in which to reside, while the latter was 'a principle, capable of a
separate existence':
[The two lives] are therefore affected by death in two different ways:
the life of vegetation cannot exist without its body, it ceases therefore
to act, when the substance in which it resides, by a disturbance in its
organization, is incapable of being acted upon; the intellectual life, as
it has an independent existence, so it must suffer an independent
extinction 68
Though not explicitly stated, in distinguishing the two lives, Rennell seemed to have
assigned the soul as an animating power to enliven bodily matter, and the mind as the
immaterial principle which embodied consciousness and preserved human identity.
Which of these two lives had immortality in Rennell's belief? He went so far
as to say, 'As then the two lives are so different in their nature, we have no reason to
conclude that they will terminate together'.69 However, he was ambiguous as to
whether it was the mind or the soul that was the ultimate agent for human
65 Ibid., 81.
66
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67 The use of terms like 'living principle' and 'superaddition' would suggest that Rennell endorsed the
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immortality. His view on consciousness as the medium for the continuity of
personality would suggest that it was the intellectual life that had an existence
beyond death. With a negative statement: 'Nor is the apparent decay of the faculties
of the soul any argument of its final extinction',70 Rennell seemed to suggest that the
soul could have a continuous existence after the termination of the external life. He
seemed incapable of denying immortality to either the soul or the mind. Perhaps, as
did most of his contemporaries, Rennell conceived of the mind and the soul
interchangeably, as illustrated by his description of the state of dreaming right in the
midst of discussing how thought could not be from matter:71
Perception, that faculty of the soul which unites it with the external
world, is then suspended, ... the soul is transported ... into a world of
its own creation. There appears to be an activity in the motions, and a
perfection in the faculties of the mind, ...A better notion of the
separate and independent existence of the soul, could not be formed,
than from our observations on the phenomena of dreaming.72
What was unequivocal to Rennell was that the mind or the soul was independent of
any material organs; it was this independence from matter that would ensure its
separate existence beyond the bodily dissolution of the material brain or body,
thereby retaining the prospect of human immortality.
In his critique of Lawrence's theory of life as organization, Rennell employed
primarily the rules of logic to expose what he considered the fallacies in Lawerence's
reasoning. For instance, Lawrence's analogy that 'organization is the instrument,
vital properties the acting power, function the mode of action and life the result' was
rendered insensible by Rennell's parallel example:
... a scalpel is the instrument, a hand the acting power, cutting the
mode of action, and a wound the result. What would Mr Lawrence
say to the man who asserted, that the wound was co-existent with the
scalpel, or again that the act of cutting was a wound?73
Similar treatment was given to two of Lawrence's key assertions: that 'organization
is the peculiar composition which distinguishes living bodies', and that 'organization
is the instrument which produces life as its result'. Rennell inferred therefore that
70 Ibid., 110.
71 There was much fluidity in the meaning of 'mind' and 'soul' in this period. The two terms were
often interchangeable; for instance: 'Mr Lawrence very plainly declares himself satisfied that the
brain ... is of itself capable of thought; and is, in fact, that which is called the mind or the soul.'
Edinburgh Monthly Magazine, 3 (1820): 69-88, 84.
72 Rennell, Remarks, 93.
73 Ibid., 67.
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'according to Mr Lawrence, "life is the result of the peculiar composition which
distinguishes living bodies'". This was not exactly what Lawrence said, but Rennell
applied the rules of logic by conjoining life is the result of organization, and
organization is the peculiar composition of living bodies, to arrive at the seemingly
circular claim. As explained by Rennell, the nonsensibility lies in that life, far from
being the 'result' becomes 'a component part' of organization; 'in other words, we
first take for granted the existence of life, and then we prove it to result from its own
existence'.74
To Rennell, organization was 'nothing more than a system of parts so
nc
constructed and arranged, as to co-operate to one common purpose'. As a proof of
their independence, Rennell raised the point that organization continued to exist after
life was gone, and that 'it began to exist before life was imparted':
... it is well known that the organs are gradually forming, and arrive at
a considerable degree of perfection before they are endowed with any
other than a borrowed life. Before a certain stage of its existence, the
death of its parent will inevitably cause the death of the offspring,
evidently shewing that its life, if it may be so called, was not its own
... Thus then the organization of a body commences before its own
independent life, as it continues after its death.76
Rennell's understanding of organization seemed to be confined to the structural
rather than the corpuscular level, which would have been closer to Lawrence's
definition. For Rennell, it was as inconceivable for life to result from organization as
it was for thought to arise from matter. 'The body having nothing essentially active
either on its nature or its construction, from whence did the motion originally
77 • ■*■•••
arise?' Whether it was the soul as the animating power to organized body, or the
mind as the 'something beyond' the brain, animal life or intellectual life were both,
to Rennell, undoubtedly transcendent to matter.
The high level of engagement with the scientific content in Lawrence's ideas
in the Remarks is a credit to Rennell. He was not merely 'invading a physiological
i*i 78issue with theological arguments'. It is all too easy to appreciate the Remarks as a
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differences in the two philosophical systems that have shaped the metaphysics in
science and in religion. An article in the Gentleman's Magazine reviewed Rennell's
Remarks favourably and also unwittingly, touched upon the crux of the matter by
lamenting that it was 'a misfortune that people now [knew] nothing of Plato's
doctrine of ideas'. Aristotle was maligned because:
When Aristotle ... first reduced all elementary properties to air, earth,
fire, and water, it is evident that every thing went wrong till the
system was overthrown by Lord Bacon.7
In the article, the religious doctrine of the soul merged seamlessly with Plato's
incorporeal existence of ideas, and the rightful allegiance to a Platonic soul was
presented as a fait accompli. The allegiance to a Platonic soul not only characterised
Remarks, but might have influenced the shaping of Rennell's arguments. For
instance, the nuances of the tripartite system in Plato's Timaeus which distinguished
the human mind from the soul, with the former being the divinely-endowed entity
capable of immortality, and the latter, the animating force, were reflected in the
Remarks, in Rennell's distinction of the external and intellectual lives.80
At the heart of this seeming clash between science and religion, was a most
fundamental clash of two systems of philosophy - that of Plato and Aristotle. In the
area of life-matter issues, Plato conceived life as transcendent of matter; Aristotle
viewed life as immanent in matter. In formulating the theological doctrines
pertaining to the body, the mind and the soul, the Platonic influence had dominated
in western Christendom. The dualism behind the life-matter and mind-brain
relationships in the Christian beliefs bore the essence of the Platonic soul, whose
origin and destiny was utterly transcendent from the material world.
Rennell's attempt to expose the contradiction and confusion in Lawrence's
reasoning by the rules of logic somewhat missed the mark of Lawrence's position.
In seeing life as residing in organization, Lawrence's view on life was essentially
Aristotelian; it was the fundamental belief in matter as the ultimate medium whereby
life could be understood. It would not be far-fetched to state that for Lawrence, it
was only by studying matter itself that one might understand life eventually. Like
79 Gentleman's Magazine, 89 (1819): 438.
80 The mind nous has parity over the other parts of the soul: the passionate thymos residing in the
heart, and the appetitive epithymetikon residing in the liver. Furthermore, the human mind in the
Platonic scheme is the only part of the human soul which is both immaterial and immortal. Thymos
and epithymetikon, though immaterial are mortal. Plants and animals, as living systems, possess the
soul, but since they do not have nous, they will not attain immortality in the Platonic scheme.
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Lawrence, Aristotle was a medical man; and perhaps it was his training in medicine
that brought Aristotle to embrace a view of life as immanent in matter. In seeing life
as residing in matter, as enformed, the Aristotelian view was certainly a more fruitful
approach in scientific enquiry. That the Timaeus should be so revered when
Christianity was formulating its doctrine was a historical happenstance that cast such
a long shadow on western thought that it is only too easy to forget, that the seed for
the clash between Lawrence and Rennell was long sown in Athens before Christ was
born, when Aristotle's Lyceum vied with Plato's Academy for supremacy.
IV
In the conclusion of the Remarks, Rennell was concerned to reinforce one of the
cornerstone arguments of natural theology - that God was the first and independent
cause in nature. Earlier in the Remarks, Rennell had defined life as the 'inherent
activity' to distinguish the activity of all living bodies from the activity that was
produced by external cause like material impulse or chemical agency. This 'inherent
activity' could only be traced to God:
It matters not through how many bodies we trace the succession of
activity and motion, we must come at last to the hand from which the
impulse was originally given, to the first intelligent, independent
moving power. That power is God. He is the one supreme and
perfect Being - independent in his existence, infinite in his wisdom,
eternal in his duration - the author of all power, the source of all life,
the cause of all motion.81
The necessity of a First Cause to explain the origin of life was likened to the need for
the cause of Gravity. As a unifying concept, Gravity has been infinitely fruitful in
explaining a multitude of physical phenomena, but even for Newton, 'Gravity must
82be caused by an agent, acting constantly according to certain laws'. In other words,
having discovered giavily as the cause of all motions does not in itself explain what
causes gravity. Similarly, for Rennell, to define life as organization did not in itself
explain the cause of life:
Matter is first organized as a recipient of life, and after it is so
organized, life is imparted. It is true that a living being is uniformly
81
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the channel by which life is communicated, but it is not, therefore, the
cause of the communication.83
In his affirmation that organized matter is the channel for the communication of life,
Rennell was much closer in giving Lawrence a fair hearing than Abemethy and many
of his critics. Lawrence had similarly drawn parallels between 'organization' and
'gravity', on the limitation of gravity as an explanation of motion. Rennell differed
crucially from Lawrence, however, in his need to attribute God as the First Cause
when the limits of natural explanation were reached.
Lawrence never took up the position of being a critic of Rennell. True to his
belief, he did not attempt to take up the theological grounds of his opponents to
launch a defence. His caveat to his lecture given in 1817, that 'the theological
doctrine of the soul, and its separate existence, has nothing to do with this
physiological question' would suggest that he was aware of the theological issues he
might be raising with his physiological views.
It seems to me that this hypothesis, or fiction of a subtle invisible
matter, animating the visible textures of animal bodes, and directing
their motions, is only an example of that propensity on the human
mind, which had led men at all times to account for those phenomena,
of which the causes are not obvious, by the mysterious aid of higher
and imaginary beings. ... all the appearances of nature, which the
progress of science enables us to explain by means of natural causes,
have been referred to the immediate operation of the divinity.84
In Lawrence, we are perhaps witnessing the emergence of the new scientist, as
distinct from the natural philosophers of the Newtonian tradition. In this new
scientist, to accept the limitations of knowledge at each stage was the prerequisite for
a fruitful enquiry, and with this acceptance, the frontiers of knowledge could then be
advanced stage by stage. Repeatedly, Lawrence stressed that our limitation in
knowing was no reason for resorting to a divinity in order to supply an ultimate
explanation. In respect of the life-matter duality, Lawrence had expressed the limits
as follows:
In the science of physiology we proceed on the observation of facts, of
their order and connexion, ... We are thus led to admit the vital
properties, ... as causes of the various phenomena; in the same way as
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do not profess to explain how the living forces in one case, or
attraction in the other, exert their agency.85
Lawrence's positive attitude towards the limits of knowledge in his scientific
enquiries was ahead of his time. The majority of his contemporaries would concur
with the stance taken by the Edinburgh Monthly Review, which regarded such
acceptance as synonymous with the danger of mling God out of the universe:
The great danger to which those are exposed in the study of physical
science, who are ignorant even of the first principles of intellectual
science, is this - that being accustomed to account for all the
phenomena of that science from mere secondary causes, they forgot
the first cause of all things ... that there can be no law without a
86
lawgiver.
Lawrence did not give the impression that he was trying to disprove the existence of
God in his physiological formulations. What he was at pains to establish was that
'God as the First Cause' was neither an explanation nor would it help to advance the
frontiers of knowledge. In the area of mind-brain duality, Lawrence would rather
accept the inability to explain how medullary matter could think, than to recourse to
an immaterial mind as the thinking agent. In contention with the immaterialists,
Lawrence emphatically related certain facts which he interpreted as inextricably
linking thought with the brain:
Thought, it is positively and dogmatically asserted, cannot be an act of
matter. Yet no feelings, no thought, no intellectual operation has ever
been seen except in conjunction with a brain; and living matter is
acknowledged by most persons to be capable of what makes the
nearest possible approach to thinking. The strongest advocate for
immaterialism seeks no further than the body for his explanation of all
the vital processes, of muscular contraction, ... He will not allow the
brain to be capable of sensation.87
Physiological facts which indicate a greater importance of the brain beyond what the
immaterialists would allow are: that the human brain 'receives one fifth of all the
blood sent from the heart', that it is 'so peculiarly and delicately organized, nicely
enveloped in successive membranes, and securely lodged in a solid bony case'. In
oo
fact, the human brain 'is better fed, clothed, and lodged than any other part'. From
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matter was capable of thought. Our ignorance as to how matter could think, in
Lawrence's opinion, was no reason for not granting that matter could think.
Shall I be told that thought is inconsistent with matter; that we cannot
conceive how medullary can perceive, remember, judge, reason? I
acknowledge that we are entirely ignorant how the parts of the brain
accomplish these purposes - as we are how the liver secretes bile, how
muscles contract, or how any other living purposes are effected; ...
Experience is, in all these cases, our sole, if not sufficient instructress;
and the constant conjunction of phenomena, ... is the sole ground for
affirming a necessary connexion between them. If we go beyond this,
and come to inquire the matter how, the mechanism by which these
things are effected, we shall find every thing around us equally
mysterious, equally incomprehensible - from the stone which falls to
the earth, to the comet traversing the heavens — ... from the formation
of a maggot in putrid flesh, or a mite in cheese, to the production of a
Newton or a Franklin.89
Rennell came close to sharing this acceptance of limitation of our knowledge
with his comment that from 'certain experiments, we are enabled to infer the
existence of gravity, and to calculate its laws; but how it operates, and in what
manner it exists, we must be satisfied to remain in ignorance'.90 This satisfaction to
remain in ignorance, however, was not his ultimate position, but was inextricably
bound up with the conception of a God who was the First Cause of all things. It was
the God of the natural theologians, whose remit was to see in nature 'such irresistible
proof a superintending Providence'.91 In many ways, the Lawrence episode was a
test case in this period of transition, when science was perhaps trying to break out of
the strait-jacket imposed on it by natural theology. To all intents and purposes,
Lawrence was pleading for leave to conduct his scientific enquiries without a hidden
agenda of having to prove Nature's God. This 'hidden agenda' or expectation was
reflected in D'Oyly's comment on the role of science and its relation to religion,
which incidentally, also encapsulated the confusion of Lawerence's critics:
It is not certainly to physiology that we look for the main proofs of the
immateriality of the soul, and its continuance after death - we only
ask that this valuable science may not be enlisted into the service of
infidelity, ... that it may not be brought to invalidate those other
proofs of the immaterial and immortal nature of the soul, which, in
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That physiology, or as Paley had favoured, comparative anatomy, should serve the
role of being a powerful ally to natural theology was fully borne out by the
Bridgewater Treatises of the 1830s. A publishing phenomenon, the treatises
indicated the huge importance of physiology and anatomy as a domain for evidence
of 'the power, wisdom, and goodness of God'. Out of the total eight treatises, six
were devoted to the study of life or its structure: 1. Thomas Chalmers on the Moral
and Intellectual Constitution of Maw, 2. John Kidd on the Physical Condition of
Man'\ 3. Sir Charles Bell on The Hand: Its Mechanism and Vital Endowments', 4.
Peter Mark Roget on Animal and Vegetable Physiology, 5. William Kirby on the
Instincts ofAnimals', 6. William Prout on The Function ofDigestion. The other two
titles were: William Whewell on Astronomy and Physics; and William Buckland on
Geology and Mineralogy. The 'varied blend of natural theology and popular
science' of these treatises attracted 'extraordinary contemporary interest and
"celebrity", resulting in unprecedented sales and widespread reviewing'.93 The
success of the Bridgewater Treatises as a form of 'popular science' suggested the
strength of the tradition of natural theology well into the 1830s. While Lawrence
was not alone in taking the stance that science should be separate from theology, he
was certainly riding against the strong tides of natural theology in this controversy
that spanned between 1816 and 1822.
y
'Materialism and Atheism go hand in hand', — this was Rennell's overriding concern
in his Remarks. Lawrence's ideas were judged to promote materialism and in turn,
atheism. To what extent was Rennell's concern justified? In conclusion, this section
examines Rennell's assertion that 'Materialism and Atheism go hand in hand' under
three headings: theological, philosophical, and social.
Theologically, Rennell was concerned that if 'we have argued ourselves out
of the existence of our soul, which is a spirit, by the same process, we argue
ourselves out of the existence of the Almighty, which is a spirit also'.94 The High-
93 Jonathan Topham, 'Science and popular education in the 1830s: the Role of the Bridgewater
Treatises', British Journal ofHistory ofScience, 25 (1992): 397-430, 397.
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Church, Tory Anglicanism that Rennell represented would affirm the doctrine of the
soul as the giver of life; the soul proceeded from God, who was a spirit; and the soul
was a spirit like God. To argue that life did not depend on an immaterial soul but the
material organization was to invalidate God as the first cause of life. To doubt the
existence of the soul was tantamount to doubting the existence of God; and hence, in
Rennell's mind, materialism and atheism went in tandem.
Was Lawrence an atheist then? There was evidence suggesting that
Lawrence was a member of a city church of 'Free-thinking Christians'.95 The sect
was 'a quasi-Unitarian body'; their doctrines can be summarised as: 'they
condemned the doctrine of the Fall; affirmed (with Luther) the Scriptural resurrection
of the dead as against the immortality of the soul; disparaged death-bed repentance;
censured public prayer; assailed alike Quakerism and Deism'.96 Lawrence was
alleged to have expressed 'doubts about the immortality of the soul, but to believe in
the immortality of the body'. He was also reputed to have denied the inspiration of
97
Scriptural authors, and disbelieved in the descent of all men from Adam and Eve.
Echoing Lawrence's views in this period was another prominent dissenting
physician, John Elliotson, Professor of Medicine at London University from 1831.
Infamous for his radical views, Elliotson argued that 'the notion of the "immortality
of a supposed system distinct from the body" was a "heathen doctrine"; that both
scripture and science agreed that the only means of personal survival was by "the
resurrection of the what we obviously are - bodies, and that through a miracle of the
Almighty'. In respect of the nature of life and the mind, Elliotson asserted, 'As I
cannot conceive life any more than attraction unless possessed by matter, so I cannot
95
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conceive mind unless possessed by a brain endowed with life'.98
Taking the evidence as a whole, while Lawrence's religious affiliation was
unorthodox, he was not atheistic. A powerful conclusion can be drawn that at the
heart of the Lawrence-Rennell debate, it was not so much religion against science, as
different Christian religious beliefs that were at odds in respect of the nature of man
and the basis of a future life. Theologically therefore, materialism did not
necessarily lead to atheism, as demonstrated by the dissenting tradition, which
disowned the immaterial soul and based their hopes for immortality on the
resurrection of the material body. Underlying this theological impasse between the
different sections of Christian believers (orthodox and dissenting) was a
philosophical tension that had underlain Christian orthodoxy ever since the inception
of its faith at the Hellenistic period.
Philosophically, the 'orthodox' Christian beliefs were too rooted in Platonism
to take cognizance of the alternative views of the dissenting Christians on the issue
of the soul and the basis of immortality. The philosophy of Joseph Priestley of man
as one uniform substance rather than two natures as in the dualistic tradition of the
Platonic system could have provided a valuable starting point for such a re¬
cognizance. Priestley's conception of man further allowed him to derive a theology
of a future state based on bodily resurrection. However, as a Unitarian minister,
Priestley was firmly branded as a dissenter, his theology condemned as heresy, and
political exile his eventual choice. In appraising Lawrence's lectures, the Hackney
group in fact saw the lectures 'as an authoritative re-publication of the Priestleian
materialism they politically defeated in the 1790s and the early 1800s'.99 As a
Hackney member, Rennell probably was unable to consider Priestley's materialism
as any different from the French materialists like Diderot, La Mettrie and d'Holbach.
Rennell was right in perceiving the dangers of the philosophy of the French
materialists as ultimately tending to atheism. Through Cartesianism, the French
materialists were dangerous because they philosophised from within the same
dualistic system of Platonism. What they did was to push this dualistic conception of
man to its very limit, separating body and soul so categorically that the soul receded
into the background. Accordingly, they effectively arrived at a form of materialism
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that reduced man to organised matter, levelling the distinction between man and the
animals, likening vital functions with those of a machine. Furthermore, the
reductionist form of French materialism was inextricably coupled with atheism.
Hailed as 'the first of the atheists', Diderot's achievement was in place of God, he
offered matter as 'the creative source of all change'. Diderot argued his case:
... not by repudiating the mathematical physics of Descartes or the
universal mechanics of Newton but by bringing them, as he
contended, to fulfilment. He expanded the principles of Descartes and
freed them from an unwarranted metaphysics. In so doing, he realized
his own Universal Mechanics, ... but it was a science which did not
point beyond itself to nonmechanical principles.100
As far as the French materialists were concerned, materialism and atheism did go
hand in hand. When Rennell penned his Remarks, it was this branch of materialism
that coloured his reading of Lawrence's lectures, which he decried along with 'the
subtle insinuations and designing sophistry of D'Alembert and his fraternity; who
were the first to lay the foundation of that school of infidelity'.101 In fact, Priestley's
ideas 'were hardly even perceived as different from earlier versions of
materialism'.102 In failing to perceive Priestley's materialism as any different from
the French, for instance, the potential of re-working the Christian theology for the
body, the mind and the soul that could have met the challenges of ideas such as those
advanced in Lawrence's lectures was never realised. Rennell, along with the
Hackney group, probably viewed his campaign against Lawrence's lectures as a
continuation of the purge against Priestleian materialism.
The possibility of re-examining the doctrine of the soul was further beset by
the Tack of a well-defined canon of Anglican doctrine and of a coherent grouping of
professional theologians'.103 As suggested by Corsi, this intellectual weakness was
reflected, 'in the plurality of views expressed by contributors to the British Critic, the
journal controlled by the Hackney leaders'. An illustration of this plurality was the
critical responses to Lawrence's lectures as distinct from those to the craniology of
Gall and Spurzheim. Rennell was terse in his dismissal of craniology, saying that the
'system of Gall and Spurzheim, however ingenious or amusing in theory it may be, is
100 Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins ofModern Atheism (Yale, 1987), 249.
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annihilated by the commonest reference to fact'.104 Significantly, however, Rennell
did not charge craniology with materialism. Rennell indicated his reservation by
stating that: 'It must be allowed, that this system does not, of logical necessity,
terminate in materialism'.105 Similarly, a lengthy article in the British Critic was
categorical in clearing craniology of materialism:
A priori, we conceive that no valid objection can be raised against the
system, as tending in the smallest degree either to materialism or to
infidelity.106
The reviewer emphatically stated, 'we were convinced, that [the system] led to no
107conclusion really hostile to religion, or subversive of good morals'. That
Lawrence's lectures should be censured and condemned while craniology was
cleared of any charges of materialism, was an inconsistency that demands an
explanation. The evidence suggests that Rennell and other like-minded thinkers
were swayed by what they took to be the very different social implications of
craniology and Lawrence's more familiar kind of materialism. Craniology under
Spurzheim developed into the science of phrenology with an explicit social agenda
of educational reforms and self-improvement of individuals. While craniology could
be seen, therefore, as a movement in keeping with the conservative values of early
nineteenth-century Britain, the same could not be said for Lawrence's science. On
the contrary, the ideas in Lawrence's lectures were taken up and deployed by
political radicals, such as Richard Carlile and Percy Shelley, in order to undermine
the religious basis of morality as a means for political control.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the religious basis of morality depended on an
immaterial soul as the vehicle for an existence in a future state. Two examples of
sermons illustrate how the doctrine of the soul was held to crucial to the message of
contentment with our earthly life, — an effective form of social control through
religion. As Archdeacon of Carlisle, Paley addressed 'the labouring part of the
British public' on the Reasons for Contentment (1793). Speaking of the roles of
Providence and religion, Paley instructed his working-class audience:
But Providence, which foresaw, which appointed, indeed the necessity
to which human affairs are subjected... hath contrived that , whilst
fortunes are only for a few, the rest of mankind may be happy without
104
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them.... Religion smoothes all inequalities, because it unfolds a
prospect which makes all earthly distinctions nothing.108
The prospect religion was supposed to unfold related to the heavenly realm, the
kingdom to where the immaterial and immortal soul would soar after death. As to
their earthly life as labourers, Paley enlightened his audience, 'that a life of labour,
such I mean as is led by the labouring part of mankind in this country, has
advantages in it, which compensates all its inconveniences'. The sermon concluded
with a stern warning against the miseries wrought by revolutions:
that changes of condition, which are attended with a breaking up and
sacrifice of our ancient course and habit of living, never can be
productive of happiness, ... to covet the stations or fortunes of the
rich, as to wish to seize them by force, or through the medium of
public uproar and confusion, is not only wickedness, but folly; ... that
it is not only to venture out to sea in a storm, but to venture for
nothing.109
A sermon by Rennell at St. Paul's Cathedral on 17 May, 1821 on John
xviii:36: 'Jesus answered, My Kingdom is not of this world' illustrates how the
prospect of a future state was woven into a message of preservation of the status quo:
'The knowledge of Christ is not of this world'. The prospects which it
opens, the motives which it suggests, ... are those of another and a
better country, 'that is an heavenly'. The influence which it exercises
over the hearts and affections of its subjects is purely spiritual,
elevating the mind above all transitory objects, and fixing its ultimate
view 'upon things above and not on things on the earth.' On the other
hand, the peculiar responsibility which it attaches to all actions of life,
enforces the discharge of every earthly duty, and strengthens the
obligation of every social tie. Thus then by keeping the one in due
subserviency to the other does it reconcile the opposite interests of
two contending worlds.110
Rennell's sermon was directed at the domestic situations in post-Napoleonic Britain.
In 1816 and 1819, Lawrence published his two controversial series of lectures.
Between those years, Britain witnessed series after series of mob violence, mass
gatherings and economic distresses of rising unemployment and increased food
prices. The state of distress in 1816, for instance, caused Charles Western, a
Member of Parliament, to propose that the House should resolve itself into a
Committee of the whole House, to take into consideration the distressed state of
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agriculture of the United Kingdom.1" Mob riots broke out in the countryside. In
Cambridge, where Rennell was installed as the Christian Advocate, a mob of 1500
strong gathered in 1816, arming themselves with long heavy sticks studded with
short iron pikes, marching to their flag inscribed 'Bread or Blood'. 2 The riots
spread from the countryside to the industrial townships, culminating in the Spa Fields
meeting in London on 2nd December 1816, which involved a plot to take the Tower
and seize the city. The Seditious Meetings Act was passed in 1817 stipulating that a
licence had to be obtained for any assemblies of people. Though this measure was
designed with surveillance of radical politics in mind, the dissemination of science
was caught up in it. For instance, in 1817, the Quarterly Review implicated the
Philosophical Society of Newcastle 'on the slender grounds that Thomas Spence had
presented his dangerous views before it in the 1780s'.113 The reaction (or 'over-
reaction') of the public to Lawrence's Lectures has to be understood against the
socio-political climate in Britain in those anxious years of anti-Jacobinism
immediately after the Napoleonic wars. London, being the capital, was the centre of
such vigilance, and the geographical location for the deliverance of Lawrence's
Lectures was a precipitating factor in the debate.
The year Rennell published the Remarks was the year of the 'Peterloo'
massacre, 1819. The loss of nerves by the governing magistrates in Manchester over
the peaceful gathering of some 50,000 labourers in August 1819 ended in the
bloodshed of the innocent, children included. The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool,
declared the action of the Manchester magistrates as 'substantially right', though not
altogether 'prudent'; and 'there remained no alternative but to support them'.114 One
of the consequences of 'Peterloo' was the passing of the Six Acts in November 1820,
intended to strengthen the laws governing public meetings, and the curb the
'unbound liberty' of the Radical press. It was against these domestic situations that
Rennell preached his sermon stressing the role of religion for social stability:
It is not by preserving, but by corrupting the religion of a nation, that
despotism and tyranny promote their sway. Eradicate from a people
the fear of God, ... loosen the bands of national religion, subvert the
111 See Edinburgh Review, 26 (1816): 255-281 for the speeches by Western on 7 March.
112 See Scots Magazine, 78 (1816): 470 and The Times, 30 May 1816. See also A. J. Peacock, Bread
or Blood, The Agrarian Riots in East Anglia, 1816 (London, 1965).
113 See Ian Inkster, 'London Science and the Seditious Meetings Act of 1817', British Journal for the
History ofScience, 12(1979): 192-196, 195.
114
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foundations of Christian morality, ... and you lead them through the
fearful stages of clamour and licentiousness, rebellion and bloodshed,
to the final doom of usurpation and tyranny.115
Rennell was clearly concerned that Lawrence's lectures were subversive to
the foundations of Christian morality. Was it a concern with any basis? A succinct
example can be found in the political career of Richard Carlile (1790-1843), as
supporting evidence for Rennell's concern. Joel Wiener, Carlile's biographer, names
Lawrence as a crucial writer who 'impelled Carlile in the direction of atheism'.116 In
formulating his atheistic radicalism, Lawrence's science was a source of inspiration
to Carlile. Some ideas contained in Lawrence's lectures were given a decidedly
atheistic edge by Carlile, for instance:
Instead of viewing ourselves as the particular and partial objects of the
care of a great Diety, ... made in the express image of the Diety, ...
we should consider ourselves but as atoms of organized matter, ...
whose existence in a state of organization ... is a matter of no
importance in the laws and operations of Nature; we should view
ourselves with the same feelings, as we view the leaf which rises in
the Spring ... and falls in the autumn, and then serves no further
purpose but to fertilise the earth for a fresh production.117
Wiener describes that a central aspect of Carlile's atheism was 'a faith in the
regenerative powers of science'; it was Carlile's alternative to theism. In his tract An
Address to Men of Science, Carlile propounded that 'Superstition corrupts and
deteriorates all the human passions', while 'science alone is qualified to amend and
118moralize them'. The subversive danger to morals of Lawrence's lectures as
perceived by the religious establishment was borne out in the deployment of
materialistic science as a means to replace religion as the basis for morals.
Carlile's career as a radical reformer further provides the context for
understanding the seditious potential of materialistic science on the working class as
feared by the ruling elite. 'Enthusiasm for science constituted an important facet of
working-class culture in the nineteenth century. Lectures carried the latest scientific
ideas to eager audiences of artisans and mechanics, while popular journals gave these
ideas detailed coverage'.119 The son of a shoe-maker, Carlile identified with the
115 Rennell, The Unambitious Views, op. cit., 17.
116 Joel H. Wiener, Radicalism and Freethought in Nineteenth Century Britain - The Life of Richard
Carlile (London, 1983), 110.
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working classes. He told his followers, 'There are no mysteries in nature, but what
man, by the aid and progress of science might ultimately apprehend'.120 The
message proclaimed here was that man, allied with science, would be masters of the
Universe. The intended political message by Carlile for his working-class followers
was that, 'empowered' by science, they would ultimately break free from their
station in society.
Carlile's atheistic radicalism made him 'a leader of an "infidel challenge"
against orthodox religion', and fed directly into his role as one of the most important
British working-class reformers of the nineteenth century. But what was singular in
Carlile's achievements was the fight he staged to vindicate the principle of free
discussion. For this, he was credited as 'having done more than any other
Englishmen in his day for the freedom of the Press', as having 'made the greatest
stand in the nineteenth century for freedom of speech and writing'.121 It was in his
role as a fighter for the freedom of speech that Carlile's direct involvement in the
Lawrence episode can be traced.
Written within two months of the Chancery lawsuit in May 1821, An Address
was a direct rebuttal of the verdict. In his tract, Carlile referred to Lawrence as 'that
spirited young man' who had shown 'a disposition in his public lectures to
discountenance and attack those detailed impostures and superstitions of Priestcraft'.
Indignant on Lawrence's behalf, Carlile declared:
I will every Man of Science and opportunity of publishing his
sentiments without any direct danger to himself: I will fill the gap of
persecution for him, if a victim be still necessary to satisfy the revenge
of dying Priestcraft.122
Unwittingly, the verdict of the Chancery lawsuit that Lawrence's lectures were
blasphemous, seditious, or immoral had the direct effect of raising the profile of
Lawrence's lectures for Carlile's political ends. Carlile's publishing career was
beleaguered by political suppressions of a similar kind. Having read Thomas Paine
for the first time in 1816 and greatly admired him, Carlile published the theological,
political and other works of Paine. The publication of Paine's works at the dawn of
the post-Napoleonic era was perhaps as ill-timed (unless provocation was the intent)
as Lawrence's Francophile declarations were ill-judged. For these publications,
120 As quoted in Wiener, 111.
121 'Richard Carlile', Dictionary ofNational Biography, 9 (1887): 103.
122
Carlile, An Address, 20.
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Carlile was charged for bringing forth opinions which brought into disrepute the
Holy Scriptures. By October 1819, Carlile had six indictments against him in
connection with his publications of Paine's works. In November, he faced his three-
day trial and was sentenced to £1,500 fine and three years' imprisonment in
Dorchester gaol. Faced with his imminent trial, Carlile published The Accusation,
Condemnation, and Abjuration of Galileo before the Holy Inquisition in 1819,
drawing parallels between the plight of Galileo and his own:
The Magnificent Inquisitor General of that day, and of that country,
and the Magnificient Inquisitor General of the present day, and of this
country, are men of the same stamp and disposition. The charge
against Galileo was, that his opinions had a tendency to bring into
disrepute the Holy Scriptures; the charge against me is, that my
publications have the same tendency. Galileo was imprisoned, but
before the expiration of his sentence, his persecutors were convinced
of their ignorance and folly. Galileo was liberated, and his
astronomical opinions espoused, even by his former persecutors. For
the honour of my country, I hope, that a jury will not be found in the
present day to become a bar to scientific research, progressive
improvement and free discussion on all subjects.123
It was probably not just his own plight that Carlile had in mind when he wrote the
preface. The allusion to the ignorance and folly of Galileo's Inquisitor, the plea for
freedom of scientific research and discussion, were more immediately relevant to
Lawrence's plight. Finally, with Lord Eldon's verdict which turned Lawrence's
intellectual property into free public property, Carlile published in 1823 Lawrence's
condemned lectures, and in sarcasm, dedicated his edition to Lord Eldon for 'his
injustice in refusing to establish the Author's Right of Property in these lectures'.124
What was Lawrence's response to Carlile's involvement in publicising his
lectures? There was evidence that two men were undoubtedly acquainted: First,
amongst those who subscribed to the relief of Carlile when he was in Dorchestor
gaol was a 'W.L.' of London, who contributed 3 shillings in 1821. Secondly,
Lawrence was the physician who ministered to Carlile in his last illness. Finally,
Carlile willed his body to Lawrence for dissection, though Lawrence decided not to
carry out a post-mortem. Lawrence's sympathy for Carlile's cause was implicit but
the extent of his support was not so easy to assess. Lawrence seemed to be careful to
maintain his distance for he stood to lose a lot by being publicly associated with, or
123 Carlile, An Address, iv.
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openly avowing his support for Carlile. One conclusion we are allowed to draw is
that, Lawrence's plea for setting up boundaries of knowledge, if understood to mean
that science should not and would not influence society or theology, would be
disproved by the work of Carlile. It was in the winter of 1816-17 that Carlile,
hitherto a respectable tinman, faced with a seemingly hopeless prospect for
employment for the artisan class in the post-war depression, launched his career as a
radical reformer through the use of the press. The economic difficulties of 1816-1820
provided the social climate for Lawrence's scientific ideas to be radicalised for
political ends. To censure the religious establishment as obscurantist would be to
miss the wide-ranging import of Lawrence's lectures, especially in those years of
economic chaos and social unrest, which Rennell had not been totally inaccurate in
naming. For better or worse, Lawrence's scientific views had religious and social
implications. In its final analysis, it was not the doctrine of the soul per se that was
at stake, but the religious basis for morality that Rennell considered being
jeopardised by the materialism in Lawrence's lectures. For Rennell, religion, with its
belief in the future state, was the vehicle for enforcing morality, and if the religious
basis of morality was undermined, it was much feared that would, in turn, lead the
masses to revolution.
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Two Sciences of the Mind
The question of Materialism is, whether the substance of which the thinking
principle is composed be matter or spirit? ... According to Phrenology,
morality and natural religion originate in, and emanate from, the primitive
constitution of the mental powers themselves. ...The only points certainly
known are, that in this life mind is never manifested without brain, and that
the powers of manifestation vary with the size and condition of the brain or
its particular parts.... [If] God has made the brain to think, ... His objects in
creating man will not be defeated on account of his having chosen a wrong
substance out of which to constitute the thinking principle.
George Combe, 18241
... should we ever be convinced that we are not moral agents, we should
likewise be convinced that there exists no moral order in the universe, and
no supreme intelligence by which that moral order is established, sustained,
and regulated. Theology is thus again wholly dependent on Psychology; for,
with the proof of the moral nature of man, stands or falls the proof of the
existence of a Deity. ... should Physiology ever succeed in reducing the facts
of intelligence to Phaenomena of matter, Philosophy would be subverted in
the subversion of its three great objects, — God, Free-Will, and Immortality.
Sir William Hamilton, 18362
I
In the year 1816, when Lawrence gave his controversial lectures in London, the end
of the Napoleonic wars had brought Dr Johann Spurzheim (1776-1832) to Edinburgh
to seek an audience for a new science of the mind known as phrenology. Educated in
Austria, Spurzheim had been a pupil of Dr Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), and
between 1800 and 1813, Spurzheim assisted Gall's research into cases of aphasia
precipitated by brain injuries in battle, which led onto further research in
neuroanatomy. In methodology and in his metaphysical assumption, Gall's approach
to neuroanatomy differed from the traditionalists. Departing from the contemporary
practice of brain dissection by successive slicing, Gall pioneered the method of
following the contours of what he took to be the brain's structural organization as
'
George Combe, Outlines ofPhrenology (1824, Edinburgh, 9th edn. 1854), 32.
2 William Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics (Edinburgh, 1859), Lecture II, first delivered, Session
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manifested in its anatomy. In his metaphysics, Gall dismissed the traditional
approach to the mind-body problem, which viewed the soul or mind as an
independent principle, acting purely by itself, and capable of producing the faculties
and propensities. Instead, Gall's research was guided by the belief that 'the faculties
and propensities of man have their seat in the brain'.3 Through neuroanatomy, Gall
set out to establish the link between the physical brain and mental functions. He
further postulated that knowledge of brain physiology would lead to better
understanding of human behaviour, and remove the abstractions and speculations
surrounding the philosophy of the mind. In other words, Gall's aim was 'that
psychology should cease to be the domain of the speculative philosopher and should
become the special study of the naturalist and physiologist'.4 By his own admission,
the object of Gall's research was 'to found a doctrine on the functions of the brain.
The result of this doctrine ought to be the development of a perfect knowledge of
human nature'.5
This doctrine came to be known as organology or craniology, and central to
this doctrine was the insistence of linking brain anatomy with psychology. In
summary, the chief tenets of craniology were: (1) that the brain is the organ of the
mind, and is an aggregate of mental organs (not a homogeneous unity); (2) that these
mental organs are topographically localized into specific functions; (3) that other
factors being equal, the relative size of any one of the mental organs can be taken as
an index to that organ's power of manifestation; and (4) that since the skull ossifies
over the brain during infant development, external craniological means can be used
to diagnose the internal state of mental faculties. While such a summary facilitates
discussion of the new science of the mind, it has to be read in the context that there
existed nuanced differences between Gall and his followers. Robert Young's
account of the development of Gall's doctrine into craniology and then further into
phrenology by Gall's different followers admirably highlights the twists and turns of
such a process; and serves as the caveat to any attempt at a summary.6
Young's assessment of Gall's work was that 'his was the first empirical
3
Quoting Gall, in Robert Young, Mind, Brain, and Adaptation in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford,
1990), 20.
4
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5 Franz Gall, A Biographical History of Philosophy, tr. George H. Lewes, 4 vols. (London, 1857),
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6 See Young, op. cit., 9-53.
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approach both to the nature of the faculties and to their localizations'.7 By cerebral
localization, Young refers to Gall's doctrine that the various parts of the brain have
relatively distinct mental, behavioural, and/or physiological functions. Even Pierre
Flourens, Gall's most effective critic, remarked on Gall's achievement in the
following terms:
the proposition that the brain is the exclusive seat of the soul is not a
new proposition, and hence does not originate with Gall....The merit
of Gall, and it is by no means a slender merit, consists in having
understood better than any of his predecessors the whole of its
importance, and in having devoted himself to its demonstration. It
existed in science before Gall appeared - it may be said to reign there
ever since his appearance.8
Flourens' remark sets in context the relevance of Gall's doctrine to our
current discussion. By pursuing the question, 'What are the functions of the brain?'
Gall resolutely focused on the material organ rather than speculated on the nature of
the mind. After Gall, the understanding of the manifestation of mental faculties took
a decisive turn from philosophy into the domain of biological science. Though
critical of Gall's detailed findings, George Fewes acknowledged Gall's place in his
positivist History of Philosophy, as having 'rescued the problem of mental functions
from metaphysics and made it one of biology'.9 Based on Gall's craniology,
Spurzheim developed the system of mental science came to be known as phrenology,
derived from two Greek words, Phrenos meaning mind, and Logos meaning
discourse. Distinction must be drawn, however, between craniology and phrenology
and their respective scientific merits. Phrenology was an attempt to apply craniology
to deduce important character traits by an examination of the shapes and sizes of the
skulls. Such an application was originated by Spurzheim, not by Gall himself.
Furthermore, while Gall's primary concern was to 'prove psychology depended on
the structure of the brain', Spurzheim was intent on 'applying phrenology to
problems of contemporary philosophy, religion, and social reform'.10 Combe, as the
arch-disciple of Spurzheim, extended and propagated phrenology further as a creed,
in which the moral constitution of man was seen as manifested through his physical
constitution, with special reference to his skull.
7 Robert Young, 'Gall', Dictionary ofScientific Biography, 16 vols. (New York, 1972), V:250-6,
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When Spurzheim set foot in Edinburgh in 1816, the university city was
unique in Europe for her twin reputation in medicine and metaphysics. It was a city
where the study of the brain as an organ in medicine, and the reflection of the mind
in philosophy, had equally contributed to the golden age of Scottish Enlightenment.11
It was not surprising, therefore, that the reception of Spurzheim's lectures on the
latest science on the brain should be so polarised. On the one hand, George Combe's
conversion to phrenology in 1816 turned him into the most effective champion for
the science, in Britain and America, for the ensuing four decades. On the other hand,
the intelligentsia in Edinburgh who had been trained by her university in either
medicine or metaphysics, or both, became the most effective critics of phrenology. It
was in Edinburgh that the debates between the established science of the mind
represented by the Scottish common-sense philosophers and the new science of the
mind coming from phrenology were most intense and protracted.
'The Edinburgh Phrenology Debate: 1803-1828' formed the subject matter of
12
an historiographical discussion between Cantor and Shapin (1975). A
comparatively internalist approach is adopted by Cantor to explain the
'incommensurability' of the two sciences of the mind. Meta-issues beyond the
immediate subject matter of the controversy, related to methodology and theology
for instance, are examined to understand the two systems of assumptions that give
rise to the 'opposing' sciences of the mind. Shapin adopts an externalist approach to
account for the allegiance to, and rejection of, phrenology in terms of socio-political,
and religious factors. De Giustino's Conquest of Mind (1975) is a study of the
interaction of phrenology with the social thought of the early Victorian period, in
areas like religion and education.13 Cooter's historical study of phrenology as a
science that had reached the populace and influenced their attitudes is an attempt to
reclaim a part of what he sees as that 'veritable wasteland' between 'the sociology of
collective behaviour and the history of scientific ideas'.14 This chapter is an attempt
11 See for instance, R. H. Campbell & Andrew Skinner (ed.), The Origins and Nature of the Scottish
Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1982); Anand Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment - A Social History
(London, 1976); Richard Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment, The Moderate
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in the similar direction, in that 'veritable wasteland' between the internalist and
externalist approaches. It does not purport to enumerate all the differences between
the two sciences of the mind. The primary interest of this chapter is to understand
the contemporary objections raised against phrenology as a science of the mind by
focusing on three events in Edinburgh. The first was the publishing event of three
articles against craniology or phrenology by the Edinburgh Review in 1803, 1815 and
1826, respectively by the mental philosopher Thomas Brown, the physician Dr John
Gordon, and the Whig politician and a founder of the Review, Francis Jeffrey. At
each key stage of the development of the new science of the mind, the Review
responded judiciously with its criticism. Referred to as the 'Koran of the reading
public' by George Combe,15 the articles served as landmarks in charting the
reception of phrenology by the Edinburgh intelligentsia and of how the wider public
might have been influenced in this respect.
The second event of focus centred on the debate between George Combe and
Sir William Hamilton, the last Scottish common-sense philosopher of any note.
From 1826, Hamilton was reckoned by the phrenologists in Edinburgh as the most
formidable anti-phrenologist. The two representatives of the two sciences of the
mind conducted a protracted debate on phrenology through correspondence and
public lectures. The course of the debate between Combe and Hamilton will be
discussed, and the arguments advanced by each side examined. In 1836, the Combe-
Hamilton debate that had been ongoing for a decade received a public verdict in the
form of a chair contest, which is the third event being discussed in this chapter.
Combe and Hamilton were amongst the candidates for the contest of the Chair in
Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh. The contest became a test
case as to whether phrenology as the new science of the mind would replace the
traditional science of the mind represented by the Scottish common-sense
philosophy. The perceived significance of the contest offered the public and the
press an opportunity to debate the implications of conferring on phrenology the
15 The first issue of the Edinburgh Review appeared on 10 October 1802, and. was an instant success.
Sales increased at a remarkable rate, reaching 2,500 copies in July, 1803; 9,000 in 1808; to nearly
13,000 copies in 1814. Periodicals in this period were typically under the influence of the publishers;
the success of the Review might have owed much to its independence from a publisher, and the
handsome payment made to its contributors guaranteed to attract the best of talents. The first
publisher, Constable, agreed to pay ten guineas a sheet, which was 'three times what was ever paid
before for such work'. (Cockburn, Journal, ii, 74). The minimum was soon raised to sixteen guineas
a sheet, and the average was between twenty to twenty-five guineas during Francis Jeffrey's
editorship.
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respectability of a university discipline. It is argued here that the religious and moral
implications of the phrenological doctrine ranked as the chief consideration in
assessing the respectability of phrenology.
II
Long before Spurzheim set foot in Edinburgh in 1816 to preach phrenology to the
Scots, the Edinburgh Review was aware of the significance of Gall's system of
craniology to the extent that the journal, in its second year of circulation, devoted an
article to discuss the subject in April 1803.16 Its author, Thomas Brown (1778-1820)
was then a medical student completing his M.D., but whose interest in mental
philosophy had led him to read Dugald Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the
Human Mind in 1793, and to attend Stewart's lectures at the University of Edinburgh
the following winter. In 1796, Brown joined the Literary Society whose members
included Brougham, Jeffrey, Homer, Sydney, Leyden, bringing together the future
founders of the Edinburgh Review. In 1798, Brown published Observations on the
Zoonomia of Erasmus Darwin, which received high acclaim and earned him a
reputation in the Edinburgh literary circle. With that reputation and being a close
associate of the founders of the Edinburgh Review, Brown became one of its earliest
contributors. Brown's Review article on Gall was a response to Charles Villers'
published letter to George Cuvier on Gall's doctrines. Though later on in his life,
Brown had expressed views which led Hamilton to charge him of 'infidelity' to the
Scottish school, at the time of writing the Review article, Brown was perceived as a
protege of the common-sense school. Indeed, when Stewart retired in 1810 from the
chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, Brown succeeded him and held the chair
until his death in 1820. In assessing Brown's suitability as an assessor of craniology,
it should be noted that as a medical student, he would have studied the brain as an
organ, and as a mental philosopher, the mind had been his 'object' of reflection.
16 An earlier notice of craniology was by John Yelloly, M.D., in the Monthly Review in 1802, which
dismissed the science as 'visionary'. Before 1820 phrenology was regarded with disdain in the
Edinburgh Medical and Surgical Journal, London Medical Repository, British Critic, Monthly
Criticial Gazette, Critical Journal; Literary Journal and the Monthly, Quarterly, Augustan, Eclectic,
and Edinburgh reviews; the Gentleman's, New Monthly, and Blackwood magazines; and the Literary
Gazette, to mention only the most widely circulated. See Cooter, op. cit., 22-3.
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Brown's article introduced Gall and his system with humour and also testified
to the fact that Gall's craniology was not well known in Edinburgh in 1803. 'Of
[Gall's] system, we till now [had] known little more, than that it terrified the stout
hearts of an Emperor [of Austria] and his Council, whom many years of unsuccessful
war had not been able to dismay'.17 Speaking of the Emperor's measure of issuing
an edict to exile Gall, Brown stated that he could not see why the Emperor's 'regard
took such violent alarm', for he did not see the charge of materialism as relevant. 'If
the tendency to Materialism be all which was dreaded, [craniology] seemed to have
no more tendency to it, than any other theory of the brain, which [had] been taught
for ages, without the least fear of penalties of the royal edicts'. Brown summarised
that for all the theories of mind, there could be two opinions only. The first was
'pure immaterialism', which asserted that all mental functions take place
immediately by the energies of the mind without the intervention of any material
organ. The only alternative position was to assert the necessity of a material organ.
If one were to adopt the alternative, then any modification of it which did not
exclude the mind 'as the ultimate percipient, must have an equal tendency to
materialism'. To Brown, the position was essentially the same whether 'the whole
brain be the organ, or a part of the brain be the organ, or different parts be organs of
different functions'. He went on to point out the inconsistency of the position of the
immaterialist who believes:
... that it is the soul which sees, the soul which hears, as much as that
it is the soul which judges, and the soul which imagines; and, since he
does not condemn, as impious, the allotment of different organs of
sight and hearing, what greater heresy is there, in the allotment of
different parts of the sensorium, as the organs of judgement and
imagination?18
To Brown, to allow organs to affect sight and hearing but not other mental functions
like judgement and imagination was inconsistent. Significantly, Brown had set out
to dismiss the significance of the charge of materialism levelled against Gall's
system of craniology.19
17
[Thomas Brown], 'A letter from Charles Villers to Georges Cuvier, ... on a New Theory of the
Brain, as the immediate organ of the intellectual and moral faculties, by Dr Gall of Vienna, Metz,
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18
Ibid., 148.
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the ideas of certain French materialists. 'Brown is sometimes accredited with being a republican and
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Brown's criticism of Gall's system was more on physiological grounds,
namely, 'that the arguments, adduced in support of the separate localities of thought,
[were] not very convincing'.20 In this respect, the focus of Brown's article was to
disprove Gall's claim that the brain was the aggregate of different mental organs.
For instance, Gall argued that the sense of relief experienced by a mental organ from
a change of subject after long study was a proof that different parts of the brain were
employed for different subjects of study. Brown gave a counter-example to testify
that relief could be experienced by the same organ in response to a change to external
stimulus; the same eye, fatigued with gazing on one species of light, would find
tremendous relief from a mere change of colour. The sense of relief experienced due
to a change in external stimulus was, to Brown, not a conclusive proof that different
organs were employed.
As a proof that different mental faculties had different localities within the
brain, Gall adduced from the fact that diseases, madness or external injuries of the
brain would lead to the partial loss of mental power peculiar to one faculty, while
other faculties remained unimpaired. Gall's argument was that this was a proof that
the affectation was localised to one organ. Contrary to Gall, Brown pointed out that
partial loss within the same faculty was more frequent than not. For example, there
were numerous cases of persons losing memory of one language while retaining fully
that of another; or of memory of a particular period of one's life being obliterated
while other periods remained unimpaired. For Brown, this implied that the same part
of the brain was healthy and diseased at the same time, which was clearly
contradictory.
The third argument adduced by Gall was the various degrees of power
manifested by different faculties within the same person as a proof that different
organs governed the manifestation of different faculties. Brown contended that if a
mathematician had no poetic taste, it was because the perception of the relations of
mathematical ideas formed one series of affections, while the perception of the
beauties of poetry formed another. Brown maintained that the two series could
explains the paradox of British phrenologists later coming to regard him as their philosophical
forerunner.... But it is doubtful if Edinburgh phrenologists would ever have claimed Brown "a
phrenologist in disguise" had not Brown's biographer, David Welsh, been an Edinburgh Phrenological
Society member.' See Cooter, The Cultural Meaning ofPopular Science, (Cambridge, 1984), footnote
31,308.
20
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belong to the same organ, as in muscular motions where two different series were
necessary in two different mechanical arts, that of contraction and extension.
The fourth argument Brown tried to refute concerned the varying degrees
whereby different faculties seemed to be affected by the state of sleep. Gall
considered somnambulism (a less extensive sleep) as proof of the brain being the
aggregate of different organs. Brown disagreed with the validity of the proof. For
the purpose of our current discussion, it is important to notice that Brown's chief
objection against Gall's doctrine was not that the brain was the organ of the mind,
but that the brain was an aggregate of mental organs. Brown's standpoint could be
summarised as:
To us, however, the circumstances, in which the faculties are
exercised, seem to shew sufficiently, that they are not the energies of
different parts. Thus, if perception and memory result from affections
of certain organs, and imagination from the affections of another
organ, ... we cannot conceive the imagination to act, without
including in itself those ideas which are said to be the states of
unconnected parts.21
In other words, the brain as the organ of the mind functioned as a unity in Brown's
opinion. That the brain should function as the aggregate of different organs was
simply inconceivable for Brown. He extrapolated what was to him an absurd
situation, in which 'the mind should be capable of completely believing, and, at the
same moment, completely disbelieving the same proposition', if the brain were to
function as the aggregate of different organs. In the final analysis, Brown's chief
objection to Gall's system was not materialism - it did not concern the claim that the
brain was the organ of the mind. Brown was contending against the claim that the
brain should be an aggregate of mental organs. In this respect, the counter¬
arguments by Brown seemed to be advanced from a physiological point of view, but
it is important to note that the conception of the mind functioning as a unity at any
22
one time was a foundational premise of the common-sense philosophy. The
metaphysics that instructed Brown in his analysis of his medical evidence appeared
to be that of the common-sense philosophy.
Another tenet in craniology that Brown disputed, at lesser length, concerned
the claim that the difference of power manifested by different faculties was
21
Brown, op. cit., 154-155; author's italics.
22 See D.R. Brookes, R. Derek (ed.), Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, on the Principles
ofCommon Sense (Edinburgh, 1997).
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correlated to the quantity of the parts of the brain. This objection was reiterated by
Dr John Gordon, M.D. (1786-1818), in his article in the Edinburgh Review published
in 1815. As a fellow of the Edinburgh Royal Society and the College of Surgeons
and a popular lecturer in anatomy and physiology at the University of Edinburgh,
Gordon's standing as a medical professional was indisputable. The article was
occasioned by the publication of Spurzheim's The Physiognomical System of Drs
Gall and Spurzheim in the same year.23 Though the title referred to both Gall and
Spurzheim, it was not to be assumed that Gall would have agreed to all that was
published by Spurzheim in this work. Gordon stated in the article that Spurzheim
had enlarged and amended the doctrine of Gall to such an extent that a certain schism
already existed between the master and the pupil. As regards the merit of Gordon's
article as a commentary on the new science, the Christian Pioneer in April 1835
alluded to Gordon's article as 'the most virulent attack' launched against Gall and
Spurzheim:
'The Quarterly, the Eclectic, the British, the Critical, the Monthly
Reviews, with the London Medical Repository, and the British Critic,
all exerted their powers of ridicule, argument and abuse; but the most
virulent attack of all was that of the late Dr.John Gordon in the 49th
number of the Edinburgh Review,24
Writing in 1836, Hewett Watson in his Statistics ofPhrenology referred to the fiat of
the Edinburgh (and Quarterly) Reviews as being 'held decisive by a large portion of
the public, fifteen or twenty years ago'. Gordon's article published in the Review,
which was 'then so powerful and influential', was to give 'a signal for every petty
witling and self-sufficient railer to join in the hue-and-cry raised against the doctrines
of Gall and Spurzheim'.25
23
[John Gordon], 'The Doctrines of Gall and Spurzheim', Edinburgh Review 25 (June 1815), 227-68.
Gordon had already established his standpoint in another Review article, 'Functions of the Nervous
System', Edinburgh Review, 24 (Feb, 1815), 439-52. His book, A System of Human Anatomy,
(Edinburgh, 1815), contained a detailed account of his objections against Gall and Spurzheim's
system on anatomical grounds, see especially pages 79-174. The Physiognomical System ofDrs Gall
and Spurzheim was translated from French of Anatomie et Physiologie du Systeme Nerveux en
general, first published, 1810.
24 Hewett Watson, Statistics ofPhrenology, (Edinburgh, 1836), 17. Watson (1804-1881) gave up law
to study medicine in Edinburgh; introduced to phrenology when in Liverpool c. 1823 and became an
ardent follower after meeting Combe; assumed editorship of the ailing Phrenological Journal 1837-
41; turned away from phrenology c.1840 and devoted time to study botany and evolution. Scientific
publications like Progress of the Earth's Changes (1837), and Theory of Progressive Development
(1845) were accounts of his developing theories on botanical evolution.
25 Ibid., 17.
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So, what message did Gordon give out to the reading public through the
powerful medium of the Edinburgh Review? Writing in the immediate wake of the
Napoleonic wars when Francophobia was still strong, to decry the new science as a
breed of the French atheistic materialism which was feared as having led the French
to revolution and wars would have been consistent with the national mood.
Significantly, however, Gordon did not address the subversive hues of the
materialistic doctrine proposed by Gall and Spurzheim.
Gordon's scientific objections are not what most secondary sources focus on.
The language he employed to introduce and conclude his article, vehement, and at
times sardonic, seems to attract more attention from his posthumous reviewers that
the subject matter of his review. Right from the outset, Gordon declared 'the whole
doctrines taught by these two peripatetics, anatomical, physiological, and
physiognomical26 as a piece of thorough quackery from beginning to end'.27 From
1805, Gall and Spurzheim undertook extended tours of the intellectual centres in
Germany, Switzerland, Holland and Denmark to propagate the new science of the
mind, until they arrived in Paris in November 1807; and parted company. The terms
'peripatetics' and 'Doctors' used by Gordon conveyed his professional disdain
towards Gall and Spurzheim, which was rendered explicit in his concluding
comment:
The writings ... consist of such a mixture of gross errors, extravagant
absurdities, downright mistatements, and unmeaning quotations from
Scripture, as can leave no doubt, we apprehend, in the minds of honest
and intelligent men, as to the real ignorance, the real hypocrisy, and
the real empiricism of the authors.28
Aside from these flamboyant remarks, the importance of Gordon's article has to be
viewed as a creditable and representative specimen of how the new science of the
mind was interpreted by a medical professional at the end of the Napoleonic era. By
examining the two chief objections raised by Gordon, some aspects of the
incompatibility between the predominant beliefs of the mind and the new science of
the mind can be understood.
26
Physiognomy was another branch of brain science being developed by Gall's contemporary, the
Swiss priest Johan Caspar Lavater (1741-1801). Lavater's work was independent of Gall, and against
Lavater's intention, physiognomy became associated with the practice of correlating aspects of human
nature with facial signs.
27 Gordon, op. cit. 227.
28
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The first objection concerned the 'irrestible conclusion' one was to reach
after reading Physiognomical System that 'all functions or faculties of man, whether
those of his automatic or of his animal life, [were] innate and determinate'29. All
faculties of automatic life were innate because they were the effects of
organization.30 Man was born organized, with flesh and blood, skin and bone; the
faculties governing the automatic (or organic) life of man were therefore innate and
determinate. 'Innate and determinate' in the sense that one was born with them, and
had no choice whether to have or not to have these faculties. In respect of automatic
life, therefore, man was no different from other lower animals or plants.
Gordon went on to relate the second category of faculties concerned animal
life, and were sub-divided into four orders in The Physiognomical System, namely,
(1) voluntary motion, (2) the five external senses, (3) propensities and sentiments,
and (4) understanding. In determining whether these faculties were innate, Gall and
Spurzheim reputedly seemed to rely heavily on the similarities between man and the
animals. Concerning the first two orders of faculties, Gordon accepted that they
were innate, the reason being: 'Voluntary motion [was] possessed by man in
common with the lower animals; and the five senses [were] likewise inherent in the
nature of both; therefore, they [were] obviously given by nature, or innate.'
However, as regards propensities and sentiments and understanding, Gall and
Spurzheim allegedly stated that these functions were not caused by external
influences; to wit even these faculties were determinate and innate. Hence, man was
a social being like hogs, geese and crows; he was endowed with faculties destined for
society; and consequently, society was not the cause of his faculties. Similarly
education was not the cause of the intellectual faculties; for every kind of animal
always preserved its own nature, and individuals of the same kind often excel each
other. Examples of animals like 'M. Dupont's cow', which alone understood how to
open the enclosure of a field while his companions failed to imitate his action, were
cited to illustrate the stance that understanding was innate. Spurzheim cited
29
Ibid., All italics, unless stated otherwise, are the author's.
30
'Organization' was used in the article without further definition. The term was prevalent in any
discussion on 'matter' in the early 19th century, which centred on whether matter was inert, or
endowed with properties, or that properties emerged from the peculiar ways that matter was arranged.
'Organization' carried many connotations, but its basic reference concerned the arrangement of
matter. A contemporary definition for 'organization' was 'the peculiar composition, which
distinguishes living bodies; in this point of view, they are contrasted with inorganic, inert, or dead
bodies', from William Lawrence, An Introduction to Comparative Anatomy and Physiology, (London,
1816), 120. See also chapter three, section iii, of this thesis.
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numerous biblical verses to assert the point that 'the religion of Christ, also admits
the innateness of the faculties', which were no fewer than thirty-three.31 Reading
between the lines, Gordon probably would accept the innateness of the automatic or
organic life, but not the innateness of the faculties that govern the so-called animal
life. Though Gordon did not clearly state the reasons for his objection, the
deterministic implication of such a doctrine might be Gordon's chief obstacle. In
this respect, Gordon quoted in full Spurzheim's own 'recapitulation' of his system of
morals as the best indictment of the inconsistency of the new science and its moral
claims.
I have ascertained that our doctrine does not lead to fatalism. I have
stated, that, according to a general law throughout all nature, inferior
laws are subordinate to superior ones; that, therefore, the faculties
proper to man ought to govern the other faculties common to man and
animals; that, for this reason, man must be free; that liberty begins
with understanding, and requires will, motives, and the influence of
the will upon the actions; that motives are of two kinds; that the
faculties proper to man procure moral motives; and that, therefore,
man alone has moral liberty.32
Gordon's only ironic remark to the passage was that it was 'so clear and so
unanswerable, that it would be a shame to embarrass it with any comment'. Against
Gordon's exposition of Spurzheim's doctrine which claimed all mental faculties
were innate, Spurzheim's assertion that his doctrine did not therefore lead to moral
fatalism would indeed appear 'unanswerable' to the Review readers. Perhaps in
Spurzheim's mind, to assert that mental faculties were not caused by external
circumstances still left him room for asserting that mental faculties could be
'influenced' or 'improved' by external circumstances; in that 'cause' was not the
same as 'influence'. Even if such was the case, the nuances between 'cause' and
'influence' were not something Gordon dwelt on. To Gordon, if all mental faculties
were innate and not caused by external circumstances, whether it was society,
education, or climate, then that, in itself, was enough to render the doctrine fatalistic.
31 For example, 'A man can receive nothing except it be given to him from Heaven' John iii 27.
'Who has ears to hear, let him hear' Matt xiii 9. 'St Paul says, "When the Gentiles which have not the
law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves
..."'Rom ii 14. Gordon listed all the thirty-three faculties governing the animal life in Spurzheim's
system; eighteen of which were propensities; fifteen of which related to the intellect. As quoted by
Gordon, op. cit., 233-239. See also Graham Richards, Mental Machinery: The Origins and
Consequences of Psychological Ideas, Part I: 1600-1850 (London: Athlone Press, 1992), p. 263,
where he points to the similarities between Gall's and Spurzheim's classification of the mental
faculties and those of Reid and Stewart.
32
Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System, 523; quoted in Gordon, op. cit., 240.
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The second chief objection from Gordon concerned Spurzheim's claim that
the brain was exclusively the organ of feelings and the intellectual faculties.
Contrary to the metaphysics of the Scottish common-sense school, Gall and
Spurzheim declared in the first place that their inquiry was not into the nature, but
the manifestations, of the faculties of the mind. Their motto was that the mental
faculties could only be understood by their manifestations, not by reflecting on their
nature. Secondly, Gall and Spurzheim maintained that there could be no
manifestations without organization. In other words, the manifestation of each
mental faculty could be correlated to an organ; and all manifestations of the mind
depended on organization. Their final words on this subject were that 'the brain was
exclusively the organ of all feelings and intellectual faculties'.
Gordon devoted some eight pages of his article to refute the claim that the
brain was the organ of the mind. His comments against the arguments cited by
Spurzheim to support a corporeal organ for the mind would suggest that Gordon's
conception of the mind was of the Cartesian model, that the mind was an immaterial
entity, quite independent of any bodily parts. Their views can be sampled as follows:
Spurzheim: The manifestations of the mind are modified in every
individual.
Gordon: Is it probable that the soul of each individual differs? No; it
is said that all mankind have descended from the same original
parents.
Spurzheim: The faculties of mind may be exercised and trained.
Gordon: but how can an immaterial being be exercised?
Spurzheim: Every one feels that he thinks by means of the brain.
Gordon: We solemnly declare, that we, for our parts, have never yet
known what it is to feel that we think by means ofour brains.33
The notion that mind was an immaterial entity independent of a bodily organ was a
long-standing belief in western culture. The Cartesian model of mind-brain duality
which underpinned the immateriality of the mind was like an innate concept, not
only for the general public, but even for a sophisticatedly trained medical
professional like Gordon. Against the claim that the brain was the organ of intellect,
Gordon argued:
The organ of intellect may reside in some other part of the nervous
system, or in some other region of the body; and that part or region
33
Gordon, op. cit., extracts of views from 241,243,245; author's italics.
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may be continually receiving from the brain a supply of something
necessary to the healthy discharge of its functions; ... 4
Regarding the seat of sensation, Gordon countered that 'it might as well be argued
that all sensation depended ultimately on some change of condition in the heart'.3
Gordon's position was that the mind was an immaterial entity that could not be
bound up with a specific bodily part or organ.
Spurzheim's claim that no manifestations of the mind would have been
possible without the organ of the brain was not just a challenge, it was almost an
affront to Gordon, as testified by the vehement condemnations of the work sprinkled
throughout the article. The nature of the affront was perhaps summed up in the
following indictment of the Physiognomical System in the article:
Such is the trash, the despicable trumpery, which two men calling
themselves scientific inquirers, have the impudence gravely to present
to the physiologists of the nineteenth century, as specimens of
reasoning and induction.36
It was not merely the affront felt by an individual towards what was to him, an insane
demand to take cognizance of such an alien concept concerning the mind. It was the
outrage of a scientific man towards his fellow practitioners whose work he judged as
unworthy of the practice of science. As a lecturer of anatomy at the University of
Edinburgh, Gordon's comments on the Anatomical Discoveries of Drs Gall and
Spurzheim were demonstrative of his indignation towards his fellow practitioners in
this department of knowledge.
These gentlemen [Gall and Spurzheim] are too knowing not to have
perceived, that the science of anatomy is in general cultivated with
most zeal, by those who have the least leisure to devote to it; that is,
by persons who are toiling with weariness through medical practice;
... They calculated, no doubt, that as the number of individuals is
inconsiderable, ...the chance that a few bold affirmations respecting
the structure of a delicate and complicated organ would be put to the
test of experiment, was proportionally small.37
The most obvious anti-French allusion in the article was in respect of the Institute of
France, which in Gordon's mind, had failed to uphold the standards for science. It




Ibid., 250; the reference to the nineteenth century was used to hint at the fact that Gall's system was
firmly an invention of the eighteenth century.
37 Ibid., 254.
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years, to obtain the good opinion, in all physiological matters, of that strange
association of talents and obsequiousness', called the Institute of France.38
In summary, Gordon's article has to be appreciated as first and foremost an
OQ
attempt to address the scientific issues of Spurzheim's theory of the mind.
Gordon's chief objections were against the following two positions: (1) that all
mental faculties were innate, and (2) that the brain was the organ of all intellect and
sensation. Gordon's style and language, to a certain extent, might have compromised
and distracted from the scientific merits of his article for readers who expect
dispassionate objectivity from any scientific commentators. However, if the
language employed could be understood in context, as an expression of the outrage
against a fellow practitioner, then that should aid our understanding of how
passionately people two centuries ago felt about being challenged to re-consider the
concept of an immaterial mind.
After Gordon's article, the next major Edinburgh Review article devoted to
the discussion of phrenology came from Francis Jeffrey (1773-1850). Brown's 1803
article addressed Gall's craniology; Gordon's 1815 article was directed at
Spurzheim's Physiognomical System; while Jeffrey's 1826 article was aimed at
Combe's A System of Phrenology. Published in 1825, the System went into a second
edition by October. 'This emdite and massive system of 566 closely printed pages',
as Jeffrey called it, was reviewed in a lengthy article of sixty-six pages. Intended to
stop Edinburgh from being 'the great nursing mother' of phrenology, Jeffrey's article
seemed to have the contrary effect by giving a new impetus to local interest in the
science. A public debate followed between Combe and Jeffrey, whereby Combe
answered Jeffrey's September article. Jeffrey replied in the 89th issue of the Review
in December 1826, to which Combe responded in February 1827, again in the
Phrenological Journal,40
Trained in the law, Jeffrey was admitted to the bar in 1794. His progress in
the legal profession was slow to begin with, which gave him leave and the need to
38
Ibid., 254.
39 Gordon addressed other interesting issues regarding the brain not discussed in this chapter. For
instance, that the brain is an aggregate of many organs, that the energy or perfection of each faculty is
proportional to the size of its organ; and a lengthy discussion on the White and Brown Matter of the
brain and their converging and diverging fibres.
40 Combe's first response to Jeffrey occasioned by the Review articles were published under separate
cover as 'Letter from George Combe to Francis Jeffrey, Esq. In Answer to His Criticism on
Phrenology', Edinburgh Review, 44 (1826):
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start his venture with the Edinburgh Review. Jeffrey and his co-founders like Henry
Brougham and Francis Horner were all committed to the whig cause, and the Review
was founded as a liberal journal - a counterweight to the conservative Quarterly
Review. Jeffrey's long editorship of the Review only came to an end with his
election as dean of the Faculty of Advocates in 1829, followed by his appointment as
the Lord Advocate in 1830. Archibald Alison, a close friend of Jeffrey from youth,
spoke of him as 'judicious and candid in criticism, and lenient and considerate in
judgment, but [with] scarcely an original thought or profound reflection in his
mind'.41 When the boys first met, Alison was barely thirteen, and his assessment of
the youthful Jeffrey might have been premature. Nonetheless it was an apt critique
of Jeffrey's performance in his 1826 article. Jeffrey's lenient and considerate
judgment of Combe was evidenced by his opening statements to the article:
This [A System of Phrenology] is a long, sober, argumentative
exposition of a very fantastical, and, in our humble judgment, most
absurd hypothesis. The author, however, is undoubtedly a man of
talent as well as industry; ... it is impossible not to admire the
dexterity with which he has occasionally evaded the weak, and
improved the plausible parts of his argument - and the skill and
perseverance he has employed in working up his scanty and
intractable materials into a semblance of strength and consistency.42
Unlike Gordon, whose outrage against Spurzheim's science left him no scope for any
judicious comments, Jeffrey was able to allow the achievement of Combe, summed
up in his assessment that 'Phrenology, in [Combe's] hands, had assumed, for the first
time, an aspect not absolutely ludicrous'.43 The objections against phrenology raised
by Jeffrey also concurred with Alison's assessment that Jeffrey was not gifted for
original thought. In many ways, Jeffrey rehearsed the arguments of Brown's and
Gordon's, albeit without the philosophical depth of the former, and the technical
command of the latter. Still, the significance of Jeffrey's opinions came from the
potential influence on the ten-thousand strong readership of the Review.
Furthermore, his opinions represented effectively the class Jeffrey typified - the
41 Archibald Alison & Jane R Alison, Some Account ofMy Life and Writings, An Autobiography,
(Edinburgh, 1883), vol. 1: 34; quoted in Mary Cosh, Edinburgh, The Golden Age, (Edinburgh, 2003),
139.
[Francis Jeffrey], 'Review of A System of Phrenology, by George Combe', Edinburgh Review,
44(1826), 253-318, 253.
43 Ibid., 253.
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upper-middle-class professional intelligentsia with a liberal political leaning during
the Golden Age of Edinburgh's civic life.44
The chief difficulty Jeffrey had with phrenology was to conceive the brain as
the organ of the mind. His position was well summed up as:
The truth, ... is, that there is not the smallest reason for supposing that
the mind ever operates through the agency of any material organs,
except in its perception of material objects, or in the spontaneous
movements of the body which it inhabits;...45
Throughout the article, Jeffrey laboured over the point that the only organs related to
the mental faculties of which we had any knowledge were exclusively organs of
external perceptions. There remained 'no proof that the mind, when it [was] not
percipient of matter, act[ed] or [was] affected by material organs of any sort'. In
Jeffrey's opinion, if the mind was related to some material organs, there was
'certainly no proof that those organs [were] in the brain, any more than in the heart or
the lungs'.46 Jeffrey granted that certain actions of the brain were necessary in
maintaining the vitality of the mind; but he argued that in this respect, the brain was
not different from other material organs like the heart or the lungs, which were
equally essential in maintaining the vitality of the mind. To Jeffrey, it was
inconceivable how the brain could be the organ of the mind, any more than the heart
or the lungs. In a matter-of-fact manner, Jeffrey stated that, 'it [was] very true, that
in our present state of existence, the mind [was] united, in some mysterious way, to a
living and organized body'. 7 Furthermore, Jeffrey asserted that while for some
people it was 'natural, and perhaps necessary, to suppose that there should be
material organs to connect the mind with material objects', for him 'there was
plainly no such probability or necessity'.48 In other words, for Jeffrey, the mind was
an immaterial entity that could assert its agency without necessarily being connected
with any material organs. In saying so, Jeffrey unwittingly went against Brown's
arguments.
If Jeffrey found it difficult to conceive the mind as connected with the
material organ of the brain, it was equally, if not more difficult, to conceive of the
44 Reference to Mary Cosh's Edinburgh, The Golden Age; the title designates the period of civic and
cultural life in Edinburgh from 1760 to 1832.
45
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mind being divided into different faculties, each with its own physical locality within
the brain. Arguing against the employment of the term faculties to denote the
different activities that the mind could engage in, Jeffrey maintained that what were
called 'faculties of the mind, we would consider as different acts, or rather states of
it'. Such an assertion would be consistent with the conviction that the mind was an
immaterial entity, for only matter was capable of being divided. If the mind was not
composed of matter, it could not possibly be divisible. Unequivocally, Jeffrey stated:
The mind, we take it, is one and indivisible: -- and if, by faculties, is
meant parts, portions or members, by the aggregation of which the
mind is made up, we must not only deny their existence, but confess
that we have no great favour for a term which tends naturally to
familiarise us with such an assumption.49
Jeffrey therefore considered the mind as one indivisible immaterial unity, connected
to the living body in some mysterious manner. Jeffrey's position betrayed the
adoption of the Cartesian mind-brain duality, all the more significant because it was
not even a conscious choice that Jeffrey felt a need to justify — it was a default
position that he felt he could take for granted. Writing in 1826, Jeffrey denied the
claims of phrenology on the basis that they were incompatible with the default
position that he, and presumably many of his readers, still held as unassailably true.
Speaking more as a lenient judge than a fierce opponent, Jeffrey's judicious
concluding comments on phrenology were:
We have no objections to Phrenology, as an amusement for idle
people, and as a means, perhaps, of tempting them into a taste of
reflection; and to those good ends this free exposition of its fallacy is
likely ... to contribute. ... [Phrenology] would no doubt have declined
of itself in no very long time.50
Significantly, Jeffrey did not denounce phrenology as a materialistic doctrine that
would undermine religious beliefs, or dwell on the moral fatalism to which the
doctrine could lead. On the contrary, Jeffrey was able to see the 'good ends' to
which phrenology might lead, despite its 'fallacy'.
Brown, Gordon and Jeffrey had in the main argued against craniology or
phrenology on physiological grounds. With various minor differences, the three
reviewers had argued in the main that the mind was an indivisible unity that could not
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Gall's doctrine of materialism because he did not object to the brain being the organ
of the mind. Brown's chief objection was that the brain should be an aggregate of
mental organs, because in his view, the mind was indivisible in its manifestation.
Gordon defended the mind not only as an indivisible unity, but as an immaterial
entity that could not be bound up with a specific bodily part or organ. Jeffrey's
review has less technical command but represented best the layman's point of view:
that there remained 'no proof that the mind, when it is not percipient ofmatter, acts
or is affected by material organs of any sort'.51 His stance might also best represent
that of the educated public - sceptical towards phrenology but not condemning.
Gordon's review, the most robust, albeit vituperative, was the only one which
objected to the philosophical conception of the mind as the brain for its moral
implications as well. The stance taken by Gordon in denouncing phrenology for its
metaphysical and moral implications, was pursued by Hamilton with forensic
persistence. For Hamilton, nothing less than truth was at stake; and 'no one
interested in the philosophy of man [could] be indifferent to an inquiry into the truth
or falsehood of the new doctrine'. Jeffrey's predicted decline of phrenology did not
come quickly; the decade after 1826 in fact witnessed the increasing popularity of
phrenology. To Hamilton, the widespread support for phrenology rendered the
doctrine impossible to be 'passed over with contempt', because it was 'maintained
not only by too many, but by too able advocates, to be summarily rejected'.52
Combe was certainly one of these able advocates, and the decade after Jeffrey's
Review article was to witness the sustained debate between George Combe and
William Hamilton over phrenology.
Ill
While Brown, Gordon and Jeffrey had written against the doctrines of Gall,
Spurzheim, and Combe respectively, none of them had carried out the kind of
observations and experiments as Hamilton had with his own hands, in order to
disprove phrenology on its own grounds. Given that phrenology had professed to be
founded on sensible facts, Hamilton maintained that 'sensible facts must be shown to
51
Ibid., 257; italics mine.
52 Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics (Edinburgh, 1859), Appendix, 406.
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be false, not by reasoning, but by experiment'. For good reasons, Hamilton was
recognised by the phrenologists from 1826 as the most formidable opponent. An
anecdote according to Archdeacon Sinclair, who was invited to dine with Combe and
SirWilliam Hamilton by a zealous phrenologist, gave some indication of Hamilton's
standing as an anti-phrenologist. Speaking of the occasion, Sinclair's host related his
hope:
to have a great phrenological field-day, by securing an equal number
of phrenologists and anti-phrenologists to back these two champions,
... You [Sinclair] must come to support Sir William. I can easily
bring together as many well-informed phrenologists as I please ...; but
I can hardly find a single anti-phrenologist who is not wholly ignorant
on the subject.54
The year before the outbreak of the French Revolution saw the birth of
Combe and Hamilton. While the two philosophers shared 1788 as their year of birth,
their birthplaces were suggestive of the very divergent social environments in which
they started their early lives. Hamilton was born in a house attached to the College
of Glasgow, where Thomas Reid was still living in his old age. His grandfather and
his father, both named Dr William Hamilton,55 were Professor of Anatomy and
Botany at the University of Glasgow in succession. In contrast, Combe's was
humble and insalubrious, in a house adjacent to his father's small brewery situated
beneath the steep bluffs supporting the Edinburgh Castle, then known as the
Livingston Yards.56 Hamilton was an embodiment of the Scottish intellectual
aristocracy, while Combe personified the spirit of progress and self-improvement
that characterised his age. In their choice of first profession, Combe and Hamilton
converged in the law, and their social circles overlapped in their mid-life. In their
twilight years, the social standing of Combe and Hamilton was not as far apart as at
birth. Partly through sound investment, (as in the American railway) and partly with
the added fortune of his wife, Cecilia Siddons, daughter of the celebrated actress
Sarah Siddons, Combe was in fact financially more secure than Hamilton. In 1846,




55 Dr William Hamilton, born 31 July 1758, was apprenticed to William Hunter (brother of John
Hunter) in London. The Hunter brothers' reputation would have assisted Hamilton in establishing a
medical profession in London. However, he was even better connected in Glasgow, and at the age of
twenty-three, he was nominated by the Crown to the Chair of Anatomy as his father's successor.
56 See Gibbon, op.cit., 2.
Chapter 5 Two Sciences of the Mind 155
state, which offered an annual sum of £100, too demeaning for Hamilton to accept.57
In contrast, Combe had more than one residence, could travel in comfort,
CO
accompanied by his wife and an entourage of a carriage and two servants. Their
careers and personal fortunes, in a sense, reflected the shifting alignments in
Victorian society in which industrialisation and education were only two of the
powerful forces that were moving ranks and fortunes.
Hamilton's more distant ancestors had been lairds, knights and baronets.59
Such ancestry clearly inspired the young William Hamilton, to research into the
family's genealogy from 1813-1816. The research enabled Hamilton to present a
case to a jury before the Sheriff of Edinburgh in 1816, who adjudged him 'heir-male
in general' to Sir Robert Hamilton of Preston (1650-1701). The effort undertaken to
establish this claim was both laborious and expensive, but it could not be argued that
any financial rewards could have been the motivation, for the estate had by then been
separated from the family.60 To rectify the landless title, the new Sir William,
Baronet ofPreston and Fingalton, purchased in 1819 the old tower of Preston and its
surrounding ground. The zeal and devotion with which young Hamilton searched his
family's ancestry was probably symptomatic of the man's reverence for the past, for
traditions, for lineage, for which he styled himself a custodian. This trait was as
emphatically expressed in his intellectual position, and in the way he defended the
Scottish school of philosophy against phrenology.
The knowledge and authority Hamilton commanded as an anti-phrenologist
came from the meticulous and extensive researches he conducted on the crania and
the cerebella of man and animals. The experimental data amassed by Hamilton
seemed to have outdone even those of the phrenologists. Speaking of his tables of
data which extended to 'above 1000 brains of above 50 species of animals;
accurately weighed by a delicate balance', Hamilton remarked that 'the phrenologists
[had] not a single observation of any accuracy to which they [could] appeal'.61 Of all
the evidence gathered to disprove phrenology, Hamilton considered his observations
57 See Veitch, Memoir ofSir William Hamilton (Edinburgh, 1869), 285-293.
58 See NLS MS7385, f. 15, Combe to J. Adam, 28 September 1836, [draft letters],
59 John Veitch, Memoir, 66-73, for the history of Hamilton's ancestors.
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forty or fifty volumes of an old, close, difficult hand. Letter quoted in Veitch, Memoir, 68.
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on the frontal sinuses as the most conclusive of all. His findings on this subject were
presented at the Royal Society in December 1826 under the title, 'Practical
Consequences of the Theory of the Functions of the Brain of Dr Gall', followed by
another paper in 1827.
The rules of the Society precluded any reply to the arguments thus advanced.
Combe was keen to find a channel to answer Hamilton's argument. The opportunity
arose when Hamilton proposed to deliver a popular lecture at the University of
Edinburgh for the benefit of the distressed co-operatives. Combe wrote to solicit
Hamilton's assistance to allow him to respond to his lecture to the same audience.
According to the College Minutes of the University of Edinburgh dated 16 April
1827, a meeting was convened by the Senatus Academicus to consider Hamilton's
proposal 'to give a lecture on Phrenology in the University, and a correspondence
between Mr Combe and Sir William Hamilton arising from that advertisement'. The
Senatus resolved to grant permission to Sir William Hamilton, 'to deliver the
Demonstration on Phrenology advertised, but without its being considered in any
way as a precedent,' but 'the request of Combe could not be complied with, he not
being a member of the University'. Before a crowded audience of supporters and
opponents of phrenology, Hamilton read his two lectures on the subject. The lectures
'sparkled with fine irony, and abounded in facts which a goodly array of real skulls
fully confirmed,' was the comment of one of those present.63 For Combe's part, he
had to resort to delivering his lecture, also for relief of the distressed co-operatives,
in the Assembly Rooms at George Street. Some six hundred people attended, raising
a considerable sum for the relief fund. Hamilton was present in this three-hour-long
lecture, during which Combe tried to counter Hamilton's arguments against
phrenology based on the existence of the frontal sinuses.
Frontal sinuses referred to the cavities between the tables of the frontal bone,
which were situated at the forehead above the ridge of the eye sockets. As one
commentator describes it, the existence of the frontal sinuses was to 'become the
most treasured piece of evidence against the craniological part of the doctrine'
62 EUL, MSS College Minutes of the University of Edinburgh, first series, vol. IV, f.238, entry dated
16 April 1827. The special circumstance pertained to the cause to aid the distressed cooperatives.
Hamilton's proposal seemed to have included Combe to deliver a correspondence address with him,
which put Hamilton in a more charitable light than what Gibbon, Combe's biographer, would grant
Hamilton. See Gibbon, The Life ofGeorge Combe, 2 vols.(London, 1878), 1:191-193.
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because it prevented 'all direct cranial reading in that region of the head of any
supposed phrenological organ beneath'.64 Hamilton asserted that the frontal sinuses
existed in all adult crania, and were of 'variable and, (from without), wholly
inappreciable extent and depth'.65 The phrenologists claimed that the size, and
therefore powers of the respective parts of a cerebellum, could be gauged by an
examination of the cranium, on the basis that the contours of the skull mapped the
contours of the brain it shelled. The significance of the frontal cavity was that since
its extent and depth could not be gauged from without, it invalidated any claim of
fair estimation of those parts of the cerebellum over which the cavity lay. Adding to
the gravity of Hamilton's argument was the concentration of some of the smallest
phrenological organs over the region of the sinus, casting doubt over phrenological
observations of sixteen out of the thirty-three organs. For instance, like 'peas in a
pod' six of the smallest phrenological organs of Form, Size, Weight, Colour, Order
and Number lie side by side upon the eyebrows.66
Combe's predecessors had addressed the issue of the existence of frontal
sinuses in different manners. Gall's defence was that even if the cavity did exist,
given the plates of the frontal bone were parallel, it would not have affected the
craniological observations. Hamilton's reply was that the cavity was only formed by
'divergence from parallelism'; and the non-parallel alignment of the plates of the
bone was conceded even by the phrenologists. While Gall acknowledged the
existence of the cavity, Spurzheim negated it altogether, claiming that the cavity
occurred only amongst the elderly and the insane. After inspecting several hundreds
of crania, Hamilton was confident to assert that 'no skull was without a sinus'.67
Furthermore, his data disproved the common belief that the cavity increased in extent
with the advance of age. As for Combe, his defence was a combination of both
Gall's and Spurzheim's views,
... while organs were found to differ in size to the extent of an inch
and upwards, the departures from parallelism in the table of the skull
did not in general exceed one-tenth or one-eighth of an inch; — that in
childhood the sinus did not exist; that after puberty it was generally
present to a limited extent, so as to throw a difficulty in the way of
observing the development of the organs of lower Individuality and
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Size; and that in old age and disease, it was occasionally met with
very large.68
In other words, Combe still maintained, though to a lesser extent than Gall, the
parallelism of the tables of the frontal bone, and reiterated Spurzheim's defence in so
far as the sinus did not exist in children, and was increased by age and disease.
After the 1827 lectures to raise Relief funds for the cooperatives, Hamilton
and Combe exchanged numerous letters on the subject without resolving their
differences. Hamilton proposed to refer the matter to a panel of three arbiters for the
issues regarding the frontal sinuses to be tried.69 The panel met twice without being
able to determine on the means or methods to settle the issues. Hamilton submitted
fourteen propositions of the phrenologists and his counter-propositions to be
adjudged by the panel, while Combe desired a collection of skulls to be examined by
the tribunal. Combe clearly favoured an empirical approach, while Hamilton
believed that the truth of the science could be verified by examining its propositions.
Combe's proposal was adopted in part eventually; the arbiters decided to make their
own observations by attending the pathological dissections over a few months at the
Infirmary and Fever Hospital. The case history of each observation would be
available in a way that the skulls made available do not obtain.
The controversy now moved into 1828, beginning in January with a lecture
given by Spurzheim in Edinburgh, against which Hamilton published a long letter in
the Caledonian Mercury. Combe responded in the Scotsman, and Hamilton in turn
criticised Combe's letter for its manifold misrepresentations in a private letter. A
new direction also emerged in the development of the debate when religious grounds
were touched upon by Hamilton's public comments on Combe's Essay on the
Constitution of Man before its publication. Hamilton maintained the Essay was
implicit atheism for its over-ridding message of material necessity, which led to
fatalism concerning human action. The Essay had been publicly read at the
Phrenological Society to canvass opinions but was not yet published. Combe was
irate that Hamilton had taken the liberty to comment on his unpublished work.
Hamilton defended his action by comparing an elaborate refutation published by the
Christian Advocate of Cambridge of Oedipus Judaicus, which was only privately
68 Combe referring to his lecture at the Assembly Room, see Gibbon, op. cit., 1:193.
69 Hamilton nominated Dr (later Sir Robert) Christison, Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, to act on
his behalf; Dr John Scott acted for Combe, and James Syme, Professor of Anatomy and Surgery at
Edinburgh University was the third arbiter. (Christison was one of the appointees to the medico-legal
inspection for the Burke and Hare trial in December 1828.)
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circulated. Combe's comment on that defence was, 'that the commission of one
wrong by a Cambridge scholar does not justify another wrong by a senior wrangler
of that university'.70 To this allegation, Hamilton retorted by asking why Combe
was better entitled to allude to opinions advanced by him in a paper read before the
Royal Society, than he was to refer to opinions read before the Phrenological
71
Society, which had been reported and published in the Scotsman. The acrimony
was by now tangible in the exchanges between the two opponents.
Putting aside some of the exchanges between the two opponents which at
times degenerated into being personal, the nobler sentiments that motivated each into
the debate were still apparent. Both Hamilton and Combe waged hugely their
reputations behind their chosen positions and conducted themselves as if truth was at
stake. Cockburn testified to Combe's sincerity in his cause in so many words:
This George Combe, the patron and expounder of Edinburgh
phrenology, is a calm, excellent man, with a clear natural style of
didactic speaking and very benevolent objects. Some wise people call
him a quack; but I am satisfied that he really believes in that folly, as
many other honest men do. Some allowance must surely be made for
the attractions which any creed has to a person whose adventure in it
has ended in him finding himself its apostle.72
As for Hamilton, he stated the significance of Gall's doctrine in categorical terms.
That if the doctrine was true, then it 'would not only afford a new instrument, but
would supersede the old'. By 'the old', Hamilton meant the science of the mind
founded by the Scottish school of common-sense philosophers. The two sciences of
the mind, to Hamilton, arrived at 'conclusions the most contradictory', that the
establishment of the one necessarily supposed the subversion of the other. In
Hamilton's own words, the pre-eminent utility of mental philosophy was nothing less
than:
That it comprehends all the sublimest objects of our theoretical and
moral interest; that every (natural) conclusion concerning God, the
soul, the present worth and the future destiny of man, is exclusively
deduced from the philosophy of mind.73
In short, mental philosophy was not only the foundation of our knowledge; it was the
foundation for our beliefs in God, immortality of man, and of the moral freedom in
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our action. Hamilton's strong reaction against Combe's Essay which was later
published as the Constitution ofMan, was driven by what he saw as under threat -
the moral freedom of man. In his letter to Combe, Hamilton stated his objections as:
no true phrenologist can be a Calvinist. 'The contingency of second
causes', and 'the liberty of man undetermined by any absolute
necessity of natureis a dogma, as much part and parcel of the
Calvinistic scheme, and is as strongly enforced by the Confession of
the Scottish Church, as any of the Five Points; and a clergyman who
could maintain an opposite opinion, would promulgate a heresy, not
only condemned by the standards of Calvinistic orthodoxy, but in
contradiction to all the doctrines hitherto received as fundamental by
every Christian sect. 74
Here, Hamilton was asserting that a true Calvinist could not believe that our
characters were determined by our physiology. 'The liberty of man undetermined by
any absolute necessity of nature', as Hamilton stated, was in fact the foundational
premise of Reid's moral philosophy. 'By the liberty of a moral agent', Reid meant,
'a power over the determination of his own will'. In this respect, Reidian freedom
differs from Lockean freedom, which provides that a man is acting freely if he has
the power to do what he wills to do, or to refrain from doing what he wills to refrain
from. More attuned than Locke had been to determinist arguments, in which the will
was said to be subject to external influences, Reid went further and considered moral
liberty in terms of the causation of the volition; that is, the power to will is the power
to cause the act of willing. Reid continued by explaining, that if 'in every voluntary
action':
... the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of
something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in his
external circumstances, he is not free; he has not what I call the liberty
of a moral agent, but is subject to necessity.76
Reidian freedom was the foundation upon which the moral nature of man could be
established. To Hamilton, 'the possibility of morality depends on the possibility of
liberty'. The importance of man being a moral agent was explicated as: 'should we
ever be convinced that we are not moral agents, we should likewise be convinced
that there exists no moral order in the universe, and no supreme intelligence by
which that moral order is established, sustained, and regulated'. It is no exaggeration
74 Hamilton's letter to Combe, 14March 1828, quoted in Gibbon, 201; author's italics.
75 Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid; quoted in William Rowe, Thomas Reid on Freedom and
Morality (Cornell, 1991), 75.
76 Ibid., 599.
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therefore to claim free will as the first premise in Hamilton's philosophy, 'for, with
the proof of the moral nature of man, stands or falls the proof of the existence of a
Deity'. It is in this sense that 'Theology is thus again wholly dependent on
Psychology'; and:
should Physiology ever succeed in reducing the facts of intelligence to
Phaenomena of matter, Philosophy would be subverted in the
subversion of its three great objects, — God, Free-Will, and
Immortality.77
To Hamilton, phrenology was a doctrine which reduced the facts of intelligence to
phenomena of matter. In doing so, phrenology threatened the Reidian basis of
freedom by suggesting that every 'voluntary' action was the necessary consequence
of something involuntary in the state of the mind, as determined by the physical state
of the mental organs that aggregated into the brain.
If phrenology was falsehood in Hamilton's opinion, what then was the true
science of the mind to him? The depth and breadth of the Scottish common-sense
philosophy, of which Thomas Reid was the attributed founder and Hamilton, the
acknowledged last prominent exponent, is beyond the scope of the current
discussion. Its relevance to this thesis, however, resides in the fact that the common-
sense philosophers created a science of the mind by studying the phenomena of the
mind. The centre-place of the human mind in the conception of man by the
common-sense philosophers was eminently borne out by the frontispiece of
Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic:
On earth, there is nothing great but Man;
In Man, there is nothing great but Mind.
The mind was the essence of man, and in this respect, the common-sense
philosophers practised under the mantle of Descartes. Their method was to argue
from Common Sense, which in the words of Hamilton, was defined as:
To argue from Common Sense is nothing more than to render
available the presumption in favour of the original facts of
consciousness - that what is by nature necessarily BELIEVED to be,
truly, IS. Aristotle, in whose philosophy this presumption obtained
the authority of a principle, thus enounces the arguments: 'What
appears to all, that we affirm to be; and he who rejects this belief will
assuredly advance nothing better worthy of credit.' As this argument
77
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rests entirely on a presumption, the fundamental condition of its
validity is that this presumption be not disproved.7
The argument from Common Sense, therefore, hinges entirely on one presumption,
namely, 'that as elements of our mental constitution - as the essential conditions of
70
our knowledge, -- they must by us be accepted as true'. By instinct, we want to
object to such a presumption and protest, 'how can anyone just accept the original
facts of consciousness as true?' However, when we attempt to verify such a
presumption, what other means have we got but to fall back on our consciousness,
our 'common sense'? As Thomas Reid succinctly summed up the inevitable
presumption one has to accept in order to make possible any human knowledge:
Every kind of reasoning for the veracity of our faculties amounts to no
more than taking their own testimony for their veracity. There is an
absurdity in attempting to prove by any kind of reasoning, probability
or demonstrative, that our reason is not fallacious, since the very point
in question is whether reasoning may be trusted.80
In other words, there is no means beyond itself to verify the trustworthiness of our
consciousness; by necessity and by limitation, we have to accept 'what is by nature
necessarily believed to be, truly, is'. The veracity of our mental faculties cannot be
proved, and can only be taken on trust, by faith. Argument from Common Sense is
perhaps not so much a method, as an acknowledgement of the foundational
presumption that makes any mental philosophy possible, or indeed, any endeavours
in knowledge.
Descartes saw this ultimate limitation or necessity, and fell back 'on the
veracity of God, as the author of our faculties'.81 Descartes also established
consciousness as the primary means of identity, of being. With his famous motto,
'Cogito ergo sum\ Descartes not only separated the body from the mind, but also the
mental world from the material world. Henceforth, philosophers from Locke to
Berkeley, from Hume to the common-sense philosophers had to grapple with means
to bridge the two worlds.82 An associated question arising from the twofold reality
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is: 'which of the two worlds is primary?' In the scheme of Idealism, the material
world is a product of the consciousness; in Material Realism, consciousness is a
product of the material world. For instance, Thomas Brown was more of an Idealist,
and maintained that we have no immediate knowledge of anything beyond the states
or modifications of our own minds. Dugald Stewart tried to derive a scheme
whereby equal status could be given to both the mental and material worlds, neither
of which had primacy. It was a kind of 'sitting on the fence' position, which
Hamilton described as untenable, because Stewart's claim for equal status for the two
worlds, was itself an act of consciousness, and could not therefore be 'invalidated
without self-contradiction'.83 In other words, the fact that such an assertion itself
originates from the mental world contradicts the claim for equal status of the mental
and material worlds. Hamilton's position was that of a Realist, in that he believed in
the existence of a permanent material universe, independent of human consciousness.
By permanence, Hamilton probably regarded this ultimate reality as above space and
time conditions, as evidenced in his discussion of Berkeley:
If Berkeley held that the Deity caused one permanent material
universe ... which ... on coming into relation with our minds through
the medium of our bodily organism, is, in certain of its correlative
sides or phases, so to speak, external to our organism, objectively or
really perceived (the primary qualities), or determines in us certain
subjective affections of which we are conscious (the secondary
qualities), in that case I must acknowledge Berkeley's theory to be
virtually one of natural realism.84
Contrasting natural realism with idealism, Hamilton continued his discussion of
Berkeley as:
... if Berkeley held that the Deity caused no permanent material
universe to exist and to act uniformly as one, but does Himself either
infuse into several minds the phenomena (ideas) perceived and
affective, or determines our several minds to elicit within
consciousness such apprehended qualities or felt affections; in that
case I can recognise in Berkeley's theory only a scheme of theistic
idealism - in fact, only a scheme of perpetual and universal miracle,
... [supposing] the Deity to perform a petty miracle on each
representation of each several mind. 85
83 Hamilton, Lectures on Metaphysics, 21A.
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Hamilton (Edinburgh, 1869), 347.
85 Ibid., 347.
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Natural realism was Hamilton's position, and his comments on Berkeley would
suggest that Hamilton's form of theism acknowledged a permanent material universe
created by the Deity, and in this resided the religious significance of Hamilton's
realism.86
While Hamilton accepted the independent existence of a permanent material
world, the mental world remained to him primary; it was the mind which studied the
material world. The phenomena of the two worlds were separate and distinct: 'the
phenomena of the mental world are not, like those of the material, placed by the side
of each other in space'. Furthermore, the mind was conceived as one single
indivisible unity by Hamilton: 'Each state of mind is indivisible, but for a moment,
and there are not two states or two moments of whose precise identity we can be
assured'.87 In the language of the common-sense philosopher, the mind is often
referred to by its 'phenomena', 'states', 'manifestations', or 'modifications'. In these
qualifications of the mind, we get the sense that the philosopher would not like to
speculate on the substance of the mind. Elsewhere in his lectures, Hamilton states
that 'the existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to
oo
make, from the existence of known phenomena'. As regards the religious import of
the mind, for Hamilton it lies in the assurance that the consciousness is the 'Identity
of Mind or Person'. Plainly stated, this 'consists in the assurance we have, from
consciousness, that our thinking Ego, notwithstanding the ceaseless changes of state
or modification, of which it is the subject, is essentially the same thing - the same
person, at every period of its existence'. In regard to this deliverance of
consciousness, Hamilton continues, 'the truth of which is of vital importance,
OQ
affording, as it does, the basis of moral responsibility and hope of immortality'.
The brief discussion of Hamilton's science of the mind would suggest that the
two sciences of the mind stood on antithetical grounds. As Hamilton put it, in
Common Sense philosophy, 'the conscious mind is at once the observing subject and
the object observed'.90 Critically, both the observing subject and the object observed
86 'Hamilton's Natural Realism affords a foundation for what is highest in the poetic view of nature;
... and the poetry of Wordsworth is the natural complement of the Realism of Hamilton', is the
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belong to the same world - the mental world. In phrenology, the 'object' observed is
transferred to the material world; the observing subject (still the conscious mind) and
the object (the brain) are severed. Even without the existence of the frontal sinuses
to disprove phrenology for him, or the threat to genuine moral freedom, Hamilton
probably would never be able to endorse the new science of the mind. In fact, the
phrenologists, in asserting that the brain was the organ of the mind, were effectively
asking a Common Sense philosopher to abandon the mental world altogether. Even
with Hamilton's natural Realism, to disown the mental world would still have been
impossible for him.
IV
When David Ritchie resigned from the chair of logic and metaphysics in the
University of Edinburgh in 1836, the path of Hamilton and Combe met again as
candidates in the contest for Ritchie's successor. In 1820, Hamilton lost to John
Wilson (Christopher North), in the contest for the Edinburgh chair of moral
philosophy, which had been held by Dugald Stewart and then Thomas Brown.91 As
with clerical offices, so it was with academic posts, the system of patronage rendered
chair appointments in Scottish universities political events, and at times notoriously
so.92 Hamilton blocked his chance in the 1820 contest by refusing to state that he
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was not a Whig - not a political opponent to the dominant Tory electors of the Town
93Council. As it was in 1820, so it was in 1836, Hamilton declined to do what was
politically expedient. In a letter to the Lord Provost of 8 April, Hamilton explained
his position of declining to canvass for his candidacy. He assured the Provost that he
was 'most anxious to obtain this Chair', but he was 'ambitious of it not as a boon
granted, but as a right recognised':
I only ask - I would only accept - the appointment on the ground of
superior qualification. To mendicate the votes of the patrons by the
private solicitation of myself or friends, and to forestall an unbiassed
decision of the body ... by a private preliminary canvass of the
individual electors, are proceedings which I not only scorn, but of
which, as morally dishonest, I trust I am incapable.94
As for Combe, his confessed motive for entering the chair contest was tied to
his ambition for phrenology. His letter to the Reverend Dr David Welsh,95 ostensibly
to persuade Welsh to apply for the chair, stated that:
If [Welsh] shall, for any reason, decline to do so, you will lay me
under the necessity of coming forward myself,.... My object would be
to state the well founded claims of Phrenology to be admitted into the
University as the science of mind, without consideration of my
chances of success. I would present testimonials in favour of the
science, not of myself; and by this means pave the way for a future
candidate entering with greater ease. 96
In his letter to the Lord Provost offering himself as a candidate, Combe reiterated
that it was his regard that phrenology was 'the only true science of Mind', that he felt
Q7
bound by duty to enter the contest. The energy and efforts invested by Combe in
canvassing for his candidacy were typical of the man's dogged determination. In a
short space of time, Combe amassed 58 testimonials from Britain and abroad.98 In
respect of two of these testimonials, by Andrew Thomson and Thomas Chalmers,
(Edinburgh, 1985); and Jack Morrell, Science, Culture and Politics in Britain, 1750-1870 (Aldershot,
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Combe's youngest brother," Andrew chided him for forcing 'a testimony from their
silence at variance with their real opinion'. Combe had cited Thomson and Chalmers
as 'not disapproving of [his] doctrines on the ground they had not publicly attacked
them, while all the time [Combe] knew that in their private life they did condemn
them'.100 Equally candid was Andrew over George's chances with the chair:
I never could fancy that you had any, ... and may I add I fear that you
are doing some things under the excitement which when it is past you
would wish undone. 01
As close brothers, Andrew was privy to George's private thoughts. Andrew's
letters revealed certain duplicity in George Combe's motive in entering the chair
contest that self-interest almost certainly played a part. But Combe's canvassing
probably shaped the press in seeing the chair contest as nothing short of a duel
between the two sciences of the mind.
Commenting on the forthcoming contest for the Chair of Logic at Edinburgh
University in 1836, the Edinburgh Chronicle could not praise Combe enough. It
forewarned that if the Town Council should fail to elect Combe to the Chair, it would
leave an indelible stain on the character of the citizens whom the Council
100
represented. On the other hand, the Scottish Guardian stressed that the successful
candidate should be a philosopher with Christian principles. Combe's opinions were
judged to 'differ widely from the doctrinal standards of the Church', and phrenology
was described as 'a false philosophy'. Referring to the latest elective reform of
Council, the Guardian highlighted the significance of the contest as a test case
whereby the public would 'judge in the end whether political connection, and
103
personal influence' had less power than formerly in deciding a professorship.
Imbedded in the comment of the Scottish Guardian was the firm belief in an alliance
between the university and the church, originated during the Reformation when the
college was founded to prepare candidates for ministry. The Council was expected
99 The bond between the two brothers was strong throughout their lives. George financially supported
Andrew in his medical training, brought him into his household because of Andrew's sickly
constitution. He also converted Andrew to phrenology, and as the physician to the Belgian Royal
family, Andrew became one of the most illustrious phrenologists.
100 NLS MS7238, f. 14, Andrew Combe to George Combe, 12 August 1836; author's underlining.
101 NLS MS7238, f.10, Andrew Combe to George Combe, 7 July 1836.
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103 Extract from the Scottish Guardian of 12 April 1836, quoted in a pamphlet, George Combe, The
Suppressed Documents or an appeal to the Public against the Conductors of the Scottish Guardian
(Edinburgh, 1836), 5.
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to honour such an alliance by electing an orthodox Christian professor only. In the
opinion of the Guardian, Combe was disqualified on religious grounds. Hamilton
was not immured from religious scrutiny either. For his writing on Schelling and
Hegel, Hamilton was suspected of infidelity. While Hamilton was writing in
opposition to Hegel and Schelling, his opponents misunderstood him as writing in
support of German Absolutism. The religious allegation against Hamilton was
brought forward on the day of the election. The City Treasurer, Adam Black, spoke
out against such charges, and denounced the 'too common crime of making religion
a stalking-horse in the disputes of the day'. Black asked for proof to be procured
from Hamilton's articles to support the allegation of infidelity, to which there was no
reply; and the allegation was dropped.104
The actual election took place on 15 July 1836 during a special meeting of the
Edinburgh Town Council presided by Sir James Spittal, the Lord Provost. Hamilton
emerged as the successful candidate out of the ten contestants. The voting system of
the thirty-two municipal representatives of the Council was that votes were cast with
regard to all the candidates in the first instance, and the lowest struck off from the list
for the next round of voting until the contest should lie between two. Combe was
struck off when it was down to four candidates. Hamilton and Isaac Taylor stood for
the final round of voting, and Hamilton won by gaining eighteen votes against
Taylor's fourteen.
A level account of the Chair contest featured in Lord Cockburn's memoir. In
respect of Combe's candidacy, Cockburn described that 'he claimed his place
honestly and solely on phrenological grounds'; but that 'to the honour of the electors,
Combe had only three votes'. Cockburn considered Hamilton the best candidate,
'able, learned both in ancient and modem languages, laborious, and devoted to
intellectual pursuits', as 'the only man [then] in Scotland' being 'reverenced by the
profound on the Continent'. Henry Cockburn referred to the 'unusual interest'
excited by the case as partly due to the fact that 'it was watched as a specimen of the
reformed town-council's elective virtue'.105 Cockburn's assessment of the Council's
elective virtue was that 'they [had] just saved themselves', referring to the slim
majority of four credited to Hamilton.
104 Veitch, Memoir, 197.
105
Henry Cockburn, Journal ofHenry Cockburn, being a Continuation of the Memorials ofHis Time,
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If the 'reformed Council's elective virtue' generated part of the interest, the
predominant strand of interest lay with the fact that in the public perception, the
contest was a trial-case for phrenology. Those who supported Combe would like to
have seen phrenology established as the creditable science of the mind, displacing
the metaphysics of the common-sense philosophers, of which Hamilton was a fine
representative. Those who supported the common-sense philosophy as the true
science of the mind considered it a much-prized national intellectual heritage. The
Spectator's report in the days leading up to the election highlighted this aspect of the
interest, regarding the future of the philosophy of mind:
The chief candidates are Sir William Hamilton and Mr George
Combe; and the interest arises from the pretensions of the latter to
establish the Phrenological Philosophy of Mind and Morals for the
first time, in a University chair.106
Echoing the Spectator, the Bath Herald elevated the contest to the philanthropic
platform, describing it as a 'struggle' that could 'not be regarded with indifference by
any whose philanthropy was not purely individual, since the possession of a tme or
false system of moral and intellectual science involve[d] questions indissolubly
associated with the best interests and truest happiness of mankind'. Another English
newspaper, the London Courier, supported Combe, and saw the potential election of
Combe in the context of Edinburgh pioneering into another new science:
... the Town Council of Edinburgh ... would gain respect and honour
from conferring the Chair on Mr. Combe. Scotland has the honour of
having founded the science of the wealth of nations. She should be
ambitious of adding to her glory by promoting the first of all studies -
that of man.
The Scotsman supported Combe's candidacy by quoting the authority of Archbishop
Whately of Dublin, who had studied phrenology in great earnest. Whately claimed
that the 'phrenological writers employ a metaphysical nomenclature far more logical,
accurate, and convenient, than Locke, Stewart, and other writers of their schools'.
Another Scottish newspaper, the Glasgow Argus, deciphered for its readers the three¬
fold task of a Professor of Logic and suggested that a phrenologist could discharge
the duty as well as a common-sense philosopher.
He has to expound the practical sciences of correct management of the
intellectual powers (logic) and exegesis (rhetoric), and he has to rest
these upon the ultimate principles of mind (psychology).... We do not
106
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see that a man's being a phrenologist, should of itself, exclude himself
from a Logic Chair.
The Glasgow Argus ended its comment by remarking that Combe's testimonials
were such as it had 'scarcely ever seen in favour of one individual'. Other minor
Scottish newspapers like the Fife Herald and the Kilmarnock Journal, which
supported Combe's candidacy, offered the more sensational touch to the occasion.
The Fife Herald described the contest as 'an outcry', and that 'to be pursued by a
sectarian and bitter hostility' was the price 'every man must pay for originality and
eminence'. The Kilmarnock Journal tried to portray Combe as a founder of a new
science being persecuted for the sake of a true science like other great scientific
pioneers:
[phrenology] has paid 'the usual tax of entry' - that, after bringing,
like the discoveries of Galileo, of Harvey, and of Sir Isaac Newton,
the wonted need of persecution upon its founders, it is daily
witnessing its scoffers becoming the most zealous of its devotees.107
Chronologically, the chair contest was like a culmination of the debates
between the two sciences of the mind that had been ongoing for over three decades in
Edinburgh. If common-sense philosophy had won the day, phrenology had not lost
for good. In one sense, 'the scoffers have indeed turned devotees', for it is now little
debated that the brain is the organ of the mind, but the emergence of consciousness,
which the common-sense philosophers waged so heavily on, remains a mystery. The
mental world still has a boundary of its own and the task of bridge-building between
the material and mental worlds continues for philosophers. In the course of this long
debate in Edinburgh, however, the question of Materialism: 'Whether the substance
of which the thinking principle is composed be matter or spirit?' was less immediate
than it was in the debate on life and mind in England discussed in the previous
chapter. As the last prominent exponent of the common-sense philosophy, Hamilton
focused the debate on the basis of Free Will, on which alone could man be a moral
agent, and on which alone any beliefs in God and immortality ultimately depended.
If the chief issue against phrenology for Hamilton was a secure moral basis for
mankind, it is to be found that Combe was seeking nothing too different in
embracing phrenology:
According to Phrenology, morality and natural religion originate in, and
emanate from, the primitive constitution of the mental powers
themselves. ... in this life mind is never manifested without brain, ...
107
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[If] God has made the brain to think, ... His objects in creating man
will not be defeated on account of his having chosen a wrong substance
out of which to constitute the thinking principle.108
How Combe carved out a code of morality based on natural law with the science of
phrenology is the subject matter of the next chapter. As for Hamilton, though he
emerged as the winner in the chair contest, his battle for academic freedom was not
won so decisively against the interference from the town council as the patron of the
chair. Whether Hamilton was allowed to divide his lectures into two courses, one
upon Logic, and the other upon Metaphysics, and whether he was entitled to charge a
fee for each course, was the subject of a protracted debate between Hamilton and the
Senatus Academicus of the University of Edinburgh.109
y
In conclusion, it is interesting to reflect on the difference between London and
Edinburgh in their differing responses to new scientific ideas. A letter to Henry
Brougham from Lawrence's chief religious critic, the Reverend Thomas Rennell
offered some useful insights as to how Edinburgh was being regarded as an
intellectual centre by a quintessential High Church, Tory Anglican minister:
For many years, as you, Sir, well know, Edinburgh has been the
headquarters of infidelity. The diffusion of scepticism among the
higher ranks is fully equal to that of religion among the lower. ... The
diffusion of knowledge, and the interchange of opinions which marks
the present day, will effectually prevent the conversion of religion into
an engine of state police.110
The social and political utility that Rennell had in mind for religion was clearly
stated here. Religion was, for Rennell - an engine of state police. In this respect,
Rennell was most concerned with the utility of religion in enforcing an external code
of morality which would support and reinforce the status quo. Lawrence's theory of
life was subversive to such a remit assigned to religion, as demonstrated in the way
108
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Richard Carlile had deployed Lawrence's scientific ideas to radicalise politics. The
socio-political climate in those years, coupled with the publicity of Lawrence's
controversial lectures being given in the capital city of London, heightened the
authorities' vigilance against ideas which were subversive to the role of religion as
an engine of state police. As Rennell remarked to Brougham, 'the vigilance of the
clergy [in England] enables them to mark the first appearance of the disease (of
infidelity), and their talent to arrest its contagion'.111 By contrast, even allowing for
the fact that phrenology had only started to spread in 1816 from Edinburgh to
England, phrenology did not engender a debate of the same nature as Lawrence's
Lectures precisely because it was useful as an engine of state police, in the sense that
it was a very effective popular science that would educate the lower orders towards
the end of 'right' behaviour.112
Rennell regarded Edinburgh as a hotbed of scepticism, and the spread of
scepticism was a consequence of the deficiency of the Scottish clergy, who:
as a body have neither the learning nor the power which is necessary,
in these times, to defend the citadel of Christianity, and to silence its
assailants. There is no inducement held out in the Scottish Church for
a young man of family of talent, or of attainment, to enter the clerical
profession, or to bring any superior endowments to the defence and
support of the sacred cause.113
The deficiency of the clerics, in Rennell's mind, allowed the philosophers to spread
scepticism, and scepticism readily led to infidelity. Hamilton, though a philosopher
and not a cleric, was not unconcerned about a secure basis for morality. However,
unlike Rennell, Hamilton's concern for a basis of morality was primarily in the
internal sense as defined in this thesis. Hamilton's basis ofmorality was not founded
on religion as a practice (for instance, he motioned against religious tests at the
University Senatus) but on the metaphysical notion of free will, and the
consequences of moral responsibility.114 It was crucial whether free will was real or
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a mere illusion, because free will was, for Hamilton, the foundation of human
morality. It was for this reason that the phrenological debate took place in
Edinburgh, as the capital of Scottish philosophy, in which moral and mental
philosophy go hand in hand. It was the Scottish Common Sense tradition of
establishing the basis of morality as a metaphysical premise that saw in the
materialistic notion of the mind underpinning the system of phrenology a proposition
inimical to human morality.
The geographical differences of the two controversies highlight the fact that
in London where the Lawrence controversy unfolded, the concern for morality was
more in the external sense - of morality as an engine of state police. In the
Edinburgh phrenological debate, the chief issue was morality in the internal sense -
that innate notion that humankind possesses free will as the basis for moral decision.
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George Combe: His Phrenology, His Religion
I too claim to be a Christian. I repeat my conviction, that Christianity
owes its strength to its precepts having sprung from the pure sources
of the moral and religious emotions in its founder and leading
promulgators, and to the divine administration of this world being
really adapted to afford scope and enjoyment to the whole faculties of
man, which they act under the enlightened guidance of these higher
powers.
George Combe, 18531
Beginning the year before the outbreak of the French Revolution and ending the year
before the publication of Darwin's The Origin of Species, the life of George Combe
(1788-1858) was bracketed by these two landmark events which shaped the course of
political, social and intellectual history of nineteenth-century Europe. Born on 21
October, in a house situated beneath the steep bluffs supporting the Edinburgh Castle
in what was then known as Livingston Yards,2 Combe's birthplace was humble and
insalubrious. The family home was located in a damp, low place shaded from any
winter light and was too small for the seventeen children who were to share it. To
the east and south of Livingston Yards were tanning works and magnesia work. The
refuse from these industries was freely discharged into open ditches. Further east of
these industrial sites was an acre of ground, which turned into a filthy swamp in
winter, and was covered with dunghills in summer. Running past the family home
was an uncovered public drain, which carried the soil from the houses in
Grassmarket and Westport. The house was attached to the family-owned brewery,
which was the chief means of their livelihood. The windows of the house faced
north and west, in the direction of the gardens belonging to the family, which were
let out to a market-gardener; and beyond them were cornfields. However, the open
1
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and cheerful vistas through the windows merely gave the promise of health which
was destroyed by the other influences. Of such living surroundings Combe was to
write, 'a more unhealthy residence [could] scarcely be conceived'.3 He also noted
that around 1800, his parents, thirteen children and two servants were all crowded
into a few rooms of small dimensions.4 Combe further remarked, that at the turn of
the nineteenth century, every one still acted on the hypothesis that 'the mind was
regarded as independent of the body', and 'the laws of health, depending on
ventilation, ablution and exercise were wholly unknown'. Of the seventeen children
born to the Combe family, eleven survived their father when he died of apoplexy in
September 1815.5 Combe's feeble constitution was to cause him considerable
suffering, and with yearning and lament, he wrote at the age of twenty-three: 'I do
not expect to live long, though I eagerly desire I may'.6 The many deaths in the
family and the bad health of those who survived, Combe unequivocally attributed to
the living surroundings.
Combe's father, who commanded a striking stature of six foot two inches,
was a brewer, whose education equipped him to do arithmetic and book-keeping, and
to read and write, though with great deficiencies in grammar and spelling. The
education of Combe's mother was even more limited, and while she could read, 'her
writing did not extend beyond subscribing her own name'.7 Though the family was
financially independent, neither of the parents were themselves educated enough to
guide Combe into a higher social station, nor well-connected to assist the children in
their entry to society or a profession. Nonetheless, Combe was given an adequate
education to nurture social aspirations beyond the confines of Livingston's Yard.
When Combe was sixteen, Combe's father intended to apprentice him to a cloth
manufacturer. The father and son were on the way to an interview for such a
position when they met with a relation, William Arnott, who was Baillie of the
Canongate. Arnott suggested the career of a Writer to the Signet for George Combe
3
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instead of that of a draper. The father's comment was that 'he had always
understood that high, rich, and influential connections were necessary to succeed in
the law, and that in the case of his sons all these would be wanting'.8 Arnott made
the necessary connections on Combe's behalf, and set him on the road to becoming a
Writer to the Signet. Given his humble upbringing, the entry into a gentleman's
profession was not without significant social pains for Combe. For instance, Combe
admitted how he realised his pronunciation was 'incorrect, vulgar, and slovenly in
the extreme' on entering the law; and he undertook vigorous training in elocution to
rectify the shortcoming. It was an example of the indomitable spirit in the man; and
his approach to life typified that spirit of self-improvement and self-reliance that
were deemed such virtues of his generation. Whether it was speech or health,
Combe found the motivation to overcome the odds against him. By observing strict
rules of health he later incorporated in The Constitution ofMan^ Combe was able to
live to the age of seventy despite his weak physical constitution.
It was equally remarkable that Combe should dedicate himself to helping his
younger brother, Andrew, to rise above the station into which he was born. Combe
financially maintained Andrew through his study of medicine at the University of
Edinburgh, then an international renowned centre for medical education. Andrew
became a distinguished physician and was appointed to the Royal court in Belgium.
He was a frequent guest of the Belgian Royal family and their circles, but more self-
assured and self-effacing than George Combe, Andrew was neither pretentious nor
affected by his own success.9 The careers charted out by the Combe brothers for
themselves would suggest that during this period there was a greater degree of social
mobility in Scotland than in England, where the physicians were a prestigious elite
class recruiting chiefly from the second sons of the gentry or the sons of clergy.10
Combe's older brother, Abram had his own tannery business until he visited Robert
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Owen (with George) in 1820aL New Lanark, where Owen had set up his 'ideal
society' on a communal estate with housing and education provided for the workers.
Abram Combe became a convert of Owenism and he tried a small-scale community
experiment at his tan works. With the support of other philanthropists, Abram
embarked on the ambitious venture at Orbiston on an estate of 290 acres nine miles
east of Glasgow to found a new community based on Owenite principles, which
Abram defended against the common charges of atheism and infidelity.11
To a certain extent, the philanthropic spirit of Abram Combe which led him
to embrace Owenism was shared by George Combe, albeit tinted with a desire for
personal fame. An entry in his diary in 1811, at the age of twenty-three, spoke of
that 'vanity [he felt] to be a feature of his mind, strongest in its weak state'. He
remarked his hopes that 'a desire of fame may be one mark of a mind that deserves
it'; but then he was tormented by the fact that he was 'a low man among the great',
with 'no important friends to support him'. Combe's desire for fame was bound up
with a sense of calling or destiny, which he articulated as a belief that he had the
'powers of mind sufficient to write some useful book on human nature, and
especially on the education and intellectual state of the middle ranks of society'.12
This sense of calling was further conjoined with a spiritual quest for divine
governance, which he first sought in the agency of earthly governments, then in
different sciences, from the political economy of Adam Smith and Malthus, to
chemistry, physiology and the philosophy of the mind of Dugald Stewart. The quest
eventually ended in 1816, when Combe attended a series of lectures given by Dr
Spurzheim in Edinburgh on phrenology, which was a new science ofmapping mental
faculties to the physical locales of the human brain.13 It was from Spurzheim that
Combe learned his phrenology. From the outset, phrenology was not a mere
anatomical science of the brain for Combe, but a new philosophy of the mind fraught
with religious implications and social applications. For Combe, the adoption of
phrenology resembled a religious 'conversion' - it was a faith commitment that
11 See J.F.C. Harrison, Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America - The Quest for the
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demanded a complete re-orientation of outlook. After 1816, phrenology became the
new Weltanshauung whereby Combe interpreted man and his place within the
physical universe.
Once he became convinced of the science of phrenology, Combe turned
himself into its most effective champion. From 1817 to 1836, Combe was
developing his career as a Writer to the Signet, and at the same time engaged in a
rigorous programme aimed at disseminating the science to the widest public. With
'the zeal of a religious missionary', Combe seized on every opportunity to preach his
newly found 'gospel', giving lectures to a wide range of audiences, from ministerial
divines and medical professors, to 'the clerks and shopkeepers and their wives and
daughters'.14 He also embarked on lecture tours to take his 'gospel' further afield in
Britain and the United States, sometimes at great cost to his own health. He even
took phrenology to the gaol by examining David Haggart's head prior to the trial that
convicted Haggart as the murderer of his jailer in Dumfries.15 Edinburgh became the
base of Combe's missionary activities; and he helped to found the Edinburgh
Phrenological Society in 1820, and the Society's Phrenological Journal in 1823.16
Apart from being an indefatigable preacher, Combe was also a prolific writer,
disseminating his one big idea through pamphlets, journals, published lectures and
books. The close of this period was marked by Combe's candidacy in the contest for
the Chair of Logic in the Edinburgh University in 1836. The episode represented the
culmination of Combe's social ambition for phrenology and himself. The election to
the chair would have represented a social elevation for Combe, and a powerful
symbol that the philosophy of the mind of the Scottish common-sense school was
being supplanted by phrenology. The eventual election of Sir William Hamilton to
the Chair carried the implicit verdict on phrenology as a science that had failed to
gain the intellectual respectability that Combe so desired.
Soon after the chair contest, Combe decided to retire from law at the age of
forty-eight. In a letter to his friend, James L'Amy, Combe reasoned that in order for
14
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phrenology to continue its influence, he needed to rectify his deficiencies in scientific
knowledge, so that he could take his 'place among men of scientific attainments'.17
A review of Combe's activities after 1836 would suggest a different emphasis from
his pre-1836 period. He was still lecturing, writing and promoting phrenology, but
phrenology was less in the centre of his activities, and became more a means to an
end. His writing after 1836 covered a wider spectrum of political and domestic
issues related to, for instance, the Currency Question, colonial government in respect
of British rule in India, capital punishment and prison reforms, as well as the need for
a secular education and public health. He also seemed to reflect more extensively on
the relationship between science and religion, publishing On the Relation between
Science and Religion in 1847, and privately circulated An Inquiry into Natural
Religion in 1853.
In the opening sentence of Combe's biography, published in 1878, Charles
Gibbon wrote, 'The name of George Combe is now rarely heard in scientific or
philosophical circles'.18 It is true that Combe has never attained the kind of stature as
Darwin in scientific or philosophical circles. But like Darwin, Combe had published
a book that was hugely influential during his lifetime. As Harriet Martineau
remarked on the death of Combe, 'A man must be called a conspicuous member of
society who writes a book approaching in circulation to the three ubiquitous books in
our language - the Bible, Pilgrim's Progress, and Robinson Crusoe'}9 The
popularity of The Constitution ofMan cannot be over emphasised. First published in
1828, its sale had reached over 100,000 copies in Britain by 1860, and another
200,000 more copies in America. By comparison, The Origin of Species, published
in 1859, had only sold 50,000 copies by the end of the century. It was claimed that
for the second third of the nineteenth century, The Constitution of Man was next in
circulation to those mentioned by Martineau, and that it stood on bookshelves where
no others but these were to be found.20 Admittedly, the circulation of The
Constitution ofMan was much boosted by the Henderson bequest, which allowed the
People's edition to be printed in 1832 in a 'cheap form so as to be easily purchased
17 Letter of 16 November 1836, cited in Gibbons, op. cit., 333.
18 Charles Gibbon, op. cit., xi.
19 Harriet Martineau, Biographical Sketches (London, 1869), 265-276. The book is a collection of
memoirs written for the Daily News.
20 William Harral Johnson, 'Death of Mr George Combe', Investigator, a Journal of Secularism,
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by the more intelligent individuals of the poorer classes and Mechanics'
Institutions'.21 Another title that had achieved phenomenal sales on this scale was
Tom Paine's Rights of Man (1791), allegedly with 200,000 copies sold by 1793.
During the nineteenth century, Rights of Man and Constitution of Man were
sometimes bound together for sale, and were equally condemned by certain sections
of society.22 Ever since its first publication, The Constitution ofMan had aroused
considerable opposition with many viewing it as a text for promoting materialism.
Combe was denounced as an infidel, a materialist, and an atheist.
The reception of The Constitution ofMan, to a certain extent, mirrored that of
Lawrence's lectures and reflected the religious sentiments of some sections of the
British public against any hints of scientific materialism in the aftermath of the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. Combe was himself mindful of the
likely hostile reception of The Constitution ofMan given the political context, and
asserted in the preface the fact that 'the views of the natural laws themselves,
advocated in this work, are diametrically opposite to the practical conduct of the
French revolutionary ruffians, requires no demonstration'.23 Gibbon interpreted the
hostile reception of The Constitution ofMan as coloured by the still 'comparatively
fresh memory' of the people of 'the attempt of the French revolutionists to overturn
Christianity'. He continued by saying, 'although [the people] might tolerate any
departure from established rule in science, they would not allow similar dealings
with religion'.24 Gibbon's comment registered the fact that The Constitution ofMan
was not just a book about the rule of science, it was a book with deep religious
import that could not be easily passed over. As one historian, Roger Cooter, has
claimed, 'it was very largely out of the religious controversy over The Constitution of
21 Charles Gibbon, Life of George Combe, 2 vols. (London, 1878) 1:257-8. William Ramsay
Henderson (1801-1832), was born and died in Edinburgh. He was so convinced of the benefit of
phrenology that he bequeathed the residue of his estate, which was in excess of £5,000, towards the
diffusion and cultivation of phrenology. In his will, he declared: 'that I dispose of the residue in the
above manner, not from being carried away by a transient fit of enthusiasm, but from a deliberate,
calm, and deep-rooted conviction that nothing whatever hitherto known can operate so powerfully to
the improvement and happiness of mankind, as the knowledge and practical adoption of the principles
disclosed by phrenology, and particularly those which are developed in the 'Essay of the Constitution
ofMan'.
22 Robert M. Young, 'The Impact of Darwin on Conventional Thought', in Anthony Symondson (ed.),
The Victorian Crisis of Faith (London, 1970), 13-35, 16; Charles Gillispie, Genesis and Geology
(Harvard, 1996) 163, 172; R. K. Webb, The British Working Class Reader, 1790-1848, (London,
1955), 38; cited in Cooter, footnote 53 on 338.
23 Cited in Gibbon, op. cit. 1:181, 317.
24
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Man lhal was born the so-called nineteenth-century conflict between science and
religion'.25 If The Origin of Species had triggered off a full-scale conflict between
science and religion, Combe's The Constitution of Man had contributed to the
gathering of such forces that were to unleash in this conflict.
While there is no doubt that The Constitution ofMan is an important force in
the history of science and religion, to instigate a conflict between science and
religion was by no means the intention of Combe when writing the book. To the
contrary, Combe conceived his work as filling a gap in the existing Christian
teaching that was flagrantly deficient in the knowledge of the natural laws. He
lamented that 'the popular interpretations of Christianity have thrown the public
mind so widely out of the track of God's natural providence, that His object or
purpose in this pre-ordainment is rarely thought of'. This chapter argues that The
Constitution of Man was Combe's attempt to integrate the science of phrenology
with the rudiments of his religious faith.
Another aim of this chapter, to quote Brooke and Cantor, 'is to move the
focus away from the history of ideas', and centre it on Combe as an individual. It is
in recognition that the individual is 'a site worthy of study', and this short biography
on Combe 'offers an appropriate genre for understanding the construction of science-
97
religion relationships'. It is by understanding how Combe integrated his science
and his religion in The Constitution of Man that we can begin to appreciate the
'religious' dimension of the wide-ranging appeal the book commanded on Combe's
contemporaries. In the words of Martineau:
Much else there is in the book which fill in remarkably with the needs
and desires of the time; there can be no doubt that the effect of the
work, as a whole, on the health, morality, and intellectual cultivation
of the people, has been something truly memorable.28
The project undertaken by Combe in The Constitution ofMan was nothing less than
instituting a new moral code based on natural law. A large component of 'the needs
and desires of the time' that The Constitution ofMan was filling in could have been
this cogent alternative to a religious basis of morality based on doctrinal Christianity.
For this reason, Combe was decried as an infidel or atheist by those who adhered to
25
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the doctrinal faith within the established national churches. Unlike Darwin, who
admitted his loss of Christian faith, Combe professed himself a Christian to the end
of his life. This chapter examines the ways in which Combe's religion and his
phrenology reinforced each other. It will consider the grounds on which Combe
claimed his efforts in promoting phrenology were sympathetic to Christianity. In
conclusion, this chapter examines whether Combe was justified to claim himself a
Christian. And if so, in what sense was Combe a Christian, and in what sense had
Combe's works contributed to the forces undermining the authority of the established
faith?
II
When Combe spoke about Christianity, he spoke with the credence of someone who
had been brought up in an environment steeped in Calvinism. In his unfinished
biography, Combe gave a brief account of his religious education. From the age of
seven to seventeen, every Sunday, the Combe family went to church from eleven
o'clock in the morning to one o'clock in the afternoon, and from two to four in the
afternoon after a brief lunch. At five o'clock, the children commenced learning a
portion of the Shorter Catechism, and when older, the Larger Catechism, with the
'proofs', or texts on which it was founded, and six verses of a hymn or Psalm by
heart. A hurried tea at seven in the evening would be followed by more learning. At
eight o'clock, the children were summoned by their parents to repeat what they had
committed to memory, and would be well scolded for any mistakes. The evening
was concluded by the family sitting round the table with each reading a verse of the
New Testament in turn, until the six or seven children capable of reading had read as
much as the equal of a chapter for each. No family prayers were said, and Combe
believed this arose from his father's fear that he could not do justice to so sacred a
duty. As no printed prayers were sanctioned by the established Church of Scotland,
the children were all ordered to say their prayers privately. Combe's assessment of
his religious instructions was that it felt as a heavy addition to the toilsome load of
learning unintelligible things which oppressed his existence. Far from cultivating a
religious spirit in him, they made the church, Sunday and the Catechism odious.29
29 Charles Gibbon, op. cit., 31-9.
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As he grew in understanding, Combe related how the religious teachings put
his mind in great turmoil. In the church, nothing was taught but the Calvinistic
dogmas: 'the terrors of the Gospel, the fire that never quenched, ... the worm that
never die[d], the sinfulness of sin, the corruption of human heart, and so on'. Combe
said how he believed them all and trembled. At home the family never talked of
religion: 'It was too awful and painful a subject for us'.30 Combe summarised his
views on the doctrines of original sin, the atonement and the future state held around
1803 as follows:
the whole world appeared to me to reflect the Fall and the sinfulness
of man from every feature. But, then, the consequences were
appalling! Some persons were elected to everlasting enjoyment in
heaven; many more passed over by God's decree, before they were
bom, to everlasting torments in hell. I included myself at once in this
category; for the doctrine of Christ's having suffered for my sins and
purchased my redemption, appeared inconsistent, first with a pre¬
existing irreversible decree, and, secondly, with benevolence and
justice.
Of all the doctrines within Calvinism, Combe seemed to be most troubled by the
doctrine of predestination. He recorded how he was made very miserable by a
terrible sermon on Election when he was about fourteen. It led him to confide in a
childhood friend that he felt certain that he was 'one of those who were destined
from all eternity to be passed over to the left hand at the day of judgement'. His
friend expressed surprise, and replied, 'The doctrine of Election gives me great joy,
for I feel that I am one of the elect, and that I am sure of salvation'.32 It was a
striking revelation to Combe that anyone could actually be assured of his personal
salvation. After he became a phrenologist, Combe explained such a difference in
attitude between him and his friend as due to the relative sizes of their mental organs.
His friend had Veneration, Hope and Wonder all larger in relation to the organ of
Conscientiousness, while in Combe, Conscientiousness was larger than all the other
named organs. According to Combe, therefore, if one had Conscientiousness larger
than Hope, then one was likely to feel doomed under the doctrine of predestination.
On the contrary, if Hope was larger than Conscientiousness, then one would be sure
that one belonged to the elect.
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Combe reported how she was pained by the uncertainty of her fate after death. 'Oh, I
could bear all this with patience if I were sure of a good place in the world to come,'
she said. Combe was by then converted to phrenology, and his indignation against
the doctrine of predestination was evident in the closure of his letter to Andrew:
My heart burns to think that under this strange creed of ours the
veriest scoundrel who has Hope large, and Conscientiousness small,
should pass through the bed of death full of confidence, while the very
excellent of the earth should groan beneath dreadful apprehensions
arising from the very faculties which inspired their conduct with
virtue.33
It would be fair to say that Combe considered phrenology as the force that liberated
him from 'the terrors of a lamentable superstition' induced by the doctrine of
predestination. To Combe the phrenologist, whether or not one was capable of
feeling sure of one's future state bore no relationship to how righteous one was, but
was due to the relative size of the mental organs.
Once the doctrine of predestination crumbled under the scrutiny of
phrenology, the whole edifice of what Combe called 'doctrinal Christianity' fell
apart for him. More specifically, Combe named 'the fall, the atonement, and the
doctrine of future rewards and punishments which the orthodox interpretations
present[ed] to us as Christianity, as contradicted by known facts in nature and
legitimate inductions from them'.34 To Combe, the Christian religion, as generally
professed, was founded on the Fall of Man; which was in contradiction to the
religion of nature. He reasoned that 'if the human organism, bodily and mental, has
been adapted to external nature such as it now exists, and nature to it, then apparently
man never was essentially different from what he now is'.35 In Combe's view, not
only was the Fall unsupportable by the laws of nature, but the doctrine of the
Original Sin brought with it many averse consequences:
By laying down the corruption of human nature as a fundamental
proposition in religion, and founding on it the doctrine of man's
natural aversion to holiness and virtue; and his natural incapacity to
discern Divine truth, the clergy deprive themselves of every resting
place in human nature for religion and morality.36
In orthodox Reformed, or Calvinist teaching, all men are depraved and
33 Letter to Andrew Combe dated 2 July 1819, quoted in Gibbon, op. cit., 121.
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warranted eternal punishment; the elect are saved by grace alone, and not by works
or faith. But in Combe's understanding (or misconception), personal salvation came
'only through faith in that atonement', and 'through the influence of the Holy Spirit
would the moral taint introduced into man's nature by the Fall be removed, and the
punishment due for it and for each individual's actual transgressions' be averted.37
The doctrine of the Fall therefore necessitated the doctrine of the Atonement. The
Fall brought sin into the world, and the second Person of the Trinity, himself God,
assumed the form of man, suffered the penalty of that sin, atoned for it, and thereby
restored the human race to the favour of God. Future rewards centred on the idea of
Heaven, generally alloted to the true believers, who had shown the soundness of faith
by good works; while some sects maintained that faith alone sufficed to ensure
salvation. Combe's criticism about this doctrine centred on what he considered to be
faith. In phrenological terms, one's capacity to believe any thing depended on the
development and condition of his brain, and the training, and instruction received.
'These conditions are determined chiefly for the individual, and little by him'.38
Combe did not go further to draw out the implications of his stance, but it would
suggest that he considered faith as a psychological outcome of one's phrenological
conditions. It followed therefore, that one did not choose the faith; but the faith was
chosen for you, by your brain, training and instruction.
Another criticism Combe had of the doctrine of the Atonement, albeit borne
out of misconception of the orthodox Reformed teaching, was the inherent injustice
of such a system of salvation, whereby a life of crime and immorality could be wiped
away at the death bed by a mere act of confession of faith. In mockery of the
injustice in the scheme of future rewards, Combe asserted:
No spectacle is more common than to see an unhappy individual, after
a life of crime, which society regards as flagrant that his existence can
no longer be tolerated on earth, assured by his spiritual guides that his
repentance in prison, accompanied by unhesitating faith in the
atonement of Jesus Christ, will prove sufficient to transmit his soul
from the gallows to heaven, where he will enjoy through eternity the
society of God, the angels, and just men made perfect.39
On the other hand, Hell was generally assigned to unbelievers, mis-believers
and evil-doers. To Combe, erroneous beliefs and evil deeds arose chiefly from 'a
37 ibid., para. 410, 181.
38 Ibid., para. 414, 181.
39 Ibid., para. 414, 181.
Chapter 6 George Combe: His Phrenology, His Religion 186
deficient or an ill-proportioned development, or an unfavourable constitution of the
brain, or from these combined with deficient training and instruction'. To consign
individuals thus constituted to eternal misery for conduct which was the natural
result of their faculties and circumstances, appeared to Combe to be 'at variance with
benevolence and justice'. Similarly, 'to assure them of heaven as the result of a
prison-inspired repentance and belief, seem[ed] to be equally opposed to all sound
views of a moral government of the world here and hereafter'.40 Combe strongly
advocated prison reforms based on his belief that the propensity to vice, crime and
sin was a misfortune in one's natural endowments: 'The evils are generally inherited,
and not voluntarily selected by individuals'; and the fear of hell would not appal men
with a lower development of brain. Combe therefore saw punishment, be it in this
life in prison or in the after life in hell, as 'at variance with benevolence and justice'.
To Combe, the remedy for the propensity to vice and crime must be the removal of
the causes rather than punitive measures. Finally, Combe maintained that the idea of
hell was unsupported by evidence from natural religion, which should bring
deliverance 'from the horrors of hell; for no traces of hell or the devil' were to be
found in nature.
If the doctrine of future rewards and punishment associated with the idea of
heaven and hell was rejected, did Combe reject immortality as well? Before the
question of immortality can be discussed, Combe's views of mind and matter have to
be first related. In An Inquiry ofNatural Religion, Combe demonstrated he was fully
conversant with the physiological theories of life that had caused so much
controversy in the Lawrence episode. He rehearsed the two hypotheses of life that
were in currency in 1853. The first assumed that the vital principle, of an unknown
element, combined with the chemical elements of the human organism to form life;
at death, the vital force escaped leaving the chemical elements as residue. The
second hypothesis dispensed with a vital principle as a force distinct from matter and
considered that life was a complicated action of the common properties of matter.
Writing in 1853, Combe reported that the first hypothesis was upheld as true in
popular belief, and that 'the unknown element added to the chemical elements to
produce life [was] assumed to be an immaterial mind or soul'.41 Consciousness was
referred to as evidence of this immaterial element. Combe was aware that the belief
40 Ibid., para. 415, 182.
41
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in immortality hinged on the immateriality of the vital principle, in the form of the
mind or the soul, surviving the bodily decay at death.
The grand recommendation of [the first] hypothesis to popular
acceptance is, that it is supposed to prove our immortality. Soul,
mind, or spirit, it is argued, not being matter, is indestructible, and
must endure for ever; it being distinct from matter, death is merely its
separation from the body. 42
However, he argued that 'if this doctrine be sound, then we must allow souls, or
spirits, to the dog, elephant, and ass, as well as to man; because they think and feel,
and their brains appear to be composed of the identical elements which constitute the
brain in him'. Combe did not draw out the implication of such assertion in An
Inquiry into Natural Religion, but the implication of ascribing souls to brutes, as
John Wesley did, would be to grant animals the prospects of immortality as well.
This position was clearly inconsistent with the corollary belief of immortality being
the distinct gift to man alone.
Combe endorsed the second hypothesis of life, which in turn caused his views
on mind and matter to depart from the conventional beliefs in two significant ways.
First of all, instead of considering mind as an immaterial principle superadded onto
the physical brain, Combe stated that mind was the name given to 'the result of a
series of acts of the brain'. To Combe, 'the mind stands in the same relation to the
brain as digestion does to the abdominal viscera', with digestion being the name
given to the result of a series of acts of the stomach and its assisting organs.43 In this
respect, Combe was almost echoing the French physiologist, Cabanis' famous (or
infamous) analogy between the mind and the digestive system, by stating that the
brain 'digests' impressions as the stomach digests food.44 The physical basis of the
mind in the brain was the indisputable point for Combe: 'The only points certainly
known are, that in this life mind is never manifested without brain; thought and
feeling were functions performed by nervous matter placed in certain
circumstances'.45 While Combe firmly identified the mind with the brain, he did not
go so far as identifying the mind as the brain. As early as 1826 when Combe was
penning Outlines of Phrenology, he indicated his awareness of the quintessential
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brain and the emergence of consciousness was to be bridged.
The brain, whether in life or after death, presents nothing to our
contemplation but a mass of matter, of a soft and fibrous texture, in
which no thought can be discerned and no sentiment can be perceived,
and in which no spirit or immaterial substance can be traced.46
Combe did not attempt to bridge the gap, but was content with the position that: 'if
God has made the brain to think, we may rest assured that it is exquisitely and
perfectly adapted for this purpose'. In other words, if 'medullary matter thinks,' then
it must be the best possible substance for thinking.
Combe was aware that the corollary of anchoring the mind in the brain was to
reduce the distinction between man and animals. The popular view maintained that
man was distinct from the animals by virtue of his endowment of an immaterial
mind. Combe asserted that the crucial difference between man and animals lay in the
variations of the form and size of their brains.
In [the animals] the form and size of the brain differ from those in
man, and they and we arise in the scale of intelligence and emotional
power in proportion as the parts of our cerebral masses are augmented
in number and size.47
Instead of seeing man as totally distinct from the animals, Combe saw man as
different from the animals by degrees, not in absolute terms. However, Combe
positively affirmed man's superiority over the animals, asserting man as 'designed
for another and a higher destiny than that which was allotted to [the animals],
whatever be the substance of which his mind [was] composed'.48 For Combe, 'no
idea can be more erroneous than that which supposes the dignity and destiny of man
to depend, of necessity, on the substance of which he is made'.49 He argued that
'man [had] received higher organs than any of the other creatures, this latter
endowment render[ed] man a distinct being from all the other inhabitants of this
globe, and constitute[ed] the race improvable'.50 For his contemporaries though, not
only was the foundational belief of immortality as based on an immaterial mind
jeopardised, but that the distinction between man and the animals could also be
eroded, by making a close identification between the mind and the brain. Combe
46 Ibid., 33.
47 Combe, An Inquiry into Natural Religion, para. 388, 172.
48 Combe, Outlines ofPhrenology, 33.
49 Ibid., 33.
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was fully aware of the inflammatory nature of his views contained in An Inquiry of
Natural Religion, and that was why the work was only intended for posthumous
publication.
If Combe's views of the mind and man's place in creation were audacious,
his views on matter were equally controversial. While most of his contemporaries
held matter to be destructible and believed that immortality could not therefore come
from a material medium, Combe expressed his contrary opinions as:
there is no evidence that matter is destructible; and if immortality
must depend on the essence or substance of the thinking power being
indestructible, matter, as something of which we have experience, and
which really seems to us to be indestructible, will afford a firmer basis
for our hopes than a purely assumed existence of something unknown
and incomprehensible called spirit.51
Combe's basis for any hopes of immortality therefore rested on matter rather than on
an immaterial soul, claiming that 'a reconstruction of the human organism [did] not
seem to be impossible'.52 In this respect, Combe's position was reminiscent of
Priestley's views on matter discussed earlier. While Priestley believed that a future
life would come through the Christian doctrine of resurrection as a reconstruction of
the material body, Combe did not make any explicit link between resurrection and
the reconstruction of matter. Combe readily admitted that 'Natural Religion [threw]
us exclusively on the bounty of God for our hopes of a future life',53 but he did not
speculate on how this future life would come into existence or whether these hopes
of a future life would be realised. The only clear conclusion Combe made in respect
of materiality and immortality was:
As this Power and Intelligence called us into existence, bestowed on
us the qualities we possess...we may legitimately infer that we now
exist in fulfilment of his design; that we shall exist until that design,
whatever it may be, shall be completed; and that hence it is altogether
irrational in us to fear that his object may be defeated in consequence
of having chosen a wrong substance out of which to fashion us. The
question of Materialism, therefore, in relation to immortality, appears
to be one which we cannot solve, and in itself to be of no practical
importance to our future destiny.54
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By the time Combe wrote An Inquiry into Natural Religion in 1853, he was able to
report that:
the opinion is now very general among thinking man, that the question
of immortality has no dependence on that of the immateriality of the
soul and possibility of its separate existence, but that whatever the
nature of the soul is, it can be immortal or mortal only by the will of
God.55
However, the opinion of the thinking man was not representative of the general
public, nor did the Church advance to incorporate new knowledge in the life
sciences. Combe confessed that he had frequently received communications from
'young men of talent and unexceptionable morality', who had stopped short in their
clerical studies 'from a conviction that the doctrines which they were called on to
believe and to teach could not stand the test of honest examination'.56 Combe was
unsparing in his criticism about the Church's teaching, her interpretation of the Bible
and the role of the clergy:
What has been taught as the Christian religion, is not the religions of
Jesus Christ, simply as he delivered it; but creeds, and confessions,
and catechisms, concocted by semi-barbarous men from isolated texts,
drawn often with unscrupulous irrelevancy and daring from all parts
of Scripture.57
In the final analysis, it was the 'doctrinal interpretations of the Bible' that was
at the core of Combe's criticism of Christianity as professed by the established
national churches. Combe used the term 'doctrinal Christianity' to denote the system
of Christian beliefs based on doctrines, such as the Fall and the Atonement, which
were derived from certain interpretations of the Bible. To Combe, nearly all that
passed in the world for Christian faith really consisted of a 'system of doctrines
founded upon particular texts, interpreted in a particular manner, by particular
individuals or conclaves of men; and in point of fact, the Bible contained] no
systematic exposition of religious doctrine which all men must necessarily
acknowledge as Divine revelation'.58 Combe's critique of doctrinal Christianity
showed his insight into the impending clash between science and religion that was to




Ibid., para. 428, 188.
57
Ibid., para. 438, 196-7
58 Ibid., para. 423, 185.
Chapter 6 George Combe: His Phrenology, His Religion 191
there is a source of weakness in doctrinal Christianity which is not yet
generally perceived, but which will become more apparent in
proportion as a knowledge of nature penetrates into the public mind.
It stands exclusively on a supernatural basis, and can neither advance
with the knowledge of nature, nor be amalgamated with the forces and
adaptations by which God conducts the government of the natural
world, both physical and moral.59
Another major weakness of doctrinal Christianity, according to Combe, was that it
allowed the clergy 'to hold sway over the laity'. It gave the clergy the temporal
power 'to substitute their own doctrines for the order of nature in the instruction of
people,' and 'to prevent the public mind from entering honestly and independently
into the consideration of many departments of natural science'. 0
There was no doubt by the time An Inquiry into Natural Religion was written
in 1853, Combe's departure from doctrinal Christianity in belief and practice was
well established. If 1816 marked his conversion to phrenology, evidence would
suggest that by the time Constitution of Man was published in 1828, Combe had
already rejected the Calvinistic doctrines he was brought up with. An entry dated 1
September 1828 in one of his private journals recorded this departure from doctrinal
Christianity and the adoption of the 'principles for true religion' as formulated in The
Constitution of Man. The following paragraphs offered a palpable record of this
shifting in his religious beliefs, as if the pieces of mental furniture related to
Calvinism were thrown out one by one to make room for the new creed contained in
The Constitution ofMan:
What is the end of religion? To obtain salvation will be the common
answer. How is salvation to be obtained? By faith in Jesus Christ,
and by practising morality, as at once the evidence and result of that
faith. What is salvation? Deliverance from God's wrath and curse, to
which we are exposed on account of original sin and actual
transgression; and being made partakers, through grace, of eternal
felicity in heaven. These ends, then, are purely selfish. Punishment is
an object of fear, on account of its painful and distressing nature;
eternal happiness in heaven is an object of desire, as implying the
highest gratification.
After reciting the doctrines that he was rejecting, Combe proceeded to give the
reasons of his rejection:
It is impossible to love a Being whom we fear; and habitual
consciousness to liability to eternal misery enslaves the mind, and
59 Ibid., para. 425, 187.
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renders it unfit to entertain generous emotions. The desire of heaven
may be elevating or degrading, according to the notions formed of the
state of being to be realised there ... The practical effect, then, of any
particular religion will be good or bad according as it maintains the
higher or the lower faculties in habitual activity. Fear maintains
Cautiousness, but it chills Benevolence, Veneration, Hope,
Conscientiousness, and Intellect. The desire of heaven, if a mere
abstract undefined aspiration after happiness, will cherish a dreamy,
imaginative frame of mind, much more allied to selfishness and
superstition than to practical holiness and virtue.61
By the time The Constitution of Man was published, Combe was no longer a
Christian in the conventional sense. He no longer subscribed to a set of key
doctrines as stated in the Westminster Confession and taught by the Catechism; nor
did he owe allegiance to an established national church, like the Church of Scotland.
His religious affinity could probably be described as an advanced 'Broad Church'
position; and his religious beliefs consisted of a new creed based on natural laws.
Ill
The new creed, which to all intents and purposes, became Combe's new religion,
was explicated in The Constitution ofMan. In places, the language employed was
reminiscent of the Catechism, and the tone of the text was deeply religious, as when
Combe was setting out the purpose of God in creating Man:
God exists: He created man that he might be happy. Man can be
happy only by exercising all his faculties under the supremacy of
moral sentiment and intellect. Religion, therefore, consists in seeking
to discover and obey the divine laws, from conviction that they alone
are suited to gratify all our faculties.62
But the 'true principles of religion', if inspired by phrenology, was not without traces
of the old religion that Combe was shifting out. It is most interesting to note how the
concept of divine pre-ordainment developed in The Constitution ofMan. It is a term
used by Combe to refer to the laws of nature within the moral universe, which were
in every way as 'natural and inevitable' as the laws of nature governing the physical
universe. The object of The Constitution of Man was to demonstrate that 'to the
infringement of every natural law [was] attached a pre-ordained natural consequence,
61 Quoted in Charles Gibbon, op. cit., I: 223-4.
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which Man [could] neither alter nor evade'.63 It would not be far-fetched to suggest
that Combe's concept of pre-ordainment came from the raiment of the doctrine of
pre-election that he had rejected, as if he could not totally cast off the concept of
some form of divine prescription.
In The Constitution ofMan, Combe distinguished two senses of 'the laws of
nature' as follows:
The former is the sense in which it is employed by the physiologist
and the natural philosopher; the latter, that in which it is most
commonly used by the jurist and the moralist. To speak of 'obeying'
or 'disobeying' a natural law in the latter sense of the phrase, is to
speak literally and with precision; but to speak of 'obeying' or
'disobeying' a natural law in the former sense (as, for instance, the
law of gravitation) is to say in a figurative manner that we adapt, or
fail to adapt, our conduct to the fixed order and modes of action of
things.64
Combe saw himself as writing about the laws of nature as a physiologist or a natural
philosopher, and the laws he was expounding were on a par with the law of
gravitation. One has no choice but to be subject to the law of gravitation; and
therefore disobedience has no meaning with reference to choice. To disobey the law
of gravitation means, figuratively speaking, to fail to adapt. To expect no injuries by
jumping off from a great height is an instance of failing to adapt to the law of
gravity. In The Constitution ofMan, Combe was attempting to lay down a system of
natural laws governing the physical and moral aspects of man in the same manner as
gravity governs our motion. Combe asserted that there was nothing inscrutable if the
most pious and benevolent missionaries embarking on their mission in an unsound
ship should be drowned, while the 'greatest monsters of iniquity' survived in 'their
staunch and strong vessel', if the physical laws were taken into account. Likewise, if
a morally depraved man endowed with a sound bodily constitution, observed the
rules of temperance and exercise and enjoyed longevity, it was the consequence of
the operation of natural laws. A man with a feeble constitution who disregarded the
laws of diet and exercise might be a paragon of Christian virtues, but he would still
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suffer pain and sickness. With justification, the Swedish translation of The
Constitution ofMan was entitled 'The Doctrine of Happiness on Earth'.65
To a large extent, The Constitution ofMan was Combe's treatise of God's
prescriptions instituted in the laws of nature for the physical and moral welfare of
man. Drawing parallels between the laws that governed the physical universe and
the laws that governed the moral universe, Combe stressed the independent
operation of these natural laws. By independence, Combe probably meant that they
were even independent of God; in the sense that once the laws in both the physical
and moral universe had been instituted by the Divine Mind, they operated
independent of God. Certain actions would inevitably lead to certain consequences,
because the cause and effect were 'pre-ordained by the Divine Mind for a purpose'.66
That purpose, continued Combe, appeared to be 'to deter intelligent beings from
infringing the laws instituted by God for their welfare, and to preserve order in the
world'. Pre-ordainment therefore carried with it the element of inevitability and
inflexibility. While the inevitable and inflexible nature of the laws governing the
physical universe was more readily adhered to, Combe laboured over the parallels
between the moral and physical realms. He was at pains to point out that it was the
same degree of inevitability and inflexibility with the laws that governed the moral
universe as with the laws that governed the physical universe, even though such a
fundamental premise was not readily conceded to:
In considering moral actions ... the public mind leaves out of view the
natural and inevitable. Being accustomed to regard human
punishment as arbitrary, and capable of abeyance or alteration, it
views in the same light the inflictions asserted to take place under the
natural moral law, and does not perceive Divine pre-ordainment and
purpose in the natural consequences of such moral actions.67
Combe reasoned that it was the arbitrary nature of human punishment that had
blinded us to the absolute nature of those natural laws that governed our moral
actions. Combe stated that 'the great object [he] had in view' in writing The
Constitution ofMan was 'to show that this notion [was] erroneous, and that to the
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infringement of every natural law there is attached a pre-ordained natural
consequence, which Man can neither alter nor evade'.68
Another feature reminiscent of the doctrine of predestination contained in the
principle of pre-ordainment was the degree of determinism in existence prior to birth.
In On the Relation between Science and Religion, Combe stated his opinion on the
importance of the constitutional qualities of the stock from which one was
descended.
human happiness and misery depend more upon the constitutions of
body and brain communicated prior to birth than upon all other causes
put together. Where these are radically defective and unsound,
physical pain, mental imbecility, impulsive and irresistible desires,
torpid inactivity, or insanity with all its deep afflictions, are the
unhappy characteristics of the individual.69
It was not surprising that one of the most rehearsed comments about phrenology was
that it promoted moral determinism. It was the chief metaphysical objection William
Hamilton raised against phrenology. If Combe had found the doctrine of pre¬
destination oppressive, what did he gain by trading Calvinism in for phrenology,
which seemed to preach only a different creed of pre-determinism before birth? If
everything was pre-ordained, where did free will exist? If there was no free will,
how could man be responsible for his action? If determinism was the ultimate stance
of phrenology, what was the point of writing The Constitution ofMan as a manual
for self-improvement? Neither would it explain the amount of time and energy
Combe devoted to the promotion of education and prison reforms in his later career.
It would appear that Combe was fully aware of the deterministic implications
of his new religion, and had attempted to address the issue in a paper delivered in
1826 to the Phrenological Society, entitled Essay on Human Responsibility as
Affected by Phrenology. Combe admitted from the outset that he had omitted the
subject of Will and Responsibility since 1819, when he published his Essays on
Phrenology. It was obvious to him 'that if necessity were demonstrable by
argument, Responsibility was certain as a fact] and how to reconcile them, was a
problem which for years' he was unable to solve. It is significant that Combe set out
to solve the problem of necessity, free will, and human responsibility before writing
The Constitution ofMan. It was as if he needed to resolve the difficulty of necessity
68 Ibid., 23.
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and free will before he could fully develop the principle of divine pre-ordainment in
nature in The Constitution ofMan.
In Essay on Human Responsibility as Affected by Phrenology, Combe defined
human action as 'the consequences of Will', and 'Will is the result of the strongest
desire sanctioned by intellect, and desires arise from the activity of the faculties, and
this activity springs from either internal or external excitement'.70 Combe reasoned
that since desire always preceded Will, and that 'the feeling of freedom arose entirely
from the existence of the desire', it was therefore impossible, 'from the nature of
things, that we [could] even feel the Will otherwise than as free'.71 Furthermore,
Combe argued that the sequence of events leading to human action stemmed from
some internal or external stimuli, which caused desires to arise. The intensity of
each desire was in proportion to the size and activity of the organ; hence, the natural
development of the brain was 'the grand source of desire'.72 Combe probably
envisaged that the intellect would referee amongst the desires, and 'the strongest
desire sanctioned by intellect' resulted in what he understood as Will. Will could be
nothing other than 'free' in such an analysis. In this regard, Combe quoted Jonathan
Edwards, who claimed philosophy proved, by demonstration:
The predominance of motives, and the conclusion of moral necessity
is inevitable; nevertheless it is every moment refuted by
consciousness; for we have the irresistible conviction that we are free;
— we feel that our will is free, and this refutes and sets our philosophy
at nought.73
It would appear that Combe concluded any debate on the existence of free will as an
objective reality was a fruitless task. Subjectively, in the way human action was
originated and resulted, free will remained an irresistible conviction - 'we feel that
our will is free'. In this respect, Combe was actually in full agreement with the
Scottish common-sense philosophers. From Thomas Reid to William Hamilton, the
basis of their assertion that man was a free agent was none other than that our
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irresistible conviction - 'we feel that our will is free'; it was the argument by
Common Sense rehearsed.
From discussing what he thought Will was, Combe progressed on to
discussing what he called, 'the doctrine of Responsibility'. He declared the general
perception that 'without Free-Will there can be no Responsibility' was a
'fundamental error', but without giving any further explanation. However,
interpreting the statement in the context of the whole essay, Combe was probably
rejecting the conventional notion that responsibility originated from within, as a
consequence of the exercise of free will. Instead, Combe tried to establish that
human responsibility originated from without, in the physical and moral laws
instituted by the Creator. Physical responsibility consisted of observing those
physical laws of the universe; the enforcement of which was so rigid that even
ignorance would not exempt us from their consequences. For instance, fire could
bring immense blessings and benefits but could also cause indescribable damage; and
the employment of fire carried with it physical responsibility. In Combe's scheme,
the moral laws were as unbending as the physical, and imposed on us responsibility
from without that we could not evade.
Paradoxically, the framework of moral conduct and consequences prescribed
by The Constitution ofMan might appear to promote moral determinism, but in fact,
it offered scope for Combe to believe that an individual, to ascertain extent, could
influence the outcome of his own end. The crucial difference for Combe was that
with the doctrine of predestination, he could not be sure of his salvation and felt sure
that he was doomed. Furthermore, under predestination, he felt he could do nothing
to change the outcome concerning his personal salvation pre-determined before his
birth. By comparison, the concept of divine pre-ordainment in nature offered Combe
the comfort of certitude that by his obedience to the natural laws in the physical and
moral realms, he could 'choose' the outcome. The corollary of replacing the doctrine
of predestination with his doctrine of pre-ordainment was to change the mechanism
whereby personal salvation was to be effected. Under predestination, salvation was
effected by Christ's atoning act on the cross and determined by the will of God.
Under pre-ordainment, salvation came from the individual's decision to adapt to the
natural laws divinely prescribed.
In An Inquiry into Natural Religion, Combe drew the conclusion that 'the
only way in which we can serve God, is by acting in conformity with His will; and
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His will may be discovered by us by observing and reflecting on His works'.74
Phrenology was the fruit of such observations and reflections of the divine laws of
nature that would assist one on the course of self-improvement. 'The discovery of
the functions of the brain, and the means by which its constitution and development
may be rendered more and more perfect', enabled man to improve all mental
7S
capacities'. . The brain was indisputably the prime medium for such self-
improvement. Knowledge through education was the means for effecting such
improvement.
Within the phrenological system, the expression of different mental faculties
and sentiments were correlated with different parts of the human brain. These
faculties and sentiments were broadly divided into two orders: the Affective and the
Intellectual. The Affective order was further divided into two Genera: propensities
and sentiments; and the Intellectual order, into three Genera: the external senses, the
perceptive and the reflective. Located at the bottom and at the back of the brain were
the propensities man had in common with the animals; for example, 'Adhesiveness'
(the tendency to live in communities), 'Combativeness', 'Destructiveness',
'Acquisitiveness' and 'Amativeness' (sexual feelings). Propensities were what gave
rise to primitive instincts, and were distinguished from sentiments. All the
sentiments were further sub-divided into two categories. The first category of
sentiments was common to man and the lower animals and they were: 'Self-esteem',
'Love of approbation' 'Benevolence' and 'Cautiousness'. The second category of
sentiments were proper only to man, and they were: 'Veneration', 'Firmness'
(determination to do good), 'Conscientiousness' (duty or gratitude), 'Hope', Wonder,
'Ideality' (inspiration, imagination), 'Wit' and 'Imitation'.
The second order of faculties had three genera. The first genus comprised of
the five senses that man and animals had in common and allow them to communicate
with the external world. The second genus comprised of the perceptive or knowing
faculties for taking cognizance of the existence, qualities and relations of external
objects, and they were: 'Individuality', 'Form', 'Size', 'Weight', 'Colouring',
'Locality', 'Number', 'Order', 'Eventuality', 'Time', 'Tune' and 'Language'. The
third genus comprised of the reflective faculties, and they were: 'Comparison', and
'Causality' (the ability to perceive the dependency of phenomena and to trace
74 Combe, An Inquiry into Natural Religion, para 458, 206.
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motives and the first cause). The manifestation of power by each faculty was
determined by its size and condition, and the phrenologists were at pains to point out
that it was the relative, not the absolute, size of each faculty within the person that
would determine the predominant traits in his personality and abilities. For example,
as related earlier, 'the veriest scoundrel with Hope large, and Conscientiousness
small' would pass through the bed of death full of confidence, while the very
excellent, with Conscientiousness large and Hope small, would groan beneath
dreadful apprehensions arising from the very faculties which inspired their conduct
with virtue.76 Or, if Veneration and Hope were large while Conscientiousness and
Benevolence small, the individual was likely to prefer the pomp and rituals of
religious worship to the practice of charity and justice.
Given that it was one of the fundamental principles in phrenology that 'the
human faculties acted with a degree of energy corresponding to the size of their
organs,'77 to influence the size of certain organs would therefore affect the relative
manifestation of the faculties. In On the Relation between Science and Religion,
Combe posed the question, 'Is man capable of exerting any influence over the size
and condition of the brain?' He claimed the answer must be in the affirmative, and
that our power in this department would be 'found equal to, probably greater than,
our influence over inorganic substances and agencies'.78 To claim that the condition
and size of the brain could be influenced to the same, or even greater, extent than
over inorganic substances betrayed the firm materialistic basis upon which Combe
based his view of the brain. 'The brain is the material instrument by means of which
the mind acts, and it consists of a variety of parts, each connected with a special
mental power'; and therefore 'the brain is subject to the same organic laws as the
other parts of the body', asserted Combe.79 In a similar manner as the physical
constitution of the human body could be improved by exercise, temperance, diet and
hygiene. The size and condition of the brain could be enhanced by mental training
through education. Such a claim was entirely consistent with Combe's belief that the
mind was not an immaterial, ephemeral entity, but was solidly anchored in a material
brain.
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The phrenologists believed that the organs of the animal propensities were
generally large and naturally powerful to ensure survival. It was the moral and
intellectual organs that required artificial cultivation to enable them to regulate the
lower propensities. If the doctrine of pre-ordainment as manifested in natural laws
was the new creed supplanting the doctrine of predestination in doctrinal
Christianity, education was the new mechanism to effect personal salvation in place
of the theory of atonement. In his lectures on popular education, Combe laid down
the need of education as:
the moral and intellectual organs, in most individuals, when
combined, although equal or superior in size to those of the
propensities, stand more in need of artificial cultivation. Their
function is to control and direct the animal feelings and desires, and
they need to be instructed and strengthened themselves to fit them to
accomplish this duty.80
Combe laboured over making the distinction between instruction and training; and
that education should embrace both. To Combe, instruction meant 'communicating
knowledge', and training implied 'the repetition of certain modes of action in the
mind and body until they [had] become habits'. To teach a child to repeat the
precepts and doctrines of the New Testament was mere instruction; and the child was
not 'trained' in religion and morality until he became accustomed to practise these
01
precepts in his daily conduct. The answer to the question whether the condition
and size of the brain could be improved was therefore answered by Combe's belief
that:
It is a law of our constitution that any organ, when accustomed to
repeat frequently its action, acquires additional strength and facility in
doing so; and the force and advantages of habit arise from this law. 2
If education was the mechanism of salvation in Combe's new gospel, it was
not surprising that after penning The Constitution ofMan, Combe turned his attention
increasingly to promoting education reforms based on his phrenological principles.
He even alluded to the Scripture to support his point on training: 'Train up a child in
the way in which he should go, and when he is old, he will not depart from it'. He
claimed therefore that in this respect, scripture and nature were in agreement.
Despite the element of determinism that appeared inherent in the doctrine of pre-
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ordainment, in practice, Combe was a devout believer in the role of education in
influencing the condition of one's own mental constitution as given at birth. To this
extent, his moral philosophy was not deterministic. In the moral universe
constructed under his doctrine of pre-ordainment, Combe allowed for an element of
free will which brought with it responsibility and duty, for the individuals and
society as a whole.
Moral Philosophy, the sequel to The Constitution of Man, was written to
illustrate how 'the principles of human nature' developed in Constitution of Man,
might be applied to the 'conduct of life - by man as an individual, and as a domestic,
a social, and a religious being'. Moral Philosophy was the collection of twenty
lectures originally delivered in 1832 to 'an Association formed by the industrious
classes of Edinburgh for obtaining instruction in useful and entertaining
knowledge'.83 To an impressively large audience of some five to six hundred men
and women, Combe stated unequivocally that 'obedience to every natural law [was]
a positive duty imposed on us by the Creator, and that infringement or neglect of it
[was] a sin or transgression against His will'.84 Knowledge of God's will and laws
as revealed in nature was essential in discharging this duty and avoiding
transgression. It followed therefore that 'the gaining of knowledge [was] a moral
duty'; and that it was 'the office of the divines to instruct in the duties prescribed in
the Bible, and of philosophers to teach the department of nature'85. The religious
overtone of the terms used by Combe, like 'moral duty', 'sin', and 'transgression',
would not have been missed by his immediate audience in 1832. The terminology
was also suggestive of Combe's orientation that while he had rejected doctrinal
Christianity, he had not departed from a deistic religion. Throughout his series of
83 See Preface of Combe's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh, 1893), v. This association was the
predecessor of the 'Edinburgh Association for procuring Instruction in Useful and Entertaining
Science', founded on 29 October 1834. According to Henry Cockburn: 'This and similar institutions
were strongly characteristic of the times. It is a sort of popular unendowed college, where lectures are
given to all, male and female. .. t he lectures are on botany, geology, phrenology and education. They
drew in 1832 about £720 from 400 or 500 regular pupils, and had nearly 3000 visitors at 6d. each
night.... It is a very useful establishment, giving respectable discourses very cheaply to a class of
persons for whose scientific instruction and amusement there is no other provision.' George Combe
was 'their genius, and consequently phrenology is a favourite and most productive branch.' See
Henry Cockburn, Journal of Henry Cockburn, 1831-1834, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1874), 73-4. The
Association was a typical example of such institutions founded to cater for the needs of the lower
middle classes and the more self-motivated workers who patronised the Mechanics Institutes
springing up all over Britain in this period.
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lectures, God was referred to as 'the Creator', 'the Lawgiver', 'Divine Ruler'.
Combe also insisted that the Divine mind, and will, and government were revealed in
Nature, reiterating the tradition of natural theology into which Combe was trying to
shape his philosophy. What Combe was attempting to illustrate was that there
evinced the same degree of design, and of the presence of a Divine Mind, in the
order of the moral universe just as it was in the physical universe.
IV
Combe's new gospel did not stop with the message of personal salvation. In An
Inquiry of Natural Religion, Combe was explicit in his criticism of established
religion as offering 'the consolation of religion in our suffering from evil, without
enabling us to remove the cause of the evil'.86 Such criticism is reminiscent of Karl
Marx's indictment of Christianity, that it opiates the religious poor without removing
their plight. The tides of working-class agitation that coalesced into Chartism in
Britain in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and the wave of revolutions
that swept across Europe in 1848 would not have been far from Combe's mind when
he penned An Inquiry in 1853. Combe's religion had a social dimension that sought
to improve life on earth. It is beyond the scope of the present essay to relate in detail
Combe's social programmes. As illustrations, we will look in brief at Combe's
application of phrenology in the areas of politics, and social and penal reforms.
In Moral Philosophy, Combe stated the principles underpinning the
relationship between the rulers and the subjects as:
Rulers and subjects are all equally men, and are equally placed under
the Divine laws; and as these proclaim the obligation on each of us to
do to others as we would have them to do unto us, and to love our
neighbours as ourselves, the notion of right in any one man, or class
of men, to rule for their own pleasure or advantage over their
neighbours, against their inclination and inconsistently with their
welfare, is utterly excluded.87
The Christian precept of loving our neighbours as ourselves, and the echo of Paine's
Rights ofMan can be discerned in Combe's principles. Improvement for government
would take the form of moving towards independence and liberty. By independence,
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Combe meant not being governed by a foreign power; by liberty, he meant the nation
owned no superior on earth, and every individual was protected by laws in his
person, his property, and privileges not only against the aggressions of his
neighbours, but against the government itself. The only obligation incumbent on the
subject towards the State was to obey the laws; and the only form of government
founded by the dictates of natural laws, was that which flowed from the subjects, and
was exercised directly for their benefit. Combe forewarned that political
improvement would be slow and gradual because pure and moral institutions could
not flourish and produce their legitimate fruits unless the people for whom they were
intended possessed corresponding moral and intellectual qualities. He concluded
therefore that there could be 'no real freedom without prevalent intelligence and
morality among the body of the people'. How could intelligence and morality be
promoted among the people then? Combe's answer was:
These can be introduced only by education and training; but the
general diffusion of property, by giving a direct interest to numerous
individuals in the maintenance of justice, greatly promotes the
progress of morality. Hence, public enlightenment, morality, and
wealth constitute the grand basis of freedom.
In other words, to arrive at enlightened governments, the people as individuals would
have to be enlightened first, by education and training, which brought us back to the
first precept of Combe that self-improvement was the first and foremost duty of
every individual to his Creator.
Consistent with his view of an enlightened government being independent
and liberal, Combe was critical of British colonial expansion. In a series of letters in
February 1858 to the Editor of the Scotsman, Combe, calling himself a great heretic,
decried British conquest of India as 'a blunder' and 'a crime'. His language was
direct and his arguments lucid:
In India we are conquerors. ... The people are ruled by men aliens in
race, in religion, and in language. No arguments will persuade me
that this can be acceptable to the natives of India; for the feeling of
patriotism or love of national independence is indestructible.88
Ideological reasons aside, Combe also argued against the rule of India on economic
grounds. For instance, he described the profit on our [not clear if he meant British or
Scottish] trade with India as 'a bagatelle in the profits of England's trade', and that
the profit might be had even if the British were not conquerors. But so long as the
88
Combe, Letter to the Editor of the Scotsman, dated 10th February 1858.
Chapter 6 George Combe: His Phrenology, His Religion 204
British continued to rule India by the sword, the Indian revenues had to cover the
cost of maintaining the dominion. With the Catholic Emancipation crisis dominating
much of the political landscape in the second quarter of the nineteenth century,
Combe drew a pertinent and almost prophetic analogy between the conquest of
Ireland and India:
All conquests that have ended in good have been those in which the
dominant power laid aside its exclusive pretensions, and amalgamated
with the vanquished, and raised all to equal rights. This was
England's case after the Norman Conquest; and Ireland, while ruled as
a conquest, was a curse to England. India cannot be held by
amalgamation; and in proportion as we enlighten and civilise the
natives, we shall awaken their feelings of patriotism, deepen their
sense of degradation, and prepare them for rebellion.89
On another highly political issue, that of slavery, Combe appeared to have thought
extensively on the political and moral implications of the practice. In his reply to M.
B. Sampson's 15-page long letter on 2 December 1844, Combe observed that 'to
restore the negroes to Africa is not to fill to them the measure of justice in
compensation for their wrongs'. Combe believed in giving the negroes the right to
choose, stating that 'if a fair and full atonement, such as God, or a disinterested just
and benevolent man, would pronounce to be adequate, were offered, the Americans
would have the right to hold out to the negro any alternative they saw proper, leaving
to him to select the atonement, which is his full measure of justice'. 90
Combe's application of phrenology was not restricted to political issues
alone. Like many of his contemporaries, he was concerned with the conditions of the
workers in the industrial towns, and the rise of pauperism and crime. These were the
urgent issues which spurred the Scottish evangelical leader, Thomas Chalmers, on to
the ideal of a 'Godly Commonwealth', or another Scotsman, Robert Owen, to
experiment with Socialism in New Lanark. The same concerns had found voices in
their English counterparts amongst Christians like F. D. Maurice and Charles
Kingsley in their Christian Socialism. Combe was fully aware of the success of the
industrial system which had brought unprecedented wealth to Britain. In giving his
lectures of Moral Philosophy in 1832, Combe was able to state that 'no nation in the
world possess[ed] so much wealth as Great Britain: none display[ed] such vast
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property in the possession of individuals'. 1 However, amongst the dazzling and
glittering array of riches in her large towns, Combe also witnessed the rise in
pauperism and heathenism. His analysis of the plight of the urban poor was
extensive, and the long working hours and the conditions of the charity-workhouses
were two of his most recurrent themes. Describing the state of society in which 'the
grand object of each' was:
To gain as much power and distinction to himself as possible. He
pursues this object without any direct regard to his neighbour's
interest or welfare; ... he dedicates his whole powers and energies to
the production of the mere means of living, and he forces all his
fellows to devote their lives to precisely the same pursuits.92
Repeatedly Combe spoke out against the practice of long hours of labour in the
industrial system, which benumbed the faculties of the labourers and deprived them
of the leisure essential for any moral and intellectual cultivation. In addition to
campaigning for shorter working days, Combe proposed that on all private business
should be suspended on Sundays, and 'a portion of time should be set apart for
teaching in public assemblies, and for discharging our social duties'. The contents
of these public instructions should include science and knowledge of the natural laws
of the universe, which would facilitate men to live more harmoniously with their
physical and moral constitution. His assessment of the charity-workhouses as the
breeding ground for the next generation of paupers showed his practical insight. 'In
point of fact', declared Combe, 'in feeding pauper children with the most moderate
quantity of the coarsest and cheapest food', means were taken to perpetuate the evil
of pauperism. He reasoned that bad feeding in childhood weakened the body and the
mind, and consequently diminished the power of the individuals to provide for
themselves. He considered it imperative that these children should be supplied with
nutritious diet, and to be given adequate education to avert this spiral of pauperism.
For Combe, phrenology was not just a science, it was a religion. Phrenology
offered Combe a scheme to understand man's moral constitution with reference to
his physical constitution. What hitherto seemed to be arbitrary in the make-up of a
person's character or abilities became predictable within the parameters of the
science. What was hitherto the realm of metaphysics became instead a verifiable
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science. A God who was just and caring that Combe had failed to find in orthodox
Christianity could now be discerned through the natural laws He had instituted in the
moral universe. The certitude in a God that Combe had discovered through
phrenology far exceeded what he was able to grasp in the Calvinistic tradition in
which he was brought up. In Combe, we do not see a compartmentalisation of his
science and his religion. On the contrary, he sought to integrate his phrenology into
a religion such that the two systems in fact became one, and The Constitution ofMan
was the synthesis of his science and his religion. Phrenology also became an
effective religious force that empowered Combe to formulate his opinions on a wide
range of political, social and moral issues. In formulating these opinions, Combe
also sought to change the world, out of the deep conviction that God had instituted «•
natural laws to allow justice to be exhibited in the moral universe as we inhabit now,
not in the future world after death.
V
By his own admission, Combe professed himself to be a Christian to the end of his
life. In what sense was he a Christian? It was fairly clear that Combe was not a
Christian in the orthodox sense. By the time he penned The Constitution of Man,
Combe no longer owed any allegiance to the established Church of Scotland, or any
other established churches for that matter. Nor would he honestly subscribe to the
Westminster Confession, or any articles of faith associated with an established
church. Combe publicly admitted that he was rejecting 'doctrinal Christianity', and
by that he meant the belief system based on certain doctrines like the Fall, the
Atonement, Predestination. In reality, he was probably rejecting the whole
establishment that maintained 'doctrinal Christianity' as orthodoxy. In practice,
however, Combe did not openly break with the establishment, for the sake of social
respectability rather than out of any conviction of their rightfulness. The discrepancy
between what Combe really believed in, and what he seemed to keep up for
appearances was sharply pointed out by his brother, Andrew Combe.
This discrepancy was highlighted during the chair contest of 1836, which
occasioned some pertinent and penetrating remarks from Andrew. The testimonies
that Combe amassed in support of his candidacy suggested an element of duplicity in
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some cases, and Andrew was concerned by this duplicity as compromising Combe's
character. From the silence of Andrew Thomson and Thomas Chalmers, Andrew
rebuked George for forcing 'a testimony from their silence at variance with their real
opinion'. In a similar vein, Andrew continued, 'The same with your sitting 'for
years' in his church - when in reality you only had a seat for a year or two and did
not sit'.94 Andrew was pointing out that Combe had a seat in a church but did not
actually attend church. In another letter to George occasioned by the chair contest,
Andrew referred to the discrepancy between the public and private positions in
Combe's attitude towards Scripture:
In truth, I have frequently before warned you that you go much too far
in alluding to Scripture. You often declare and still more frequently
imply a perfect belief in revelation. If you think you don't, you give
little credit to the logical perception of the public. ...You gain a few
present disciples by mystifying, but it is by placing yourself in a
position immeasurably below where you ought to .. .The Author of the
Constitution and the expounder of God's moral law ought himself to
be their bodily representative.95
Andrew was pointing out the fact that Combe no longer believed in Scripture as
revelation, but was prepared to pretend otherwise in public. Combe's view of the
Bible would suggest the influence of the German higher critics of Scripture.
Evidence in this direction came from the extant correspondence between Combe and
Marian Evans (George Eliot), who publicly endorsed the rationale in the approach of
German biblical criticism. In one of her letters to Combe, Miss Evans stated that she
was 'never fond of the plan of availing oneself of the elasticity of the biblical text to
make the scriptural writer teach philosophy and to force truth on the believer in
inspiration'.96 It was a stance that Combe adopted, but was not prepared to be as
open about it as George Eliot was. But as Andrew was not slow to point out to
Combe, he had gone 'much too far in alluding to Scripture', and he gave Tittle credit
to the logical perception of the public'. This logical perception of the public was
articulated by Albert Collins in a letter to Combe in 1836:
It appears to me extraordinary that you should endeavour to show that
your system of the constitution of man is compatible with revealed
religion. I believe that to all the great truths of that religion, your
system is diametrically opposite. If those passages in revelation
which relate to the fate of man, the depravity of the human race, and
94 NLS MS7238, f. 14, Andrew Combe to George Combe, 12 August 1836.
95 NLS MS 7238, f.10, Andrew Combe to George Combe, 7 July 1836.
96 NLS MS 7333, f.93, Marian Evans to George Combe, 22 January 1853.
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the necessity of regeneration, be forgeries - let them be expunged; but
so long as those passages remain - and it would destroy one half of
the book to take them away - it appears to me useless to say, that a
work which contradicts those doctrines, is in perfect accordance with
the Book that declares them true.97
Albert Collins was correct in his assessment that Combe's 'system of the constitution
of man' was incompatible with revealed religion. In this regard Andrew reminded
Combe after the chair contest that those who had been entrusted to elect the future
professor 'would be neglecting their duty to look on and allow an unchristian
professor to teach their students'.98 Combe was 'unchristian' in that he believed
neither in the established faith nor in Scripture as revelation. There was no doubt
that Combe was not a Christian in the orthodox sense. This would appear to be the
interpretation of Combe's religious position by most of his contemporaries, since
Combe was widely speculated to be the anonymous author of Vestiges of the Natural
History of Creation (1844), a book adjudged to be irreligious and had caused a great
sensation to Combe's contemporaries.99
However, Andrew's comments also reinforced the assessment of Combe as a
believer of some kind. In writing The Constitution of Man, Combe saw himself
acting 'as the expounder of God's moral law'. In professing himself to be a
Christian in An Inquiry of Natural Religion, there was probably no element of
duplicity as there was in some instances in 1836. An Inquiry was written when
Combe was sixty-five; it was more a confessional statement at the close of his life
than a text with a political agenda like his testimonials in 1836. In Combe's own
words, An Inquiry was 'intended for posthumous publication, if ever published at
all'.100 In stating that he was a Christian, Combe probably did believe himself to be a
Christian. He understood that he was not a Christian in the orthodox sense, but in the
97 NLS MS7238, f.l, Albert Collins to George Combe, 12 August 1836.
98 NLS MS7238, f.10, Andrew Combe to George Combe, 7 July 1836.
99 See James Secord, Victorian Sensation - The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret
Authorshi of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (Chicago, 2000), 378: 'Most strikingly, in
print Combe never denied rumours that he had written Vestiges himself, although in conversation and
correspondence he was more open.' Combe's own suspicions that Chambers (with whom he was
personally acquainted) was the author of Vestiges were confirmed 'after criticisms he made verbally to
Chambers appeared in a new edition'. An example of such correspondence — NLS MS 7390, f.66,
George Combe to the Author of 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation', 1st March 1845, sent via
the publisher, which was the Chambers Brother in this case. The letter reads, 'Sir, I beg leave to
return my best thanks to you for the honour done me in sending me the third edition of your work.
Congratulate him on the success. The work has been assigned to various authors, (including my
Brother Dr. A . Combe and myself) but so far as I can learn , no one has yet conjectured who you are.'
100
Combe, An Inquiry into Natural Religion, vii.
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sense that his God came from the Christian tradition, even though he had discarded
all the doctrines associated with this Christian God. More specifically, Combe's God
was in his essence God the creator, who revealed himself through his creation, in the
order of the physical and moral universe. In this respect, Combe's God was the God
of design, of governance, of wisdom and providence that was established within the
tradition of natural theology. What the natural theologians had established before
Combe was God the creator in the physical universe; what Combe set out to do
through the science of phrenology was to establish the same God of design and
governance in the moral universe. In doing so, Combe considered himself as laying
down a new foundation of morality based on natural laws. In moving the basis of
morality away from doctrinal Christianity, Combe considered himself offering a
more secure basis of morality. It would be fair to say that Combe considered
Christian doctrines as the arbitrary outcomes of the interpretations of the Bible by
various human efforts. Ordinances revealed in the natural order were more 'secure'
because they were not arbitrary - they were inflexible and inevitable. In professing
himself a Christian, Combe was largely holding on to the conception of God the
creator within the tradition of natural theology.
In denouncing doctrinal Christianity and promoting a natural religion, Combe
had also undermined the authority of the established faith. 'Have not your delights in
the Constitution been doubled by thinking that it will in time undermine a system
based upon error and superstition?'101 The rhetorical question Andrew put to Combe
would suggest that the undermining was not unwittingly done. Though Combe
admitted a God in his version of natural religion, he was providing the artifices for a
system of beliefs that could move easily into the godless 'religion' of the French
materialists, who promoted a mechanistic view of the universe where certain causes
would lead to certain effects. The laws of nature were hailed as governing both the
courses of the physical universe and the actions of the living creatures. Vegetation
followed the pattern of seasons in bringing forth their fruit and shedding their leaves;
animal actions were dictates of their instincts and senses, there was no volition
involved; human beings were on a par with the other living creatures, actions and
judgments followed the course of the given circumstances and the dictates of
instincts; to improve behaviour, one had to improve the circumstances which drove
people to act in a certain way. The political stance of the followers of the French
101 NLS MS 7238, f.10, Andrew Combe to George Combe, 7 July 1836.
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materialists tended to be revolutionary, for they believed that human improvement
was not a matter of converting the souls to virtues, but to improve the circumstances
of life with the end of promoting greater happiness for more people. Their religious
position tended to be atheistic, for in a mechanistic universe, the laws of nature
governed everything. There was no need for a Creator-God to sustain the physical
universe or to uphold the moral fabrics of society. Man was only matter, there was
no soul and no future life after death, no post-mortem retribution; this life and this
world were all that we had. Salvation meant the improvement of this world and this
life. In abandoning the Christian God, the French materialists, chief of whom
d'Holbach, turned Nature into the new deity. In denouncing revealed religion and
instituting a code of morality based on natural laws, Combe was paving the way for
many who had the Bible and The Constitution ofMan on their shelves, to substitute
the former with the latter; and eventually, substituting God with Nature.
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Frankenstein's Hideous Progeny
Frightful must it be; for supremely frightful would be the effect of any




In her preface to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, which is a short account relating
the origin of the novel, Mary Shelley referred to Frankenstein somewhat
affectionately, as 'my hideous progeny', which she bid to 'go forth and prosper'.2
First issued on 1 January 1818, Frankenstein has indeed prospered, to the extent that
the name 'Frankenstein' has outstripped its author's in fame. The progeny of a
ghost-story writing contest, Frankenstein had its inception in June 1816, in the same
year that the Lawrence-Abernethy debate flared up. The ungenial summer brought
incessant rain and days of confinement to Percy and Mary Shelley, who were on a
continental tour, to seek the company of their neighbour, Lord Byron in his villa
Diodati, by the Lake of Geneva. For amusement, they read ghost stories translated
from German into French, and Bryon proposed that they each wrote a ghost story.
Mary Shelley's story grew out of a half-waking reverie in which she 'saw the
hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of some powerful
engine, show signs of life, and stir with an uneasy, half-vital motion'.4
Present at Diodati was also Byron's physician cum travelling companion,
John William Polidori, who was, by one assessment, 'a first-rate physician fresh out
1
Mary Shelly, Frankenstein, the 1818 Text, ed. Marilyn Butler with 'Introduction', (Oxford, 1994),
'Author's 1831 Preface' as Appendix A, 196. Preface to 1818 edition was by Percy Shelley.
2
Ibid., 197.
Frankenstein was set in Geneva and its immediate environs. The breath-taking scenery of the region
described in Frankenstein, like le Mer de Glace and Chamounix, featured in Mary's Journal. See
Frederick Jones (ed.), Mary Shelley's Journal, (Oklahoma, 1944), 50-61.
4
Frankenstein, 196.
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of Edinburgh'. 5 Polidori (1795-1821) had obtained his doctoral degree in medicine
from Edinburgh at the unusual age of nineteen, and was recommended by Sir Henry
Halford to Byron on the strength of his extraordinary talent. Indeed the precocious
Polidori would be compared with Frankenstein. Although Polidori was not
specifically mentioned in Mary Shelley's 1831 account as directly contributing to the
genesis of Frankenstein, his presence most probably directed the interest of the party
at Diodati towards the latest scientific issues in medicine, and anatomy and
physiology.
The night before the proposed contest, Polidori's diary entry for 15 June 1816
recorded his conversation with Shelley 'about principles - whether man was to be
thought merely an instrument'.6 In her preface to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein,
Mary Shelley referred to another conversation, between Shelley and Bryon,
revolving around 'the nature of the principle of life', and to which she was 'a devout
but nearly silent listener'. Discussion on the probability of discovering and
communicating the principle of life gave rise to three speculations: first, of
spontaneous generation of life as demonstrated by Erasmus Darwin's experiment
with vermicelli preserved in a glass case; secondly, of reanimating a corpse by
galvanism; and finally, of reconstructing a creature from component parts and then
contriving for it to be 'endued with vital warmth'.7 This conversation, taking place
some days after the proposed contest and immediately before her nightmarish
reverie, was attributed by Mary to be the source for her 'acute mental vision' from
which Frankenstein was born. Frankenstein's Monster was reconstructed from
component parts gathered from the charnel house, dissecting room, and slaughter
pen, and the creature was then 'infused with a spark of being' with 'the instruments
of life'.8 In this respect, the Monster was a hybrid of those speculations between
Bryon and Shelley concerning the principle of life. It was not the product of
spontaneous life generation, or a reanimated corpse, but a reconstructed humanoid,
5 Polidori's sister was the mother of William (editor of Polidoir's works) and Christina Rossetti. James
Rieger, 'Dr.Polidori and the Genesis of Frankenstein', Studies in English Literature 3:4 (1963),468.
6 William Rosetti (ed.), Diary of J.W. Polidori, 1816 (1911), quoted Butler, 'Introduction', op. cit.,
xxi-ii. Butler addresses the issue of seeming discrepancies between Mary's and Polidori's accounts of
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with components gathered from dead bodies, and animated with instruments
suggestive of galvanism.9
Shelley's budding interest in science dated back to his Eton years, when two
of his teachers, Adam Walker (1731-1821) and Dr James Lind (1736-1812), directed
the precocious and inquisitive mind of Shelley towards scientific interests. From
Walker, Shelley developed a keen interest in astronomy, electricity, and magnetism;
from Lind, an unorthodox doctor trained in Edinburgh, Shelley learned about
chemistry and medicine. Shelley's scientific interest took a more practical turn when
he began his training, in some earnest, as a professional surgeon after being expelled
from Oxford for his share in publishing The Necessity ofAtheism. It was Shelley's
surgical training that brought the Lawrence-Abernethy debate to bear upon the
conception of Frankenstein.
During the five months from April to August 1811, Shelley attended
Abernethy's anatomical lectures and walked the wards of St Bartholomew's Hospital
under Abernethy's tutelage.10 Through his training, Shelley certainly became
acquainted with William Lawrence, who was working as Abernethy's demonstrator
at the time. In the winter of 1814 to the summer 1815, Shelley's health significantly
deteriorated, and Lawrence became Shelley's physician, and treated him on what was
widely speculated to be syphilis.11 From 1814 through to 1817, some form of
friendship probably developed between Lawrence and his patient. Shelley's letter
recorded attending on 21 September 1817 the wedding of a 'Mr William Lawrence
and Miss Jane Clarke, notable because the couple objected to the legal necessity of a
religious ceremony, and refused to kneel during it'.12 Given that Shelley was invited
to what was apparently a fairly private ceremony, Shelley and Lawrence were on
fairly familiar terms. In September 1817, it was noted that Shelley brought along the
manuscript of Loan and Cythna on his trip to London (from Marlow,
9
Edinburgh Review, 3 (1803): 194-98 on John Aldani's An Account of the late Improvements in
Galvanism (London, 1803).
10 Nora Crook and Derek Guiton, Shelley's Venomed Melody (Cambridge, 1986), 1-26; Butler,
'Introduction', xv. Shelley and Lawrence might have been met before 1811 through their mutual
membership of the Godwin circle.
11 Crook and Guiton's study represents the most comprehensive investigation on Shelley's 'incurable
disease', the term used by Mary in her Journal.
12
Hugh Luke, 'Sir William Lawrence, Physician to Shelley and Mary', Papers on English Language
and Literature, 1 (1965), 141-52; quoted in Bynum, op. cit., 134.
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Buckinghamshire) to consult Lawrence on his health,13 While Shelley might have
discussed his poems with Lawrence, Lawrence's scientific expertise was probably
instrumental in guiding Shelley's reading in 1814-17.14 On Lawrence's advice
following this consultation in September 1817, Shelley resolved to seek the warmer
clime of Italy to improve his health. In March 1818, Shelley sailed for Italy and was
never to see England again. He was drowned in Leghorn in July 1822. Lawrence's
intellectual influence on Shelley during this period is a focus of Marilyn Butler's
Introduction to Frankenstein, in which she draws specific attention to 'a significant,
previously unnoted part' played by Lawrence in the gestation of the Frankenstein,15
For the purpose of this thesis, the Lawrence-Shelley connection placed
Frankenstein firmly within the discourse in contemporary science concerning life
and mind. The Lawrence-Abernethy debate on the principle of life probably had
informed some of Shelley's opinions on the subject which he expressed at Villa
Diodati. In March 1816, when Lawrence delivered his two Introductory Lectures,
which were effectively a retort of Abernethy's 1814 lecture on the Hunterian
principle of life, the Shelleys were living in Bishopsgate, Windsor. They left for
Switzerland in May 1816, and the crucial conversation on the principle of life
between Shelley and Bryon might have been influenced by Lawrence's very recent
lectures. In June 1816, Mary began writing Frankenstein', the couple returned to
England in the autumn of 1816 and settled from January 1817 in Marlow.
Frankenstein was finished in June 1817,16 during which year Abemethy delivered his
lectures that publicly addressed the humiliating blows dealt out by Lawrence in 1816.
Butler rightly points out that the conceiving and writing of the novel were almost
contemporaneous with the Lawrence-Abernethy debate, and that Lawrence was
physician to Percy Shelley in this period.
Regarding the nature of the mind, Butler points out that the consultations with
Lawrence would have focused on 'Shelley's nervous condition, his suggestibility and
his dreams,' and when Lawrence and Shelley discussed the nature of the mind,
'different traditions of thinking about mind plainly converged'.17 These discussions,
13
Roger Ingpen (ed.), Shelley's letter to Lord Bryon of 24 September 1817, The Complete Works of
Shelley and Letters, 10 vols., (London, 1914), IX, footnote, 245.
14
Butler, op. cit., xvi.
15 Ibid., xii.
16
Mary Shelley's Journal entry on 18 June 1817: 'Frankenstein' was sent back |by publisher John
Murray], Jones, op. cit., 81.
17
Butler, 'Introduction to Frankenstein', xvii-viii.
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Butler suggests, were most likely the background to Shelley's fragments written in
1815 on 'Metaphysics' and 'Morals', which she considers to have featured in the
conception of Frankenstein. In short, Butler's study highlights the prominence of the
Lawrence-Abernethy debate as the backdrop of Frankenstein; the scientific issues
concerning the origin of life and the nature of the mind were central, rather than
incidental to the conception of the novel. In this respect, Frankenstein can justifiably
be read as an alternative critique of the contemporary science that Rennell was taking
issue with.
Rennell's assessment of scientific ideas was inextricably bound up with their
religious and social implications. In flavour and in tone, Frankenstein was very
different from Renell's Remarks. But as a critique, Frankenstein embodies the moral
sense which warns of the danger of pursuing scientific knowledge for its own sake.
The social and moral consequences unleashed by Frankenstein's scientific
experiments strongly imply that scientific endeavours have wider implications that
could not be devolved from the science itself. In this respect, Frankenstein as a
response to contemporary science was closer to Rennell's Remarks than it first
appeared. This chapter is an attempt to read Frankenstein as an alternative critique
of Lawrence on the theories of life and mind on a par with Rennell's Remarks.
Under three broad headings, this essay explores what Frankenstein said about
contemporary science, religion and society. The 1831 edition of Frankenstein,
which included Mary Shelley's preface, also contained numerous substantive
amendments to the original 1818 text. While the 1831 Author's Introduction is
illuminating for the current discussion, the 1818 text of Frankenstein is used for the
following discussion for being most immediately contemporary with Rennell's
Remarks of 1819. Another layer of textual variances exists between Mary's
Manuscript and the 1818 text incorporating Percy Shelley's changes.18 Some
consider Percy's alterations as more than stylistic; one commentator adjudges that
the alterations have the overall effect of undermining Mary's assumption of 'the
existence of a sacred animating principle, call it Nature or Life or God', by adding
'his atheistic concept of a universe mechanistically determined by necessity or
18 Charles E. Robinson, (ed.) The Frankenstein Notebooks, a facsimile edition of Mary Shelley's
Manuscript Novel, 1816-17, (with Alterations in the Hand of Percy Bysshe Shelley) as it survives in
Draft and Fair Copy Deposited by Lord Abinger in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, 2 vols. (London,
1996).
Chapter 7 Frankenstein's Hideous Progeny 216
power'.19 A study of textual variances between the Manuscript and the 1818 text
might highlight further nuances. However, Percy's alterations, substantive or
stylistic, had been incorporated with authorial consent. For the purpose of the
current discussion therefore, it was the published 1818 text, rather than the
Manuscript, that ranked as a contemporary critique similar to Rennell's Remarks.
II
In genre, Frankenstein was conceived to be a 'ghost-story' - 'one to make the reader
20dread to look round, to curdle the blood, and quicken the beatings of the heart'.
But Frankenstein is more than just 'a wildest story imagined', 'it has an air of reality
attached to it, by being connected with the favourite projects and passions of the
times'. Such were the remarks of the Scots Magazine, 21 which quite correctly
identified the perennial appeal of Frankenstein beyond that of a mere ghost story in
its possession of an air of reality based on contemporary science. The reviewer also
aptly named 'the projects and passions of the times' that became encapsulated in
Frankenstein as nothing less than 'the discovery of the means to communicating life
to an organized form', in terms which resonated with the Lawrence-Abernethy
22debate on life.
Frankenstein's 'project and passion' which led to the creation of his Monster
were eloquently and succinctly related in less than ten pages of text. The project
contained two distinct stages: the discovery of the cause of life, and the experiment in
using the knowledge of animation. By Frankenstein's account, the discovery
originated in his peculiar interest in 'the structure of the human frame, and, indeed,
any animal endued with life', which caused him to become acquainted with the
science of anatomy. But Frankenstein's ultimate interest was not in the structure of
animal frames per se, but in the mystery that lay behind animated forms. 'Whence
19 Anne Mellor, 'Choosing a Text of Frankenstein to Teach', in ed. J. Paul Hunter, Frankenstein, A
Norton Critical Edition (London, 1996), 162-170.
20
Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, 'Author's 1831 Preface', 195.
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did the principle of life proceed?' was the bold question that preoccupied
Frankenstein. From anatomy, Frankenstein turned to physiology to uncover the
mystery of life, which gave him the insight that 'to examine the causes of life, we
must first have recourse to death'. To understand death, Frankenstein was 'forced to
spend days and nights in vaults and charnel houses' in order to 'observe the natural
decay and corruption of the human body'.
From the account of Frankenstein's scientific progression, it was clear that
the study of animal frames shed light on the human body, and that anatomy was the
basis for physiology. Mary Shelley might not have read Lawrence's 1816
Introductory Lectures, but the rendering of the crucial relationship between anatomy
and physiology echoed Lawrence's exposition of their underlying relationship:
The anatomy of animals have been investigated at first, in order to
throw light on the organization and functions of the human body, ...
comparative anatomy... means the anatomy of all living things,
compared to each other. It thus furnishes the data, which constitute
the basis of general physiology, of which the object is to determine the
laws that regulate the phenomena exhibited by organized beings.24
In asserting that the causes of life were to be sought by recourse to death,
Frankenstein was acting out the conviction in the latest notion in contemporary
physiology of defining life as a state capable of opposing the onset of the decaying
process exerted by environmental influences. According to Abernethy, the English
physiologist John Hunter considered Life as 'a great chemist', which 'even in a
seemingly quiescent state, had the power of resisting the operation of external
agency, and therefore preventing the decomposition of those bodies in which it
resided'.25 Lawrence, as a follower of the French physiologist Xavier Bichat,
defined Life as 'the assemblage of those functions which resist "death"'.26 As
founder of the science of histology, Bichat also identified 'tissue' rather than organ,
as the more basic organizational unit. Whether it was the English 'vitalist' school
which conceived Life as externally imposed by an agency beyond organization, or
the French school which considered Life as an emergent property of organization,
they shared in common the view that whatever life was, it was the ability to resist
24
Lawrence, Introductory Lectures (London, 1816), 8.
25
Abernethy, Physiological Lectures (1817), 27.
26 Bichat: 'la vie est l'ensemble des functions qui resistent a la mort', quoted in Rennell's Remarks,
60, from Bichat's Recherches physiologiques sur la vie et la mort (Paris, 1800), full reference of the
publication from Hall, op. cit., 122.
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death. Frankenstein's discovery of the causes of life was unambiguously portrayed
as made by studying death. It was by 'examining and analysing all the minutiae of
causation, as exemplified in the change from life to death, and death to life' that the
secret of life was yielded up to him.
The discovery of 'the cause of generation of life' meant that Frankenstein
now possessed the power of bestowing animation. Such tantalizing capacity led him
on to the stage of experiment. Nights and days he toiled to construct a human frame
as the receptacle of his animating power. 'I had worked hard for nearly two years,
for the sole purpose of infusing life into an inanimate body', recalled Frankenstein.
The ultimate moment of infusion was, by contrast, brief and anticlimactic for
Frankenstein:
With an anxiety almost amounted to agony, I collected the instruments
of life around me, that I might infuse a spark of being into the lifeless
thing that lay at my feet. ... I saw the dull eye of the creature open; it
breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs.
The culmination of the experiment was the point where Mary Shelley began her
• • i 27
original tale. It was the hub from which the rest of Frankenstein developed. The
few sentences that related the process of animation, though brief, touched upon a
multitude of contemporary scientific speculations concerning the causes of life.
Firstly, 'the instruments of life' had reference to galvanism which Mary
explicitly alluded to in her 1831 preface. In 1791, the Bolognese physiologist Luigi
Galvani published De Viribus Electricitatis in Motui Musculari Commentaris,
reporting the contractions observed on the limbs of frogs, deprived of life, when they
were in contact with an arc of metal wire connected to a pile of copper and zinc
plates. Galvani concluded that electricity was causing the contractions; he observed
that this form of electricity was different from the natural form as from lightning, or
static electricity generated by friction. He postulated (incorrectly) that this new
form of electricity was innate to animals, and called it 'animal electricity', generated
mostly by the brain, and as a fluid capable of 'flowing' through the nerves to the
muscles, thereby producing the stimulus necessary for muscular motions. Galvani
was correct in detecting electricity, correct even in detecting that it 'flowed' like a
fluid, but he was incorrect in ascribing the electricity as unique to animals. The
ultimate scientific import of Galvani's 'animal electricity' was in discovering what
27
Mary Shelley, 1831 Preface, 197.
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was in fact current electricity (also known as galvanic electricity), which led on to
the construction of batteries by Volta for its generation.28 However, the postulation
of the existence of 'animal electricity' as a cause of life appeared to gain a wider and
sensational propagation by Galvani's nephew, Giovanni Aldani.
In December 1802, to a London audience including the Prince of Wales, the
Dukes of York, Clarence and Cumberland, Aldani performed an experiment using a
Voltaic pile connected by metallic wires to a recently killed ox-head. It was
observed that 'the eyes were seen to open, the ears to shake, the tongue to be
agitated, and the nostrils to swell,' as if the animal were to go into combat. In
January 1803, a similar experiment was conducted by Aldani on the corpse of
Thomas Forster, an hour after the murderer was hanged at Newgate. The Voltaic
pile this time, consisting of 120 plates of zinc and copper each, was attached to wires
which were then connected to the ear and mouth of Forster, 'the jaw began to quiver,
the adjoining muscles were horribly contorted, and the left eye actually opened'. By
smearing volatile alkali on the points of stimulus, the convulsions were so much
increased as to 'give an appearance of re-animation'.29 The spectres continued into
1804, when Aldani conducted further experiments, in which 'the bodies of human
corpses became violently agitated and one even raised itself as if about to walk'. A
'lighted candle placed before the mouth was several times extinguished' when
respiration was artificially re-established by exerting pressure against the ribs.30
'Perhaps a corpse would be reanimated; galvanism had given token of such
things,' recalled Mary Shelley in her preface. Aldani's series of experiments
between 1802 and 1804 might have been behind Mary Shelley's reference to
galvanism and its part in the genesis of Frankenstein. Galvanism certainly excited
contemporary interest and made headlines; many of Aldani's experiments were
conducted in public, as before the Commissioners of the French National Institute, or
28 What Galvani had discovered was current electricity, which he (incorrectly) postulated as innate in
animals. Alessandro Volta built on the experiments, and by 1800, had constructed electrical batteries
consisting of electrodes of dissimilar metals in a salty electrolyte. In Galvani's experiments, electric
current was generated with the two different metal piles acting like electrodes, and the animal's body
fluid, the electrolyte.
29 John Aldani, An Account of the Late Improvements in Galvanism, with a series of Curious and
Interesting Experiments performed before the Commissioners of the French Institute and repeated
lately in the Anatomical Theatres ofLondon; to which is added, An Appendix, containing the author's
Experiments on the Body of a Malefactor executed at Newgate (London, 1803), 54. Quoted in Anne
Mellor, Mary Shelley, Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monster, (Routledge, 1988), 105-6.
30
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to noble celebrities in the Anatomical Theatres in London. Aldani's Late
Improvements in Galvanism (1803) was reviewed by reputable journals such as the
Edinburgh Review, which cautioned against Aldani's claims by concluding:
While we admit that the production of muscular contraction, by the
combination of animal organs, to all appearance dead, is a very
curious circumstance, we cannot allow that it affords any proof of the
presence of a peculiar electricity in living bodies, or that it tends, in
the slightest degree, 'to explain the sensations and contractions in the
animal machine.31
Aldani was, however, so perfectly convinced of the existence of 'the ethereal
animal fluid', that he entertained great hopes that 'Galvanism may be usefully
applied in cases of apparent death from suffocation'. In fact, the ultimate aim of
Aldani's research was nothing less than the command of the vital powers:
To conduct an energetic fluid to the general seat of all impressions; to
distribute its influence to the different parts of the nervous and
muscular systems; to continue, revive, and, if I may be allowed the
expression, to command the vital powers', such are the objects of my
researches, and such are the advantages which I propose to derive
from the action of Galvanism.32
The preamble, 'if I may be allowed the expression,' suggested that Aldani was aware
of the 'monstrosity' of his ambitions. In words that resonated with Aldani's
ambitions, Victor recounted the thoughts that supported his spirits through the
unremitting toil:
... if I could bestow ambition upon lifeless matter, I might in process
of time ... renew life where death had apparently devoted the body to
corruption.33
Frankenstein's experiments read almost like a replica of Aldani's in some respects.
Victor recorded that he had 'tortured the living animal to animate the lifeless clay;'
which suggested possibly that 'the spark of life must be transferred from a living
animal to a dead one'.34 In terms reminiscent of the descriptions from Aldani's
experiments, the animation of the Monster was rendered as: 'the dull yellow eye of
the creature open; it breathed hard, and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs'. The
Voltaic metal piles suspended in saline solution for the generation of galvanic
31 Review of John Aldini's An account of the Late Improvements in Galvanism etc (London, 1803),
Edinburgh Review, 3 (1803), 194-98, 195.
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electricity would loosely comply with the descriptions as 'the instruments of life' in
animating the Monster or the 'chemical apparatus' used in creating his mate. Quite
appropriately, Mary Shelley was scant in details of either the instruments or the
process of animation. It was more than plausible, however, that Aldani's
experiments had not only caught the imagination of the contemporary public, but
also indirectly fired the imagination ofMary Shelley in the genesis of Frankenstein.
The second scientific speculation that was touched upon in Frankenstein
concerned the theory of electricity as a cause of life. If Aldani was the
experimentalist of 'animal electricity', Abernethy was one of the 'theorists' trying to
interpret the data. Abernethy's 1814 lectures, which Lawrence derided in his 1816
lectures, contain an explication of electricity as a possible cause of 'irritability'. In
physiology, 'irritability' referred to the range of voluntary and involuntary responses
in organized structures upon stimulation, while 'sensibility' designated the range of
conscious and unconscious feelings. To trace the cause of irritability was, in
eighteenth-century physiology, to pinpoint the cause of iife-as-action'.35 Was 'life-
in-action' emergent as an activity of matter in a particular configuration, or did it
require an added principle? This was the eighteenth-century physiological question
that Hunter theorised on, and Abernethy tried to expostulate, based on his
interpretation of Hunter's opinions and the latest developments in galvanic
electricity. Abernethy dismissed the proposition that irritability was 'the effect of
chemical change' on the premise that reiterated contractions were produced by
Voltaic electricity during twenty-four hours on limbs of animals severed from the
body. He argued that since supply of materials for any chemical change to the limbs
was also severed, the experiment invalidated the claim that 'irritability' was the
result of chemical change. Hunter's opinions, as advocated by Abernethy, was that
'irritability is the effect of some subtile, mobile, invisible substance, superadded to
the evident structure of muscle, or other forms of vegetable and animal matter, as
magnetism is to iron, and as electricity is to various substances with which it is
connected'. Invoking the authority of Newton, Abernethy asserted that all matter
was governed by the property of vis inertiae, thereby necessitating 'the superaddition
35 For example, La Mettrie identified the self-moving power of organism with the concrete
phenomenon of muscular irritability in his VHomme Machine (1747).
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or
of some subtile and mobile substance'. He postulated that 'a subtile invisible
substance', powerfully mobile, was responsible for muscular motions in a like
manner as the subtile substance causing magnetic and electric motions. In fact,
Abernethy came close to identifying electricity as the cause of irritability by
asserting that:
To be as convinced as I am of the probability of Mr Hunter's Theory
as a cause of irritability, it is ... necessary to be as convinced as I am
that electricity is what I have now supposed it to be, and that it
pervades all nature. 37
The phenomena of electricity and irritability, in Abernethy's opinion,
corresponded:
The motions of electricity are characterized by their celerity and force;
so are the motions of irritability. The motions of electricity are
vibrating; so likewise are those of irritability.38
While drawing analogies between electricity and the subtile substance that caused
irritability, Abernethy was emphatic that it was not 'meant to be affirmed that
electricity [was] life':
I only mean to prove that Mr. Hunter's theory is verifiable, by
shewing that a subtile substance of a quickly and powerfully mobile
nature seems to pervade everything, and appears to be the life of the
world; and therefore it is probably that a similar substance pervades
organized bodies, and produces similar effect in them.39
Lawrence was scathing about Abernethy's postulation that the cause of life
was analogous with electricity. 'The truth is, there is no resemblance, no analogy
between electricity and life: the two orders of phenomena are completely distinct;
they are incommensurable,' asserted Lawrence.40 Abernethy's speculation was a
true reflection, however, of the intense contemporary interest in the power and nature
of electricity. As regards its nature, electricity was 'visible' through its power, but
'invisible' in its existence; mobile like fluid and subtile like ether. Albani's 'animal
electricity' was referred to variously by him as the 'energetic fluid', 'elastic fluid, or
'ethereal animal fluid'. The fluidic form ascribed to electricity was probably closely
connected with the belief that it was a force that could permeate all matter. The
36
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belief of its all-pervading nature in turn led to the speculation that electricity could be
like gravity, a unifying force behind all matter, even living matter. In Frankenstein,
it was Benjamin Franklin's discovery of 'the perfect similarity between electricity
and lightning' that was dramatised. Named as Franklin's greatest discovery and 'of
the greatest practical use to mankind' by Priestley, 41 the wonder of this powerful
perfect similarity was a focal point in Victor's scientific awakening. Witnessing the
strike of lightning on an old oak, young Victor was utterly amazed by the dazzling
power, which blasted the oak to its stump and reduced it to 'thin ribbands of wood'.
He eagerly inquired of his father:
the nature and origin of thunder and lightning. He replied,
'Electricity'; describing at the same time the various effects of that
power. He constructed a small electrical machine, and exhibited a few
experiments; he made also a kite, with a wire and string, which drew
down that fluid from the clouds.
It was not only the stupendous power of electricity that was captured in this passage,
but the 'fluidic' form in which it was conceived to exist. The 'fluid' that tore across
the sky could likewise be captured in the small electrical machine, probably a
Leyden jar, for storing static (atmospheric) electricity. First invented in 1745, the
Leyden jar was very much in vogue both in laboratories and in private studies by the
late eighteenth century. Galvani used the static electricity stored in a Leyden phail to
experiment with stimulation of muscular contractions in living and dead animals in
the 1770s, and soon pioneered electricity as a healing agent for certain diseases.
John Wesley's Desideratum, or electricity made plain and useful (1760) dwelt
extensively on the healing power of electricity and inferred that the nature of
electricity was little short of a 'miracle' and must be of divine origin. For example,
he referred to the experiment where electrified water could set off spark and even
cause combustibles to catch fire over water as the work of God.42 The improvements
in patients after electrical therapy was believed to be the result of loss of internal
electricity being replenished; and the widespread acceptance of the healing property
of electricity further reinforced the speculation that electricity was the vital force.
Against the background fascination of electricity as the possible vital force,
Mary Shelley was probably directly instructed by Humphry Davy and Percy Shelley
41
Joseph Priestley, The History of the Present State of Electricity, introd. Robert Schofield, 3rd ed.,
The Sources of Science, No. 18 (New York, 1966), 2, 204.
42 Simon Schaffer, 'Natural Philosophy and Public Spectacle in the Eighteenth Century', History of
Science, 21(1983), 1-43, 5-6.
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on this matter. Mary was only nineteen when she wrote Frankenstein. Though
precocious, extremely well-read, and introduced to some of the most fascinating
scientific ideas through members of the Godwin circle, Mary was not as steeped in
science as Percy was. In 1816, Mary read Davy's Discourse, Introductory to a
Course of Lectures on Chemistry (1802), the only ostensibly scientific text read
during the genesis of Frankenstein. Professor Waldman, who tutored Frankenstein at
university, embodied the most positive (though not unreservedly) image of science in
the story and has been inferred as modelled after Davy.43 The invention of the
voltaic cell in 1800 allowed Davy to embark on researches in electro-chemistry,
another reflection of the contemporary interest in the applications of electricity. His
experiments on electrolysis of aqueous solutions culminated in 1807 when he
successfully isolated sodium and potassium metal by the electrolysis of their fused
salts. Davy's analysis of salts into metal lent further credence to the belief of the all-
permeating power of electricity, including the chemical nature of matter. Going
hand in hand with the all-permeating nature of electricity was the belief that
electricity as a force was part of the harmonious whole governing the cosmos. It was
no coincidence that Michael Faraday, Davy's scientific apprentice at the Royal
Institution from 1813, should be researching on the 'interconvertibility' of the
powers of nature - electricity, magnetism, gravity and heat during this period.
Historically, Ritterbush explains such extravagant belief of electricity in the early
nineteenth century as due to the fact that:
The inheritance of a harmonious system of forces was made to order
for electrical speculation. The relationship between the speculative
framework and the newly discovered cosmic force accounts for the
extravagance of belief.44
This extravagant belief was personified by Percy Shelley. As a student at
Oxford, Shelley owned electrical apparatus consisting of several Leyden jars. His
intimate Oxford friend Thomas Jefferson Hogg related how Shelley begged him to
work 'the machine' until:
he was filled with the fluid, so that his long, wild locks bristled and
stood on end. Afterwards he charged a powerful battery of several
large jars; labouring with vast energy and discoursing with increasing
vehemence of the marvellous powers of electricity, of thunder and
lightning; describing an electrical kite that he had made at home, and
43 For example, Butler, Vasbinder and Mellor all make the same references in their respective studies.
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projecting another ... enormous one, or ... a combination of kites, that
would draw down from the sky ... the whole ammunition of a mighty
thunderstorm; and this being directed to some point would then
produce the most stupendous results.45
Before Oxford, Percy was tutored in the sciences at Eton by Adam Walker, whose
System of Familiar Philosophy (1799) made the connection between electricity and
life, as illustrated by Galvani. Despite Percy's contact with Lawrence between 1814-
17, it was not clear that Percy was 'weaned' off the teaching of Walker and his
speculation of vital power of electricity by Lawrence's theory of life as emergent
from organization. In fact, the strong evidence proffered by Percy Shelley's
Prometheus Unbound (1819),46 published in the year after Frankenstein, in which the
force of life was repeatedly portrayed as 'electrical', suggested that galvanism and
electricity continued to capture Shelley's imagination. On more than one score,
Lrankenstein was modelled after Percy Shelley, and in the details of his scientific
interests, Lrankenstein almost exactly replicated Percy.47 For instance, Percy's
youthful obsession with the medieval Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus was faithfully
reincarnated in Frankenstein, and with it Mary Shelley introduced the tension that
prevailed through the narrative between the sway of the ancient alchemists on
Frankenstein and his embrace of the new sciences which he imbibed at University of
the Ingolstadt.48 To annex the mighty power from the sky towards the most
stupendous results - in this, Shelley's youthful ambition was translated into
Frankenstein, the Modern Prometheus. The text hinted at the central role of
'electricity' in animating the Monster: 'a spark of being' was infused presumably by
45 Thomas Jefferson Hogg, The Life ofShelley (London, 1858), I: 33.
46 In 1819, Percy Shelley also wrote the poem 'England in 1819' in the aftermath of the 'Peterloo'
massacre; the poem was a parody of the state of government in England in 1819. In politics, Shelley
was a disciple of Godwin's. However, by this stage, Mary Shelley was already disowning the radical
politics she was brought up through the subversive use of the image of 'Monster', which Edmund
Burke had used in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) to characterise the masses in a
revolution. See Anne Mellor's discussion in the chapter on 'Promethean Polities', op. cit., 70-88; and
Lee Sterrenburg, 'Mary Shelley's Monster: Politics and Psyche in Frankenstein', in G. Levine and
.U.C. Kiioepfhnacher (eds.), op. cit., 143-171.
47 Victor was Percy's pseudonym for publishing his childhood poem in 1810. Parallels between
Frankenstein and Percy Shelley: (1) Family — father married a wife young enough to be his daughter;
the oldest son had a favourite sister/cousin named Elizabeth. (2) Education - both were fascinated
with science, especially chemistry and were gifted linguists. See Mellor, op. cit., 72-23; and Peter
Dale Scott, 'Vital Artifice: Mary, Percy and the Psychopolitical Integrity of Frankenstein', in G.
Levine and .U.C. Knoepflmacher (eds.), The Endurance ofFrankenstein (Berkeley, 1974), 172-202.
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'the instruments of life,' and involved the transfer of the spark of being from a living
animal to a dead one as earlier suggested. In place of fire, the 'modern' Prometheus
stole electricity from 'heaven', metaphorically speaking - with the most stupendous
results.
For the debate on the origin of life as imparted by a principle or emergent
from organization, Frankenstein's experiment was a firm model of life as imparted.
Butler's interpretation is that Frankenstein's blundering experiment was one
'working with superseded notions'; it shadows the intellectual position of Abernethy;
and Mary Shelley's 'serio-comic representation' echoed Lawrence's sceptical
commentary on Abernethy's position.49 This interpretation is more one attempted in
hindsight than one that fairly reflected the position of Mary Shelley during the
genesis of Frankenstein. Given that Percy Shelley seemed to hold a comparable
view that the vital force was electrical, and assessing the evidence from the journals,
letters and reading lists of the couple, it was unlikely that Mary Shelley was
consciously offering a critique on the scientific merits of what in hindsight proved to
be 'superseded notions'.50 Frankenstein was first and foremost a reflection of the
sensational contemporary interest in galvanism and its related fascination with
electricity as possibly 'the principle of life'. Abernethy's theory of life was,
incidentally, an attempt to harmonise the intense contemporary (not yet superseded)
speculation involving electricity as the vital principle with the school of vitalism.
The vitalist position was that life could not have resulted from matter, and that life
must be an external principle imparted to matter. Far from being 'superseded',
Abernethy's theory, tangential as it appeared to posterity, resonated within the
popular core of scientific speculation, which continued well into the 1830s. A
prominent example was Andrew Crosse's 'extraordinary experiment', in which the
spontaneous generation of life was linked to electricity was reported by a local
newspaper on the last day of 1836. A sensational debate on the origin of life and
electricity ensued; Crosse was accused of being a Frankenstein, a 'disturber of the
peace of families', and 'a leviler of our holy religion'.51
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England', in David Gooding, Trevor Pinch, Simon Schaffer (eds)., The Uses of Experiment
(Cambridge, 1989), 337-383, 338.
Chapter 7 Frankenstein's Hideous Progeny 227
It would appear that Abernethy's theory and Mary Shelley's inspiration were
both responses to the contemporary speculation on galvanism and electricity as the
possible animating force. But then, with an interesting twist, and probably
unwittingly, Mary Shelley highlighted the illogicality of the vitalist position such as
espoused by Abernethy. The vitalist position originated from the intuitive grasp that
living matter was distinct from non-living. Matter could not animate matter; the
force of animation must therefore be externally imparted to matter to make it alive;
this force of animation must therefore be 'immaterial'; and for the Christian tradition,
this immaterial force had been designated as 'the soul'. In naming the animating
force an 'invisible', 'subtile' fluid, Abemethy was tenuously clutching onto the
immateriality of the vital principle. In portraying Frankenstein as being able to
harness and manipulate this animating force, in the same manner as one could
manipulate matter, Mary Shelley drove home the inconsistency of the vitalist
position - life was externally imparted — but by a material force. The invisible,
subtile fluid was still matter after all.
The third scientific speculation in Frankenstein of direct relevance to this
thesis pertains to the creation of the artificial man, whose origin could be traced to
Descartes' beast-machine. Descartes first hypothesised the beast-machine in
52Treatise of Man around 1632, in which animal life was explained in terms of
mechanical operations. The life exhibited in animals was due to a corporeal force
which Descartes called vim vegetandi et sentiendi. This vegetative and sensitive
force existed in man as well, and was the force that vitalized matter. Corporeal and
mechanical in nature, this vital force was for Descartes, not the soul. In conceiving
the beast-machine, Descartes sought to re-define 'soul' sharply by distinguishing the
soul from the vitalizing principle, which man had in common with brutes. Descartes
designated the 'soul' to mean the incorporeal mind that man alone possessed. For
Descartes, the soul was synonymous with reason. The soul remained incorporeal for
Descartes, and by re-defining the 'soul' to be the mind and not the animating
principle, immateriality applied only to the mind alone.
The concept of the beast-machine was taken to its logical conclusion by
Julien de la Mettrie in L'Homme Machine (1747). In devising the man-machine, La
52 Descartes withheld his Treatise from publication when he heard about Galileo's condemnation by
the Church. Parts of the Treatise were published anonymously in 1637 in Section V of his Discourse
on Method. Descartes died in 1650, and the complete Treatise was published by his executor in 1664.
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Mettrie proceeded to remove the Cartesian soul by maintaining that the full range of
mental phenomena could be accounted for by cerebral irritability. Like his
eighteenth-century contemporaries, La Mettrie considered the phenomena of
irritability as the key to the mystery of life itself, but what he proposed in L 'Homme
Machine was to 'erect the mechanistic theory of mind on this firm biological
foundation'. All mental activities, including reason, could be explained
mechanically. The rational mind, the de facto Cartesian soul, was viewed in
refraction by La Mettrie 'through the primary level of the instincts', 'ce merveilleux
Instinct, dont l'Education fait de l'Esprit'.53 In La Mettrie's conception, man was a
machine like the beast-machine, and there was no place for the soul:
The term 'soul' ... which an enlightened man should employ solely to
refer to those parts of our bodies which do the thinking. Given only a
source of motion, animated bodies will possess all they require in
order to move, feel, think, repent - in brief, in order to behave, alike in
the physical realm and in the moral realm which depends on it ... Let
us then conclude boldly that man is a machine, and that the whole
universe consists only of a single substance [Matter] subjected to
different modifications.54
To La Mettrie, thought was 'so little incompatible with organized matter, that it
[seemed] to be one of its properties on a par with electricity, the faculty of motion,
impenetrability, extension, etc'.55 In the final analysis, the man-machine became
absorbed into the mechanist school as symbolic of the belief that the manifestations
of instinct, sensibility, and even intelligence - typifying human behaviour - could be
explained in terms of organic mechanism.
In Frankenstein, the creation of an artificial man from dead material pushed
the formulation of the man-machine to its extremes, creating the most powerful
symbol of materialism in fictional narrative. In his essay On Life, Percy Shelley
remarks that if we 'reflect upon the manner in which thoughts develop themselves in
[our] minds,' it is 'infinitely improbable that the cause of mind, that is, of existence,
is similar to mind'.56 Shelley probably meant that the cause of mind was life, and the
cause of life was different from the nature of mind. The Monster was not only
animated, and was in full possession of a mind. Read as a contemporary response to
53 La Mettrie, L'Homme Machine, introd. Aram Vartanian (Princeton, 1960), 22.
54 Toulmin and Goodfield, op. cit., 166, quoting La Marriet.
55 La Mettrie, L'Homme Machine ; quoted in Vasbinder, op. cit., note 24 to chapter 4, 90.
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the science of the mind, Frankenstein cast into sharper relief the two questions
concerning the nature of the mind, namely: Is medullary matter capable of sensation
and thought? Does the Monster have a soul, in the sense of an immaterial mind?
The first question concerns the nature of the agent of knowledge - is it the
immaterial mind or the material brain that perceives and thinks? The second
question asks whether the creature, irreducibly material in its genesis, possessed any
element of 'immateriality', of 'spirituality', that transcended the man-machine?
Mary Shelley did not specifically refer to the creation of the Monster's brain,
nor explicitly linked the emergence of consciousness with the presence of a brain.
But assuming that the Monster was a full artificial replica of man and was given a
brain, Frankenstein presumably would have gathered material from the dissecting
room or the slaughter house. Given the gigantic size of the Monster, and if the brain,
like his limbs, was 'in proportion', then it was probably a composite of medullary
matter that constituted his brain, for an average brain would be insufficient to fill the
cranium. It was clear that the Monster did not inherit a personality or any memories
though the composite material forming his brain would have belonged to others.
Furthermore, the story maintained that the brain material thus sourced was sufficient
for a separate consciousness to evolve over time. The process of knowing about the
external world developed in tandem with the Monster's attainment of self-
knowledge, and the self-narrative of the Monster of his growth was itself a powerful
device to re-enact such an attainment. 'If it were possible that a person should give a
faithful history of his being, from the earliest epochs of his recollection, a picture
would be presented such as the world has never contemplated before,' wrote Percy
57
Shelley in 1815. The Monster's self-account of first sense experience reads just
like such an attempt:
A strange multiplicity of sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard,
and smelt, ... and it was ... a long time before I learned to distinguish
between the operations of my various senses. By degrees, ... a
stronger light pressed upon my nerves, ... I was obliged to shut my
eyes. Darkness then came over me, and trouble me; but ... by
opening my eyes, ... the light poured in upon me again. ... I felt cold
also, and half-frightened as it were instinctively, ... I knew, and could
distinguish, nothing; but, feeling pain invade me on all sides, I sat
down and wept.58
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That the creature's sense experiences were the foundation for the emergence of
consciousness was unambiguous. In this respect, Mary might have been influenced
by Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), which Mary read in
1816. Lockean epistemology asserted that all our ideas were derived from
experience of the external world through the senses and reflection. In other words,
ideas were not innate. Locke also postulated that if God so wished, he could endow
certain systems of created senseless matter with thought, reason and volition, as well
as sense and spontaneous motion. Locke's famous postulation of the 'thinking
matter' was 'realised' by Frankenstein's experiment; and in making the composite
matter of the Monster's brain capable of sensation and thought, Frankenstein was no
less than 'playing' God.
In another respect, Mary's conception of the Monster's 'mind' could be a
reflection of the contemporary interest in the nature of the mind. Perhaps partly
influenced by the consultations with Lawrence and the notion that 'medullary matter
is capable of sensation and thought,' Percy Shelley wrote Speculations on
Metaphysics in 1815.59 'We can think of nothing which we have not perceived'.60 In
his tract The Necessity ofAtheism (1811), Percy Shelley asserted that 'the senses are
the sources of all knowledge to the mind'. This was one of the premises upon which
Percy Shelley concluded that 'every reflecting mind must allow that there is no proof
of the existence of a Deity'. Since an immaterial Deity could not be known by the
senses, there could be no basis for a belief in God: 'the mind cannot believe the
existence of a God'. 61 In Shelley, his epistemology and his atheism were conjoined.
Inferring from his epistemology, the mind came into existence by virtue of knowing
about the material world. Along with La Mettrie, Shelley would probably maintain
that there was no place for the immaterial soul.
The process of the Monster's acquisition of knowledge seemed to conform to
Shelley's epistemology, and the account of the Monster's sense of evolving identity
59 Vasbinder notes the influence on the genesis of Frankenstein by David Hartley's Observations on
Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, which Percy Shelley bought in 1812. Hartley was
an empirical materialist who considered that ideas were the result of sensations alone. Vasbinder, op.
cit., 39-42.
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rendered in fictional narrative what Percy wrote in philosophical speculation: 'We
are,' asserted Shelley, 'intuitively conscious of our own existence, and of that
connexion in the train of our successive ideas, which we term our identity'.62 The
process of knowing and of forming the mind in the Monster's case would suggest
that some of Percy's views were absorbed in the genesis of Frankenstein. In creating
a man-machine, Mary Shelley has woven a story in which medullary matter was
made capable of sensation and thought. However, in the last analysis, Mary
subverted the utter materialism of the man-machine conception by allowing
Frankenstein's hideous progeny a 'soul'— a spiritual aspect of the creature's
personhood that utterly refuted mechanical explanations. Despite all his fiendish
acts, the Monster had first sought 'the love of virtue, the feelings of happiness and
affection', he was 'nourished with high thoughts of honour and devotion;' and his
'thoughts were once filled with sublime and transcendent visions of the beauty and
the majesty of goodness'. Had the Monster been a mere man-machine, he might
have been more 'controllable'. But Mary intended the Monster to have reason,
emotions and volition which interplayed to guide his action. Pleading with
Frankenstein to make him a companion, the Monster asserted: 'I was benevolent; my
soul glowed with love and humanity;' that his vices were 'the children of a forced
solitude'.64 The creature that was given a being by scientific materialism had needs
and yearning that could not be satisfied materially.
But perhaps, the most subversive ploy against scientific materialism in
Frankenstein was the subtle shift in Victor's attitude towards the dead. In pursuing
his project to create a Monster, Victor remarked that 'the churchyard was to [him]
merely the receptacle of bodies deprived of life, which from being the seat of beauty
and strength, had become food for the worm'. This attitude, as befitting a scientist in
Victor's estimation, was the result of his education, in which he proudly proclaimed
that his 'father had taken the greatest precautions that [his] mind should be impressed
with no supernatural horrors'.65 It was a stark contrast when Victor entered the
cemetery to mourn the dead of his family, he observed that 'the spirits of the
departed seemed to flit around, and to cast a shadow, which was felt but seen not,
62 Ibid., 472.
63 Frankenstein, 189.
64 Ibid., 78, 121.
65 Ibid., 33-4.
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around the head of the mourner'.66 Not only did he feel the presence of the spirits in
the graveyard, but that he actually knelt and invoked them to aid him in his pursuit of
vengeance:
I call on you, spirits of the dead; and on you, wandering ministers of
vengeance, to aid and conduct me in my work.67
The cemetery scene marked a turning point in the story, in which Frankenstein,
hitherto the 'passive' victim being stalked by the Monster, reversed the roles and
became the pursuer. During his pursuit, Frankenstein attributed provisions laid down
for him on the way, probably by the Monster he was chasing, as 'set there by the
spirits that I had invoked to aid me'. When 'parched by thirst', Frankenstein
accounted for the rain drops from a slight cloud in an otherwise clear sky that so
often revived him as the aid of the spirits. Was Mary hinting that the die-hard
materialist scientist had made a sea change in his attitude towards the spiritual? One
can argue that such change in perception was not a self-conscious intellectual shift in
Victor, but more the result of the vivid imagination of a desperate and bereft being
on the verge of a breakdown. If Mary questioned the total negation of the 'soul' and
the spiritual aspect of life, she questioned it not by eloquent postulations, but by
subversion. By turning Victor's scientific materialism on its head, Mary Shelley cast
doubt on the scientific materialism that Victor embraced, and on the notion that man
was ultimately a mere machine. In the final analysis, Frankenstein defied the utter
materialism which the creation of the artificial man symbolised, and the Monster's
farewell epitomised such defiance:
But soon ... I shall die, ... I shall ascend my funeral pile triumphantly,
... My spirit will sleep in peace; or if it thinks, it will not surely think
thus. Farewell.68
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III
The Scots Magazine warned its readers of Frankenstein that 'some of our highest and
most reverential feelings receive a shock from the conception on which it turns'.69
The Quarterly Review observed: 'It inculcates no lesson of conduct, manners, or
morality; ...it fatigues the feelings without interesting the understanding'. Amidst its
mauling criticism the Quarterly reviewer added equivocally, that 'in language highly
terrific,' there was 'something tremendous in the unmeaning hollowness of its sound,
and the vague obscurity of its images'.70 Both contemporary reviews seemed to
make reference to the moral vision of Frankenstein. While they could not specify
what parts of our highest feelings, or what 'this something tremendous' was, they
foreshadowed the mythical stature that Frankenstein would attain. The nameless
Monster created by Victor Frankenstein has in time, quite appropriately, usurped the
name of its creator in folk memory. This duality between the Monster and its
creator, central to the story, also immeasurably heightens the mythical stature of
Frankenstein. This mythical quality, in turn, was inextricably linked with the moral
vision embodied in the sub-title - The Modern Prometheus. Clearly intended as an
epithet, the sub-title holds the key to the most important quality of Frankenstein. In
what sense was Frankenstein a 'Prometheus', and in what sense was he 'modern'?
And what was the moral vision being conveyed by 'the vague obscurity of its
images' in the Modern Prometheusl
The myth of Prometheus had two ancient strands. The Greek Prometheus
pyrphoros defied Zeus by stealing fire from the sun to succour mankind, and was
chained to the Caucasus with vultures feeding on his vitals as punishment. In the
Roman version, Prometheus was the plasticator, who recreated mankind to animate a
figure of clay. Around the third century A.D., the two versions became fused to
create the Prometheus who stole the fire of life to animate his man of clay. As M. K.
Joseph points out, this fused version 'gave a radically new significance to the myth,
which lent itself easily to Neoplatonic interpretation with Prometheus as the
demiurge or deputy creator, but which could also be easily allegorized by Christians
... as a representation of the creative power of God.71 This fused version was
69 The Scots Magazine & Edinburgh Literary Miscellany, 81(1818):249-253, 253.
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portrayed in Ovid's Metamorphoses, which Mary Shelley read in 1815:72
Whether with particles of Heav'nly fire
The God of Nature did his Soul inspire,
Or Earth, but new divided from the Skie,
And, pliant, still, retain'd the Aethereal Energy;
Which Wise Prometheus temper'd into paste,
And mix't with living Streams, the Godlike Image caste ...
From such rude Principles our Form began;
And Earth was Metamophos'd into Man. (1:101-6, 111-12)73
Coincidentally, while Mary Shelley was engaged in writing Frankenstein,
another literary 'contest' involving the deployment of the Prometheus myth seemed
to be running in parallel for the Diadoti party. Bryon's 'Prometheus', which Mary
Shelley copied out and carried to Byron's publisher on her return to England in
August 1816, was a poem celebrating 'the unyielding will, noble suffering and
concern for mankind' of Prometheus in his act of defiance.74 Byron's 'Prometheus'
developed into an epic poem Manfred, which Mary read soon after its publication in
June 1817. In Manfred, Byron focussed on the Faustian thirst for knowledge which
led Manfred to steal the secrets of nature. In 1816, after re-reading Aeshcylus' play
Prometheus Bound, Percy Shelley decided to compose a rebuttal, and began
Prometheus Unbound in September 1818. In his preface, Percy explained that
Aeshcylus 'supposed the reconciliation of Jupiter with [Prometheus] as the price of
the disclosure of the danger threatened to his empire by the consummation of his
marriage with Thetis', the daughter of Jupiter. Percy was 'averse from a catastrophe
so feeble as that of reconciling the Champion with the Oppressor of mankind'. In
Prometheus Unbound, Percy sought to personify Prometheus as 'the type of the
highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature, impelled by the purest and truest
motives to the best and noblest ends'.75 These Promethean qualities were indeed
what Shelley and Byron thought they possessed as poets. Other Romantic poets like
William Blake, in Visions of the Daughters ofAlbion, Coleridge in Ancient Mariner,
and Goethe in his verse drama Prometheus, had all deployed the Prometheus myth to
72 Frederick Jones (ed.), Mary Shelley's Journal, (Norman, 1944), entries for April 8 to May 11 of
1815,43-6.
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their own ends. In common to the first generation of the Romantic poets was this
Promethean desire to transcend human boundaries, 'to elevate human beings into
living gods'. The poetic imagination was their means of such elevation. Percy
Shelley asserted that 'a poet participates in the eternal, the infinite, and the one'.76
In similar terms, Coleridge designated the primary imagination 'an echo of the
Infinite I am;' and Wordsworth argued that 'the higher minds' of the poets were
'truly from the Deity'.77 To the Romantic poets, the Promethean qualities of 'the
highest perfection of moral and intellectual nature' were embodied in their poetic
imagination. Furthermore, they focussed on the defiance of Prometheus as impelled
by the 'purest and truest motives to the best and noblest ends'. For instance,
Goethe's Prometheus was a 'self-portrait of the artist', who 'liberated himself from
70
serving dull, idle gods,' and rejoiced instead in his own creative powers.
Mary Shelley combined the Promethean theme and the ghost story into
Frankenstein. Though the publication of Frankenstein predated the composition of
Prometheus Unbound, the melodrama of Frankenstein was a parody of the
Promethean qualities that Percy Shelley, along with other Romantic poets, extolled.
Mimicking the acts of Prometheus, Frankenstein 'tortured the living animal to
animate the lifeless clay'; and with 'the instruments of life', Frankenstein infused 'a
spark of being into the lifeless thing'. In prosaic terms, Frankenstein was 'modern'
because in place of fire, he stole the divine spark of life, suggested to be electrical in
nature. In two significant respects, Mary Shelley departed from her contemporaries
in her deployment of the Prometheus myth. First, she cast Frankenstein as the
'scientist' who animated lifeless clay, not the 'artistic poet' who fashioned the world
with his imagination. Secondly, she portrayed Frankenstein as 'usurper', not the
defiant hero who suffered for mankind.
In one sense, the Romantic poet deified his imagination by deifying Nature.
This desire to transcend the normal bounds of human endeavours was a quality that
Mary Shelley highlighted. In the words of Waldman, Victor's professor, the prowess
of the modern masters of the science was described as:
They penetrate into the recesses of nature, and shew how she works in
her hiding places. They ascend into heavens; they have discovered
how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe. The
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have acquired new and almost unlimited powers; they can command
the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake [gunpowder], and even
mock the invisible world with its own shadows [magic lantern].79
In his pursuit, the scientist transcended himself, and became elevated to a kind of
living god: he ascended into the heavens, acquired new and almost unlimited powers.
While the poet fashioned Nature with his imagination, the scientist 'penetrate[d] into
the recesses of nature'. Lawrence had made similar pronouncements, in respect of
life and matter: 'to observe living bodies in the moment of their formation ... when
matter may be supposed to receive the stamp of life ... Hitherto, however, we have
not been able to catch nature in the fact'.80 In pursuing Nature to her hiding places,
the scientist was heeding the calling from Francis Bacon, who announced, 'I am
come in very truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your
o i
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service and make her your slave'. Frankenstein's experiment in which creation of
a human was made to supplant procreation was symbolic of the very ultimate
subjugation of a female Nature 'by an aggressive, virile male scientist'.82 Nature, far
from being deified, was hounded down like a prey by Frankenstein:
One secret which I alone possessed was the hope to which I had
dedicated myself; ... with unrelaxed and breathless eagerness, I
pursued nature to her hiding places.
This subjugation, to Mary Shelley, came with its sting. Adroitly, she wove into the
narrative that in the process of enslaving nature, Frankenstein became enslaved; in
possessing the power of animation, Frankenstein became a 'possessed' being.
Once the secret of animation was possessed, Frankenstein could have
stopped; there need not be an experiment to animate a human frame. Indeed he
'hesitated a long time concerning the manner in which [he] should employ' the
astonishing power of bestowing animation he possessed. However, as he confessed,
'a resistless, and almost frantic impulse, urged me forward; I seemed to have lost all
soul or sensation, but for this one pursuit'. As his labours progressed, showing 'how
well he had succeeded', Frankenstein bemoaned that he 'appeared rather like one
doomed by slavery to toil in the mines, or any other unwholesome trade, than an
artist occupied by his favourite employment'. The tension within Frankenstein was
79 Frankenstein, 31. See Vasbinder, op. cit., 67-73 for a fuller exposition of the scientific discoveries
alluded to.
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palpably heightened in a self-narrative where the normative 'I' predominated with in
a self-account,83 and yet at the same time, this T could not have been more driven.
The scientist who appeared to be 'in control' had actually lost control to an impulse:
... I could not tear my thoughts from my employment, loathsome in
itself, but which had taken an irresistible hold of my imagination. I
wished, as it were, to procrastinate [all that related to] my feelings of
affection until the great object, [which swallowed up every habit of
my nature], should be completed. 4
Before the changes indicated by the brackets in the above quotation were introduced
by Percy Shelley, Mary's manuscript had read: 'to procrastinate my feelings of
oc
affection, until the great object of my affections were completed'. The irony would
have been intensified without Percy's changes, for within the same breath, Victor
described his employment as 'loathsome', and referred to the humanoid as 'the great
object of my affections'. Instead of directing his feelings of affection towards real
people, Victor was channelling all his 'affections' to an object, which he then utterly
rejected at the very moment of its coming to life. Obsessed with the experiment of
animation, Frankenstein abandoned human society; oppressed by the consequences
of his successful experiment, Frankenstein continued to shirk human interaction.
Mary Shelley clearly felt strongly that affections acted as a bulwark against excesses,
and interjected at possibly the only point in the narrative where the authorial voice
was explicit:
If the study to which you apply yourself has a tendency to weaken
your affection, and to destroy your taste for those simple pleasures in
which no alloy can possibly mix, then the study is certainly unlawful,
... not befitting the human mind.86
While the Monster would have sacrificed everything to be accepted by
society, he was ostracised. In contrast, the success of his experiment had brought on
dire consequences that caused Victor to shirk society at every possible juncture.
Frankenstein's compulsion for solitude mirrored and mocked at the same time, the
'Spirit of Solitude', in Percy's poem Alastor, composed in 1815. In the preface,
Percy alluded to 'the Poet's self-centred seclusion was avenged by the furies of an
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nonetheless, portrayed as the result of the failings in the sympathy of other human
beings, denoted by Percy as 'selfish, blind, and torpid, ... those unforeseeing
multitudes'. Mary described Alastor as 'the outpouring of [Shelley's] own
00
emotion', and Alastor, a youth 'of uncorrupted feelings and adventurous genius,'
who drank 'deep of the fountains of knowledge, and [was] still insatiate'89 was a self-
portrait of Shelley and an apt description for young Frankenstein. Alastor's quest led
him to haunt the graveyard, a habit Frankenstein shared, where he beseeched the
'Mother of this unfathomable world', to yield up:
... thy deep mysteries. I have made my bed
In charnels and on coffins, where black death
Keeps record of the trophies won from thee,
Hoping to still these obstinate questionings
Of thee and thine, by forcing some lone ghost
Thy messenger, to render up the tale
Of what we are. In lone and silent hours.90
The solitary quest of Alastor amongst the gravestones for the mysteries of Nature in
edifying language found its parody in Frankenstein's equally solitary, but unmistakably
profane and sordid, endeavour:
Who shall conceive the horrors of my secret toil, as I dabbled among
the unhallowed damps of the grave, ... I collected bones from charnel
houses; and disturbed, with profane fingers, the tremendous secrets of
the human frame.91
Like Alastor, Frankenstein had pursued 'Mother of this unfathomable world' to yield
up her mysteries by haunting the graves. He was 'forced to spend days and nights in
vaults and charnel houses;' he 'beheld the corruption of death succeed to the
blooming cheek of life'; and 'how the worm inherited the wonders of the eye and
brain'.92 Frankenstein himself admitted that his 'human nature turn[ed] with loathing
from [his] occupation'. His project, unhallowed and clandestine, involving stealth
and theft, was a direct parody of Alastor's quest; and in that parody, the Promethean
myth that the Romantic poets tried to appropriate for elevating man to god, met its
immediate antithesis in the Promethean scientist personified by Frankenstein.
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In deploying the Promethean myth to characterise a scientist, Mary Shelley
highlighted the fine line between passion and obsession, and the moral issues raised
when the ends became the justification for the means. For instance, while Abemethy
was strongly against vivisection,93 others would have no qualms in using animals to
advance physiological research. The fictional Frankenstein, for example, 'tortured
the living animal to animate the lifeless clay'. Not only were animal bodies at stake,
but the unhallowed occupation of Frankenstein in graveyards and charnel houses
reflected the contemporary situation for scientific research into the human body. The
underworld of criminal activities involving body snatching, grave robbery, and even
murders, were the main source for furnishing the anatomists and physiologists in
Britain with cadavers for their research.94 In Britain, for more than a hundred years
until the passing of Anatomy Act in 1832, the procurement of cadavers was a
clandestine activity. George Walker's Vagabond pictured a young and idealistic
Frederick Fenton, the disciple to a radical anatomist, who experimented on the dead
to prove the non-existence of the soul. Fenton assisted the anatomist by digging up
cadavers, and his ghoulish task paralleled Frankenstein's:
My practice of plundering the church-yards at the most solemn hours,
under danger of detection, and what was words, under the fear of
infection from diseases nearly advanced to putrescence before the
interment; to break open a coffin, and carry in my arms a naked body,
whose scent was sufficient to ferment a plague, was an undertaking
that required all the resolution of philosophy, and fitted me for the
event of any revolution and combustion of nature.95
Walker's description emphasised the will involved in Frankenstein's kind of
clandestine activities, and in a footnote, Walker commented on the state of affairs
regarding body trafficking:
It is a known fact, that every part of the human body has a regular
price. No person can deny the necessity of dissections, but as at
present conducted, they are a disgrace and an outrage on society; —
nor are the jests and levity of some of the young surgeons becoming,
93 It would be interesting to explore whether Abernethy's religious sentiments biased him towards a
theory of life as imposed, which in turn, predisposed him against vivisection.
94 See Owen Dudley-Edwards, Burke and Hare (Edinburgh, 1993).
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over the body of an human being.96
In this respect, the 'greatness' of John Hunter, the father of English physiology, was
in proportion to his adroit and callous ingenuity in procuring specimens. The Scots
Magazine remarked on the eight-foot giant Frankenstein pieced together was 'as
97
gainly (sarcastic for ungainly) in appearance at least as O'Brien'. The eight-foot
Irish giant Patrick Cotter O'Brien was indeed a prized trophy in Hunter's collections.
As O'Brien drank his way to death, Hunter the physician offered no assistance to
arrest his demise. Instead, Hunter the scientist employed a body snatcher to stalk
O'Brien, and bribed other snatchers with £500, to secure the body against other
competitors, probably the largest sum ever paid for a single cadaver. The night-
watch eventually secured Hunter's prize, which he escorted to his laboratory. Before
morning dawned, Hunter had cut up the giant's body into manageable segments to
boil the flesh away. The hasty process turned the bones of the giant brown, but in all
other respects, they formed 'a splendid skeleton'.98 Behind the splendid skeleton
was a callous passion that threatened to make the end justify all means. In casting
Frankenstein as a modern Prometheus, Mary Shelley was not only offering a critique
of the Poet eulogised in Alastor, but of the passion that guided (or goaded) scientists
like Hunter to pursue their goals.
In casting ancient Prometheus as a modem scientist, Mary Shelley played on
the potential of the scientist to be the 'champion of mankind'. In the first instance,
Frankenstein's goal appeared to be guided by lofty motives.
Life and death appeared to me ideal bounds, which I should first break
through ... A new species would bless me as its creator and source;
many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. No
father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should
deserve theirs. ... I thought, that if I could bestow animation upon
lifeless matter, I might in process of time ... renew life where death
had apparently devoted the body to corruption.99
Instead of philanthropy, it was self-glorification and aggrandisement that motivated
Frankenstein. He was gripped by the prospect of being the first to break through the
bounds of life and death. In other words, the 'ideal bounds' that had bounded all
human beings would be unlocked by him. In so doing, Frankenstein metaphorically
96 Walker, op. cit., 1:82.
97 The Scots Magazine, op. cit., 250.
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speaking, became more than just man, he became a 'creator', a god. Frankenstein's
hideous progeny referred not only to the ghastly appearance of his creation, but the
nature of the act of his creation as ungodly. The Monster was left to discover from
Frankenstein's laboratory papers, the disgusting circumstances under which he was
produced, and 'the minutest description of [the Monster's] odious and loathsome
person' was rendered in language which painted Victor's own horrors.100 Yet
inexorably, Frankenstein carried his experiment to its bitter end, and his crime was
summed up in the reproach of the Monster: 'How dare you sport thus with life?'101
Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned from me
in disgust? God in pity made man beautiful and alluring, after his
own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, ... Satan had his
1 m
companions, ... but I am solitary and detested.
Victor's creation story mirrored, on one level, the biblical creation of man - the
parallels between God creating Adam who turned against him and the force of evil
unleashed in this act of disobedience. It was not the science that had failed in
Victor's case. On the contrary, the experiment was so successful that a 'being' was
created dispensing with the initial physical dependence. But in failing to give the
Monster a sense of belonging in a web of human relationships, Victor had failed
abysmally to take moral responsibility for his creation. On another level,
Frankenstein explored the theme of 'disobedience' of Adam against his Creator.
Adam ate the apple from the tree of knowledge against the injunction of his Father.
A similar act of disobedience was re-enacted by the two scientists in the novel:
young Victor imbibed the 'science' of the medieval alchemist Agrippa against the
warning of his father; and against his father's injunction not to set sail, Walton
aspired to be an Arctic explorer.
In Adam's case, his disobedience was also his transgression. Mary Shelley
clearly saw that there were likewise certain boundaries that man transgressed at his
own perils: 'how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge ... [for him] who
aspires to become greater than his nature will allow'.103 The fatal flaw in
Frankenstein's tragic-heroism lay in this transgression of limits, in his vain hope for
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'From my infancy I was imbued with high hopes and a lofty ambition,' confessed the
dying Frankenstein to Robert Walton, but 'like the archangel who inspired to
omnipotence, I am chained in an eternal hell'.104 The theme of transgression was so
central to Frankenstein that Mary reinforced it with Walton's ambition to be the first
to reach the Arctic. Like a quasi-Promethean scientist, Walton was motivated by the
desire to 'accomplish some great purpose'; he confessed that he 'preferred glory to
every enticement that wealth placed'.105 When immured in ice, the turning-point in
Walton's expedition took place when the crew voted to abandon the voyage for home
if they ever escaped. The dying Frankenstein who had been rescued by Walton's
crew bounding for the North Pole, flared up with all his residual strength and
lectured the crew on the meaning of glory:
Did you not call this a glorious expedition? ... because it was full of
dangers and terror; ... because danger and death surrounded, and these
dangers you were to brave and overcome. For this was it a glorious,
for this was it an honourable undertaking. You were hereafter to be
hailed as the benefactors of your species; your name adored, as
belonging to brave men who encountered death for honour and the
benefit of mankind. ... Do not return to your families with the stigma
of disgrace ... Return as heroes who have fought and conquered.10
Walton would 'rather die, than return shamefully, — [his] purpose unfulfilled'.
Lacking the tragic-heroic stature of Frankenstein, Walton directed his expedition
homewards, with his ambition dashed. Frankenstein's speech, however, suggested
that he had not relented from his Promethean ambition as a scientist, even though he
was dying from it. In the final analysis, Victor's final words to Walton might serve
to be Mary's:
Farewell, Walton! Seek happiness in tranquillity, and avoid ambition,
even if it be only the apparent innocent one of distinguishing yourself
in science and discoveries.107
The crimes of the Monster were borne out of the misery of being ostracised,
of being brought into a world void of the web of human relations vital for his
integration into society. Victor's transgression, in contrast, was borne out of self-
imposed isolation - intellectual and emotional. Mary Shelley seemed to consider
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was making a profound assessment of the danger inherent in the wish of the
scientific community to be left on its own to carry out its enquiries, unperturbed by
public debates. In that respect, 'Frankenstein, the usurper' was a powerful reworking
of the Promethean myth for the necessity of the kind of public discussions that
eventually resulted in the complete withdrawal of Lawrence's published works, even
though she might not necessarily endorse the withdrawal itself. Rennell's Remarks,
'intrusive' as Richard Carlile or Lawrence might think, had its place in society
essentially because we do not live in isolation, the insulation of the scientists'
endeavours totally immune from the knowledge and critique of the non-scientific
world could be costly in terms of the consequences they wield. The moral message
of Frankenstein was not along the line of the religious pamphleteers or their leader,
Rennell, who concerned themselves that materialism would lead to atheism; but its
moral vision embodied elements deeply rooted in biblical parallels, and the tenacity
of such moral vision is testified by the iconic significance 'Frankenstein' has
attained.108
108 See Jon Turney, Frankenstein's Footsteps - Science, Genetics and Popular Culture (New Haven,
1998) for an exposition of the continuing significance of Frankenstein.
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Conclusion
What is the cause of life? that is, how was it produced, or what agencies
distinct from life have acted or act upon life? All recorded generations of
mankind have weariedly busied themselves in inventing answers to this
question; and the result has been, — Religion. Yet, that the basis of all things
cannot be, as the popular philosophy alleges, mind [God's mind], is
sufficiently evident. Mind, as far as we have any experience of its
properties, ... cannot create, it can only perceive.... If any one desires to
know how unsatisfactorily the popular philosophy employs itself upon this
great question, they need only impartially reflect upon the manner in which
thoughts develop themselves in their minds. It is infinitely improbable that
the cause ofmind, that is, of existence, is similar to mind.
Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1815.1
I
Reflecting on what he called the cause of life in 1815, Shelley provided us with a
good starting point for the conclusion of this thesis. He pointed out that in 'popular
philosophy,' God's mind was alleged to be the basis of all things. Here, Shelley's
use of the term 'mind' reflected contemporary usage, in that the mind represented the
immaterial or spiritual, and God, as the supreme spiritual being was seen as pure
mind. By insisting that the mind could not create, but could only perceive what was
already external to it, Shelley's intent was to deny God. If God is mind, Shelley
argues, He cannot create but only perceive what is already external to Him. When
Shelley argues that, 'it is infinitely improbable that the cause of mind, that is, of
existence, is similar to mind', he means to say that if God is mind, then God could
not be the first cause but must Himself be the result of a cause, and that cause cannot
be anything like another mind, but must be a different kind of entity, one which is,
unlike minds, capable of acts of creation. Shelley also pointed out that the effort in
search of an answer to this question by all recorded generations had all resulted in
Religion. By Religion with a capital 'R', Shelley probably meant to imply that
religion is merely the man-made result of mankind's muddled thinking (about the
nature of minds, immaterial beings, and God). Similarly, this thesis has argued that
in the three episodes examined, where the cause of life and the nature of the mind
1
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were debated, it was Religion - as a man-made institution for the support of a civil,
and moral, society - which was the ultimate concern, not the nature of God and his
Providence.
Writing in 1815, the popular philosophy that Shelley referred to encompassed
a belief system wherein the doctrine of an immaterial soul was upheld as the basis for
an existence in the future state. All hopes of immortality therefore were anchored on
some form of immaterial agency that would survive the physical death of the
material body. The importance of the future state for this life lay primarily in
supporting a religious basis of morality that prescribed a post-mortem system of
reward or retribution. In this popular philosophy, the philosophical concern for an
immaterial soul was driven by the concern for immortality, and the concern for
immortality was driven by the politico-religious concern for a basis for a morality,
seen entirely in terms of social and civic responsibility in order to maintain the status
quo.
In the Lawrence controversy, the debate between Lawrence and Abernethy
appeared to be one on the substance of two opposing theories of life— one material,
the other immaterial. The express materialism of Lawrence's theory of life being
'caused' by the material organization of bodily matter seemed to be directly opposed
to Abernethy's interpretation of Hunter's theory of life based on a superadded vital
principle transcendent to the bodily matter. On closer examination, however, it was
found that there was an element of vitalism in Lawrence's materialism, and there was
an element of materialism in Abernethy's vitalism. The Lawrence-Abernethy debate
transpired to be concerned less with the substance of the two theories of life than on
the importance of supporting a theory of life that could be made to serve the
traditional alliance between religion and morality. Hunter's theory, by explicitly
admitting the need for a superadded principle external to bodily matter, could easily
be made to look compatible with orthodox religious teachings. Moreover, by
advocating a theory that could be made to reinforce a religious basis of morality,
Abernethy directly conferred moral respectability on the whole profession that he
represented. It is important to note, also, that Lawrence himself came to recognise
the importance of the moral responsibility of the science writer, and genuinely seems
to have repented of the unguarded comments in his original lectures.
In examining the religious opposition met by Lawrence in promoting a theory
of life based on organization, it appeared in the first instance that in promoting a
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materialistic theory of life, Lawrence was undermining the doctrine of an immaterial
soul. By undermining the immateriality of the soul, it was feared that the concept of
God as a spirit, an immaterial being, would also be undermined. In a nutshell, it was
as if Lawrence's scientific materialism was condemned because it was feared that it
would promote atheism by disproving the existence of God as a spiritual being. But,
given the closeness of the scientific views of Abernethy and Lawrence, it seems clear
that the concern towards materialism as an agency for atheism, in its final analysis,
was driven by the concern that the religious basis of morality would be eroded. If
Scientific materialism called into question the existence of an immaterial soul, and an
after-life, then there would be nothing to enforce a code of morality in this life built
upon a system of justice in that after life. The poor were exhorted to be content
because their virtues would be rewarded in the next life. Post-mortem retribution
was used as a deterrent to immorality in this life. The concern that 'Materialism and
Atheism go hand in hand' was not so much the concern for the doctrine of the soul
per se, but a concern for the politico-religious basis of morality that the immaterial
soul was supposed to underpin. The major concern, therefore, was not with
Lawrence's scientific materialism (not so far removed, after all, from Abernethy's
views), but with the public way in which he presented it.
Similarly, in the controversy concerning the nature of the mind surrounding
the science of phrenology, it was found that the opposition against phrenology was
raised not so much against the scientific materialism in a science that considered the
mind as reducible to the brain, but the moral implications of such a reduction. If all
mental phenomena were merely the physical expression of a material organ called
the brain, then the philosophical foundation for the existence of free will was
removed. The chief anti-phrenologist Sir William Hamilton, in his efforts to
disprove the claims of phrenology on experimental grounds, was motivated by the
concern that the science of phrenology was inimical to the foundation of morality by
its implied materialistic determinism. In defending the Scottish common-sense
philosophy against phrenology, Hamilton was defending a philosophical system
which upheld the conception of a mind undetermined by any absolute necessity of
nature. To the common-sense philosophers, the mind had the power over the
determination of its own will. For Hamilton, the philosophical foundation of free
will was paramount for morality, because the notion of culpability absolutely
depended on the possibility of freedom of action. In denouncing phrenology, it was
not primarily the scientific materialism in the science that was the issue, but what he
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saw as the moral implications of such materialism. As a science that promoted the
necessity of nature, phrenology was considered antithetical to any arguments for the
existence of free will. Without the possibility of free will, there would be no basis
for morality, and that was ultimately why Hamilton needed to disprove phrenology.
The force of determination by nature inherent in the science of phrenology
that Hamilton so vehemently decried as morally pernicious was turned into a force
for morality by George Combe. The Constitution ofMan was effectively a treatise
that instituted a new code of morality based on God-given natural laws which Combe
derived from the phrenological doctrines. Causes and effects in human action were
portrayed as pre-ordained by God in his governance of the moral universe, in the
same manner as the physical laws instituted by Him to govern the physical universe.
The law of nature was characterised to be inevitable and inflexible, but in this system
of determination by nature, Combe found the certitude for a basis for morality which
was, to him, superior to any codes of morality derived by human efforts, which was
considered inferior by being arbitrary. In Combe, his science and his religion
became one system, in which a more materialistic conception of the mind was
employed as the vehicle for a new code of morality. In denouncing doctrinal
Christianity, Combe also denounced in full the reliance of the doctrines of the soul
and of the future state for the enforcement of morals. In preaching this new code of
morality based on the determination by nature, Combe undermined the basis of
revealed religion. However, his concern for morality, and his insistence that this was
linked to conformity to God's natural laws, shows that he did not intend to
undermine the social authority of established religion.
In Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, the ambition of a scientist, intent to trespass
the boundaries of knowledge, is portrayed as the tragic flaw of the 'hero' in the
novel. It points to the morals of the Modem Prometheus as a usurper, and of Mary
Shelley's view that there exist boundaries of knowledge that we trespass at our own
peril. The Monster was the progeny of the extreme scientific materialism personified
by Frankenstein, but the Monster asserted his spirituality as a person against the odds
of the circumstances leading to his creation. In portraying the Monster as more
human, and more moral, than his human creator, Mary Shelley was affirming the
spirituality of the Monster as a person against the creation of him as a mere object.
The power of Mary Shelley's moral vision lies in its inescapable warning that an
absolute denial of the spiritual aspects of life is inimical to our humanity. Without
being explicitly religious, Frankenstein encapsulates a new kind of secular humanist
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spirituality that denies outright materialism.
In summary, this thesis argues that the interface between religion and
biology, concerning the nature of the living body and the mind, despite initial
appearances, cannot be simply analysed in terms of atheists versus believers, with
both sides holding stereotypical views. If Lawrence showed some atheistic
tendencies, he appeared to withdraw in the end to a more conservative socio¬
political, and religious, position. Combe's unorthodoxy cannot be denied, but he was
a long way from being an outright atheist. He professed himself to be the spokesman
of a new kind of natural religion, and his profession seems to have been sincerely
held. Mary Shelley, an atheist by her upbringing, had a view of natural morality
inherent in humankind so highly developed that it was no less than a spiritual view of
what it is to be human. It seems that, in spite of the convictions of orthodox
contemporaries, materialism and atheism did not necessarily go hand in hand.
Given the orthodox association of materialism and atheism, however, and the
difficulty of discussing these things directly, we have seen that morality, the
pragmatic manifestation of the chain made up of materiality, immortality and
morality, was always to the fore in these case studies. The three episodes studied
illustrate a spectrum of attitudes towards scientific materialism, and it is found that
ultimately, it was the necessity for a secure basis for morality that shaped the
responses. In the case of Rennell and Abernethy, they were defending a religious
basis of morality anchored in the Christian doctrine of a soul 'superadded' to the
body. As a dissenter, Lawrence's basis of morality was probably similar to
Priestley's, which allowed a more materialistic conception of man to be compatible
with religion, and therefore with a moral view of human existence. For William
Hamilton, he was defending the philosophical basis of free will as the sine qua non
for any morality. In rejecting what he termed 'doctrinal Christianity', Combe found
an alternative basis for morality in the concept of natural law, while Mary Shelley
asserted the spirituality in our humanity as the basis for a humanist morality. These
contemporaneous attitudes illustrate the spectrum of responses towards materialism
and morality at the turn of the nineteenth century in Britain, and over time, it is the
secular humanist morality encapsulated by Mary Shelley's moral vision that would
gain increasing numbers of followers.
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II
As specific episodes in the interface of science and religion, what has this study
contributed to our understanding of the history of science and religion as a whole? In
assessing the significance of this period in this respect, the thesis will conclude by
attempting to answer three major questions. First, how had this period, which looked
back to the heydays of the mechanical philosophy with its inherent duality of matter
and mind, been a period of transition in scientific attitude? Secondly, in what ways
did the issues raised by the study of life and the mind anticipate the Darwinian
controversy for religion, in both its ultimate concern and in its conduct in interacting
with science? And lastly, what were the social and cultural changes brought about
by this period of relationship between science and religion?
The supposed scientific materialism of Lawrence's and Combe's theories of
life and the mind was perceived to be atheistic in its tendency. For this reason, it is a
fact too easily missed that the scientific materialism in this period actually had its
intellectual parentage in Newton's mechanical philosophy, which was the lynch-pin
in forging the holy alliance between science and religion in the eighteenth century.
The dualism fundamental to the system of the mechanical philosophy devised in the
seventeenth century, by Descartes and others, seemed to be compatible with the
dualism at the heart of orthodox Christian beliefs. However, neither in science nor in
religion was the dualism of body and soul an easy distinction to draw. The Platonic
dualism of the early Church was tempered by Aristotelianism from the thirteenth
century, and the soul was seen as the substantial form of the body. Since according
to Aristotle, form was inseparable from matter, Thomas Aquinas and others laboured
to harmonise Aristotelian philosophy to make it compatible with religious doctrines.
But given the Thomistic belief in the soul as the substantial form of the body,
difficulties manifested themselves in attempts to understand the mind. It seemed
clear that animals shared many of the features of the human mind: memory,
appetites, the ability to process sensory information, and even volition. If these were
attributes of animals, what aspects of the human mental life were the unique results
of the immortal soul? Considerations like this resulted in long-standing debates
among theologians and natural philosophers. The advent of Cartesian dualism
accentuated the mind-matter issues. By drawing a categorical distinction between
res extensa and res cogitans, Descartes equated the soul with thinking, and so with
the mind. In effect, this brought matters to a crisis by bringing to the fore the
Chapter 8 Conclusion 250
diminishing role of the immaterial soul, a process which had started ever since
Aquinas tried to integrate Aristotelianism with Christianity. Cartesian dualism, by
nature of the extreme distinction between body and mind, rendered it possible to
ignore the immaterial soul, and to concentrate on mechanistic materialism as a way
to explain all living phenomena, including mental phenomena - this was exactly the
stance taken by the French materialists like La Mettrie, Diderot and d'Holbach. If the
real dualistic distinction was not between bodies and souls but between bodies and
minds, then it was easy to dismiss the concept of soul. But if animals could be shown
to have minds too, then it was equally easy to reject any basis for morality—animals
were not moral creatures. Lawrence and Combe, in their way of theorising about life
and mind, were perceived as adopting the scientific materialism which had its
parentage in the atheistic interpretations of Cartesianism of the generation of French
philosophers after Descartes.
As a reaction against the extreme form of materialism, towards the late
eighteenth century, especially in England, there was a revival of vitalist philosophy
to deal with life. In Theodore Brown's article mapping out the transition from
mechanism to vitalism in English physiology, John Hunter is hailed as the one 'who
completed the dismantling of the Royal Society's mechanistic physiology'.2 In his
methodology, Hunter's experiments 'consisted in the collection of multiple instances
of the living body's unique and complicated behaviour', instead of the mechanistic
approach of 'concentrating on potentially reducible aspects of the "oeconomy"'.3
Robert Schofield in Mechanism and Materialism summarises Hunter's achievement
as 'through the influence of his teaching and writing', Hunter 'passed to the next
century, cloaked in the infinite respectability of his persistent empiricism, a heritage
of vitalism'.4 In contrast to the 'materialistic explanation in which none of the
essential causes of phenomena inhere in matter as such, but rather result from the
geometry of size and shape and the dynamics of force', Hunter invoked the 'living
principle to explain nearly all animal and vegetable physiological phenomena - of
growth, heating, cooling, healing, resistance to putrefaction, digestion', and so on.5
2 Theodore Brown, 'From Mechanism to Vitalism in Eighteenth-Century English Physiology',
Journal ofHistory ofBiology,! (1974): 179-216, 181.
3 Ibid., 182.
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In his methodology, Hunter was meticulously empirical, but in his theorising, he
adopted an approach which was antithetical to the mechanistic philosophy.6
If vitalism was Hunter's reaction against the mechanistic explanations of the
phenomena of life, his philosophical position was probably more closely aligned
with Kantian idealism than has been hitherto ascribed. In its Christianized form,
idealism re-emerged in the Renaissance as an alternative to the Aristotelian
philosophy of Scholasticism, and during the seventeenth-century, as the
philosophical position against the materialistic aspects of the mechanical philosophy.
However, seventeenth-century idealism receded against the dominance assumed by
the mechanical philosophy, with its foundation in empiricism and materialism, as the
successful metaphysical basis for science. Immanuel Kant's (1724 -1804) Critique
of Pure Reason (1781) was the first major idealist challenge to the philosophical
basis of Newtonian science. Kant's transcendental idealism, when applied to
science, meant that sense experience alone was not a sufficient basis of knowledge of
the external world, and that knowledge depended on the organinzing and interpreting
functions of the mind. Scientific explanations need not depend exclusively on
materialism or atomistic causes; spiritual or nonatomical causes were as acceptable
as material ones.7 For Hunter the 'idealist', the vital principle was a genuinely
tenable explanation, but for Lawrence, the 'vital principle' was dismissed as a 'God-
of-the-gaps' answer when science reached its frontier of knowledge. What was
being illustrated by the Lawrence controversy, and to a certain extent, by the
Edinburgh phrenological debate, was that the materialism inherent in the mechanical
philosophy, when applied to biology, was unable to sustain the alliance between
science and religion as it had done so successfully under Newtonian physics. That
'materialism and atheism go hand in hand' was itself not a foregone conclusion.
While the maxim appeared to apply to the French materialists, who applied the
mechanical philosophy in its logical extreme to biology, materialism as an inherent
component in the mechanical philosophy had been made to serve religion, to point to
a sentient Creator. It was 'mechanical materialism' that was embodied in Newton's
Principa, and it was Newtonian physics that had enshrined the tradition of natural
theology. What has been highlighted by the episodes studied was that when the
6 See for instance the numerous experimental results recorded in John Hunter, On the Animal
Oeconomy (Philadelphia, 1840).
7
Philip F. Rehbook, The Philosophical Naturalists, Themes in Early Nineteenth-Century British
Biology (Wisconsin, 1983), 15 -19.
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mechanical philosophy was applied to biology, it profoundly touched on the issues
concerning Man's place in Nature. As Whitehead has remarked, the fundamental
duality involved in the mechanical philosophy, of matter and mind, and in between
matter and mind 'lie the concept of life, organism, functions, instantaneous reality,
interaction, order of nature, which collectively form the Achilles heel of the whole
system'.8 The mechanical philosophy, when applied to the physical universe, had
been an ally to religion, but when the philosophy was progressively applied to the
study of life and the mind, it became a foe to religion.
When Leslie Stephen discoursed on materialism in 1886, he emphasised that
'materialism, in the first place, represents the necessary and proper attitude of the
man of science, that is, of physical science.' Speaking of materialism as a
philosophical or metaphysical doctrine 'that matter is the sole ultimate reality' - that
'there is nothing which is not material', and the opposite doctrine, that 'mind is the
sole ultimate reality' - that 'nothing exists except mind variously modified', Stephen
related 'the conclusion':
to which modern speculation is gravitating is, I think, in some form or
other, that the antithesis does not really represent a contradiction, but
rather two methods of combining experience, each perfectly legitimate
in its own sphere, and leading to apparent contradiction, when, and
only when, there is a misunderstanding as to the true limits of possible
knowledge.10
To put it more strongly, it is not that materialism is intrinsically anti-religion, but it is
when materialism is applied to the exclusion of the opposite doctrine. Frankenstein
personified this 'misunderstanding as to the true limits of possible knowledge', and
the timeless iconic status Frankenstein has attained is perhaps pointing to our tacit
recognition of the verity of Stephen's diagnosis, and the danger that such a
misunderstanding of true limits of possible knowledge might bring.
8 Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (Cambridge, 1926), 80-1.
9 Leslie Stephen, What is Materialism? A Discourse delivered in South Place Chapel, Finsbury, EC.
on Sunday Morning, March 21s' 1886. A 16-page pamphlet published by South Place Religious
Society, Finsbury, E.C. (No. 9 issue), 2.
10
Ibid., 2.
Chapter 8 Conclusion 253
III
The central thesis of this study has been to argue that in the first half of the
nineteenth century, the ultimate concern in the science and religion debates was a
secure basis for morality. Was this ultimate concern peculiar to the issues related to
the study of life and the mind? Did it prevail into controversies revolving round
evolutionary theories? In assessing how the issues raised by the study of life and the
mind anticipated the Darwinian controversy, it is interesting to begin by relating two
comments on the period. The first one is from Charles Raven in his Edinburgh
Gifford Lectures (1951-2), where he named the greatest challenge to religion in early
nineteenth-century Britain as:
The development of a mechanistic philosophy involving the restriction
of the field of science to the categories of weight and measurement
and the extension of it to include the organic and the human, was
obviously the most serious challenge to religion.11
In that respect, Raven was agreeing with Whitehead in naming the stresses on the
relationship in science and religion as caused by applying the mechanistic philosophy
to the study of the organic and the human. 'Yet the actual course was very different
from what might have been expected', Raven concluded, and described the century's
domination by the question of species sparked off by Darwin's evolutionary theory.
The second comment comes from Pietro Corsi in his study on Baden Powell. Here,
Corsi has similarly noted that in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the
greatest challenge to religion in Britain was physiology, not geology. Corsi remarks
that it is surprising that physiology should be allowed to develop without being
caught up in any major science-religion controversies like geology or evolution for
12the rest of the century. The observations of Raven and Corsi are undoubtedly
accurate, but neither of them attempted to provide any explanation as to why
physiology was supplanted by evolutionary theory as the most serious challenge to
religion.
It is the contention of this thesis that at the back of the debates concerning the
nature of life and the mind in the pre-Darwinian period there always loomed the
pressing politico-religious concern with the civic behaviour of the masses, and
11 Charles Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1953), I: 170.
12 Pietro Corsi, Science and Religion, Baden Powell and the Anglican Debate, 1800-1860 (Cambridge,
1988), 49-60.
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therefore a concern with the foundations of morality. When materialistic views of
life and the mind were criticised by orthodox thinkers, it was the implications for a
secure basis for morality that were behind their criticisms. One possible explanation
is that the ultimate concern for a secure basis of morality still prevailed in the post-
Darwinian period; the only difference was that the concern was transferred from the
study of life and the mind on to the implications of the evolutionary theory. Two
pertinent 'religious' responses, from Adam Sedgwick and Samuel Wilberforce,
towards the implications of evolution would appear to support this argument.
The first one came from the Reverend Adam Sedgwick in his apoplectic
reaction against the Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, the book which
brought 'an evolutionary vision of the universe into the heart of everyday life' in
early Victorian society.13 In a letter to Charles Lyell, Sedgwick related that when he
'read some pages of the foul book', it filled him 'with such expressible disgust' that
he threw it down. Speaking of the anonymous author of Vestiges, Sedgwick
continued to Lyell:
And what shall we say to his morality and his conscience, when he
tells us he has 'destroyed all distinction between moral and physical';
when he makes sin a mere organic misfortune? ... If the book be true,
the labours of sober induction are in vain; religion is a lie; human law
is a mass of folly, and a base injustice; morality is moonshine; ... and
man and woman are only better beasts!14
The following passage in Vestiges was probably where Sedgwick's quote in the letter
had come from:
It is hardly necessary to say, much less to argue, that mental action,
being proved to be under law, passes at once into the category of
natural things. Its old metaphysical character vanishes in a moment,
and the distinction usually taken between physical and moral is
annulled.15
Sedgwick was so incensed by passages such as this that he told Lyell he 'could have
crushed the book by proving it base, vulgar in spirit ... false, shallow, worthless' -
and he did, first in a scathing review of eighty-five pages in Edinburgh Review in
13 James Secord, Victorian Sensation (Chicago, 2000), xviii.
14 John W. Clark and Thomas McK. Hughes, The Life and Letters of the Reverend Adam Sedgwick, 2
vols. (Cambridge, 1890), II: 83-84.
15
[Rober Chambers], Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, 2nd edn. (London, 1844), 333-4.
This crucial passage was modified in later editions; see 12th edn. (London, 1884), 373 and lxvii; as
quoted in Robert Young, 'The Impact of Darwin on Conventional Thought', in Anthony Symondson
(ed.), The Victorian Crisis ofFaith (London, 1970), 13-35, note No. 9, 32.
Chapter 8 Conclusion 255
1845,16 and then, in a preface of 450 pages, with an appendix of a further 150 pages,
to a new edition of the pamphlet on the Studies of the University of Cambridge (itself
usually only about 100 pages long). Like Rennell, Sedgwick was ordained by the
Anglican Church; his campaign against Vestiges was reminiscent of Rennell's
against Lawrence. However, Sedgwick's response had to be understood as coming
from a renowned geologist who also had an enlightened view of the Bible. Professor
of Geology at Cambridge, and at various times, President of the Geological Society,
a Fellow of the Royal Society, President of the British Association in 1833 and its
Geological Section many times, Sedgwick had argued against those, like William
Buckland, who attempted to use geological evidence to support a fairly literal
reading of Genesis on the Deluge.
That Sedgwick should have responded with such vehemence to the notions
contained in Vestiges that 'destroyed all distinction between moral and physical' was
an indication of the strength of that ultimate concern concerning the basis of
morality. Although the quotation from the Vestiges above, which sparked off
Sedgwick's tirade in his letter to Lyell, referred to Combe's theory of the mind,
Sedgwick's subsequent critiques showed an increasing concern with evolution as the
threat to morality, rather than any specific theories of physiology or psychology.
Published in 1844, it was not until 1884 that the author of Vestiges was made public.
There had been widespread speculation that George Combe was its author precisely
because one of the tenets in this new evolutionary theory was that 'phrenology
showed that the principle of the uniformity of nature should extend to man and to his
17
mind and brain'. Nevertheless, it was Chambers' evolutionary theory taken as a
whole, with its attempt to apply the concept of uniform natural laws to the history of
life as Lyell had done for the history of the earth, which was to dominate the future
debates. Evolutionary theory was seen as effecting a kind of levelling between
humankind and other life forms. It was this levelling which incensed Sedgwick to
the core of his being because such levelling of man with other life forms removed the
distinction of human beings as above the brutes, and threatened the basis of human
morality. We can see the same concern for moral foundations in Charles Lyell's own
response to evolutionary theory when he first heard that his friend Charles Darwin
was espousing it. In a remarkable entry in his private journal in 1858, Lyell wrote:
16 Adam Sedgwick, 'Natural History of Creation', Edinburgh Review, 82 (1845): 1-85.
17 Robert Young, op. cit., 16.
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If the geologist dwelling exclusively on one class of facts, which
might be paralleled by the existing creation [arrives] at conclusions
derogating from the elevated position previously assigned by him to
Man, if he blends him [man] inseparably with the inferior animals &
considers him as belonging to the earth solely, & as doomed to pass
away like them & have no farther any relation to the living world, he
may feel dissatisfied with his labours & doubt whether he would not
have been happier had he never entered upon them & whether he
ought to impart the result to others.18
Lyell's feeling that it might be better not to propagate such ideas to the public surely
reflects a fear that such ideas would be socially and politically subversive.
When Darwin's The Origin was published in 1859, it was Bishop Samuel
Wilberforce who adopted the same role as Rennell did against Lawrence, or
Sedgwick against Chambers. Wilberforce's review of The Origin in the Quarterly
Review highlighted his concern for Darwin's evolutionary theory stemmed from a
concern for a secure basis ofmorality:
Such a notion is absolutely incompatible not only with single
expressions in the word of God on that subject of natural science with
which it is not immediately concerned, but, which in our judgment is
of far more importance, with the whole representation of that moral
and spiritual condition of man which is its proper subject-matter.
Man's derived supremacy over the earth; man's power of articulate
speech; man's gift of reason; man's free will and responsibility; man's
fall and man's redemption; the incarnation of the Eternal Son; the
indwelling of the Eternal Spirit, — all are equally and utterly
irreconcilable with the degrading notion of the brute origin of him
who was created in the image of God, and redeemed by the Eternal
Son assuming to himself his nature.19
Darwin's The Origin, instead of taking the course of the science and religion debate
in the first half of the nineteenth century into a different direction, was a continuation
of the debate on the interpretation or re-interpretation of man's place in nature. This
reinterpretation centred on the issues concerning the origin of life and the nature of
the mind in the first half of the nineteenth century and was transferred on to the
question of the origin of species. It is in appreciating the impact of Darwin's The
Origin on conventional thought that the question of species can be fairly appreciated
as involving the ultimate concern for a secure basis of morality, in the same way as
18 L. G. Wilson (ed.), Sir Charles Lyell's Scientific Journals on the Species Question (New Haven,
1970), 196; quoted in Michael Bartholomew, 'Lyell and Evolution: An Account of Lyell's Response
to the Prospect of an Evolutionary Ancestry for Man', British Journal for the History of Science, 6
(1972): 261-303,293.
19 Samuel Wilberforce, 'Darwin's The Origin ofSpecies', Quarterly Review, 108 (1860): 225-64, 258.
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the debates on life and the mind in the antecedent period. The perceptive comments
of Young in this regard serve as an incisive commentary on the relationship between
Darwin's The Origin and the debates studied in this thesis. Referring to the
contemporary objections to The Origin, Young affirms that 'the objections made
sense' given that:
The separation of mind and free will from the course of material
nature lies at the bottom of our traditional idea of responsibility and of
the spiritual aspect of man. ... The extraordinary interest in evolution
thus arose naturally from the union, which the theory implied between
man's spiritual nature and his body, particularly his nervous system ...
that the exclusion of all non-material causes from nature did not
merely eliminate miracles from Genesis. It threatened the status of
mind and will and the hope for a moral meaning to life outside of life
itself.20
In offering an explanation to the comments by Raven and Corsi, this thesis
argues that the course of debate between science and religion in nineteenth-century
Britain had always been dominated by this ultimate concern for a secure basis for
morality. Young has emphasised that the 'the idea of opposing theology could not
have been further from the minds of the main evolutionists', and that 'their aim was
to reconcile nature, God, and man', and one could safely presume, in order to uphold
the existing basis for morality. However, the efforts of the evolutionists were
strained because there is a more fundamental conflict 'centring on the relationship of
the mind and the brain, and that science cannot sanction a metaphysic which allows
21
any forces or events which transcend the continuity of nature or natural laws'.
'Yet the actual course was very different from what might have been expected' -
Raven's remark on the course of science and religion debate being 'hijacked' by The
Origin, has to be put in the context that the difference was not one of ultimate
concern, but of subject matter.
If the ultimate concern had remained the same, why was there a change in
subject matter after Darwin's The Origin. A plausible explanation is to borrow
Thomas Kuhn's analysis on scientific progress. According to Kuhn, scientists spend
most of their time engaging in 'normal science' - solving well-defined 'puzzles'
within an accepted framework of concepts and methodologies, a 'paradigm'.
Periodically, a 'scientific revolution' is precipitated by an unacceptable accumulation
20 Robert M. Young, op. cit., 20-1.
21
Ibid., 21.
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of unsolved puzzles within 'normal science': these puzzles could only be solved
22within a new paradigm. Evolutionary thought had been around for almost a
century before Darwin's The Origin. Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, was
amongst the first to express such a concept in his epic poem on nature entitled
Zoonomia (1794). Unlike his predecessors, Darwin's The Origin was a treatise that
effected a 'scientific revolution' - it afforded a new way of understanding species
mutations and extinction by the mechanism of natural selection. In affording this
insight, Darwin was a quintessential example of Kantian idealism for
Naturphilosophie. Kant's follower Schelling had remarked that 'the world of
phenomena is a mind-ordered world and that knowledge of the mind's ordering
principles is not to be gained empirically but through intellectual intuition'.23 It was
Darwin's intellectual intuition which brought about a paradigm shift in
understanding the history of life. One plausible explanation why physiology was
allowed to develop without being caught up in any major science-religion
controversies like geology or evolution for the rest of the nineteenth century could be
that the physiology was engaging itself in puzzle-solving in Kuhnian terms. In other
words, science and religion debates happen on the paradigmatic level, not on the
puzzle-solving level. The theorising on the origin of life and the nature of the mind
were at the centre of the Lawrence and Combe controversies, and these were
questions on the level of finding a new paradigm. The issues of the origin of life and
the nature of the mind, fundamental as they were to the study of life, had also been
the concerns of theologians. However, as Lawrence pointed out, the vital principle
did not actually advance the understanding of the origin of life, and to ask how the
vital forces exert their agency was an ultimate question that took us to the boundaries
of knowledge.24 Lawrence's diagnosis would appear to be right, and physiology
spent the rest of the nineteenth century doing the puzzle-solving of 'normal science',
without drawing attention to itself. This was probably why physiology was not
caught up in any major science-religion controversies after those early decades in the
nineteenth century. As intellectual history, if the century after Darwin was driven by
the quest to understand the origin of species or the laws of heredity, the first half of
the nineteenth century was preoccupied with the nature of life and the mind. This
22 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago, 2nd edn., 1970).
23
Philip F. Rehbock, op. cit., 17, summarising Schelling.
24 See discussion in chapter three, section ii, of this thesis.
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preoccupation was diverted by Darwin, but the unresolved issues related to the nature
of Life and human consciousness have become uppermost again in our time.
IV
As a study of 'Life before Darwin', it may now be instructive to consider what light,
if any, this study throws upon the later period, after the appearance of Darwin's On
the The Origin of Species. In assessing the social and cultural implications of the
interface between science and religion in the period between 1815 and 1859, three
headings professionalization, authority and separatism serve as useful pointers for
examining the changes that directly impinged on the course of the Darwinian
controversy. R. G. Collingwood describes the scientific work of the nineteenth
century as 'largely devoted to establishing the autonomy of the biological sciences as
forming a separate realm, independent of physics or the sciences of matter on the one
hand and the science of mind on the other'.25 Collingwood's remark is a reflection of
the long-standing dominance of the mechanical philosophy which, with its
fundamental duality of matter and mind, demarcated knowledge into the realms of
physics and metaphysics. In 1837 when the Reverend William Whewell wrote his
treatise on History of the Inductive Sciences, this autonomy for the biological
sciences as a separate realm was evidently still in the process of being carved out.
Without this autonomy already in place, it was not surprising that Whewell related
the history of physiology and comparative anatomy in terms of other sciences:
... we conceive an organized body to be one in which the parts are
there for the sake of the whole, in a manner different from any
mechanical or chemical connexion; we conceive a function to be not
merely a process of change, but of change connected with the general
vital process.26
However, it was equally clear to Whewell that the study of life was 'in a
manner different from any mechanical or chemical connexion'. In fact, the period
under study witnessed not only the forging of autonomy for the biological sciences
from physics and metaphysics, it was also the period when the 'scientists' fought to
establish their independence as a professional class. That the forging of intellectual
25 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea ofNature (Oxford, 1945), 133.
26 William Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Times, 3 vols.
(London, 1837), III: 377.
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autonomy of biology and social independence of the scientists should go in tandem
might be more than a historical happenstance, and could be a correlation that
suggested some form of causation between the two movements. The etymology of
the term 'biology' and 'scientist' reflects their respective 'battles' for autonomy.
Lawrence introduced the term 'biology' into the English language from German in
1818, but 'comparative anatomy', 'physiology', and 'natural history', were preferred
for the best part of the nineteenth century. Similarly, the term 'scientist' (to denote
the practitioner of any form of natural science) was not in use until Whewell
invented it in 1834, and despite his effort to reassert its usefulness, it enjoyed little
currency until towards the end of the nineteenth century.27 As Charles Babbage
complained in 1851, 'Science in England is not a profession: its cultivators are
scarcely recognized even as a class. Our language itself contains no single term by
98
which their occupation can be expressed'.
The independence that the scientists tried to establish during this period had
two aspects. On the one hand, they were seeking to promote themselves as a distinct
professional class; and on the other, they were trying to break free from, what
Huxley called, 'the yoke of the clergy'. These two aspects were related, as it was the
case that the 'spokesmen for scientific professions desired the social and cultural
prestige and recognition that had been and to a large degree still was accorded the
clergy'.29 However, to free science from clerical control, the scientific community
had to become self-defining before they could act as a cohesive force in effecting
independence from clerics. For instance, the membership reforms of the Royal
Society in 1847 were steps towards such a self-definition by the scientists, and were
correlated with 'the process of clerical withdrawal from the world of science [which]
commenced in the third quarter of the century'.30 In the Lawrence episode, the
professionalization of the surgeons was the determining factor in shaping the
outcome, and the legality of Rennell offering a critique on Lawrence's science was
never in doubt. The Lawrence episode was an account of this process of
27 William Whewells, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 2 vols. (London, 1840), 1:113. 'We need
very much a name to describe a cultivator of science in general. I should incline to call him a
scientist'. First coined the word 'scientist' in 1834, and reasserted its usefulness in his book in 1840.
28 Charles Babbage, The Exposition of 1851, or Views of the Industry, the Science, and the
Government ofEngland (London, 1851), 189.
29 Frank Turner, Contesting Cultural Authority, Essays in Victorian Intellectual Life (Cambridge,
1993), 170.
30
Ibid., 186, and Table 1, 187.
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professionalization of the scientists in its early stages. To elevate the surgeons to a
professional class was a governing principle for Abernethy. Hunter was eulogised
because he had elevated surgery from being a manual occupation to being a
gentleman profession. Hunter's anatomical collections epitomised the image of
surgery as a science, to be studied by the mind, and helped to cast off for good its
age-old image as a trade, to be practised by the hand of the barber-surgeons. The
Hunterian 'vital principle' was espoused because it could be made to dovetail with
the religious doctrine of the soul, thereby reinforced the religious basis of morality,
and conferred social respectability to its class of proponents. Safeguarding and
cultivating this new and fragile professional image of the surgeons was uppermost in
the institutional politics of the Royal College of Surgeons and the network of hospital
governors when they decided the action to be taken against Lawrence's lectures.
Indeed, even for Lawrence, it was the stake on his professional career that
determined his personal response to retract. In this respect, Lawrence anticipated
Charles Lyell, who also curbed the expression of his opinions for fear of offending
both clerical and scientific colleagues.
The Reverend Rennell, in penning his critique, was a typical example of the
gentleman-parson who took a keen interest in the study of nature, and the parson-
naturalists were a norm for the practice of science in the pre-Darwinian period.
Adam Sedgwick, William Whewell, Thomas Chalmers, and even Charles Darwin in
his early career, were fine examples of this tradition. June Goodfield-Toulmin
comments on Rennell's critique as 'invading a physiological issue with theological
arguments'.31 However, the concept of clerical invasion simply did not apply in the
pre-Darwinian period. In the first instance, the contemplation of nature for
edification was within the remit of those ordained for ministry, and was part of the
tradition of natural theology. This tradition was not only adopted by the clerics, but
by the 'scientists' alike. Frank Turner remarks on the fact that in the pre-Darwinian
period, 'many scientists considered the moral and metaphysical imperatives of
natural theology as a proper and integral part of their vocation and not as an intrusion
^9
of extraneous categories imposed by outside institutions'. However, Turner also
notes that 'by the second quarter of the nineteenth century substantial developments
31 June Goodfield-Toulmin, 'Some Aspects of English Physiology: 1780-1840', Journal ofHistory of
Biology, 2 (1969): 283-320, 316.
32 Frank Turner, op. cit., 178.
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in geology, physics, biology, physiology, psychology, and the philosophy of science
challenged or cast into doubt theological assumptions and portions of the Bible'. It
was in those years that 'both Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin complained about the
hindrance to scientific advance raised by metaphysics and theology'. In 1818,
Lawrence had made a similar complaint publicly in his lecture:
I say, physiologically speaking; and beg you to attend particularly to
this qualification: because the theological doctrine of the soul, and its
separate existence, has nothing to do with this physiological question,
but rests on a species of proof altogether different. ... An immaterial
and spiritual being could not have been discovered amid the blood and
flith of the dissecting room.34
Lawrence's response anticipated the complaint that was to intensify and become
more wide-spread in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. It was, however,
far from the vituperative outburst of Huxley in defending Darwin's The Origin:
'Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every science as the strangled
snakes beside that of Hercules.'35
Remarking on this process of professionalization, A. W. Benn named its
result as 'a transfer of authority from religious to naturalistic belief'. It is arguable
whether the process of professionalization could have been effected without the
corresponding transfer of authority. Frank Turner states it more strongly, and
attributes 'the Victorian conflict between religious and scientific spokesmen' to 'this
shift of authority and prestige' from the clerics to the scientists. It was not just
authority that had been transferred, but that it 'represented the exchange of one form
of faith for another'. Turner suggests that this 'movement from religion to science in
Western culture', had also 'meant the transfer of cultural and intellectual leadership
and prestige from the exponents of one faith to those of another'.38 The study of
Combe's deployment of phrenology illustrates this subtle transfer of authority taking
place, and how Combe used phrenology to devise an alternative faith based on
science to replace traditional religion. The phenomenal sales of The Constitution of
Man had facilitated such transfer of authority, and the fact that The Constitution was
33 Ibid., 173.
34 William Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology and Natural History ofMan, delivered at the
Royal College ofSurgeons in 1818 (London, 1819), 7.
35 T. H. Huxley, Collected Essays, II: 52; as quoted in Turner, op. cit., 174.
36 A.W. Benn, A History ofEnglish Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1906), 198.
37
Turner, op. cit., 175.
38
Ibid., 170.
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found in households alongside the Bible (and Pilgrim Progress) when no other books
were to be found was symbolic of this rivalry from the new faith.
John van Wyhe in his recent study of phrenology questions the general
characterization of phrenology as a reform science. He argues that the more constant
elements of phrenology throughout its existence, was 'the power it gave to its
practitioners to speak authoritatively on all things human'.39 Gall, the founder of
organology, and the first to study mental functions empirically, emphasised that
Nature - 'was his sole authority', and that it was 'the greater epistemological power
of his natural knowledge' which conferred 'certainty where metaphysics produced
only confusion'.40 Spurzheim, Gall's assistant, took organology into the realm of
human nature, and formulated the system of phrenology. According to Spurzheim,
human nature was still largely a mystery partly because 'man was generally treated
as being distinct from the rest of Nature, which is false.'41 Spurzheim promised
certainty even for the realm of human nature, and it was on attending one of
Spurzheim's lectures that Combe became a convert. For Combe, the epistemological
certainty conveyed by phrenology was the essence of its authority, and it was this
certainty that won him over to the cause of phrenology where salvation could be
more definite than under the scheme of predestination. In devising a religion from
the system of phrenology, Combe was trying to confer a new authority with its final
appeal to the inflexible laws of nature. In gaining followers through propagating this
new religion through his various phrenological treatises, Combe further undermined
the authority of the established churches, in a period when disestablishment was also
a political issue. The appeal to the authority of nature as the ultimate arbitrator in
Combe's new religion was to facilitate the process of substituting nature for God
eventually, and in turn, paved the way for the humanist religion of Mary Shelley's
kind to take root, where the authority resides in the intrinsic belief of the spiritual
essence in humankind.
In discussing the impact of Darwin on conventional thought, Robert Young
argues that 'the period from about 1820 to 1875 was one in which science made it
39 John van Wyhe, 'Was Phrenology a Reform Science? Towards a New Generalization for
Phrenology', History ofScience, 62 (2004): 313-331, 313.
40 F.J.Gail to R. Meier, 3 March 1806, translated and reprinted in 'Correspondence of Dr. Gall',
Phrenological Journal, 19 (1846), 36-42, 40; quoted in Wyhe, op. cit., 320.
41 J.G. Spurzheim, The Physiognomical System ofDrs. Gall and Spurzheim (London, 1815), 8; quoted
in Wyhe, op. cit., 321.
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clear to enlightened theological opinion that a third interpretation of the relationship
between science and theology was necessary'.42 Perhaps in the view of the strategy
of the professionalizing scientists to argue for the incompatibility of scientific and
religious thinking, Baden Powell, Charles Kingsley, Leslie Stephen were amongst
those who seemed to decide that the best way to preserve religious authority was to
demarcate its territory as separate from that of science. Since scientific authority
could no longer be relied upon to support religion, the authority of science must be
held to be relevant only to knowledge of the natural world. This left religion free to
stake a claim for supreme authority over moral issues, as Baden Powell suggested:
Scientific and revealed truth are of essentially different natures, and if
we attempt to combine or unite them, we are attempting to unite
things of a kind which cannot be consolidated, and shall infallibly
injure both ... In physical science, we must keep strictly to physical
induction and demonstration; in religious enquiry, to moral proof, but,
never confound the two together.43
In the pre-Darwinian period, however, this separatist approach seems to have been
inconceivable, or at least, it was not conceived. Scientific theories had clear
implications for ideas about the basis of morality and science could not, therefore, be
separated from religion. It is a sign of the strength of this view that even the
materialist thinkers accepted it, and tried, accordingly, to develop alternative
accounts of the basis for morality, which were consistent with their materialism.
Before the separatist approach was devised as a way forward for science and religion
to relate, even materialist thinkers felt the need to claim that their approach did not
undermine morals. They could only do so, however, by recourse to the
Enlightenment tradition of a rational morality. As we have seen, in the pre-
Darwinian period this approach met resistance from more orthodox religious
believers who clung to the view that morality needed religious sanction. Once again,
we can see the importance of authority in these debates. When upholders of more
orthodox religious views decided to separate religious from scientific authority, in
the period after Darwin, they did so by seizing upon moral values as the site of their
authority. This was tantamount to saying that rationally based moralities cannot
suffice. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to pursue these later developments, but it
is by no means clear that religion won the day. The Victorian period was the first
age of mass atheism and it would seem that for most Victorians the foundations of
42 Robert Young, op. cit., 22.
43 Corsi, op. cit., 189.
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morality were to be found in rational, not religious, thought. It seems impossible to
deny that the writings of Lawrence, and especially of Combe, and Mary Shelley's
Frankenstein, contributed to this secular approach to morality.
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